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La State and the Family: the Politics of Child
Custody is an examination of the development of law
and legal practices in relation to mothers and the
legal custody of children. 	 It maps the history of
statute law and re-reads legal practice focusing
upon the way in which these practices reproduce and
sustain the conditions of motherhood.
The first section documents the construction of
the infant as a legal subject and the emergence of
mothers legal rights in relation to children under the
nineteenth century Guardianship Acts. 	 The second
section examines debates regarding the role of the
state in the area of children and divorce following
the Second World War. 	 This section also examines
the influence of ideologies of welfare upon the legal
treatment of different categories of children during
this period.	 In addition, this section also analyses
the limited role which the law plays in the majority
of decisions concerning custody of children following
divorce.	 The third section documents and analyses
women's experiences of contesting custody of their
children through an empirical study of a sample of
lesbian mothers. 	 The focus is upon both the courts
and legal processes involving lawyers and divorce
court welfare officers.
	
This section reveals the
influences of notions of good mothering and perceptions
of female sexuality upon those legal processes.
The final section is concerned with contemporary
debates in the 1980s regarding the role of the state
generally in the area of children and divorce and
particularly, discussions of the role of law in con-
structing children's relationships with fathers.
This section addresses the issues of 'joint custody'
of children and conciliation schemes through a
discussion of the implications of these practices in
America.	 This section concludes with a discussion
of the general trend away from 'law' and legal rules
in this area, towards 'private ordering' in concilia-
tions.	 Finally, it sets out the implications of
that trend for feminist discussions of future policy
in the area of children and divorce in Britain.
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This thesis is the result of research into the issue
of child custody in Britain. 	 It looks at campaigns to
achieve legislation, legislation itself, court practices
and legal procedure and finall womens' experiences of law
and legal procedure in Britain in the 1980s.
The first part of the thesis is conceited with the
absolute powers of fathers in the nineteenth century
patriarchal family, and legal intervention.
	
My concern was to
to examine traditional explanations of the development of
law in relation to the guardianship and custody of children.
I argue that developments in this area of law cannot adequately
be described simply in terms of the demise of 'father right'
and the emergence of 'mother right'. 	 Rather, I document the
emergence of a third party - the State - in the management of
the patriarchal family.	 I demonstrate how legal intervention
was always tempered by a desire to preserve the family. 	 Thus
a concern for the custody and maintenance of children was
mediated through a desire that 'any new law and legal practices
should not appear to undermine the institution of the family1
by making separation and divorce a viable alternative for
mothers, except in the most extreme of circumstances.
I discuss the emergence of the infant as a legal
subject and the shift in the ideology of the family which that
focus brought about, particularly in relation to the recon-
struction of the role of mothers. However, in examining the
focus upon children,(and subsequently on mothers) over the turn
of the century, I argue that, whilst 'motherhood' was indeed
elevated in certain social practices, this did not necessarily
lead to a simple re-evaluation of power within the patriarchal
family (Donzelot 1980).	 Whilst nineteenth century campaigns
demonstrated gross failures in the system of privilege and
rights which the law attached to men, state intervention to
pro t e c t/
women and children focused upon sustaining the family
rather than undermining it. Thus the new rights which
mothers did acquire under the Guardianship Acts in relation
to children, were only operable on the breakdown of marriage.
It was at the point of breakdown that welfarist discourses
provided the dual mechanism through which childhood and hence
motherhood become constituted in family law.
In the second part of this thesis I focus on law and
legal procedure in the post war years in relation to
different categories of children - the orphan, the deserted
and the illegitimate child. Here I examine the influence
of ideologies of both welfare and motherhood particularly
in relation to new procedures to deal with children and
divorce. I analyse the tensions between two approaches to
the role of the state in dealing with this issue. One
approach, located in the Denning Report (1947) argued for
increased power for the courts to investigate and report
on the circumstances of all children whose parents divorce.
The other approach, located in the Report of the Royal
Commission (1956), argued that the aim of the state in the
post war reconstruction must be to support and encourage
the reformation of the pre war family form. The role of
family law therefore must be in stemming the tide of
divorce and adopting legal procedures which would induce,
not replace, parental responsibility.
In addition during this period I argue that the courts'
assessment of women's claims to children was mediated
through a consideration of their behaviour as wives. In
contrast to contemporary explanations of court practices
in this area in the post war years (for example, Maidment
1984a; Graveson & Crane 1957) I argue that the courts
continued to sanction the sexual misbehaviour of women
through the loss of custody of children. Thus children
continued to be awarded on the basis of guilt established
in divorce proceedings.
Through an examination of court practices and research on
child custody in the 1960s and 1970s, I take issue with
dominant explanations of developments in this field.
Those explanations have focused on 'maternal preference'
and notions of the privileged position of wives and mothers
within family law. In this section I document the tensions
in courts' approaches to who gets custody of children on
divorce and the factcr which influence fathers' chances
of being awarded custody of children. I am concerned to
demonstrate that new trends in legal practice and procedure
are not necessarily the result of a response to radical
transformation of responsibility for childcare within the
family. Indeed I argue that the debatwhich emerged in
the 1970s on this area of law, (through the fathers' rights
movement, new developments in child psychology, and criticisms
of the adversarial procedure) do not focus upon responsibility
for children within marriage. Moreover, in the 1970s as in
the 1950s, the 'law' played a very small part in deciding
the custody of the majority of children of divorcing parents.
In Part III, I move between the political and the
'personal'. Parts I and II have been concerned to demon-
strate the focus and priorities of law and legal practice
as mechanisms in the reproduction of motherhood. Part III
documents a further example of those processes but in addition,
it moves down into the 'personal' to examine women's experiences
of those practices and procedures. In this Part therefore
I examine the operation of the 'law in relation to the
issue of lesbian custody. I look at the significance
of children's residential status quo at the time of divorce
or separation and I examine the influence of notions of
'good' mothering and conceptions of female sexuality on
court practices.
My argument is that it is only within a framework
which locates the role of law in the reproduction of
power relations between parents that we can begin to
understand the legal treatment of lesbian mothers. Such
treatment is most accurately placed within an analysis of
the legal construction of motherhood. The legal experiences
of lesbian mothers documented in the third part of this
research reflect in an intensified and revealing form many
assumptions regarding the role of women as mothers in
society and demonstrate one institution (law) through
which those assumptions are reproduced and sustained.
Finally, I discuss developments in the area of child
custody and divorce in the 1980s in Britain, and the
implications for mothers.	 There are many modes of regulation
and control over the conditions of reproduction in society,
and I am concerned to demonstrate that although there has
indeed been a shift away from formal 'law' in this area
(and towards welfarist principles), this movement is not
negessesarily indicative of control 'moving back to the
people' and least of all women. Indeed, I demonstrate
that the trend towards various forms of conciliation in
this field of family law can be highly problematic for
mothers.	 I therefore conclude with a discussion on the
politics which inform the contemporary debate on 'joint
custody' in Britain, through an examination of such orders
in one State in America. 	 I argue that it is a crass
assumption to assume that because parents in Britain are
now formally (ie legally) equal guardians of their children
within marriage, that such a formal situation equates with
'co-parenting' in Britain generally.	 Indeed existing
research demonstrates that the notion of 'co-parenting'
does not describe dominant patterns of childcare in Britain.
Therefore, a presumption within legal practices and procedures
on divorce to enforce/encourage 'co-parenting' may in reality
be a presumption to continue a situation in which there are
unequal inputs into childcare, and unequal distributions
of power with regard to major decisions concerning children.
In such circumstances therefore, I have attempted to demonstrate
how certain contemporary legal practices and procedures can
continue, albeit in more subtle but nevertheless effective
ways, to sustain and reproduce both aspects of men's power
over women and the control of reproduction in its broadest
sense.	 It is because this process is mediated through a
welfarist discourse, that the intervention of feminists in
this field of social policy is both difficult and frequently
misunderstood.
Julia A Brophy
FEMINISM, SOCIOLOGY AND TIlE STUDY OF LA'
"if we conceive of feminism as more than a frivolous
label, if we conceive ci it as an ethics, a
methodology, a more complex way of thinking about, thus
more responsibly acting upon, the conditions of human
life, we neea' a self-knowledge which can only develop
through a steady, passionate attention to all female
experience. I cannot imagine a feminist evolution
leading to radical change in the private/political
realm of gender that is not rooted in the conviction
that all women's lives are important; that the lives of
men cannot be understood by burying the lives of women;
and that to make visible the full meaning of womens
experience, to reinterpret knowledge in terms of that
experience, is now the most important task of
thinking.'
[Adrienne Rich (1979) Lies, Secrets and
811 eric e]
The growth of feminist research as a field of
study in the last decade has influenced the disciplines
of sociology and, to a lesser extent, law.	 This
development raises rew questions for both disciplines
and challenges conventional approaches in both fields.
New questions are raised for research, • but in addition5
feminist analyses has required a re-examination and
interpretation of both social and legal 'facts' whether
historical or contemporary (O'Donnovan 1985; Oakley
1981; Smith 1973)	 This thesis is part of that
development and part of that challenge to conventional
thinking within the interdisciplinary study D+ the
sociology of law.
This approach however poses several problems
- ii -
because, despite respectable contributions to the
development of an interdiciplinary approach (eg: Hunt
(1976) The Sociological Movement in Law), the sociology
of law is hardly a well established area, indeed it
remains a relative newcomer to the academic curriculum.
Even so, this thesis is part of a critique of basic
conceptual isat ions of gender (or rather, the lack of
that consideration), within the sociology of law,
although it is in other ways, founded upon a critique
of legal positivism, which is a major part of the
sociology of law.
	
Therefore, this thesis runs the
risk of criticism, but more importantly
misunderstanding from a range of orthodox positions.
The legal positivist school may perceive it to be
insufficiently 'legal';
	 equally, positivist or
orthodox empiricists within sociology may find it
insufficiently sociological. It is therefore necessary
in this introduction to clearly outline my theoretical
position and my methodological approach.
	 In this way
it is hoped that the following chapters will be judged
on their own terms and for the contributions they make
to a critique of the tenets of orthodox schools o-f
thought in both these fields of study.
Qrftn.	 r.iQa
This research, like that of other feminists (eg
Earratt 1980) starts from the premise that women's
- iii -
oppression in society is a reality, arid that such
oppression is complex and takes many forms, both
institutional arid individual. 	 I am concerned with the
institution of 1 aw and two features, reproduction and
sexuality, which coritr i bute towards structuring women,' s
position in society. In attempting to understand and
analyse the position of women in society, writers have
focused on four key structures in womens lives:
production, reproduction, 	 sexuality arid the
socialisation of children (Mitchell 1971:101) These
separate structures form a very complex unity, arid
throughout history womens position in society has been
a result of different combinations in the four
elements. However, as Nava points out (1983:93) there
is rio necessary or automatic correspondence between
these structures, each has an autonomy, each can effect
women d iffererit ly.
Ih! EmiI
Marriage and the family have long been
identified as the only legitimate sight for
reproduction, the expression of -female sexuality arid
the rearing of children.	 However, 'the farni ly' is a
problematic term for feminists, it is imbred with many
emotional and psychological characteristics and is a
slippery phenomenon to examine. 	 Nevertheless, as
Barrett and McIntosh (1982:7) identify, it can be
-iv--
understood as a social and economic institution, which
is organised on the basis of a specific sexual division
of labour.	 In this sexual division of labour it is
assumed there is a primary breadwinner who is male and
whose main area of activity and self expression is in
the world of work, and a primary childbearer and
domestic worker who is female and whose main area of
activity and self expression lies within the family.
Although in part these are assumptions, research has
demonstrated that they are also a feature o-f the way in
which the family is organised in contemporary society,
whereby women (regardless of employment outside the
home) are primarily respDnsible for childcare arid
domestic work in the home (Oakely 1974; Edgel 1980;
Lewis	 O'Brien 1987).
Moreover, that sexual division of labour in the
home has far reaching consequences particularly for
women.	 To a large extent it also dictates the
different kinds of work which men and women do in the
labour market (see below - Motherhood). 	 Arid job
segregation between male and female workers in the
labour market leads to considerable differentials in
terms of wage levels, training and promotional
prospects and job security. For example, with regard
to different wage levels between men and women, despite
the equal pay and sex discrimination legislation of the
-v--
1970s, there is evidence that the wage gap is in fact
widening. Women's earning as a per-ceritage of riier's
have fallen from the 1977 figure of 75.5% to 73.8%
(Equal Opportunities Commission 1979) In addition,
those assumptions regarding the different sites 0-f
primary commitment as between men and women which
inform and underlie sexual divisions in the home and in
the labour market, also underscore arid dir-ect
principles determining state benefits and taxation -
(Bennett 1983; Land 1978; Wilson 1977) Arid, as Bennett
argues (1983:190) contrary to popular views that the
welfare state has lead to a reduction in the
traditional family, such services have in -fact
strengthened that division precisely because public law
has, since its inception by Beveridge, in the 1940's,
been equally based on the myth of the male breadwinner
and the dependent wife and children.
The concept of the family is riot there-for-c a
neutral term, it entails relationships of dominance and
dependency between men arid women and indeed between
adults and children. Neither is 'the family' a
trarishistorical or- traniscultural institution. 	 Yet it
is frequently presented in this way - as a powerful
symbolic feature of a nation's security and stability
which tranisgresses time, class and culture.	 For
individuals,	 it is often posed as the only haven in an
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otherwise heartless world (Lasch 19??); the one private
place offering a range of emotional and experiential
satisfactions unavailable from any other source in
society.	 In contrast to this over idealised a-
historical construction of the family however, feminist
have began to re-examine family life and have mounted
a major deconstruction of those conventional
de+initions	 Far from being a haven in an otherwise
heartless world, feminists have demonstrated that for
women 'the family' is in man)' ways anti-social (Barratt
and Mcintosh 1982) that it is both the site and the
source of women's economic exploitation arid emotional
and psychological destt-uction (Delphy 1976; Bernard
1976; de Beauvoir 1974; Gavron 1968). Research has
deriionstrated that the traditional model of the family -
the heterosexual couple, with husband as breadwinner
and wife as full-time homemaker - does not correspond
to the typical household unit in Britain (Segal
1983:11) .	 Indeed if one considers womens' working
lifespan as a whole and work which does riot appear in
official statistics (eg part time work, cleaning in
private houses, unregistered childmindirig, hidden work
in voluntary organisations, casual work in clothing
manufacturing industries), it is doubtful i-f it was
ever a completely accurate picture of 'family life' in
Britain (Br-istol Women's Study Group 1979:201) and it
is certainly not an accurate picture o-f families in the
-vii -
1980's.
In addition, both historical and contemporary
feminist research has addressed and been critical of
the way in which social formations are constructed
through the dichotomy of public and private domains.
Research has demonstrated that the home (the private
domain) can frequently be a violent and dangerous place
for women and children in which they can suffer sexual,
physical and emotional abuse at the hands of men (Cobbe
1878; Binruey et al 1981; Borkowski et al 1983; Dobash
Dobash 1979; Pahi 1985:23; McCann 1985; Nelson 1982;
Weir 1977; Rush 1980; Herman 1980). 	 As the National
Women's Aid Federation point out, twenty five percent
of all reported violent crime is wife assault.
However, a considerable degree of wife abuse goes
unreported. Women are reluctant to involve the police
and, as the above research demonstrates, wife assault
is the section of crime which the police are most
reluctant to become involved in. 	 That, reluctance as
researchers have demonstrated (eg Faragher 1985; McCann
1985; Maynard 1985) reflects the view of many people in
state agencies that a certain degree of wife abuse is
acceptable within 'the family'. Thus, the notion of
'privacy', usually invoked irs an effort to protect the
family from what is generally seen as the encroachment
of the modern state into its internal affairs, in
- viii -
effect, frequently serves to protect the actions of
violent men from outside interference at the expense of
protecting women and children within (F'ahl 1985).
Moreover, that very notion of 'privacy' can frequently
obscure the fact that within the 'private' sphere o-f
the family, wives and mothers suffer widespread
isolation, anxiety and depression (Chester 1972 Gavron
1968; Brown	 Harris 1978; Dally 1982:249; Parkers
Mau.ger 1974) .	 In examining the position of women in
relation to depression, Brown arid Harris demonstrate
that lack of an outside job actually lowers women's
resistance to depression. And it appears that even
among women whose social and economic position places
them in high risk groups, their social susceptibility
to depression is practically halved where such women
have a job outside the home. As Harris arid Brown
conclude, it may not be an interesting job as such
which protects women against depression, but rather,
that work outside the home provides more opportunities
to make other social contacts and thereby breaks down
the total isolation which wives and mothers frequently
experience in the home.
The family has also been located as the sight o-f
economic exploitation and appropriation o-f women's
unpaid labour by men (Delphy 1977).	 In the
contemporary period, primary responsibility -for rearing
-ix-
children makes women more susceptible to economic
exploitation because responsibility for young children
locates many mothers more firmly in the home, albeit on
a temporary full-time basis (see below motherhood).
Moreover, feminists working in the field of psychology
and psychological processes, have demonstrated that it
is within the nexus of the family that key
relationships of dominance and submission are learned.
It has been argued that it is within the family that
the acquisition of gender takes place, where children
acquire feminine arid masculine identities (Mitchell
1975; Chodorow 1978). As research demonstrates, it is
initially within the family that girls are reared to
'womanhood' and boys to 'manhood' and where girls learn
a treasury of platitudes, anxiety arid expectations
about their future role which are based upon a mixture
of tre.ditiori, myth and reality about their roles as
women in society (Chetwynd	 Hartnett 1978; Roberts
1975: i4/15 Davidoff 1973;51). Thus, the structure
and organisation of the family, in effect, reproduces
many of the material characteristics arid features
central to its ideological construction.
UQthLLLQQ.
Although of course women have always been
biologically equipped to produce children, the social
meaning of reprod uction, of conceiving, bearing arid
-x--
rearing children has varied enormously both
historically and culturally (Mead 1955; Davin 1978;
Badminter 1981). Nevertheless, motherhood does not
lend itself to a simple or straightforward analysis,
socially and experientially it is fraught with
complexities ambiguities arid contradictions.	 As
Saunders argu.es (1983;95), it is hard for women to
dismantle the positive qualities of motherhood from the
web of social political and economic factors which
surround arid inform it.	 For many womer motherhood can
provide the sole meaning of their lives, it can be the
one area in which they experience fulf i lmerit and indeed
sonie personal power and control not found elsewhere in
their lives (de Beavouir 1974;501). But equally that
sense of personal power and control is, as Daily
demonstrates (1982;143) somewhat falsified.	 It
diminishes quickly, as infants grow and their demands
irucrease in intensity and variety, and, as they
'separate' emotionally from their mothers. so the
momentary 'power' of motherhood correspond i rugly
decreases. Moreover, although motherhood is publicly
revered on many fronts in society, it is in practice,
low status work, and is not recognised as a formal job
by either the left or right in British politics
(Goodison 1980;39).
-xi-
A major contribution of feminist writers
particularly in the post war period therefore, has been
to re-address the issue of motherhood on a number of
different levels.
	
Research has demonstrated that in
fact there is an enormous gap between the dominant
ideologies o-F motherhood in society and women's lived
experiences of motherhood.	 In addition, writers have
also focused on motherhood as an important feature in
political and theoretical discussions concerning the
relationship between sexual and class divisions in
contemporary capitalist society. 	 This is
conceptual ised in the controversial patriarchy debate
end the patriarchy/capitalist debates (Barrett 1980;
Beechey 1979; Rowbotham 1979; Cousins 1978; McDoriough &
Harrison 1978; Burton 1985). 	 The central questions in
that latter debate focus upon which particular
structure is the dominant or determining structure so
far as women' s oppression is concer ned. However, in
seeking to answer some of those complex questions
certain feminists are setting aside those major
theoretical arid sometimes insoluble questions, and are
increa.singly turning to the investigation of concrete
issues in women's lives as a way of re-addressing those
major theoretical and political questions (Graham 1982;
Oakley 1974; Macintyre 1976). Thus, it is increasingly
work which focuses on the specific ideological and
material structures which sustain women's oppression in
-xii -
p2.rticular social -formations which is bridging the
theoretical and analytical gap between different
structures of oppression in society and women's lived
experiences.
In that investigation into women's exper-iences mu
society, reproduction, as one of the -four structures
identified by Mitchell (1971), holds a central place.
And a growing body of research has demonstrated how
this capacity is socially dc-fined, regulated arid
controlled (Macintyre 1976; Rose & Harnner 1975; Oakley
1975, 1876, 1979; Rich 1977; Graham 1982; Badroiruter-
1981; Treblicot 1983). Research has been concerned to
investigate and analyse how being a mother is patterned
both historically and culturally (Davin 1978; Pheonix
198.5). An important part of that analysis has been to
demonstrate the role of ideology in the reproduction a-f
the social conditions of reproduction in society.
Indeed ideology plays a crucial role both in the theory
and practice of women's oppression in society. 	 It is
therefore necessary in this introduction to say
something briefly about the corucept of ideology within
sociological and philosophical traditions.
Ih QflPt. Qi 1dQ1Q9L
In Britairu, sociologists investigating the
concept of ideology have been greatly influenced by
- xiii -
theoretical developments from cont i nerital Europe which
have focused on the relationship between social
structures and social consciousness (1).	 Prior to
that inf luence, in both the British and the American
sociological tradition, ideology received little
attention and was generally taken to mean little more
than 'false consciousness' or 'mistaken ideas' or
simply a body of ideas (Hall 1978:9). 	 However, under
the iri-fluerice of European developments in this field,
attempts have been made to understand and theorise the
inter-relationship between the dominant ideas arid the
social structure of a specific society (Centre for
Contemporary Cultur-al Studies 1978; Hall 1980; Sumner
1979).
This research project dr-aws on that development.
It starts from the premise that the dominant ideology
of a society refers to the body of ideas which, in a
complex way, underpin a particular social structure.
Secondly, the dominant ideology 0-f a society also
relates to the models of normality and expectation by
which people in that society live their daily lives.
Moreover, those models frequently legitimate and
justify the divisions arid hierarchies within a given
society.	 In addition, they are accepted by many who
derive rio material benief it from them arid -for whom, they
are a source of continuous oppression and exploitation
- xlv -
(Eaton 1985:352). How that consent is achieved, has
become a major concern for British sociologists
exploring the role of ideologies in society.
	
For
example, Sumner (1979:20) exploring the concept of
ideology clearly outlines the important differences
between traditional views of ideology and the analysis
developed in Europe. He argues that according to this
latter approach, ideology is a sign of something other
than itself, it is an 'outcome and element of social
practice which ref lect and designates the world of
that practice within the social consciousness of human
beings'. Thus, ideology is an element of social
corisciousress. But ideologies and their social
formations do not simply exist in social consciousness,
they are the material products of social practices.
Moreover, as determining elements within social
practices they help to shape those practices. Ideology
is thus both mental and concrete; a creation and a
creator of social practices.	 As Sumner argues
(1979:22) within this perspective ideologies are
inhabitants of the social world and not creations of
the human mind, they play an active and reactive part
in the formation arid maintenance of social conditions
in society.
In the context of this thesis therefore it is
that definition of ideology which is adopted and I
-xv-
attempt to illustrate how dominant ideologies of
motherhood, o-f marriage and the family are reproduced
through law and le q al practices.
Ideologies of Motherhood and Women's Experiences
One of the central +eatures of motherhood, both
historically and in contemporary society, is that it
does increase women's susceptibility to various form of
exploitation both in the home and in the labour market
(see below).	 Yet images and representations of
motherhood seldom signify that element. 	 Rather, as
Badminter demoristrates (1981:232) in her review of
motherhood in Europe, as the maternal role gained in
areas of responsibility throughout history so the
notion of 'devotion' and the image of the 'devoted
mother' increasingly dominated representations of
women.	 Indeed being a mother was increasingly
presented as an integral part of the female identity
and posed as the surest source of female happiness.
rid as Badminter argues if women themselves did riot
consider that motherhood was their calling, morality
was increasingly called in to justify what was in
reality a social demand which required the complete
self sacrifice of women to the task of rearing
children. By the beginning of the twentieth century
motherhood was chiefly discussed in terms of 'suffering
and sacrifice' (Badminter 1981; Davjn 1978). 	 Central
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therefore to modern ideologies of motherhood is the
notion that all women are innately capable a-F
motherhood, and ar-c born with the capacity for complete
self sacrif ice and the desire to give primary emotions
arid attention to the needs and demands of others but
especially to children. 	 But in addition motherhood is
largely perceived as an a-sexual role. As Bland argues
1983:10) this perception is in part a legacy of the way
in which female sexual activity in general has been
perceived, as being intrinsically linked to a desire
for reproduction and motherhood. Male sexuality
however has usually been identified with notions of
(frequently uncontrollable) lust and pleasure. 	 For
men therefore sexual activity has been perceived as a
pleasurable biological urge and an end in itself. For
women however, sex is often presented as simply a means
to an end - pregnancy arid motherhood. 	 That different
definition a-f the role o-f sex in the lives of men and
women provides the rationale for the double standard of
morality which exists in society, whereby substantial
sexual experience is thought acceptable indeed
desirable, for young men, but is viewed as problematic
and generally promiscuous where it occurs in young
women (McRobbie	 Brooke 19??).	 Symbolic
representations of women are frequently posed in two
mutually exclusive categories: eg:wifelmistress,
Madonna/whore. Images of motherhood, i ri women' s
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maqaz i nes and journals, newspapers, educational and
self help literature etc all portray motherhood in an
almost spiritual light, motherhood is valorised but
represented quite separately from any sexual identity
or discussion about sexuality in general (c/f Saunders
1983).
Against that ideological backcloth, feminists
have began to explore the question of motherhood in a
variety of ways. The dominant method adopted has beers
to ask mothers about their experiences (Graham 1982;
Oakley 1974) . Such work has demonstrated the gap which
exists between ideologies of motherhood and women's
experiences of being mothers in society. Although
images of motherhood are seldom placed within a legal
and economic framework, research has rieverthe less
demonstrated the impact which that framework has for
women' s experiences as mothers. And of course work
which focuses on women's exper i enc has a long
tradition within feminist writing arid campaigning, for
example writing in 1915, Margaret Liewellyn in
Uait.L	 f.cQia LL.kin	 documents the
burdens o-f motherhood reported by mothers themselves.
Such mothers outline at some length the pain,
suffering, poverty, hardship, malnutrition, lack of
knowledge and control which mothers experienced. 	 More
recently, contemporary writers have again documented
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the strain arid hardship involved in a job which lasts
seven days a week, twenty four hours a day and which is
completely unpaid, unrewarded and undervalued genuerally
by society (Maitland 1980; Goodison 1980) .	 Maitland
in particular points to some of the impossible demands
which are made on mothers in contemporary society
where, if mothers do riot meet the demands of total
devotion and sacrifice of their lives to the needs and
demands of their children, they are perceived as
failing, but equally, if they do, they are often seen
as over protective arid dominating. 	 As Maitlarid
concludes (1980:88) conflicting social demands which
are made upon mothers mnears in effect that a mother
can't win and whatever happens to her children it is
her fault'.	 As Gilligaru (1982:1601) arid others (eg
Davin 1978) have demonstrated, this conclusion of
'failure' on the part of mothers is largely due to the
fact that women are judged by the particular standards
of care they provide as measured against idealised
standards incorporated in dominant ideologies of
motherhood in society, quite regardless of the material
conditions under which they carry out that task. But
moreover, despite the fact that dominant ideologies of
motherhood posit motherhood as a natural (unlearned)
role for all women, nevertheless, research documents
that many women are quite unprepared for the physical
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emotional and social demands which motherhood brings
(Oakley 1980; Rich 1977; Breen 1978).
Moreover, motherhood, by locating married women
more + irrnly in the domestic economy, exposes women to
-further forms of ecor,ornic exploitation.	 This is
primarily because motherhood, (particularly in relation
to the care o-f ver-y young children) usually
necessitates women giving up full-time paid employment
altogether for the early years in a child's life.
This in effect, frees more o-f women's time to be spent
on domestic work which is riot directly related to
childcare but rather to traditional notion of wifely
duties, for example, cooking, cleaning, shopping etc
and general servicing of husbands. This work, while
essential to the current structure of families, in
effect, leaves husbands free to pursue jobs and careers
on a full time bases unrestricted by the demands of
children and domestic labour (Oakley 1974). In
addition, of course motherhood, by reducing married
women's participation in the labour market increases
their + irancial dependency upon men, arid thereby
increases their economic vulnerability.
Furthermore, motherhood + requent ly has
irreversible econoril i c consequences for women's position
in the labour market (Joshi 1984; Martin	 Roberts
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1984; Hunt 1973). There, women are already found in
predominant proportions in low paid, unskilled arid semi
skilled work, where they are confined to jobs which are
generally described as 'women's work' (Social Trends
1974:16; Hakim 1979; Hunt 1968). This type of work in
the labour market largely reflects the work which women
do in the home (ie cooking, cleaning and servicing jobs
such as nursing secretarial, clerical, and unskilled
and semi skilled work in the clothing food and drink
iridustries) (Oakley 1981:152, quoting Depat-tmerit of
Employment New Earnings Survey (1977)). Motherhood
increases that job segregation, arid this is primarily
because responsibility for children forces women into
part-time unskilled work in an attempt to combine paid
employment with the demands of motherhood (Mackie &
Patullo 1977;40 Martin & Roberts 1984;147). However,
such work offers women little or no prospects, no
further training, little job security, or rights to
statutory employment related benefits. As both Hunt
(1973:28) and Martin & Roberts (1984:147) have
concluded motherhood provokes demotion for women when
they return to the labour market, arid thus increases
their already over representation on low paid unskilled
work.
Parenthood therefore, does 'cost' women more than
men, in both the short term (through 1 os of an
- xxi -
independent income arid increased dependency upon men)
and in the longer term (through loss of immediate and
long term opportunities in employment). Moreover,
research demonstrates women suffer emotional and
psychOlo9ical stresses as a result of the imposition of
the total responsibility for the well being of
children. Alongside declining nurseries arid creche
facilities in Britain (Riley 1979), mothers turn to
child miriders, friends and relatives in their struggle
to combine motherhood with paid employment.	 Such
mothers frequently feel guilty and inadequate as a
consequences of the attitudes and myths which exist in
society regarding the effects upon children of workirig
mothers. These ideas most prevalent in the 1960's are
emerging again in right wing literature ir the 1980's
(eg: Ellis Jones - Bow Group 1986). Although research
has long since disproved a causal relationship between
such issues as juvenile delinquency and working mothers
(Burchinal 1963; Lest 1969; Home Office Research Study
1985), such is the strength of dominant ideologies of
motherhood which posit motherhood as a full time Job
which only women cat-i and should do, that mothers
continue to worry and ar-c blamed over such issues
(Oakley 1974:211; Maitland 1980:88). However, as
Oakley also points out (op cit 208), nobody has yet
sought to ask, let alone investigate the effects of
working father-s upon children's development.	 Yet
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mothers c:ontinue to deploy various coping mechanisms on
a da.ily basis in order to continue to meet a range of
impossible social and economic demands (Graham
1982:102/3).	 rid, as writers have already argued, the
heavy workload and stress which this process produces
for women is likely to increase as the boundaries of
the welfare state are withdrawn, since it is wives and
mothers who are irtcreasirigly expected to replace arid
cover for missing school meal services and nursery
facilities; it is women who ultimately have to cope
with reduced incomes as child benefits shrink and it is
women who are expected to care for elderly arid
physically and mentally sick relatives where social and
hospital services are reduced (Finch 	 Groves 1983:
1/10).
In addition as Seiter argues (1986:22) the social
organisation of the family in which women do take
primary responsibility for childcare arid the care of
family members and, where women do sacrifice their own
needs arid desires and goals in an attempt to meet the
physical, psychological and emotional needs of others3
that organisation, will tend to produce girls who
indeed better carers, better at 'mothering', better at
self sacrifice, than boys. It is then very clearly
within the nexus o-f familial relations that children
are first exposed to the realities of the sexual
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division of labour (Dyhouse 1977: Sharpe 1976; Wolpe
1975).
Finally, research on motherhood has demonstrated
how dominant ideologies of motherhood not only equate
being a women with being a mother (Gavrori 1968) but in
addition, equate motherhood with marriage and the
family.	 Thus, sex, marriage arid reproduction are
frequently linked together in a way which implies that
each explains arid necessitates the other (Lasch 1977),
and there are of course strong negative sanctions
against both illegitimacy (ROW 1979) arid voluntary
childlessness within marriage (Miller 1978). As
Busfield points out, (1974:14) 'on the one hand, it is
accepted and regarded as desirable that those who marry
will have children, and on the other hand, that those
who want to have children will marry' .
	 Thus
reproduction is, in reality, only conceived as natural
and as 'destiny' for women, so long as sex, procreation
and childcare are equated with femininity arid confined
to marriage. Radical feminists have concentrated on
illegitimacy in particular, amongst other issues, to
demonstrate this point.
	 For example both Dowrich
(1980:67) arid Rich (1979:196) argue women cannot be
mothers alone, without a husband a woman's child is not
legitimate. Thus motherhood is admirable, natural arid
celebrated only so long as mother and child are
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attached to a legal father. And research has begun to
demonstrate how these features, central to dominant
ideologies of motherhood in society, are in fact
reproduced and sustained within certain institutional
practices.	 Sally Macirityre's research (1976) in
medical sociology is a classic demonstration of this
issue arid it is worth some discussion.
Macintyre examined the routine responses a-f the
medical and helping professions to pregnancy in a
sample of married and single women. Against an
ideological backcloth which proclaims motherhood as
destiny and natural for all women, Maci ntyre identifies
two distinct attitudes towards pregriaricy arid motherhood
which depended upon the marital status o-f the woman
involved.	 Macintyre concluded from her research that
in fact for mart' ied women, pregnancy and childbearing
are indeed considered normal arid desirable; coriversely
a desire not to have chi ldreri was considered aberrant
and in need of explanation. Moreover, for married
women, to consider offering a legitimate child for
adoption was considered aberrant, arid if a married
couple were childless it is considered clinically
advisable that they receive diagnostic attention.
Furthermore, the loss of a child by miscarriage still-
birth or neonatal death should occasion instinctive
grief and distress.
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For the single mother however, Macintyre found
almost the complete reverse of these approaches and
attitudes. Thus, pregnancy arid childbearing for the
single mother are abnormal, undesirable and indeed the
desire to have children is aberrant selfish and in riced
of explanation; pregnancy itself is treated as
problematic; illegitimate children should be
surrendered for adoption, and the mother who wants to
keep her child is perceived as selfish arid/or
unrealistic in her aims. Moreover, diagnostic
treatment for infertility is not advisable or relevarit;
it is not considered proper for an unmarried woman to
adopt a child; the loss of a baby through miscarriage,
stillbirth or neonatal death should not occasion too
much grief or distress and may even produce relief. 	 In
summary, Macintyre argues that there is one solution
for the problems of a single pregnant woman and that is
to get married. If she is married she will want the
child if riot then she will riot want it. 	 'Maternal
instinct' therefore as a 'good' and 'natural' thing is
here ascribed only to married women. Macirityre's work
on the reproduction of motherhood is important because
firstly, it demonstrates both how dominant ideologies
of motherhood are reproduced through the routine and
everyday activities of social agencies and institutions
and secondly, because she also illustrates what some of
the real consequences of those ideologies can be for
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the women involved.
There are of course, as Ruddick points out
(1980:22), other models of motherhood in society
(eg: single mothers, lesbian mothers, co-parenting
among women) which constantly serve to remind us that
there are in fact many ways of rearing and caririg for
clii ldren which do not incorporate the inequalities of
power, privi lege and economic resources which currently
identify marriage and the nuclear family. 	 But as
other writers have argued (Oakley 1974; Graham 1982;
Rich 1979) the social regulation and control a-f
reproduction, of women's capacity to reproduce arid rear
children lies at the heart of women's oppression in
society.	 We must therefore understand how this
capacity is regulated and defined, both through
immediately visible arid less obvious social arid
economic mechanisms, if we are to understand how women
are regulated arid ultimately 'kept in their place'
(Graham 1882:101).
It is as part of that endeavour in feminist
writing and research that this thesis seeks to make a
contribution.	 It looks at one institution -law and
legal practices -and at the impact of ideologies of
motherhood, a-f marriage arid the -family, arid of female
sexuality, both historically and in contemporary
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society. With regard to the issue of female sexuality
in particular, through an analysis of the legal
processing of lesbian mothers involved in child custody
disputes, the role of dominant ideologies of motherhood
in law arid legal practices can be clearly identified.
That processing demonstrates the consequences for
mothers of the courts employment of particular
stereotype models of the 'good' mother, and pejorative
stereotypes of 'the lesbian'. 	 In particular, it
demonstrates some of the consequences for women who
transgressed traditional notions of female sexual
passivity and laid claims to both an assertive female
sexuality and. motherhood. Moreover, the content of
those stereotypes are not arbitrary, and they are not
interchangeable. As Perkins (197'9) has demonstrated in
relation to media steroetypes in films, stereotypes are
selected features which have a particular ideological
significance and a particular relationship to familial
relations within, social formations. 	 It is the role of
law in the reproduction a-f those relationships which
forms the central questions addressed in this research.
In the final part of this introduction therefore, I
wish to address the issue 0-f 'law', why it is important
for women, what we mean by ' law' and finally my
approach to 'reading law'.
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Sociology and Law
Within the iriterdiciplinary study of the
sociology of law, there has been a strong tendency to
theorise the form arid content of law as a reflection of
specific economic and social relationships within
society, or, as an instrument utilised by the ruling
class in a class struggle with subordinate classes.
That analysis Df law begins with the economic formation
of society, and takes the nature of law for granted.
However certain contemporary writers in this field have
been critical of the way in which that relationship has
been posed (eg Cain 2 Hunt 1979; Sumner' 1979).
Equally writers in the field of family law have also
criticised that coriceptualisation of 'law' (eg Smart
1984) and have demonstrated that in fact ' law' is
mediated through the arena of both politics and
ideology (Eaton 1986). Law is not simply an instrument
of class struggle, it is also an instrument of party
politics, a protector of revered ideas and an agency
+or moral codes. It is in addition, a means 0+
regulation, providing a normative framework 'for
familial relations. And, it is these latter issues
which have informed a substantial part of contemporary
feminists concerns with family law (eg; Smart 1984;
Atkins	 Hoggett 1984; O'Donovani 1985) particularly in
relation to discussions regarding the regulation of
female sexuality.	 The role arid function of law and
legal practices in the sphere of sexuality is however
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complex. It is not necessarily immediately apparent.
While all societies control and regulate sexuality, a
variety of positive and negative sanctions, formal and
informal mechanisms are employed. 	 Feminists within
sociology have been concerned to locate and reveal how
these sanctions are manifest in the practices of a
variety of social agencies and institutions (eg: Stang
Dahl 1978; Barrett	 Roberts 1971; McIntosh 1978; Smart
1976).
Two points arise from the above work.	 Firstly
of course, feminists working in this field are not
necessarily always opposed to the regulation arid/or
control of sexuality -it is not in all cases a 'bad'
thing, as the issues o-f rape and child sexual abuse
demonstrate. But, in attempting to understand the
concept of regulation in society and the different
levels on which it operates, it is important to
uriderstand the different forms of sarict ions which can
be employed and to note that even where positive
sanctions do riot exist in relation to particular forms
of behaviour, other (negative) sanctions may also
exist. As McIntyre's work demonstrates, these negative
sanctions can be equally effective in regulating
certain forms o-f activity. Arid 0+ course such
sanctions can equally be	 as punitive (see
below)
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Secondly, the practice 0+ sociology in examining
social institutions and locating different forms of
regulation does not however equate with locating and
revealing a form of conspiracy. Indeed, it is
frequently in quite disparate social practices, with
hidden levels of meaning which are legitimised through
particular ideologies, that the ultimate regulation of
sexual behaviour is revealed. That form of analysis
carp be demonstrated in the work of Macirityre discussed
above, but also for example in the work of Lucy Bland
(1985).	 Bland argues that in relation to rape, while
law claims to protect women from rape, in practice
however, it is frequently the rape victim who is put
'on trial', and it is her sexuality which is
questioned, her behaviour and her morality which is
subject to extensive cross examination, surveillance
arid judgemenit. This is not however the result o-f a
conspiracy to stop women reporting rape and pushing for
prosecution in the case of rape. Rather, it is a
consequence of the application, by courts, of
particular views regarding male arid female sexuality,
such that certain female behaviour (eg: styles of
dressing, previous sexual activity, geographical
location, (ie: walking alone late at night etc.,) can
been seen as contributing towards the crime of rape.
Thus, women are advised to dress and organise their
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lives in a particular way in order to protect
themselves. In this way, women's behaviour is
ultimately regulated, arid of course myths regarding
female culpability in relation to rape are reproduced.
In assessing the role of law in the regulation of
female sexuality, clearly it is necessary to go beyond
an examination of formal statute law arid the political
struggles involved in passing legislation. It is not
simply at this formal level that law sets the
parameters of what is considered normative (eg: in
terms of marriage, sexual relations, grounds for
divorce and separation, familial conditions for rearing
childreri).	 In addition, we riced to examine the law in
practice. And for a number of reasons this is
particularly the case regarding family law. Firstly
there is a considerable amount of judicial discretion
within family law and this is especially the case when
we consider law in relation to the custody, maintenance
and access of children.	 But secondly, explanations of
law cannot remain at the level of a simple reading of
Acts, since this tells us nothing of the social meaning
and practice of law.
	
'Law' is also a set of rules and
principles taken and applied to a set of gendered legal
subjects by particular sets of legal agents (judges,
registrars, magistrates) arid of course these are, in
the majority, men.
	 And it is the application of law
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to qeridered subj ects which forms the focus of much
feminist research surrounding law (eg: Edwards 1931;
EatDn 1986; Smart 1984).
It is therfore, within the application a-f law,
within that very process that law 'conies alive'.	 How
it 'comes alive', is through the mundane everyday level
of experience.	 Family law is therefore a social
discourse.	 By this I mean that it is actualised
through social and political practices and through the
lived exper-ierices of gendered legal subjects. 	 Thus,
it is women's experience of law which provides the
starting point of analysis.	 This is riot however to
argue tha.t experience 'is all', or that all cue's
experiences of law arid legal practices are the same (I
am not posing women as a unitary category (c/f Cousins
1980)).	 It is however- an important starting point -
though not an entirely new or novel approach to law as
criminologists (eg Bottoms < Maclean 1976) have
demonstrated. However, for feminists it is the issue
of the impact of 'law' on gendered subjects (ic wives
and mothers, husbands and fathers) which is an
important starting point for both theoretical arid
political analysis.	 This is not to suggest that we
should or indeed that we could ignore notions of formal
'justice' or 'equality'. 	 Rather, that such concepts
can only usefully be analysed in relation to their
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relevance for women's structural position within
society.	 Notions of formal equality arid equal legal
treatment are not a sufficient goal for women where
structurally, womera remain financially and economically
so disadvantaged vis a vis men (Erophy 	 Smart 1985:3).
Therefore if the analysis of farni ly law arid legal
practices is to add anything to discussions on women's
oppression in contemporary society it must be firmly
rooted the daily lives of women (and indeed men) and in
the cumulative effects of law on gendered individuals.
This level of analysis is lost if the focus of
examination remains at the level of abstracted notions




It will now I hope be clear that I am addressing
law from a particular theoretical perspective. 	 This
perspective moves beyond both orthodox readings of law
and the traditional sociology of law. 	 It is, in
effect, a critique of the limitations of both those
approaches for understanding the role of family law in
relation to women. Finally there+ore, in this
introductory chapter, I wish to outline the development
of my research questions, arid • to demonstrate wI-iy it was
necessary to move beyond both orthodox interpretations
of legal history in this field and traditional methods
of read i n g 1 aw.
My initial research questions arose from two
concerns.	 On a broader theoretical arid political
level I was conicerned to examine the role of
contemporary family law and legal practices in relation
to the reproduction of motherhood; how, for example,
has law defined and redef med this role in the post war
economy.	 As other feminists have already
demonstrated, it is necessary to move beyond abstract
theory and monolithic structures (Graham 1982; Oakley
1974). What is necessary in order to develop
theoretical analysis, is research which attempts to
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bridge the gap which exists between women's everyday
experiences of rnotherhood, and abstract theoretical
analysis, and which demonstrate the interconnections
between the two issues.	 Secondly therefore, I was
concerned about the problems which certain lesbian
mothers were experiencing in gairuir;g legal custody of
their children, and how those experiences might throw
some light or, the theoretical and political issues
posed above in relation to law.
The experiences of lesbian mothers involved in
legal proceedings over the custody of their children
raised a ruurnber of important issues, and refocused rily
attention on the position of mothers generally on
divorce.	 Such a focus has riot beer, a par-t of feminist
concern with the law and legal issues for some
considerable time.	 Indeed, the last major won-len's
campaign on the law relating to custody, guardianship
and maintenance of children was in the 1920s (see
chapter three het'ein).	 General responses to the issue
of lesbian mothers arid legal issues among women in
Britain in the mid 19ø's were enormously varied and
often con-fused. Much of this confusion however was
related to misunderstandings regarding law and legal
practices generally on issues of custody of children on
divorce. Women tended to argue that if 'adulterous
wives were now allowed to keep the custody of children,
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why not lesbian mothers?' or, they argued 'surely
mothers always get the custody of children on marriage
breakdown, arid wasn't that one of the few achievements
o-f the early women's movement in Britain ?'
The issue of lesbian mothers and legal practices
therefore, raised further general questions regarding
current practices in the area of child custody and
divorce in Britain in the latter part of the twentieth
century; just how significant are issues of morality
arid sexual behaviour so far as courts are concerned,
how often do fathers get custody of children, and, in
what circumstances do they do this most successfully.
It is interesting to note that at a. time when certain
lesbian mothers were attempting to riiourit a public
campaign surrounding their loss of chi ldren in the mid
1970s, organisatioris such as Families Need Fathers
(1975) were also forrcii ng and organ i sing campaigns (in
both Britaini and Europe). 	 A major theme in that
latter development was the argument that in fact, since
the last war, the ' law' had now swung too far in favour
of mothers. Thus certain writers argued that mothers
were now the privileged parent within legal practices
(Richards 1982; F.N.F. 1981; Maidriient 1981).	 That
development was largely attributed to the irif lueruce of
post war theories in the field of child developmental
psychology (located in' the work of ,Johru Bowlby (1953))
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which stressed the importance of the rnother-chi id
relationship in the early years of a child's
development (Freeman 1983).
However, I became inicreasirigly dissatisfied with
that level of explanation of law and legal practice in
the post war period. 	 For example it was apparent that
courts continued to focus on women's errant sexual
behaviour for a consider-able period following the
second world war - indeed it is identifiable in case
law well into the 1960s (see chapter- five herein).
Moreover, I questioned whether in fact the notion of
'privileqe' was an accurate or indeed useful
description o-f the position of mothers on divorce. It
was certainly riot an accurate descriptiori of legal
practices (see chapter five herein) . Furthermore,
where courts did award custody of chi ldreri to mothers,
confirming the existing sexual division of labour in
relation to childcare is riot, as my earlier discussion
on the social and economic consequences of motherhood
demonstrates, placing women in positions of economic or
social privilege vis a vis men in society.
It was therefore a dissatisfactior1 with existing
accounts of contemporary legal practices and the actual
r•ole of law in relation to custody or, divorce generally
which lead me to reconsider the development of policies
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in this area of family law in the post war economy. I
ultimately take issue with orthodox explanations of
that development. I argue (chapter +our) that in
attempting to understand and explain the particular way
in which policies on children and divorce have
developed since the last war, analysis of those trends
cannot be separated from an examination 0+ other major
concerns of the period, for example, falling levels of
public morality, fears for the stability of family life
etc., (McGregor 195?; Smart 1984) ) which informed
policy on divorce law generally after the war.
In addition, that disagreement with orthodox
constructions of post war legal history stretched back
further than the 1940s. It increased as I examine
early twentieth century developments (see chapter three
herein) and was amplified as I examined interpretations
of nineteenth century developments in this field. I
was again in disagreement with aspects of both social
historians accounts 0+ nineteenth century policy
(eg: Maitland	 Pollack 1968; Plunkett 1949), and with
interpretations offered by certain family lawyers of
that period (eg: Pettite 195?; Karminski 1959). This
disagreement came partly -from a frustration at the
limitation of the terms in which they addressed
developments in this field. But equally, that initial
criticisrii also lead me to at times, radically disagree
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rega.rdirig the ultimate role and function of family law
in relation to mothers. So for example, with regard to
the limitations of orthodox approaches, these did riot
address the question of mother's powerlessness iithin
marriage and the role of legal developments in actually
sustaining that position (see chapter one herein).
Moreover, traditional liberal interpretations of
this field of family law tell us little about the role
of the state in relation to the family.	 Yet as I
argue here (chapter one), it is important to locate the
precise form, content and legitimation of state
intervention into the patriarchal + am ii y in order to
fully understand the consequences which that form of
intervention had for mothers and ultimately for power
relationships within the family. Although a clear
concern for the welfare of chi ldren certainly increased
a focus or motherhood within marriage, nevertheless I
argue here (chapter two) that contrary to orthodox
interpretations (eg Dorizelot 1980) that focus did riot
lead to any necessary increase in mothers powers as
parents within families. Indeed that demand by women
themselves was vehemently opposed and rejected by a
range of governments in early twentieth century Britain
(see chapter three herein)
This re-examination of both historical arid
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contemporary developments is therefore important for a
number of reasons. Firstly, it throws new light on
contemporary debates regarding the role of 'law' and
leqal policies regarding children arid divorce, arid the
relative position of divorcing parents. I argue that
mothers are riot in fact the spoilt darlings of the
1980's anymore than wives were the spoilt darlings of
the law in the 1950's.	 (Lord justice Denning (as he
was then) The Times, 13 May 1950). That position,
though now part of conventional wisdom in this field of
family law is nevertheless misguided and oversimplistic
in its analysis of the role of 'law' in this area. But
secondly, that position is part of conventional wisdorii
(particularly in the post war period), precisely
because, of the limitations of the terms in which the
history of this field in family law have been
constructed. And this has pririiari ly been in terms of
notions of formal justice and increasing legal equality
for women. I argue here however, for a re-evaluation
of that history through a perspective which reveals arid
examines certain important 'silences' in orthodox
accounts. Those si lenices ar-c located in constructions
of legal history which do not address, the role of the
State, or, the role which law played in sustaining
mothers continued oppression within the family, or
indeed, women's experiences as gendered legal subjects.
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Historically, where women were trapped in
marriages which they dared riot leave for the +ear arid
sure knowledge that they had neither the means nor the
right to take their chi Idreru, where there wer-e ro or
inadequate provisions to allow women to leave and riot
risk loss of childreri, this was policy.
	 What I have
attempted to demonstt'ate here, is how those pol icies
were legitimised and justified through particular
ideologies (of child welfare and ruiotherhood and the
family), ideologies which are frequently perceived as
being constructed and engaged in women's favour and
interests. Moreover, I argue that this was largely
successful, not because o-f an enormous conscious
corispiracy to contain women in marriages which they
might otherwise leave, but precisely because the
content, (the ideas and the moral standards expressed
within these particular ideologies) were part of the
taken for granted order of society. They were part of,
and appealed to, the social consciousness of society.
Arid, as Sumner argues, with regard to utiderstarudirug the
role and function of idealogies in society, these
ideologies in turn, sustain and reinforce that
social consciousness.
Thus, while I would agree with certain writers in
this field (eg: Freeman 1983) when they identify the
development 0-f a concern for the welfare of children as
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taking a formal priority in this field of family law,
nevertheless, I argue here that that development cannot
be 'read' as somehow existing outside of an
uriderstandirg o-f law as a social arid moral discourse.
In other words, the exercise of the welfare principle
in this area of family law does riot have an autonomy,
it must equally be read as part of that social and
moral discourse.
Deconstruction of the welfare principle is riot of
course limited to the work of sociologists, lawyers are
increasingly engaging in that exercise (eg: King 1981;
Hoggett 1977). As Hoggett demonstrates in her analysis
of law in relation to illegitimacy, historically law
can be demonstrated to have been much more concerned
with the orderly transmission of property than the
actual welfare of children. Nevertheless, it is
important in this introduction to briefly elaborate on
what that exercise entailed in relation this research.
Finally therefore I wish to address this issue through
a discussion of what is commonly referred to as
'reading law'.
in LLiiL.
Although feminists are i ricreasirigly looking at
law and legal issues (Smart 1984; Eaton 1986; Kingdom
1985;) very little has been written about the actual
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practice of reading 'law' (c/f Sumner 1979; Goodricl-u
1986).	 For lawyers that practice becomes an almost
unconscious exercise. 	 But learning to 'read' law
within the discipline of legal training is regarded as
a central feature in learning the practice o-F law. In
relation to case law, this entails what might be termed
doing 'justice' to law, getting 'inside' its internal
logic, understanding legal principles and applying
those particular principles to the factors which are
deemed relevant in specific cases. 	 With regard to
child custody disputes therefore, this method entails
applying the welfare principle (established in statute
law) to the particular facts of each case as they are
presented to courts.
	 Locating its historical
development, necessitates tracing its establishment in
statute law arid also locating the application of that
principle through its devlopment by courts. In
practice, this means identifying precedents estabi ihed
by the Court of Appeal, locating where precedents are
later approved, considered, distinguished, explained,
doubted, extended, followed or overruled.
The above method is presented to the student
lawyer as a method which is a purely technical
practice.	 Arid, as one aspect of legal discourse, it
is not only a discrete phenomenon, but in addition, as
Sumnier• points out (1979), to the legally 'uninitiated'
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it can be downright impenetrable. 	 However, the
process of coming to understand orthodox legal methods
of reading ' law' demonstrated a number of important
issues within the terms of this research. Firstly, as
a method of reading case law on a 'purely technical
level it is intensely 'habit forming'.	 In coming to
understand and apply those particular skills ther+ore,
arid to some extent thereby breaking down some of the
privacy of law, one can in effect simply reproduce it.
Thus, initial drafts of the first part of thesis
locating developments over the last century, read
precisely as a lawyer might interpret legal history
(eg: Wadsworth 191), reproducing a particular
methodology by mapping out a chronological history of
statute law and case law developments, and locating
precedents through annotated cases. Clearly at that
stage it was necessary in terms of this research, to
'stand back' fromn these documents arid r-eturri to initial
research questions regarding the complex relationship
between the role of law in the repr-oductiori o-f aspects
of women's oppression in society. 	 That initial
exercise in; reading case law arid orthodox legal
interpretations of legal history, al though frustrating,
was riot however- wasteful. 	 It raised two important arid
related issu.es for -feminism and the interdisciplinary
study 0-f the sociology of law. The first issue relates
to the exercise of 'reading' case law and the relevance
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of orthodox legal methods, arid the second concerns
theoretical questions regarding the ultimate role of
family law in relation to power relationships within
the family.
Firstly, to date, very little has been written
which has sought to question and analyse in any detail
the prevalent and frequently unconscious methodology
employed in orthodox reading of law (c/f Goodrich
1986).	 As a discourse, 'law' encompasses a number of
'levels'.	 For example as a system of regulation and
control, family law can be traced throu g h a focus on
statute law examining the extension of certain rights
to legal subjects (eg the gradual increase of wife's
rights to divorce on equal terms with husbands). 	 But
thet exercise iru itself is of limited value. 	 Simply
reading legal Acts tells us nothing of law's effective
social meaning and practice.	 To explore arid
understand the role and function which ' law' p1 ays in
society with regard to the deliniatiori arid regulation
of familial relationships in any specific period, we
have, in addition, to move 'down' into the everyday
practice of 'law'. For sociology, that exercise
entails two important focuses. One focus (already
referred to earlier in this introduction) begins at the
level of the experiences of gendered legal subjects.
it is at the mundane level of everyday experience that
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'law' becomes alive. The other focus begins with
actually 'reading law' . 	 By this I mean the very
process through which legal agents construct, test arid
develop law, the legal scenario through which
particular features of a case become the significant
legal 'facts', the filtering mechanisms of trial and
pre-trial reviews, the court pr'actices through which
precedents are set, questioned and overruled. It is at
that point that legal methods arid sociological enquiry
most clearly demonstrate different concerns.
For the lawyer, the establ ishrnerit of the relevarit
legal 'facts' of a case and existing applicable
precedents is usually presented as a purely objective
and technical exercise. 	 For sociology however, what
is equally important is the social construction of
those 'facts'; how for example, out of a range of
events and circumstances in peoples lives, legal
practices construct a preferred text, and, how legal
methods actively selects and privileges certain
meanings and accents. 	 'Facts' do not 'speak' for
themselves. Indeed, a substantial part of legal
discourse in this field of family la.w is not
particularly 'legal'. Case law on child custody
disputes for example consists largely of a description
of the 'facts' to be dealt with by the court. However',
which particular features of a case count for the
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relevant 'facts' of the case, are, in effect,
constructed by court procedures, they are a product o-f
the filterirtg mechanisms of bi-later-al bargaining.
Thus, law is, as Goodrich (a lawyer) has also recently
argued (1986:V) 'inherently a social arid political
activity'. And it is that activity which forms the
focus of investigation in this research. For example
with reference to the sign i-f icance of notions o-f
morality arid sexual behaviour, what concerned me as a
feminist and a sociologist, was that although certain
lawyers argue that wives adultery ceased to be relevant
in determining the custody of children on divorce
around 1910 (Maidmerit 1984a; Karminiski 1959:)
nevertheless, it can be demonstrated that courts
continued to focus on adultery in custody cases riot
simply in the immediate post war period, but well into
the 1960s (see chapter 5 herein). Indeed in the post
war period wives adultery appears to have been almost
the only issue from a range of behavioural 'faults'
availeble, on which fathers contested custody of
children through to the Court of Appeal. Was this the
case because lawyers acting for fathers felt this was
the only ground on which fathers stood a significant
chance a-f usurping mothers claims, and if so, why was
that the case? In formal terms under Guardianship
provisions, adultery ceased to be a bar to mothers
application to the courts for custody of children in
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1873. Moreover, adultery was never a formal bar to
petition under divorce proceedings.	 In practice
however, courts continued to deny custody to adulterous
wives in divorce proceedings after both formal law arid
precedents in the Court of Appeal attempted to
eradicate that practice.
	 For example, the two judges
statements below, although separated by some one
hundred years, are nevertheless remarkably similar ir,
the moral message which they carry
"it will probably have a salutary effect upon the
interests of public morality that should be known
that a woman, if found guilty of adultery, will
forfeit, so far as this court is concerned, all
rights to the custody of or access to, her
children"
Sir Cresiell Creswll in, Seddon,
Seddon & Doyle (1862) 2 Sw & Tr 640
"if the [adulterous] mother in this case were to be
entitled to the children it would follow that
every guilty mother who was otherwise a good
mother would always be entitled to them"
Lord Denining in Re L (Infants)
[1962] 3 ALL ER 3
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For the sociologist, this raises a number of
issues regarding the role of law in the regulation of
female sexuality. In developing a theory of family law
in this field, it is not sufficient to argue that where
case law does reveal the courts to be preoccupied with
wives adultery, that such a focus is simply due to the
idiosyncratic behaviour of certain members of the
judiciary, or simply that it is examples of 'bad' case
law, or that what 1 aw)'ers coristruct is riot what ' 1 aw'
is.	 In theorising the role of law in society,
explanations cannot ultimately be located in the
behaviour of certain members of the judiciary (although
aspects of the composition of the judiciary are not
entirely irrelevant (Griffiths 197?)	 for can
explanations lie in what lawyers deem to be examples of
'good' or 'bad' case law.
In the same way that explanations o-f law in
society cannot be based in a simple reading D5 legal
Acts, neither- can explanations of case law remain
within a purely technical representation of 'facts' or
precedenuts as these arise +rorn the Court 0+ Appeal.
The process of reading law is a social and political
activity, 'law' is riot therefore simply what the Court
of Appeal struggles to establish as 'good' law, it is
-L-
equally what is happening in everyday courts (2), even
though that exercise is frequently more difficult to
establish (see chapter 5, page 115 herein).	 Thus, the
selection of the particular facts o-F a case are
important, as are the categories of cases which go to
the Courts of Appeal. Indeed prior to 197'? it was
largely only through information gained from the
details of contested custody cases heard on Appeal that
we could begin to construct a picture of what was
happening in everyday divorce courts.
	 This approach
in addition forms a link with the second issue of
concern for feminists looking at law - that of the
experience of gendered legal subjects.
Following the last war, custody continued to be
determined in an ertirely 'fault' based divorce system.
This had sign if i cant consequences for the adultery of
mothers.	 Despite the rhetoric of the 1950s arid 1960s
regarding marriage as a new partnership of equals, on
divorce arid separation judicial attention remained
focused or; the behaviour of wives.	 As Carol Smart
points out (1984:42) the divorced wife of the 1950s had
to 'earn' her maintenance, it was not hers as of right.
The adulterous wife was rarely awarded mainiteriar;ce
(Eekelaar 1978; McGregor 1970), even though the High
Court was entitled to award her some kind o-f
subsistence.	 The magistrates courts however never
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awarded maintenance to an adulterous wife - ever if she
committed adultery years after her husband had deserted
her - in fact such an action was sufficient grounds for
a court to revoke an order.	 As Carol Sriart argues,
(1984;2) this practice was based upon common law, but
the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) Act
1960 actually iritroduced the principle into statute
law.	 In this way, courts operated a sanction over the
sexual behaviour of wives.
And it must be remembered that it was within that
same moral ci imate that custody decisions were taken.
The same courts which identified wives sexual bel-iaviour
as harmful to the family structure and therefore to the
moral codes of society, also made decisions regarding
the claims of such wives to the custody of children.
Although formally different principles directed the
courts attention, 'conduct' remained relevant in
custody decisions, arid it is impossible to argue that
such decisions were not equally informed by those same
moral considerat ions. Such corisiderat ions were
embodied within the dominant ideologies of motherhood
applied by courts. Indeed to argue otherwise, is to
suggest that the social (that is, commonly accepted)
definitions of what constitutes good motherhood have no
effect upon legal processes. If that were the case it
would be difficult to see how ideology or socialisatiori
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works at all in society (Perkins 1979;140).
But moreover, to argue that decisions concerning
custody can be abstracted from this moral discourse
leaves unanswered the question of why in fact cour•ts
did remain at all preoccupied with wives sexual
behaviour in assessing their claims as mothers?
	 When
wives lost custody of children because of a.dultery
within a legal system where, as wives, they also lost
rights to maintenance and, when both issues were played
out with a legal code which 'spoke' in terms of
'obligation and duty' and 'guilt and innocence' it is
important to ask how else could women experience that
system, other than in the moral terms in which it was
corist i tuted.	 Being found guilty or i nniocerit meant, i ri
effect, being punished or rewarded, there were indeed
clear winners arid losers; how could a moral discourse
talk otherwise and how indeed could women experience it
other w is e.
For feminist research therefore, arid for the
sociology for law generally, it is not simply statute
law and legal facts which constitute 'law' arid are of
interest.	 It is also the very processes by which
'facts' are established and come to claim dominance in
relation to the range of issues at stake. The very
process of establishing the 'core' and 'periphery' of
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cases itself demands analysis. These issues are
relevant in theorisirig law in society. 	 Arid of course
questions regarding how certain ideas might i-old at
particular periods in time are addressed in the field
of the sociology of knowledge (eg in the work of Marx
arid Engels, and Durkheirn (1953) arid more recently, in
the work of Karl Mannheim (1936; 1952) . In theorising
law in society therefore, we must be concerned with
leqal discourse as a whole and its effects upon
gendered legal subjects. That exercise includes riot
only struggles to achieve legislation, statue law
itself, courts practices and trial arid pre-trial
reviews but equally the social construct and
development of 'law' by courts. 	 In order to begin
constructing a theory of law which can make a
contribution to discussions regar-dirig law arid women' s
oppression in society, the complexity and
contradictions within law and legal practices must be
addressed. In relation to this piece of research for
e::<ample I have asked, how does 'law' delineate arid
reproduce power relationships with the family ?	 It
seems to inc that in relatiori to the issue of child
custody practices, it does this in terms of certain
ideologies available in that social formation. 	 This
process is obscured and not immediately accessible
pr-ecisely because the law 'speaks' in terms of
genderless legal subjects (spouses and parents). 	 It
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is however experienced by womer, arid men who are
husbands and wives, and mothers and fathers, and who as
inhabitants of those roles, already occupy differerit
and unequal positions of power within familial
re 1 at i a ri s
Finally, although statute law does riot designate
power relations in terms of gendered subjects, this is
riot to say that such ideolDgies are in fact
identifiabl .e in legal practices but, absent from the
legislative process.	 Rather, that law designates them
in a general discourse abstracted from those gendered
categories.	 In this way, the concerr,s arid issues
which do nevertheless inform legislative changes are
concealed ir a final discourse where it is stated in
abstracted terms.
	 Thus, law appears to take on a
universal moral character separate from ideological arid
political forces.
	 This can be demonstra.ted if we
take a principle of law central to this research - the
welfare principle; as an abstract principle it is
comnmerdable. It appeals to 'common sense' arid lays
claim to a series of accepted values which are assumed
to be held in common arid consequently, do riot require
justification or explanation. However, one cannot
conceptual ise the best interests of chi ldreri without
reference to real conditions and gendered parents.
The welfare principle is riot then an unamobigious
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principle, it is not immediately 'transparent' within
legal discourse, it has to be read 'through' certairi
dominant ideologies - of marriage and the family, and
specifically what constitutes 'good' motherhood in
society.	 This thesis is therefore a contribution
towards revealing those practices which sustain arid
reinforce such ideologies. 	 It takes issue with
orthodox interpretations of legal history, riot simply
on the basis of historical accuracy (although that too
is important). But in addition, I argue, that to
engage in modern pal icy debates regarding children and
divorce, we must work from a more accurate picture of
the role of law and the effects of legal practices. 	 I
argue therefore from a broader theoretical framewor-k
i'jh i ch , among other things, requires recognition of the
impact 0+ 1 aw on gendered legal subj ects. Moreover, I
also argue that current policy debates must acknowledge
that issues of regulation, (generally only accepted as
part of legal tradition in this field of family law in
the riiriteenith and early twentieth century) , can in fact
continue to operate within contemporary legal practices
- albeit in less immediately obvious, arid more complex
forms under the guise of protecting (unambigiously) the
interests of children. It is the task of sociological
enquiry to identify and reveal those forms. And, as




Footnotes - Introductory Essay
Initially from Marx, The German Ideology, where he states
N
.lt is not consciousness which determines life but
life which determinates consciousness" (Marx 	 Engels
1976:37) And later under the aegis of modern Marxism in the
work of Aithouser, (1971) particularly in Lenin	 Other
Essays, in which Aithouser outlines his influential work on
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" (pp 121-173);
and Gramsci (1971) and (1977); and Colletti (1972); and
Poulantzas, (1968) (1974) and (1975).
2	 So for example, contemporary writers (eg: Maidment 1981;
F.N.F. (1981); Richards 1982) argue that the approach of the
Court of Appeal has been to favour mothers. Research carried
out in everyday divorce courts however (Eekelaar & Clive
1977) established that in practice, whatever the approach of
the Court of Appeal, It was not the sex of the parent which
determined court practices, but rather, the status quo
principle. That principle overruled any notion of
favouritism or privilege towards either parent, courts
awarded custody of children to the parent who had the daily
care of such children at the time of the hearing, thus
confirming the children's residential status quo.
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CHAPTER 1
PATRIARCHAL POWER AND LEGAL INTERVENTION
Over several centuries the lives of adults and
children have been increasingly differentiated, most
notably in the spheres of work, education and leisure0
Indeed, for those who perceive the child and 'child-
hood' as natural, biologically determined necessities
which entail dependency, protection, repression and
exclusion from adult society, the work of social his-
torians (Plumb 1950; Aries 1979; Pinchbeck & Hewitt
1973; Thane 1981) provide ample groundwork for locat-
ing the historical specificity of what we today gener-
ally refer to as 'childhood'0 And while recent research
does illustrate the complexity of locating the emergence
of 'childhood' in one specific discourse (that is to say,
it is in fact the point of many determinations (Fitz
1979)) nevertheless, there does seem to be a corres-
pondence between the emergence of nineteenth century
capitalism and the construction of modern age groups
(Thane 1981) 0
Historically, the concern of the law with infancy
emerged through its concern with inheritance0 In
feudal times, a principle characteristic of the family
was its concern with inheritance; it represented both
stability and continuity between generations (Plunckett
1949) 0 So, to locate the productidn of the legal in-
fant, one has initially to begin with the concern with-
in feudal society for the protection and orderly trans-
mission of land through land law0 Indeed, 'infancy'
was initially constituted as a legal category only in
relation to discourses 'about' land law and marriage
contracts (Pollock & Maitland 1968; Fitz 1979)
	
The
discharge of tenures' (1660) effectively removed cer-
tain infants from the wardship of feudal lords and
transferred the rights over those infants to what
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Blackstone referred to in 1765 as the "empire of the
father". The patriarch in this period, in terms of
control over certain children, thus changed in sub-
stance from feudal lord to father. An absence in those
early legal texts of concern for the propertyless infant
is illustrative in the way in which the child, as a
legal subject, was constitued solely in cases con-
cerning disputes over property. That separation of
children in terms of heirs to property from wage labour
was constitued by a legal system in which the property-
less infant would eventually confront the law through
the courts of summary jurisdiction.
However, for the infant with property, it was ini -
tially a concern for that property which called the
attention and protection of the law. Indeed, the medi-
eval doctrine of parens patrae (the sovereign's concern
and expression for the protection of subjects with legal
disabilities) was a concern directed not at the person
(although she/he may ultimately gain some protection)
but rather, at the protection and control of their
property until such time as the infant reached the legal
age of majority.
Although it is not entirely clear how power under
the doctrine of parens patrae devolved upon the courts
of Equity 2
 (Manchester 1980; Reiss 1934; Fitz 1979), by
the early nineteenth century the jurisdiction of the
Chancery Courts in this respect was well established.
Lord Eldon, in 1825, stated:
"...the state must of necessity place some-
where a superintending power over those who
cannot take care of themselves and the court
represents the King as parens patria..."
However, the power to act on behalf of infants was
severely limited, as Eldon continued:
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"...the court has not the means of acting,
except where it has property to act on..."
Lord Eldon, in Wellesley v Duke
of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ. 1
Prior to the introduction of civil divorce then,
matters concerning children were dealt with either in
Chancery o the courts of Common Law under habeas corpus
proceedings (which basically dealt with proceedings
concerning unlawful restraint) . If an infant had property,
a case could be brought before the Courts of Chancery
(proceedings being brought by making the infant a ward
of court) . Of the two categories of
divorce available during this pefiod 3 neither were
particularly concerned with the question of children.
Over the question of guardianship of children, the courts
of both Common Law and Equity concurred; all parental
power and rights were vested solely and absolutely in
the father. In cases where the child held real estate
independent of fathers, such fathers could, in their
capacity as guardians, have charge of that estate and
could receive the rents and profits during the child's
minority. Fathers also had rights to benefit from their
children's labour; to correct children as they felt fit
and proper; and in addition, a father's consent was
necessary for children under the age of majority to marry.
Indeed, just as marriage during this period was perceived
as a sacrament, the courts also treated fathers' rights
with a similar reverence, describing them as 'sacred'
and as such beyond the jurisdiction of the courts4.
The strength of mens' position as fathers during
the early nineteenth century was only equalled by their
position of power as husbands. For example, if a husband
chose to desert his wife and children, she could not
compel him to return; her property remained in his
possession and this included any monies she may have
earned during this desertion. A husband could return
at any time and insist upon the resumption of cohabit-
ation, and his legal rights over both wife and children
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remained undisputable. Wives held no statutory rights,
either to the custody of their children or to mainten-
ance for themselves or their children. Where a wife
could not use the somewhat limited facility of pledging
her husband's credit (Brophy & Smart 1981) she and her
children had no alternative but the workhouse - that is,
unless she could earn her own living - in which case her
earnings would be paid to her husband if he chose to
claim them (Reiss 1934).
If, instead of deserting his wife, a husband chose
to ill-treat her or commit adultery, the only redress
available to such a wife was to leave the marriage. How-
ever, as far as the court was concerned, the degree of
cruelty it would accept as sufficient justification for
her to leave had to be "nothing short of actual terror
and violence" 5 . Moreover where a husband's cruelty was,
according to the courts, of sufficient magnitude to justi-
fy her leaving, her property and children remained in his
control.
Thus, fathers' absolute rights during this period
made it virtually impossible for most wives to assert
their extremely limited rights as wives, except at the
expense of their children. Drunkenness, profligacy,
cruelty and desertion were not viewed as sufficient
grounds on which to deny fathers' rights to the custody
and control of their children 6 . The child could be re-
moved on the demand of the father even while the mother
was breastfeeding 7
 and, in one instance, the court re-
fused to interfere on behalf of a mother where a father
was in jail and his six-year-old son was being brought
to him daily by his mistress 8 . This is not, however,
to say that the term child 'welfare', or 'interests'
had not emerged as a concept in legal discourses during
this period. Indeed, it was apparent as a concept in
case law as early as the 174O. But what is signifi-
cant about its employment in legal practice during the
nineteenth century is that those early decisions carried
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both implicit and explicit assumptions about fathers'
rights, such that the preservation and perpetuation of
those rights to the exclusion of all other consider-
ations were viewed as synonymous with meeting the inter-
ests and welfare of children10.
Where the courts did interfere with the absolute
rights of fathers over their children, these cases were
generally those where either the father had administered
such gross ill-treatment and cruelty as to lead to his
prosecution and imprisonment' 1 , or where his gross im-
moral conduct was such that the court was of the opinion
that the children were in danger of contamination and
corruption if left in his care' 2 . Not surprisingly, over
this period the Courts of Chancery continued to focus on
its role of protecting the property of heirs, so that it
would refuse to uphold a father's rights to the custody
of an infant where it was likely that philandering fathers,
though not in a position themselves to contribute to their
children's upkeep (or even to their own upkeep) , might
nevertheless, as the children's rightful legal guardian,
have access to the sometimes considerable fortune of
their children's inheritance. As Lord Mansfield stated:
"...the natural right is with the father,
but if the father is bankrupt, or if he
contributed nothing for the child or the
family unit...the court will not think
it right that the child should be with
him."
Blisset's Case (1774) Lofft 789;
see also: Gifford & Gifford,
quoted in Blisset.
Even so, towards the mid-nineteenth century the
courts continued to express clear reluctance to inter-
fere with the rights of fathers. In the 1840s, for
example, the Lord Chancellor argued that the father
must have so conducted himself:
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"...as to render it not merely better
for the children but essential for their
safety or their welfare in some very
serious and important respect that his
rights should be lost or suspended...
or interfered with. If the word
'essential' is too strong, it is not
much too strong."
Re Fynn (1848) 2 De G. & Sm. 457
Moreover, not only did the courts relentlessly uphold the
rights	 of some neglectful and cruel fathers during
this period, but in addition they refused to recognise the
validity of agreements in which fathers voluntarily gave
up their rights to the custody of their children. In
effect, this meant that where a husband and wife agreed
in a separation deed that she should have the custody of
their children and should bring them up, he could return
at any time and either take the children or simply resume
control over them and the organisation of their lives.
Under those circumstances the children's mother had no
recourse to the law to uphold their original agreement'4.
Lord Chelmsford restates this position in 1873 during
attempts to change the situation:
"...the position of a wife separated from
her husband was rendered even more distres-
sing in consequence of the manner in which
the Court dealt with separation deeds...
This deed might contain a certain clause
giving the children to the mother; but if
so, the deed is not the slightest degree
binding if the husband did not choose to
be bound by it...if she appealed to the
Courts of Chancery for its interpretation,
the Court must refuse its aid on the grounds
that it was contrary to public policy for the
husband to relinquish his duty - the care
and management of his children."
Hansard 3rd Series 1873, Vol.
CCXV, Col. 14.
So that, not only were husbands able to dictate to a
large extent the amount of contact between mothers and
children through frequent disruption and change of mind,
but in addition they could influence the quality of
mother-child relationships by similar methods.
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The absolute rights of fathers as legal guardians
of their children also extended beyond the lifetime of
fathers during this period, so that a father could, by
a Will, appoint guardian(s) to act on his behalf, carry-
ing out his wishes after his death 15 . Guardians appointed
in this way held the same absolute powers (to carry out
the wishes of the father) as the father had held himself.
Under these circumstances, the Lord Chancellor in 1840
felt it necessary to set out the legal position of mothers:
"I thought it necessary to explain that, in
point of law, she had no right to control
the power of the testamentary guardian. It
is proper that mothers of children thus cir-
cumstanced should know they have no right
as such to interfere with testamentary
guardians..."
Cottenham, in Talbot v the Earl of
Shrewsbury (1840) 4 My & Gv, 672
Indeed, during this period - if the father did appoint the
children's mother as one of a number of legal guardians -
she had no more power or say in decisions concerning the
children, such as where the children should live, their
education and religious upbringing etc., than any of the
16
other guardians appointed by the father . If the father
did not appoint a guardian and the court chose, in these
circumstances, to appoint the mother as guardian to her
children, this was not in respect of any rights held by
her as their mother but rather as a consequence of the
power of the court in such circumstances to appoint and
control testamentary guardians17.
State Intervention into Fathers' Rights
State intervention into the absolute power and rights
held by fathers was both slow and, initially, class speci-
fic. In the period prior to the introduction of civil
divorce (1857) , pressure for legal changes was mounted on
two levels. Firstly, from the beginnings of campaigns for
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the recognition of the status of women as mothers, and
secondly from an increasing concern about the court's
lack of power to enforce the duty to maintain upon neg-
lectful husbands and fathers. Indeed, Blackstone (1765)
had argued that:
"...the power of the father over the child
is derived from.. .their duty.. .to enable
the parent the more effectively to perform
his duty."
Commentaries on the Laws of England
Yet, increasingly, the total absence of power within the
law to enforce that duty upon cruel and neglectful fathers
received comment within the court:
"The law makes the father the guardian of
his children by nature and by nurture...
you may go to the King's Bench for a
habeas corpus to restore the child to its
father but when you have restored the
child to its father can you go to the
King's Bench and compel that father to
subscribe even to the amount of five
shillings a year for maintenance of the
child?...wherever the power of the law
rests with respect to the protection of
children it is clear that it ought to ex-
ist somewhere; if it be not in this court,
where does it exist?... The courts of law
can enforce the rights of the father but
they are not equal to enforcing the duties
of the fathe. ."
The Lord Chancellor in Wellesley V
Duke of Beaufort (1827) 2 Russ 1
It has been argued that the fundamental reason why
the courts were not in fact equal to the task of enforc-
ing the duty to maintain upon fathers is to be found in
the low social significance of children during this period
(Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973). It is argued that children
had never been of much account in England during this
period; too many died before reaching maturity, and those
who survived were hurried into the ranks of adult society.
While this explanation is clearly applicable in relation
to the timing of state intervention and provision for
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certain classes of children (i.e. those abandoned by
their parents - the vagabond and delinquent child),
but in relation to the lack of adequate provision for
the child who suffered within the family, this explanation
is insufficient. Moreover, if one examines the debates
and legal provisions which followed nineteenth century
campaigns to achieve a legal remedy for women and
children in these circumstances, those debates and
discussions reveal a rather different rationale, which
operated both on the provision of custody legislation
and maintenance provision. It is to those debates and
the recurrent focus upon 'marriage' that I now turn.
Mothers' Rights?
Although earlier case law in the Chancery Courts
had illustrated both reluctance and the inability of the
court to interfere in the common law rights of fathers,
public debate over the issue of mothers' total lack of
rights was prompted by two somewhat famous custody
disputes. In both cases, of course, prominence was
undoubtedly due to the stigma attached to domestic disputes
in aristocratic families, but in the second case
particularly, the notoriety of the parents involved
gave rise to much publicity.
In the first case (brought under habeas corpus
proceedings) the court ordered a mother (Mrs Greenhill)
to hand over three daughters, all under the age of six,
to their father. The father, who had been living in
adultery with his mistress, claimed custody of his
children, arguing that his wife had no means of supporting
the children and, as their legal guardian, he - as
their father - had full rights to their custody. He
proposed therefore to hand them over to his own mother
to be brought up 18 . Mrs Greenhill had refused to hand
over the children; however, the court argued:
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"...she had by her conduct taken them out
of his custody...that he had a right to
claim that they all be restored...the fact
of a father having formed an improper con-
nection is not of itself sufficient reason
for separating his children from him...
The right is with the father and must take
effect."
R v Greenhill (1836) 4 AD & E, 928
The second case which raised substantial public de-
bate was that of Caroline Norton who left her husband
taking their three children. Her husband later seized
the children, took them to Scotland, and refused her access
to them. Caroline Norton began a determined crusade for
legal reform on the question of 'rights' over children.
As a married woman during this period, she had no legal
status independent of her husband; she had no rights to
maintenance from him; she could not herself make contracts
nor, following her separation, could she retain any earnings
she made if her husband chose to claim them. Even so, she
did have some major advantages over some of the mothers
who had attempted to question the common law rights of
fathers. She was a popular society hostess, and was well-
known in her own right as a successful journalist and
author. As a prominent member of the aristocracy, her
pamphlets and letters which documented the powerlessness
19
of mothers in the English courts 	 did find some sympathy
within Parliament, and a Private Member's Bill was intro-
duced on her behalf. It is undoubtedly the case that
Caroline Norton's friendship with Lord Melbourne (Ackland
1948) and her personal influence with other members of
Parliament made the Bill possible. Norton's particular
crusade was born of her anxiety and frustration at being
deprived of any relationship or communication with her
children. She did not mount an overtly feminist campaign
attacking the patriarchal common law rights of fathers
and husbands. Instead she relied upon her personal grief
and anger expressed through her literary talents. Her
crusade then was primarily a moral issue, resting upon
her innocence of matrimonial offence and the symbolism of
motherhood. Indeed, Norton was probably one of the first
women to draw upon an emerging ideology of motherhood.
- 1J_ -
The Private Member's Bill introduced into the House
of Commons by Sergeant Talfourd (who had represented Mr
Greenhill 20 ) was the first of two attempts to introduce
reforms to fathers' common law rights during the 1830s.
The first Bill proposed that, in a case of separation,
a wife - whether guilty or innocent of adultery - could
demand access to, but not custody of, her children. The
first Bill was eventually thrown out by the House of
Lords. However, the general response to those initial
proposals both inside and outside Parliament provided,
perhaps for the first time, debate of deeply held beliefs
about the nature of men's rights as husbands and fathers
over wives and children as embodying the correct and
essential structure of family relations during this
period.
What is so striking about those early debates on the
nature	 of the distribution of power in the family is
not their historical specificity, but rather their con-
temporary familiarity. For example, a pamphlet written
in response to both the campaigns of Caroline Norton and
the proposals contained in the initial Bill, argued that
the Bill would most inevitably undermine the institution
of marriage itself, and that the children of a marriage
were often the chief factor in maintaining it as an
essential institution. The pamphlet continued:
"It is notorious that one of the strongest
hindrances in all cases...to preserve wives
from lightly separating from their husbands
is the knowledge that they will thereby lose
their maternal rights. This at all times
has been a safeguard to preserve the
institution of marriage."	 21Jahied Brenton (1838)	 - quoted
in Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973, p. 374)
Opposition to the Bill then tended to argue that its
proposal favoured separation between husband and wife.
Much of the debate depended upon a consensus on the view
that children should be used as a mechanism to control and
keep women in marriages where husbands were frequently
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violent and/or neglectful, and which they might other-
wise have left. Indeed, in the debate following the
initial Bill, no mention was made of the lack of any gen-
eral legal remedy available to women and children who
were suffering at the hands of vindictive and violent men,
nor was attention focused on the lack of legal provision
to enforce the duty to maintain children upon neglectful
fathers (even though the Lord Chancellor had himself
pointed out this anomaly some ten years previously)22.
Rather, it appears that the whole question of the pro-
tection of children, and the duties of parents in these
circumstances, received only subsidiary discussion within
the context of wives and mothers who lived apart from
their husbands, and who were therefore perceived as failing
in their maternal duties towards their children:
"It is true that it is by no means certain
that wives who live with their husbands do ful-
fil all their duties to their children; but
it is quite certain that those who are liv-
ing apart from them do not and cannot fulfil
any of them."
Jahied Brenton (1838) op. cit.
The popular appeal and strength of arguments which
linked the provision of legal remedies for mothers with
accusations of state support for the breakdown of marriage
(and therefore ultimately against the best interests of
both mothers and children) 23 is clearly reflected in the
modifications which appeared in the second Bill, intro-
duced the following year. The proposals contained in
this second Bill, when compared with the initial proposals,
were clearly calculated to ensure no criticism on the basis
of the Bill actually favouring separation of husband and
wife. In essence, the second Bill did not provide certain
mothers with any 'rights' as such (equivalent to those
possessed by fathers as legal guardians). Instead, it
provided the courts with certain powers which the court
could use in relation to some categories of mothers if it
so chose; a judge in Equity could, if he so wished, in a
case of separation make an order allowing a mother who
- 13 -
was proved innocent of adultery, custody of her children
until they reached the age of seven years. The judge
could also, if he thought fit, allow her access to her
older children. Those provisions were ultimately con-
24tamed in the 1839 Custody of Infants Act
As can be seen, that Act represented something of a
compromise and was illustrative of a fundamental tension
between, on the one hand, increasingly widespread recog-
nition of the hardship, neglect and cruelty suffered by
many women and children within families 25 ; and on the other,
the impossibility of providing legal remedies to allievi-
ate that hardship which did not appear to undermine the
ideological and material structure of the nineteenth
century family, the essence of which was seen to lie in
the absolute power of husbands and fathers, and the power-
lessness and dependency of wives and children.
The significance of that first piece of legislation,
however, does go beyond its final content (as illustrat-
ive of the power and influence of some concerns over
others). What is perhaps more important in terms of
understanding the development of the law and legal prac-
tice in the field of child custody, was the mechanism
through which those modifications were orchestrated. The
law's focus upon children, as previously discussed, was
initiated through a concern over property and the issue of
rightful inheritance. 'Infancy', therefore, was consti-
tuted as a legal category only in relation to discourses
about land and marriage contracts (Fitz 1979). That con-
cern with land and property, and the corresponding pro-
tection of inheritance, in effect created a potential cus-
todial 'space' - between the heir and her/his legal
guardian. The doctrine of parens patriae provided justi-
fication for intervention and legitimated the removal of
guardianship rights where the possibility of maltrans-
action might occur.
The devolution of this power upon the courts of
Chancery provided the nineteenth century state with that
- 14 -
same lacuna - a theoretical space which it was increas-
ingly to utilise to intervene and formally reduce the
absolute powers of fathers as legal guardians of their
children. So that, in response to pressures from cam-
paigns about womens' powerlessness as mothers and increas-
ing instances of cruelty and hardship on the part of fath -
ers, the nineteenth century state's reply was not to rou-
tinely and unproblematically reduce that powerlessness
by giving mothers equal or age-related guardianship 'rights'
over children; instead, in those cases which actually
reached the courts, a somewhat different and more far-
reaching solution was provided. The power which men held
as fathers was increasingly to be subjected to limitations -
but not by introducing mothers' guardianship rights
(thereby legally formalising her relationship with her
children as their mother). Rather, some of the inherent
power which was currently held by fathers was relocated
to the court. As the Lord Chancellor stated shortly after
the 1839 Custody of Infants Act: "I have now an absolute
authority over children under seven years of age..."
[Warde v Warde (1849) 2 Ph, 7881
It was then through this (initially limited) dis-
cretionary power allocated by the state to the courts,
authorising the courts to determine who should fill that
custodial 'space', that women became constituted as
mothers. On the separation of husband and wife, mothers
were given a limited right to ask the court to consider
their request to be allowed to care for their children.
The decision as to whether to grant that request lay en-
tirely with the newly-acquired discretionary power of the
Courts of Chancery.
Those beginnings, then, of a shift of power within
certain privileged sections of the nineteenth century
family are not therefore simply to be conceived in terms
of a gradual 'swing of the pendulum' - from fathers to
mothers. But rather, mark the beginnings of a specific
form of state intervention into the family. This form of
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intervention is complex, it was not simply informed by
disputes between fathers and mothers and a growing concern
with the lack of rights of mothers. Firstly, intervention
was of course class specific. But secondly, the content
of legal intervention (initially through the Guardianship
Acts and later through divorce legislation) revealed
a further concern. Clearly there was increased recog-
nition of the need to provide protective legislation
for certain women and children. However, that recognition
existed alonide a further more clearly defined objective:
that such protection as was conceded to women and children
should not appear to undermine the institution of the
family. Separation from husbands and fathers must not
be a viable option for mothers except in the most extreme
and severe circumstances. Thus, the development of
policy in this field (both in terms of law and legal
practices) is informed by this consideration and it is
ultimately a central theme in understanding the legal
construction of motherhood during the latter part of
the nineteenth century. The final part of this chapter
is therefore concerned with the emergence and development
of that theme through both divorce law and Guardianship
jurisdictions.
Divorce Law and Child Custod
The introduction of civil divorce in 1857 conferred
further discretionary powers on the courts in relation to
the children of divorcing parents. Under the Matrimonial
Causes Act of that year, the courts were authorised to:
"...make such provision in the final decree
asit may deem just and proper with respect
to custody maintenance and education of the
children...and may if it shall think fit
direct proper proceedings to be taken for
placing such children under the protection
of the court of Chancery..."
s.35 Matrimonial Causes Act 1857
(emphasis added)
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Formally, this section did give the courts exten-
sive discretionary powers to intervene in the common law
rights of all fathers involved in divorce proceedings, and
indeed that section was interpreted by the courts as
granting a wider jurisdiction over children than had previ-
ously been possible in either Equity or common law26.
Even so, this did not necessarily improve the position of
many women and children, primarily because the exercise
of that discretionary power was mediated through an assess-
ment of the mother's matrimonial behaviour. A single act
of adultery on the part of a mother not only afforded
her husband the opportunity of divorcing her 27 , but in
addition it also effectively removed her right to apply to
the court for exercise of its discretionary power over
children:
"It will probably have a salutary effect on
the interests of public policy if it should
be known that a woman found guilty of adult-
ery will forfeit so far as this court is con-
cerned all rights to the custody of or ac-
cess to her children."
Seddon v Seddon & Doyle (1862)
2 Sw & Tr. 642
Moreover, not only did a single act of adultery on the part
of the wife mean the loss of her children and any right to
even see them, it also meant the loss of any rights to
maintenance. So that in practice, the court's application
of this extended discretionary power had differing effects
for the children of the upper classes depending upon the
guilt or innocence of their mothers.
In the Chancery Courts applications under the
Custody of Infants Act continued to bar petitions by
wives found guilty of adultery until 187328. A Bill of
that year had also sought to make binding those voluntary
separation agreements in which husbands agreed to mothers'
custody of their children. However, while provision was
made in a Custody of Infants Act of that year which allowed
for the legal recognition of such agreements, verification
of those agreements was made subject to the discretionary
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powers of the courts0 So that, it was ultimately the
court which decided whether or not husbands should be
bound by their earlier undertaking29.
In practice, the exercise of this further dis-
cretionary power showed the courts' willingness to return
children to fathers who changed their minds, despite the
existence of a legal deed of separation. For example,
in the Besant case, Mrs Besant's daughter was returned to
her husband on the grounds of Mrs Besant's views on reli -
gion and contraception (she was an atheist and promoted
birth control for women30 )	 The court argued that the
child was being returned to her father "otherwise the child
might not be brought up in a father's [religiousl belief
which he had a right to demand" 31 , The court here main-
tained that it had a clear duty to the Ward to prevent her
from exposure to the risk of being brought up: "in oppo-
sition to the views of mankind generally of what is morally
decent, womanly, and proper" (in Besant (1879) 11 Ch D
508 COAO)
Moreover, there continued to be resistance within the
courts to afford some wives the protection they required
as wives (that is, the right to live separately from hus-
bands) without subjecting them to uncertainty as to the
consequences for their role as mothers0 For example,
following the 1839 Custody of Infants Act, it was still
argued:
"000it does not follow that because a hus-
band's conduct is such as to make his wife
unhappy that he is therefore to be deprived
of the custody of his children0 To justify
such an interference with the father's
rights, his conduct must appear to be of
such a nature as to be likely to contami -
nate and corrupt the morals of his child-
ren01'
In Re Spense (1847) 2 Ph0 247
The position of women-as-wives, and women-as-
mothers then still presented the courts with what was
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felt to be a dilemma. A central objective in the argu-
ments and debates of the 1830s had been for provisions
which would enable married women to assert their limited
rights as wives to gain protection from husbands, without
being restrained by fear of separation from their child-
ren. The courts, however, initially continued to adopt
the criteria applied prior to the introduction of the 1839
Act. Indeed the criteria applied above in Re Spense was
precisely that on which the court had already shown an
albeit limited willingness to intervene in fathers' com-
mon law rights in the early part of the nineteenth century32.
Even though the 'intention' underlying the provisions of
the 1839 Act were later laid out more clearly, for example
it was stated in 1849:
"...the object of the Act...was to protect
mothers from the tyranny of husbands who ill-
used them. .she was [previously] precluded from
seeking justice from her husband by the
terror of that power which the law gave
him of taking her children from her. That
was felt to be so great a hardship and
injustice that Parliament thought the mother
ought to have the protection of the law
with respect to her children...and that she
should be at liberty to assert her rights
as a wife without risk of any injury being
done to her feelings as a mother."
The Lord Chancellor in Warde v Warde
(1849) 2 Ph. 788
Mothers, then, during this period continued to be
excluded as custodial parents except in those situations
where she was successful in establishing exceptional and
grave misconduct on the part of her husband. This was be-
cause neither the 1839 Custody of Infants Act, nor the
1873 Custody of Inf ants Act gave mothers any general
rights as legal guardians of their children. Indeed, as
discussed earlier, even following the death of her husband,
mothers did not necessarily gain any increased powers -
this depended on whether her husband had chosen to appoint
her as a testamentary guardian. And even in these circum
-
stances she had no more power than any other guardian so
appointed, and the task of all guardians appointed by the
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father to act after his death was simply to carry out
his wishes.
During the 1880s, attempts were made to limit the
rights of fathers to appoint guardians with superior
rights to those of widowed mothers. A Private Member's
Bill proposed to overcome the problems of mothers excluded
in this way by providing that, during marriage, both parents
should be joint guardians of their children 33 . On the
death of either parent, the surviving parent would be the
child's legal guardian. Where parents separated, it was
proposed that questions of custody or religious education
should be decided by the court in the exercise of its dis-
cretion. However, the proposal to introduce joint
guardianship over children within marriage raised similar
objections to those voiced during the debates over the
initial Custody of Infants Bill introduced in 1838. Oppo-
sition, both inside and outside Parliament, focused upon
the issue of the necessity of unequal power over children
within the family, and the dangers envisaged by 'divided
power'. In Parliament, for example, it was argued:
"Nothing could be more injurious than di-
vided guardianship...[thisl bill would in-
troduce discord between husband and wife,
it would place women in a position of
equality with men which they did not by
their nature possess."
Parliamentary Debate H.L. Ap 21
(1885) Vol. 297,p.298
Strong opposition finally resulted in the loss of that
Bill. However, a further Bill did reach the Statute books
the following year 34 . That Act again clearly reflected an
attempt to reconcile some of the major criticisms of the
law as it stood in relation to the powerlessness of mothers
but, at the same time, illustrated the ultimate strength
of opposition to remedies which proposed to increase the
legal power of wives within marriage. The notion that
divided power within the family represented a threat to
its stability and durability was successful in getting pro-
posals for joint guardianship dropped from the final Bill.
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Mothers were not to be legal guardians of their children
while fathers survived. However, the Guardianship of
Infants Act of 1886 did concede some limited rights to
mothers which they had not previously held.
Firstly, the Act provided that a mother could only
become the legal guardian of her children on the death of
her husband 35 . She was then to act alone, or if the
father had appointed other guardians, then jointly with
them. If the father had not appointed any guardians,
then the court was here given jurisdiction to appoint a
36guardian to act with the mother . The gain here, then,
for mothers was that they no longer had to rely on
husbands' favour or goodwill to make them guardians of
their children after his death. However, having acquired
guardianship rights on the death of a father, a mother
still had no more power and authority over her children
than other guardians appointed to act jointly with her.
That position is made clear under Section 3(2) of the
1886 Act, which dealt with mothers' rights to appoint
guardians to act after her death. That Section provided:
"The mother of any infant may by deed or will
provisionally nominate some fit person or per-
Sons to act as guardians...after her death
jointly with the father...and the court after
her death if it can be shown to the Satis-
faction of the court that the father is for
some reason unfit to be the sole guardian of
his children, may confirm this appointment."
s.3(2) Guardianship of Infants
Act 1886.
So mothers could in fact simply nominate a guardian(s)
to act while fathers were still alive. The nomination
was only to operate provisionally. Guardians appointed
by the mother then under these provisions did not become
guardians by the mere act of appointment (as in the case
of guardians appointed by the father). Instead, the
appointment must be confirmed by the court, and, until that
time, it had no binding effect. Moreover, the court
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would only confirm a mother's appointment if it was
convinced that for some grave reason the father was un-
fitted to be the sole guardian of their children.
The fundamental question regarding womens' powerless-
ness as mothers, both in and outside of marriage and on
the death of fathers, was again viewed as an extremist
proposition. The preference was for a solution which was
in accordance with the general direction in which the
settlement of disputes between parents was now most clearly
moving. The legal solution was to increase the court's
jurisdiction to capacity in relation to those disputes
over the custody of children which came before it. The
1886 Act formally gave the courts full jurisdiction to
override completely the common law rights of fathers in
relation to the custody of his children:
"The courts may, upon the application of
the mother of any infant...make such order as it
may think fit regarding the custody of such
infant and the right of access.. .of either
parent having regard to the welfare of the
infant, and to the conduct of the parents
and to the wishes as well of the mother
as of the father..."
s.5 Guardianship of Infants Act 1886
This Act completed the formal development of the court's
discretionary powers over those children who came before
it under Guardianship proceedings. There are several
important factors regarding the formulation of this Sec-
tion in the Act and its subsequent application in the
courts, and I will shortly turn to the significance of
these for mothers generally. However, in terms of the
general provisions of this Act, for those who had campaigned
for a complete reversal of the common law rights of
fathers, the provisions here were indeed disappointing.
The Act left untouched the rights of fathers within
marriage as sole legal guardians. Fathers therefore had
absolute rights to determine where children lived, their
education and religious upbringing; he retained the power
to consent to travel, to medical attention, and to their
marriage whilst they were minors. He continued in his
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capacity as sole guardian to have charge of any real
estate due to the infant and could continue to receive
and dispose of rents and profits from those estates
during the child's infancy. Even following the 1886 Act
a widowed mother had not any more rights than before to
have her children brought up in a religion different
from that of her husband unless some very exceptional
reason would persuade the court to grant her such a
'privilege' (Reiss 1934)	 Indeed, the position prior to
the 1886 Act was stated by Lord Justice James in 1871:
"The rule of the court is, thatthe court or
any persons who have the guardianship of a child
after the father's death should have a sacred
regard to the religion of the father in deal-
ing with the child."
Hawkesworth v Hawkesworth (1871)
Law0 Rep. 6 Ch. 539
And this rule applied even when the guardian appointed
by the father was the children's mother. So that, a
widowed mother's powers in these circumstances were ex-
actly the same as any other guardian appointed by the
father - simply to carry out his wishes. This rule was
not, in fact, altered by the provisions of the 1886 Act on
the appointment of testamentary guardians 37 . Moreover,
it was not necessary for the father to clearly express
any wish on the subject of the religious education of his
children0 If he died intestate, his wishes were either
inferred by the courts from his conduct or, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, it would be assumed that he
would have wished the children to be brought up in his
own religion 38 . So that, despite limited rights to become
her children's legal guardian on the death of her husband,
a widow could still find herself compelled to bring up her
children in a religion she abhorred. If, for example,•
during his lifetime he had contracted that some of the
children be brought up in a different religion from his
own (this arrangement was not infrequent in cases of
marriages between a member of the Church of England and
a member of the Church of Rome) that contract was non-
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enforceable following his death 39 . This position fre-
quently led to cases where relatives of a dead father
contested a mother's intention to continue to raise the
40children in a religion different from the dead father
The law then, over this period, offered a very limi-
ted and controlled protection to aspects of mothers' re-
lationships with their children. In relation to her
ability to get a divorce, for example, the grounds re-
mained unequal (a wife continued to have to prove her
husband guilty of adultery coupled with incest, or bigamy
or rape, or bestiality, or adultery plus cruelty) . Even
if this was the case, she had to have sufficient personal
means to enable her to take her case before the divorce
court which, during this period, only sat in London. So
that, not only must she have had an extremely good chance
of succeeding in her application, she also required a
substantial amount of money. Although the court could
in theory make an order for maintenance to the innocent
wife who succeeded in her application, in practice
clearly the court's powers were inadequate in cases
where a husband had no property on which the payment of
gross or annual sums could be secured.
A re-examination of law and legal practices in re-
lation to the question of child custody and the demise
of absolute father right in the nineteenth century re-
veals the complexity of the law in this field. But that
examination also reveals that it would be inaccurate to
portray that development simply in terms of changing
'rights'. Rather, we should view that period as one in
which both the state and the courts can clearly be shown
to have been equally, and indeed at times more concerned
with preserving and sustaining a patriarchal family form
than with the powerlessness of women (both as wives and
mothers) within marriage. To describe that period in
legal history as simply the "swing of the pendulum"
(Graveson & Crane 195740) conceals more than it reveals.
Indeed, neither the new Guardianship Acts nor the new
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divorce laws, in practice, offered any protection to the
vast majority of working class wives and mothers. There
was also, throughout the latter part of the nineteenth
century, increased comment on the high incidence of suf-
fering of wives at the hands of cruel and neglectful hus-
bands, for example, it was stated:
"No-one would read the public journals without
being constanctly struck with horror and amaze-
ment at the numerous reports of cases of bru-
tal and cruel assaults perpetrated upon the weak-
er sex by men who one blushed to think
were Englishmen, and yet were capable of such
atrocious acts."
(Under Secretary of the Home Office
142 Official Report, 3rd Series,
Col: 409-410)
And while it was popularly believed that such actions were
primarily located in working class homes, nevertheless the
1878 Matrimonial Causes Bill already before the House of
Commons contained no reference to wife abuse, and no pro-
visions to deal with that situation. The choice, then,
for working class wives beaten by their husbands was stark.
Such a wife could take the risk of bringing a case in the
Magistrates' Court (under criminal law 41 ). If she was
able to convince the magistrates of the danger and extent
of her husband's violence, he might be sent to prison.
In those circumstances, she and her children would probably
be sent to the workhouse for want of support during his
imprisonment. However, if a working class husband simply
refused to support his wife and children, the law offered
his dependents no direct protection, nor method of enforcing
the 'duty' of husbands, to maintain. In these circumstances,
her only recourse was again the workhouse.
Whilst she and her children resided in the workhouse,
and thereby became chargeable on the parish (and only while
they remained chargeable) , was it possible to take legal
action against her husband for their support. However,
the right to take legal action against such a husband was
not vested in his wife or children as legal dependents
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but rather, in the workhouse authorities under poor law pro-
vision 42 . Here, the Poor Law authorities would take out a civil
action against such a husband to enforce him to maintain his
wife and children whilst they remained 'chargeable t . The statu-
tory aim here, however, had been to protect the financial inter-
ests of ratepayers, rather than the physical well-being of the
children and/or wife (Manchester 1980; Reiss 1934; Pinchbeck &
Hewitt 1973).
A clause was finally included in the 1878 Matrimonial Causes
Bill 43
 (primarily as a result of the work of Frances Power Cobbe)
which provided that, if a wife did succeed in getting her husband
convicted of aggravated assault and, if she could satisfy the
court that her future safety was at risk, then the court could
order that she should no longer be legally bound to cohabit with
him. In addition, the magistrates could also order such a husband
to pay maintenance to his wife (though of course this in no way
ensured her support), and the court could, in these circumstances,
also make an order for the custody of their children.
During this period there were, however, several discrepancies
between the courts in their treatment of mothers and children.
For example, although this later Act did allow magistrates to
make order for the custody of children of the marriage, such
orders were only applicable to those children who were under ten
44years of age . This was despite the fact that, in the higher
courts under divorce proceedings, the courts had now complete
jurisdiction over all minor children of the marriage. And,
under Guardianship Acts, the higher court held jurisdiction
over all children under sixteen years45.
In addition, the 1878 Act also introduced into the
Magistrates Court a principle of moral evaluation of womens'
sexual behaviour. A wife could not therefore, under this Act,
ask the Magistrates Court to consider her application for
either maintenance or custody of their children if she was
found guilty of adultery - even though this bar to petition
had been removed from applications to the higher courts (under
Guardianship proceedings) in 187346. However, although this
statutory bar to petition by adulterous wives in the Magistrates
Courts formally separated mothers and children of different c1ass
in terms of the legal consequences of notions of morality
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and sexual behaviour, in practice such conceptions had
similar consequences for mothers and children of all
social classes well into the twentieth century.
Fathers, then, retained their position of ultimate
power within marriage as their children's sole legal
guardian. By extreme behaviour they could, towards the
latter part of the nineteenth century, forfeit those
rights. In such circumstances a mother might be allowed
to approach the courts and ask for the custody of her
children. Here a moral evaluation was made of her behavi-
our as a wife. If she was innocent of adultery, or suf-
ficiently 'deserving', she may be awarded custody. If,
however, she failed to convince the court of the extreme
nature of her husband's behaviour (e .g. adultery was not
of itself sufficient grounds to cease to cohabit) she
not only was unable to leave but, in addition, she had
no rights either to maintenance, nor to custody of any
children of the marriage. The primary focus of the law
over this period was on sustaining and perpetuating a speci-
fic family form in which power was vested in men as
heads of households. Women's claims as mothers in all types
of proceedings between husband and wife relied upon no-
tions of 'forfeit and innocence'. Women therefore acquired
no fundamental 'rights' over their children analogous
for example to those possessed by fathers which were based
upon kinship, sustained through legal 'rights' and pro-
tected by notions of borgeois individualism during this
period.
Later attempts to provide legislation for the magi-
strates court 47 again confronted the dichotomy between,
on the one hand meeting a demand for the protection and
maintenance of individual family members (i.e. women and
children) , and on the other taking punitive steps against
husbands and fathers which it was felt would necessarily
undermine the stability, and probably facilitate the break-
up of the family. This is not, however, to say that
notions of children's welfare or interests were absent
from case law during the mid-nineteenth century, but
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rather that the emergence of such notions did not co-
incide with any clear trend in the courts away from
prioritising fathers' common law rights. Indeed, in
instances where the possibility of a contradiction or
conflict of interests might arise, the court's position
was clear:
"It is not for the benefit of the infant as
conceived by the court, but it must be the
benefit of the infant having regard to the
natural law which points out that the father
knows better as a rule what is best for his
children."
Bowan, L.J. in Re Agar-Ellis
(1883) 24 Ch D
"It is not in our power to go into the
question as to what we think is best for
the infant. [This] father has not for-
feited his right to exercise his duties as
a father and we ought not to interfere...
this court holds this principle - that
when by birth a child is subject to a
father it is for the general interests of
families and for the general interests of
children, and really for the general in-
terests of the particular infant that the
court should not except in extreme cases
interfere with the discretion of the
father."
Cotton, L.J., ibid.
However, the introduction of 'infant welfare' into
statute law in 1886 as a principle for the Court to
consider in applications under the Guardianship Act48
did mark the beginnings of a shift within legal discourse
on the question of children involved in custody disputes
between parents. For example, during the last decade
of the nineteenth century in the Court of Appeal, it
was argued:
- 28 -
". . .the welfare of the child is not to be
measured by money alone nor by physical
comfort only. The word welfare must be
taken in its widest sense. The moral and
religious welfare of the child must be
considered as well as its physical well-
being. Nor will ties of affection be
discharged.
Lindley L.J. in Re McGrath (Inf ants)
1892 1 Ch
Clearly, the courts' approach here has moved some
considerable distance from its position at the beginning
of the nineteenth century (when it was occupied with infancy
as a category only as it was constituted through land law
and inheritance rights) and, from its concern during the
mid-nineteenth century, (with protecting and enforcing
fathers' rights). There has not simply been a broadening out
of the categories of children who became th focus of a
legal consideration. There is, in addition, a fundamental
change in relation to perceptions of what constitutes
'infancy' towards a consideration of what the important
social components of that role might be. Infancy as a
legal category was undergoing a qualitiative change. Within
law and legal practice this was articulated through a
gradual transfer of the terms in which questions concerning
custody were fought out - from an arena in which the court
simply had to establish rightful possession of the "body
of the infant" (rightful ownership) - to a quite different
focus: a focus upon the child itself through a consideration
of its 'welfare'. Welfarism ultimately provided the mechanism
through which 'childhood' became constituted in legal
discourses. And that focus upon children brought about a
substantial shift in the dominant ideology of the family and
a reconstruction of the role of mothers, and thus the
emergence of an ideology of motherhood. It is to those
two factors I will now turn.
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CHAPTER 2
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHILDHOOD AND THE
PATRIARCHAL FAMILY
The abundance of controlling, regulating and protective
legislation directed at different categories of children
over the latter part of the nineteenth century' is clearly
illustrative not simply of changing attitudes towards
children in the courts (and a concern to reorganise many
aspects of their lives) but also of enormous economic and
political transformations within Englih society under com-
petitive capitalism. There has been substantial work on
this era in the development of the British economy and
the reproduction of capital (Holloway & Picciotto 1978).
In this chapter, however, I am primarily concerned with
aspects of that reproduction of labour which had specific
consequences for discourses concerning children, and the
subsequent repercussions which that focus had for aspects
of power and gender within the patriarchal family, Thus
I will focus on the child rescue and infant protectionist
movements which developed over the latter half of the nine-
teenth century. I will examine how those campaigns pro-
gressed from a fairly narrow concern with the (apparently)
paréntless infant to encapsulate all categories of children,
that is to say, children both within and outside of the
family.
The focus upon children, such as it was over the
early part of the nineteenth century, was directed towards
the poverty-stricken, the abandoned, the vagrant, the
illegitimate and delinquent child - the (for all intents
and purposes) parentless child. The problem of delin-
quency amongst children was viewed as inextricable from
that of parental abandonment and thereby, destitution2.
(Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973; Manchester 1980) . Philanthropic
and benevolent agencies existed alonside the controlling and
regulating role of the nineteenth century state. The
purpose here however is not to attempt to separate out those
different activities (although clearly there
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were important and substantially different means and ends)
but rather to locate some of the results of those activi-
ties upon the lives of children over this period0 Central
to those improvements, then, was the notion of the child
'at risk'. Initially it was the parentless working class
child, who was the focus of attention0 Philanthropists
(e.g0 Peter Bedford, the famous Spitalfields philanthropist,
and the Quakers, Elizabeth Fry and James and Samuel Gurney,
and Mary Carpenter) attempted to contain, train and edu-
cate such categories of children. One motive being to
redirect such children away from becoming part of the crimi-
nal classes once they left the workhouse. Towards the end
of the nineteenth century, rescue organisations such as Dr.
Barnardo's Homes played a considerable role in gaining
state support through legislation to protect the neglected
and abandoned child who was, nevertheless, not necessarily
parentless 3 . Such organisations were instrumental in
gaining legislation which sought to limit the rights of
parents to reclaim children previously abandoned to the care
of these institutions0 An Act of 1891 gave the courts
jurisdiction to completely override 'parental' rights and
refuse an
	
application for the return of the child in
these circumstances:
"000it the court is of the opinion that the
parent has abandoned or neglected the child
or that he has otherwise so conducted him-
self that the court should refuse to enforce
his right to the custody of the child.0."
s.1 Custody of Children Act 1891
A further sphere where children' were increasingly
deemed to be 'at risk' was within the labour market,
through economic exploitation. The exploitation of child
labour during the nineteenth century is well documented
(JOHO Plumb 1950; Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973; Humphries 1982) ,
as is the essential contribution this labour provided
towards the income of the working class family (Pinchbeck
1930; Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973) 0 Various investigations
and Commissions into the hours, conditions and health of
child labour resulted in the gradual removal of children
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from employment in fields, factories, mines, mills,
workshops and cottage industries throughout the nine-
teenth century 4 . Thus, conceptions of the category of
children 'at risk' was extended to include economic ex-
ploitation, both by employers and by parents themselves0
In addition, legislation seeking to implement compulsory
education of young children also attempted to restrict
their employment in the labour market 5 . So that, the cir-
cumstances in which 'parental rights' could be set aside
gradually increased as the category of children encompassed
in the 'at risk' classification expanded.
The second set of circumstances which were central
to the reconstruction of childhood over this period were
those generated by fears over high infant mortality rates, and
falling	 birth rates (Davin 1978)
	
Fears of a general
population decline found expression in a barrage of propa-
ganda on the importance of child health 6 (Davin 1978; Cowan
1982). Economic and political analyses of the falling
birth rate focused on both home and foreign policy in
terms of assessing the consequences of the fall for new
developments in industrial capitalism in Britain0 For
example, in relation to foreign policy, notions of imperi-
alist expansion focused on both the quality and the quan-
tity of the British race as a resource from which to popu-
late the white dominions 7 . Children, then, became a
question of national importance; they were "the capital
of a country, and upon them depended the future of the
country and the empire"0 However, whatever the rhetoric,
the reality of the conditions of health of the vast majority
of working class children was 	 a growing	 national
problem0 Not only were general standards of physique very
poor (and a workforce with ill-health meant poor profits
for industry) but in addition, problems over public health
and hygiene had reached epidemic proportions (Cowan 1982;
Davin 1978).
That concern over the quality and quantity of Brit-
ain's children, however, dramatically increased a focus
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upon children within the family. But not only was the
child the focus of attention (Its poor physical condition
and low rate of survival). In addition.it was argued that,
if children's chances of reaching adulthood were slim, then
those responsible for child care must be to blame, that is
to say, mothers were the root of the problem: "...in
dealing with infant mortality, it is the mothers we must
go for, not the babies..." (Kanthack, Preservation of Infant
Life, p.28. Quoted in Davin 1978). What followed from
this fear for the 'population' was a medicalization of
childcare and childrearing practices (Davin 1978; Donzelot
1980).	 Fears for both the quality and quantity of
the nation's children focused attention upon mothers, both
to blame, but also as a mechanism through which to dis-
seminate new scientific methods of childcare.
The Reconstruction of Motherhood
The subsequent reconstruction of women's role in
the family over this period centred upon a new craft -
that of 'motherhood' - with one primary task: childrearing.
The subsequent strength of that ideology of motherhood
transcended class division, but it also incorporated class
specific features (Davin 1978; Donzelot 1980) . For
working class mothers, the location of blame (for the poor
physical condition of children and their poor chances of
survival) at the level of individual mothers' ignorance
obscured the effects upon child health of poverty and a
deprived environment. It proved, however, to be an accept-
able explanation for a national economic and political
problem (Cowan 1982; Davin 1978). In addition, it provided
the rationale for intervention into the working class
family by both state and voluntary agencies. Indeed,
voluntary organisations promoting public health and dom-
estic and moral hygiene mushroomed over this period 9 . Doc-
tors, district nurses and health visitors all asserted
their superior knowledge and authority over traditional
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methods of childrearing. And mother's ignorance, rather
than inadequacy of conditions and resources, formed the
focus of both state and voluntary attention (Davin 1978).
In relation to	 the focus	 on	 children of
the middle and upper classes, much of the concern was racist
andrelated to notions of the importance of 'good stock and
pure breeding'. For example, eugenics propaganda directed
at the upper classes incorporating fears of the perceived
consequences of limiting family size (a practice already
beginning in the upper classes). It was argued that in
these classes, the birth rate should increase, both to
provide an administrative elite for the White dominions
and to prevent the nation at home from being populated by
the "freely-breeding alien immigrants" (Davin 1978) . It
was also felt that the increased educational and employ-
ment opportunities which were opening up to women of these
classes was responsible both for decisions to abstain from
marriage, and to restrict the number of children they had
.once married. Indeed, in an attempt to discourage these
practices among middle and upper class women, it was
argued that intellectual development itself might impair
women's reproductive capacity:
"If child-bearing women must be intellectually
handicapped, then the penalty to be paid for
race predominance is the subjection of women."
Karl Pearson, 1885, lecture on
The Woman Question, quoted in
Davin 1978, p.20
Increasingly during this period , women in these classes
were encouraqed to stay 'at home'; to the extent that
this was achieved, they became visible symbols of status
for their husbands' social and financial success (Davin
1978; Oakley 1974)
Clearly the economic and political context in which
that preoccupation with infant mortality emerged is import-
ant. However, my focus here. is not to enter into debate
over the reproduction of capitalism and the reproduction of
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relations of reproduction; rather, the purpose here. is to
document some of the central changes which converged on
the lives of children during the period in such a form
as to relocate, control, regulate, and not unproblematic-
ally, protect increasing aspects of their lives within
the family. That primary focus on children legitimated a
specific form of state intervention into the patriarchal
family - especially initially the working class family.
At one and the same time, mothers were blamed, but
'motherhood' was revered; high infant mortality rates were
a consequence of her ignorance and inability, but scien-
tific motherhood was to give her a new social status.
Women were to be 'mothers-of-the-race'; motherhood was
glorified, and elevated to a new dignity (Davin 1978). For
the middle and upper class mother also, blame was not
without a focus. Here, self-interest and concern for her
own educational enlightenment was viewed as detrimental
to the national effort to increase the birth rate in the
bourgeois family. During this period in civil society,
mothers were the central focus and the main point of
support for all actions which were directed towards a
reformation of family life. They were both the focus of
attention as mothers but, in addition, it was women who
were chosen as auxiliaries by both voluntary and state
agencies to disseminate the new scientific knowledge 	 -
the medical and welfare principles of childcare.
Ideology of Motherhood and the end of the Patriarchal
Family?
It has been argued (Donzelet 1980) that this
'elevation of motherhood' by domestic medicine was re-
sponsible for a 're-evaluation of power' between men and
women within the family. Indeed, Donzelet (1980) argues
that this shift marks the end of the patriarchal family.
Certainly it made women the focus of attention (for both
criticism and instruction). Motherhood became women's
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central task; it became a craft in which she must be
educated and trained, observed, criticised and super-
vised. And this surveillance of mothers brought about
by an initial focus upon children certainly did relocate
aspects of women's lives in terms of public attention,
and as points of intervention by both state and voluntary
agencies. However, in relation to questions of a sub-
stantive, re-evaluation of power within the patriarchal
family structure with material consequences for women
in terms of power and control both over their own lives,
and the lives of their children, the picture is less clear0
For example, in locating the working class mother as res-
ponsible for the weak and sickly nature of her children,
she became the focal point for education and instruction0
In particular this led to substantial intrusion into her
life and increased control over her time (Davin 1978)	 The
new standards of childcare which were set were, for the
vast majority (given their living conditions and resources)
totally unrealistic. District nurses, doctors and health
visitors all asserted their new science, denigrating care
by anyone other than mothers (i.e0, neighbours, older
children, grandmothers, etc.)
Mothers' employment in the waged economy became the
focus of much criticism (Hewitt 195w). 	 Her
employment outside the home was blamed for effects upon
children's health (Davin 1978) . Attempts to force married
women out of the waged economy through legislative means had
clearly	 failed, but limited opportunities, and the
ideological pressures brought about by the notion of
motherhood as a full-time job certainly operated as a
brake on married women's employment, and helped to confirm
women as casual workers (Hewitt 195')	 Davin (1978) also
identifies that pressure as helping to create an army of
women outworkers, who tried to negotiate the need for money
from paid employment with the ideological pressure to be
full-time mothers0 To the extent that this pressure was
successful in reducing women's paid employment in the labour
market and thereby increased her dependency on the male
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breadwinner, her subordination within the family would seem
to increase with her increased sole responsibility for
childrearing. Thus, increased social 'status' and promi-
nence of mothers does not have any necessary (or indeed
unproblematic) relationship with a relocation of 'power
and control' in the nineteenth century family.
The question of women's problematic and contra-
dictory status as mothers towards the end of the nine-
teenth century, therefore, is even more clearly demon-
strated when we return to the legal status of her relation-
ship to her children.
As I documented in Chapter 1, the changing legal
position of wives as mothers cannot be described in terms
of a simple and gradual increase in her legal rights and
a subsequent decrease in fathers' common law rights.
Rather, I documented the emergence of the third party -
the state - into the management of the family. A mother's
position in relation to the custody of her children on
separation or divorce continued to rely on fathers for-
feiting their rights by gross misbehaviour. In these
circumstances, mothers acquired limited rights to ask
the court when considering the breakdown of the marriage,
to also consider their own position as mothers. The
decision to allocate children to the care and control
of mothers lay with the court in the exercise of what was,
by the end of the nineteenth century, a total discretion
over all children who came before it. To earn the favour
of this discretion, mothers had not simply to prove a
father's unfitness; she had, in addition, to convince the
courts of her own moral worth. That is to say, the position
from which she was judged as a mother depended upon her
matrimonial behaviour as a wife; thus, it was against
notions of morality and sexual behaviour deemed appropri-
ate for a wife that she was judged as a parent.
However, in civil society from a focus on infant
welfare, it was increasingly argued that children belonged
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"not merely to the parents but to the community as a whole",
childrearing was now a "cc-operative undertaking between
father, mother and state" (see Davin 1982)
	 It might appear
that against this ideological shift, women's campaigns for
legal rights as mcthers might fall on fertile ground.
How6ver, the focus was upon co-operation within marriage,
with regard to rights within marriage at the end of the
nineteenth century women had neither effective rights to
maintenance nor guardiai/h1?1er children. Outside of marriage
on divorce or separation she had only limited and conditional
rights, and the results of her application depended entirely
upon the court's evaluation of her moral behaviour as a
wife.
The emphasis upon 'childhood' and hence 'motherhood'
over the turn of the century certainly created a focus
upon women's caring role within the family. However, an
emphasis upon marriage and the family as the only legiti-
mate site for rearing children and the demand that mother-
hood be a full-time occupation, in effect increased women's
subordination within the family. Women's position in the
labour market waseffectively subordinated to her position
in the home. Yet there she was neither the focus of power
nor control over children and her ability to meet their
needs continued to rely upon husband's goodwill and
benevolence. Her position as mother, with renewed duty
and responsibility, did not lead to a redefinition of formal
power within the patriarchal family, she was not made an equal
legal guardian of her children, fathers remained sole legal
guardians.
However the campaigns of the nineteenth century f or
women's rights as wives and mothers had made public the





vindictive and neglectful husbands and fathers of all
social classes. The sanctity of the private domain of
the family had, to some extent, been broken. Domestic
relations became the focus of public debate. Campaigns
demonstrated a gross failure in the system of patronage
and protection, duty and responsibility, which it had been
claimed, flowed from the privileges and rights which the law
attached to men. Increasingly, 'scientific' welfarism
located mothers as a mechanism of intervention in the
family. However, such intervention was intended to secure
and sustain the family, rather than replace or undermine
it in any way. Giving women 'rights' per se within the
family was viewed necessarily undermining the structure
and stability of the institution of marriage. The law,
it was asserted, must not be seen as in any way supporting
the breakdown of marriage. Therefore, those severely
limited rights of application to the courts which women-
as-mothers did acquire towards the end of the nineteenth
century were, in fact, only operable on the breakdown of
marriage and the separation of husband and wife. At that
point of legal adjudiction, welfarist discourses there-
fore provided the dual mechanism through which childhood
and hence motherhood became constituted in family law.
Within the family, however, the rights of husbands and
fathers - their ultimate material and ideological power
and control - remained unimpaired. That shift of focus,
then, through the social construction of 'childhood' and
the subsequent reconstruction of 'motherhood' had no
necessary or radical weakening, let alone break-up of
the patriarchal relations within the family over this
period. And on divorce or separation patriarchal relations
were only marginally diluted by law and legal practice.
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MOTHERS' RIGHTS OR CHILDREN'S WELFARE? THE 1925
GUARDIANSHIP OF INFANTS ACT
In this chapter, I want to examine the campaign of
a group of twentieth century feminists who focused upon
mothers' lack of legal rights in marriage. Our general
understanding of feminist campaigns during the early part
of the century i usually located around the suffragettes
and campaigns for votes for women and the Sex Disqualification
(Removal) Act. However the 1925 Guardianship of Infants
Act was also a result of the campaign of feminists for
changes in the law in relation to the guardianship, custody
and maintenance of children.
In the period following the First World War, the
question of the role of law in the oppression of women
produced different responses amongst feminists. Although
few believed that obtaining the vote would provide the
solution to all the disadvantages experienced by women,
there were nevertheless wide differences of opinion regard-
ing which political goals should be pursued. In relation
to motherhood that debate focused largely on the issue of
whether women should campaign for equal rights with fathers
over children, or whether in fact women should argue for
special treatment in view of their larger responsibility
for children. In this chapter I want to examine the work
of a group of feminists whose work might initially be
viewed as generally more identifiable with the former
position. The National Union of Societies for Equal
Citizenship (NUSEC) was concerned to establish mothers
on an equal footing with fathers in relation to rights
and responsibilities over children within marriage.
However the Union's campaign was not limited to achieving
formal equality, it was linked to a more sophisticated
argument both about the unequal nature of marriage and the
role of law in sustaining that inequality.
	 Thus
feminists	 in	 NUSEC were
	 particularly
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concerned about the way in which mothers' lack of legal
rights over children was in effect utilised to restrain
women in marriages which they might otherwise have left.
The campaign of feminists in NUSEC between 1919 and
1925 covered several governments and eventually resulted
in the 1925 Act. That Act is important in understanding
the development of family law in this area for two reasons.
Firstly in legal discourses that Act is identified as
forming the basis of the contemporary approach to child
custody disputes. This is because the Act embodies the
welfare principle - the best interests of the child - as
the overriding principle for the court to consider in
exercising its discretion in custody disputes. (Although
of course the sentiments are already clearly visible in
case law). And secondly the Act is important because it
is also identified as establishing equality between
mothers and fathers in relation to rights over children
(e.g. Pettitt 1957). However I will argue through an
examination of the campaign and political struggles which
surrounded the passage of the various Bills, that in fact
the final Act did not establish formal equality between
mothers and fathers in relation to parenthood. Indeed,
I will argue that the final provisions of the Act were in
fact the outcome of a specific struggle in which the focus
of concern of the state was neither women's rights or
children's welfare, but rather the maintenance of the
patriarchal structure of the family. Moreover, I will
illustrate that the justification for preserving that
patriarchal structure was grounded in a material and
ideological rationale. This particular rationale reduced
considerations of the welfare and rights of individual family
members (.g. women and children) to questions in which the
major focus of concern was what the legal structure of the
family should be as a unit of consumption and distribution.
In the first section therefore I will discuss the
position of feminists within NUSEC in relation to law
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and motherhood, and the way in which the language and
sentiments of welfarism were ultimately successfully en-
gaged to displace the initially radical demands of NUSEC
for equal parental rights for mothers. The second part
of this chapter will examine the crystallization of
struggles between feminists and the state in 1924 and the
rationale adopted in a final rejection of feminists'
demands and the substitution of a government Bill0 The
third section will examine the proposals contained in the
government Bill in relation to custody and maintenance
of children on the-breakdown of marriage.
The Equality Debate and Mothers' Position
Within the 'amily
During 1919, the National Union of Societies for
Equal Citizenship began a campaign on behalf of some
twenty women's organisations to change the law in re-
lation to the guardianship custody and maintenance of
children0 The Union's position was for equal parental
rights for mothers but it also lodged an attack upon in-
equalities in marriage and the way in which the law
supported those inequalities. A central focus in that
latter criticism was the way in which the law in effect
utilised children to restrain women in intolerable
marriages. Thus they argued that regardless of the pro-
visions of the Guardianship cf Infants Act (1886) many women could
still only exercise their limited rights as wives at the
expense of their position as mothers. Because mothers
held no general rights as parents, women who were living
with violent, vindictive, cruel and/or habitually drunk
husbands were forced to "run the gauntlet"0 They could
leave such husbands (if they had the means to establish
a separate residence) but they could not take their child-
ren0 They must then attempt to prove to the court a suf-
ficient degree of cruelty to entitle them to a separation
order. If such mothers failed in that exercise, firstly
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they could not realistically return to such a husband,
and secondly, they could be sued by a husband for deser-
tion. Thus such women who failed to prove their case as
abused wives were effectively homeless with no means of
support and with no rights to see, let alone care for
their children. As the Union argued, many women lacked the
means to establish a separate residence and those who
wished to would not in any case leave their children in
the care of such men. Thus it was not only womens
financial dependency which trapped them in marriages they
might otherwise have left but in addition, their lack of
rights to take their children.
Moreover, the Union examined the law in relation to
the maintenance of children and argued that in fact there
was no clear enactment in law of the obligation on husbands
to maintain children or indeed wives so long as they
lived together'. Wives had no means of knowing how much
a husband earned or of establishing a minimum of support
for herself or her children. Although in theory women of
the wealthier classes could pledge their husbands' credit,
in practice this was an unpopular form of credit with the
local tradespeople, and was of minimal use. Working class
women however were entirely powerless to enforce maintenance
and in cases of neglect their only recourse, save family
and friends, was usually the workhouse.
The case upon which feminists based their campaign
was mothers' general lack of rights and power to act.
Mothers, they argued had no general rights which would
allow them to operate as legal parents independent of
fathers. ThUs they could not simply leave and take child-
ren, nor could they apply to the courts in matters con-
cerning either the quaraan/1aintenance of children within
marriage. Women's only method of gaining recognition as
a parent was to establish a matrimonial fault sufficient
on the part of husbands to break up the family.
NUSEC therefore prepared a Bill - the Guardianship
of Infants Bill - which was introduced into Parliament
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on behalf of the women's societies in 1920. The central
focus of the Bill was to give mothers general rights in
relation to their children. The Bill proposed that in-
stead of the father being the sole legal guardian of
children of the marriage, both mother and father should
be joint guardians, with equal rights and responsibilities
with regard to the custody, maintenance and education of
their children. Interestingly NUSEC here argued that in
assessing women's liability, her domestic labour in re-
lation to childcare held a value and should be deemed as
a financial contribution 2 , a position still argued (though
largely unsuccessfully) by many feminists in the 1980s
(Row 1983). That initial Bill also proposed to make
better safeguards for the custody and maintenance of
children by allowing the courts to make orders whilst
parents lived together.
Feminists in NUSEC substantiated their demands by
drawing on the two interdependent ideologies developed
over the turn of the century: childhood and motherhood.
But in addition they also drew upon the theme of formal
equality between men and women and husbands and wives.
Women had by this time achieved a measure of success in
the campaigns carried out by suffragettes for legal
status for women as citizens and workers in the Sex Dis-
qualification (Removal) Act of 1919. The work of both
suffragettes (militants) and suffragists (constitutional-
ists) had put the oppression of woccen on ot te pic
and the parliamentary agenda, and the issue of women's
campaigns for equality was rehearsed in both public and
private. Feminists in NUSEC argued that along with
amendment to property rights 3
 and civil rights, the concept
of equality	 should logically be extended to parent-
hood within marriage. On introducing the Bill into
Parliament on behalf of Women's Societies Viscountess
Astor stated:
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"May I respectfully point out that this is in
no sense a political matter. We are bound by
election pledges to carry out the programme...
we are committed by the principle of equal
citizenship as between men and women and it
will be the duty of the new Government to re-
move all existing inequalities of law as be-
tween men and women...thus, inequality be-
tween men and women in regard to the guardi-
anship, maintenance, and upbringing of their
children is one of those inequalities."
(H.C. Debates (1921) 141:1400)
Indeed, obviously aware of a level of opposition within
Parliament to the issue of 'women's rights' she continued:
"All parties are alike when it comes to women,
you will find men in all these parties who
only give [women] lip service. Some of the
greatest anti-feminists are amongst my col-
leagues, the Coalition is notorious but all
parties are alike."
(H.C. Debates (1921) 141:1407)
Nevertheless NUSEC's position was never simply located at
the level of abstract rights for women (as comparable, for
example to the position of fathers in the mid-nineteenth
century). Nor indeed - given the position of mothers
within the family - could it have done. The strength of
the ideology of motherhood and the resultant sexual divi-
sion of labour in relation to childrearing practices had
firmly located mothers of all social classes with the major
emotional and frequently physical responsibility for the
rearing of children 4
 (Davin 1978; Cowan 1982; Dally 1982).
The Union therefore also argued its case for rights for
mothers through an analysis of the materiality of child-
care responsibility within families. Thus Viscountess
Astor in arguing for the Bill stated that existing law in
relation to children in marriage bore no relationship to
the reality of childrearing in families, since the mother
was the parent with responsibility for the day to day care
of the child, her opinion as to what was best for it
should carry equal weight. Moreover she argued that fathers
should not be able to remove children or utilise them to
restrain women nor make decisions concerning their lives
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without reference to mothers. Thus she concluded, it
was in children's interests also that mothers, because
they held responsibility for childcare and childrearing,
be given equal rights over children within marriage
through becoming equal legal guardians with fathers.
Opposition to NUSEC's Bill ran high both inside and
outside of Parliament (Brophy 1982). Within Parliament,
the question of whether it was an issue of 1 rights' over
children between husband and wife had two consequences.
Firstly, those opposed to the Bill argued that giving mothers
equal guardianship rights within marriage would deter men
from marrying:
"if he feels he cannot bring his children up
as he thinks fit he will be disinclined to
marry...and this would lead to immoral con-
sequences."
(H.C. Debates (1921) 141:1409).
and it would also lead to divorce:
"...if he can't have the management of his
own children."
(H.C. Debates (1921) 57:802).
And some opponents to the general principle of the Bill
nevertheless agreed that women did indeed carry the
major responsibility for children within marriage but
because it was felt that giving mothers rights within
marriage would also necessarily give them a degree of
power the Bill was bitterly opposed (Brophy 1982).
Promoters of the Bill in Parliament came under con-
siderable attack on the issue of rights for mothers within
marriage. This resulted in a shift in the debate on the need
for the Bill. Certain promoters concentrated on the
politically safer justification of protecting the interests
of children. Indeed, it was quickly argued that the Bill was
not merely concerned with ameliorating previous inequalities
between men and women, it had a more 'sacred' endeavour:
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"the question of guardianship of infants
must not in any way be damaged by any
suggestion that in this way we are deciding
for women's ri qhts as apart from the rights
of the infant."
(H.C. Debate (1921) 141:1420)
Moreover it was then argued that the content of the Bill
should be reworded leaving out completely the general
principle of equality between mothers and fathers. The
general argument about the way in which existing law had
constructed wives and children as legal subjects such that
wives could only exercise their (relatively) new rights
as wives by deserting their children was dropped. Emphasis
in the Parliamentary campaign quickly turned to a justification
for the Bill which found public sympathy on a level which
would have been impossible in relation to women's rights
at that time. Speeches in the House of Commons turned to
what one member referred to as the 'new spirit of the age'.
The Bill was discussed in terms of the state's new approach
to the nation's children, references were made to the
amount of legislation passed to protect children over the
latter part of the nineteenth century and how this new
Bill was in fact a further contribution to that endeavour.
It is of course difficult to know in retrospect quite
what the response of the Union was to the effective
transformation of the political terrain in which this Bill
was originally set. Certainly NUSEC's position had
never been mother's rights as opposed to or in isolation
from the welfare of children. Indeed their initial criti-
cism of the law was in its treatment of women-as-wives and
women-as-mothers. Yet clearly engaging the language and
sentiments of welfarism in the name of children achieved
two ends. It effectively silenced those who strongly
opposed the Bill because it attacked the unequal power
relationships within marriage. And also for a time it did
appear that adopting such a defence would facilitate an
easier passage of the Bill through Parliament. However,
that shift of support for the Bill amongst some of its Parliament-
ary
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promoters in effect was also to facilitate fundamental
changes in the content of the Bill.
Mothers' Powerlessness: The State's Response
Feminists continued to struggle with several govern-
ments (Labour, Conservative and Coalition) over the con-
tent of the Bill; two Select Committees considered their
demands but several private members' Bills were lost
during the period 1921-23. However the crystallization
of positions on the issue of mothers and the guardian -
ship, custody and maintenance of children occurred in
1924, with the introduction of Mrs Wintrinqham's Bill.
Still central to feminists' demands was an end to the
ultimate legal power which a man held over his wife and
children so long as they continued to live with him.
However the principle objective for the state in those
struggles appeared to be that of preserving the stability
of a specific family structure in which women's subordin-
ation to men was to be sustained rather than undermined.
The justification for that particular objective was con-
structed upon both ideological and material grounds.
On an ideological level the position was justified in
terms of a desire to preserve the stability of the family
as a significant symbol of the nation's stability. On a
material level, it was justified in terms of the legal
liabilities which were currently attached to fathers as
head of household. Initially the reaction of the Lord
Chancellor's Office had been that, because the Union's
Bill attempted to broaden enormously the field of dis-
putes which might come before the court, and because it
proposed to introduce "joint liability" for children, the
Bill represented something of a threat to the purity of
English Law. Thus it was argued by the Lord Chancellor's
Office, that the courts must be protected from having
their time occupied with such matters:
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"The net result of the Bill, therefore, would
be to substitute a legal for a domestic forum
in every household; to multiply causes of
strife, and to bring into the courts, to the
encumbrance of their proper business, a mul-
titude of trivial disputes."
(P.R00, LOCOO. 2:757)
Feminists however rejected this attempt to contain domestic
relations within the "private" sphere and argued that the
modern approach to marriage was that it was now a partner-
ship and therefore the objective of Parliament should be to
set up the legal standard for all families0 Equal responsi-
bility would, they argued, promote a more responsible
attitude on the part of erring husbands, especially if
they knew that a wife's opinion would receive equal weight
should their dispute go to court0
The general level of Parliamentary debate on the issue
of legal intervention in domestic relations was of a
somewhat individual and often flippant level, members
arguing that differences between husband and wife were
not settled by a "cataloguing of rights":
"Matrimony is not based on the assertion of
rights000the whole happiness of marriage is
based on understanding and mutual forbear-
ance, one giving way to another, by reason
of love and respect, you cannot possibly
improve that contract by the enactment of
the law"0
(H.C. Debat	 (1924) 171:2708)
"from my experience as a married man there
is only one master in the house and it is
not the husband00."
(HOCO Debat	 (1924) 171:2609)
and
"I would like to see anyone bold enough to
deny the fact that the hand that rocks the
cradle rules the world"0
(H.00 Debat	 (1924) 171:2707)
"it would be a brave man indeed who would not
support this bill000and then go home and tell
his wife he had not done so000"
(H0ç0 Debat	 (1924) 171:2671
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Indeed, there were many references to "petticoat government"
in the home by Members of Parliament, and many were con-
cerned to express the view that it was indeed impossible
for the law to deal in areas of "affection".
However, the persistence of feminists in pressing
their case, and the weight of evidence they produced on
the inadequacies of the current laws on custody and
maintenance eventually forced the 1924 Conservative Govern-
ment to formally reassess the evidence produced for
Select Committees over the previous four years and ultimately
draft a Government Bill. Its response was decisive; there
was to be no Government compromise to women on the issue of
joint guardianship of children in marriage. Drawing on
evidence submitted to the 1923 Joint Select Committee, the
Under Secretary of State for the Home Office repeated the
position of the Law Officers' Department on the Bill:
"to put mothers on an equal footing with
fathers in all matters concerning their
children would simply produce a deadlock".
(P.R.O.	 L.C.O. 2:757)
The Crown Office had been opposed to the principle from
its inception in 1920:
"to make provisions for all such disputes to
come before the courts would only congest
the court and detract from the real concern
of English law".
(P.R.O.	 L.C.O. 2:757; (see
correspondence, Sir Claud Schuster,
Permanent Secretary and Clerk to
the Crown).)
However, the Government's major objection to the principle
of joint guardianship was that to allow the courts to
become the final adjudicator in all disputes concerning
children could only be subversive of family life. Intro-
ducing the Government's own Bill in 1925, the Lord
Chancellor (Viscount Haldane) stated:
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"...the status of women has very much changed
in the last twenty five years. [She] has
almost the same status as man. She has not
altogether the same status because it is nec-
essary to preserve the family as a unit and
if you have a unit you must have a head".
(H.L. Debates (1924) 57:791)
Thus the common law patriarchal power of fathers as sole legal
guardians and thereby ultimate decision makers in all
aspects of family life was not simply an historical 'fact' -
it was viewed as a central and necessary feature in the
stability and continuity of the family as a social insti-
tution. That particular view was prevalent in much of the
evidence assessed by the Home Affairs Committees of the
Cabinet during 1923 and 1924, although it was generally
presented as the intuitive position rather than the result
of lengthy debate or logical discussion - the family was a
'natural' hierarchy. From that intuitive position it was
then argued, that any duality of control over children
within the family would simply undermine the authority of
the father and lead to further domestic strife. Moreover,
not only would it add to friction in those already unhappy
marriages, but, in addition, dual authority over children
would actually undermine stability in happy marriages.
Thus, the Government's argument against joint guardianship
was that it would lead to the ultimate dissolution of the
family.
The second major objection which the 1924 Administration
tabled against joint guardianship was focused on the dangers
which would result from a dilution of the father's responsi-
bility as head of household. This case was argued on the
evidence submitted by several state departments during the
early years of the Bill. For example, it was argued on
behalf of the Ministry of Health that the principle of joint
guardianship would create serious problems firstly, in
pressing criminal proceedings against negligent fathers, and
secondly, in recouping any state expenditure administered
to a man's wife and child under Poor Law Relief 5 . On the
basis of such evidence, the Joint Select Committee
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argued that, although it held no brief for the father,
"it was essential from an administrative point
of view that a household should be treated as
a single unit and that there should be some
person within it who in the last resort should
have the determining voice."
(P.R.O. L.C.O. 2:757: Draft Report,
Joint Select Committee)
However, the Committee concluded:
"that they were unable to recommend that Parli-
ament should adopt the principle of equal
guardianship...what is at stake is the well-
being of the child itself and any duality
of control must militate against that."
Draft Report J.S.C., ibid.
(emphasis added)
It is indeed interesting to note how the language of
welfarism is introduced here to substantiate an assumption
that the hierarchy within patriarchal family relations
protects and/or ensures children's welfare. Yet what is so
striking from the entire evidence submitted to the various
governments over the four years of consideration of this
Bill is that firstly, no case was made to either of the
Select Committees which specifically argued for the
retention of fathers' sole guardianship rights to children
within marriage on the basis that such a situation was in
children's interests. Indeed apart from the evidence
which feminists submitted regarding the way in which the
existing law effectively operated to force women and children
to remain with men who were frequently violent, cruel,
vindictive and habitually drunk, there was no direct
discussion of children per se, let alone children living
in these circumstances. Rather, various state depart-
ments focused upon rejecting feminists' proposals on
the basis that they would alter the existing parameters of
the law in terms of legal liability and thereby create
problems for the State in the exercise of liabilities
which were formerly attached to fathers as heads of house-
hold. Indeed much of the evidence submitted by state
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departments relied upon a foregone consensus that pre-
serving the patriarchal structure of the family (and thereby
the power of husbands and fathers) necessarily coincided
with protecting the interests of children.
Custody and Maintenance on Separation
The area in which feminists did manage to make some
impact was that of custody. They had argued that an un-
scrupulous husband could gain compliance from his wife
through the threat of removing her children. Indeed,
he could take them away from her entirely and trust them
to another person without consulting her or seeking her
consent. And, except in proceedings for divorce or
legal separation she had no right under the existing law
even to apply to the Magistrates' Courts for the custody
of her children. The Joint Select Committee had been con-
vinced by the weight of evidence submitted by the Women's
Societies that the custody law required change. More-
over, no case was made to the Committee which argued
against the principle of equal rights to custody, and,
perhaps somewhat ironically neither was it anticipated
that the Court would experience any difficulty in deter-
mining which parent was better suited to undertake this
responsibility. The Committee therefore gave support to
the demand for a change in the current law in relation to
custody. However, it was somewhat illusory to allow a
mother to claim custody of her children, without giving her
some means whereby she could support the children. While
there did exist some limited provision to cope with the
maintenance of divorced or legally separated women, the
question of adequate maintenance within marriage presented
the Government with something of a dilemma. On the one
hand clearly there did exist loopholes in the current law
whereby certain "neglectful and vindictive" husbands
could escape their responsibility to maintain their families
adequately (such families often becoming dependent on
the state). But in addition, there was no legal way of
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enforcing that obligation except through the disintegration
of the family. Yet, to allow women to come before the
Court and obtain an order to determine the proportion of
her husband's wage to which she was entitled, and to make
that order enforceable whilst they continued to live to-
gether, was thought to be tantamount to legislating for
domestic strife. Thus, it was argued by Viscount Cave
(Lord Chancellor in the previous Government) that such a
provision would actually cause yet further domestic fric-
tion;
"by putting a weapon in the hands of a wife
whilst she was still part of the household."
(H.L. Debates (1924) 58:355)
(emphasis added).
The dilemma for the Government was again how to ameliorate
the disadvantages suffered by some women and children
without threatening further the stability of the family
unit by undermining the position and power of the father
as head of the household.
The Government's attempt to resolve that dilemma
became what was then referred to as the"Clause 3 Comprom-
ise". The central issue was whether to give a mother an
order for custody and maintenance while she lived with her
husband. The Government's position, outlined by the Solici-
tor General (Sir Henry Slessor) was that for the law to
regulate relations between husband and wife in this way
could, (yet once again) lead to a subversion of family
life. He continued,
"similar objection was felt to a provision
which would enable a wife to obtain an order
for payment which could only be enforced in
the last resort by seizure of the property
or imprisonment of the husband, who would
normally be a wage earner".
(P.R.O. L.C.O. 2:758; C.P. 287)
When the Lord Chancellor defended the Government's
proposals to Parliament, he again stated that the
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Government's criticism of the feminist's Bill. Firstly,
it did not give sufficient priority to the child's inter-
est, and secondly, it would increase the area of domestic
friction. He began,
"The Bill of the Government does away with
all those objectionable features of the origi-
nal measure. It removes all those fertile
opportunities for domestic differences with
which the other Bill bristled."
(H.L. Debates (1924) 57:796)
What the Government proposed was, that a mother should
be able to go to Court and obtain an order for the custody
and maintenance of her children, but that the order was
not to be enforceable as long as she continued to live
with her husband. The Lord Chancellor further argued that,
while a mother should be able to ask the Court to deter-
mine the proper sum to be allowed for her maintenance,
"it did not follow that if a wife chooses to
stay with her husband that she ought to be
able to enforce the law...if things get so
bad that the wife is bound to leave the
husband then she has an order ready."
H.L. Debates(1924) 57:794)
Comparing that provision with the existing law, (whereby
a wife had first to leave her children and her husband
before she could apply for an order) he added,
"But the order is not to be enforceable so long
as she stays under his roof. That is a com-
promise by which an endeavour is made to get
rid of a dual authority which was considered
to be one of the chief defects of previous
Bills."
H.L. Debates (1924) 57:799
(emphasis added)
However, it could of course be argued that the Government's
"compromise" had defeated its own stated objective, that
of preserving the unity of the family. By attempting to
side step the crucial question of inequalities of power
between husband and wife the Government had in fact, put
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something of a premium upon separation, since it proposed
to make a mother's rights to custody and maintenance con-
tingent upon her leaving her husband.
Feminists' response to this proposal was somewhat
divided. NUSEC had, during this period, managed to secure
provision in the Government's Bill to allow mothers
equal rights with fathers to apply to the Court in any
matter regarding the children. This was (given the loss
of the joint guardianship provision) , an important addition
because it gave women a general right of application to the
court separate from divorce or judicial separation pro-
ceedings. Even so, there was considerable opposition to
the compromise from many of the Womens Societies. There
was some support for an outright rejection of the Govern-
ment's Bill on the grounds that it left untouched crucial
demands in the original Bill to alter power relations
within the family. NUSEC was faced with either supporting
a Bill which went a very small way to meeting their original
demands, or withdrawing their support, putting down wrecking
amendments and losing the Bill altogether.
The Government's position remained unchanged. It
claimed the "Clause 3 compromise" was the best that could
be attained between, on the one hand, a desire to amend
the existing law, and on the other, the more extreme
proposals for enforceable custody and maintenance con-
tained in the feminists' Bill. In recommending these provi-
sions to the Cabinet, the Sub-Committee (appointed by
the Home Secretary) stated that:
"the proposals represented the absolute mini-
mum necessary to secure anything like agree-
ment in the House of Commons, and, in view of
the pledges [on equality of the sexes] given
on behalf of the Labour Government during and
before the last election...it seems highly
desirable that early steps should be taken to
give effect to that Compromise now arrived at
and avert the danger which might result from a
renewal of the agitation for a more radical
amendment of the law."
(P.R.O. L.C.O. 2:758, C.P. 287 p.8)
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NUSEC, faced with a very real possibility that the Bill
would indeed be lost, finally agreed to support the
Government's severely limited proposals.
In addition to that "compromise" over maintenance
and custody, the promoters had also lost in their negoti-
ations with the Government for an 'Attachment of Earnings'
clause. This clause would have meant that payments
for maintenance could (on the order of the Court) be de-
ducted from a father's wage by his employer. This clause
was seen as vital by feminists because it would have
allowed payments to change hands without the parents having
to meet. NUSEC had provided evidence of women suffering
abuse and violence when they tried to collect the payments
from fathers which they had been awarded by the court.
But what is significant about the loss of that provision,
is not so much that it was an essential feature of the ori-
ginal demands, but rather the Government's stated rationale
for excluding the provision. The rationale had been that
in the current economic climate the provision was "too
controversial". The argument had been addressed on two
levels, both with undesirable results in terms of the labour
market. From the point of view of the employer it was
thought that it migh unnecessarily increase his workload,
and thus possibly make certain employees less acceptable.
From the point of view of labour itself, it was argued that
such a provision could reduce work incentives and would in
any case be resisted by the Trades Union Movement because
it would contravene the Truck Laws 6 . Thus it was finally
argued that an 'Attachment of Earnings' provision would
be likely to cause further friction in the economy, at a
time when the Government was already concerned about unemploy-
ment, such a situation was therefore to be avoided at all
costs?.
The most striking feature about both the 'Clause 3
Compromise' and the exclusion of the 'Attachment of Earn-
ings' clause is the total absence in these debates of
questions which addressed the issue of how best to secure
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adequate maintenance provisions for children whose father
would not willingly or voluntarily supoort them. Indeed,
the rationale applied throughout itself precluded any
discussion of child welfare.
The effectiveness of the provisions under the "Clause
3 Compromise" were further reduced by the introduction of
a time limit before the Bill finally reached the Statute
books. The Government amended the clause so that if a
mother was still living with the father three months after
she had obtained an order for custody or maintenance then
that order became void. The amendment was justified on
the grounds that,
"it would be undesirable that an order of that
kind should be hanging over the heads of parents
for an indefinite period."
(Lord Chancellor, H.L. Debates
(1925) 61:522)
The Union protested at this short time limit. They argued
that in a relationship where a wife suffered abuse and
neglect, an order of the court empowering her to custody
of children and a mantenance order could provide mothers
with some limited bargaining powers. A wife might realise
an order through separation, but equally she may be able to
draw upon it in attempts to negotiate better behaviour on
the part of a husband.. The Union therefore argued that if
a clause stating a time limit was inescapable then six months
should be the minimum period. This would at least provide
mothers with a more realistic period in which to assess
whether their husbands had reformed. It is interesting to
quote the Lord Chancellor's response to that argument at
length because it also illustrates how the original Bill
had been diluted and transformed from its original objective -
that of attacking precisely those expressions of patriarchal
power and control which the Government's Bill sought to
protect:
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"...if these orders are going to be obtained
simply by way of a threat to the father.coa
long period might be desirable0 But I think
the intention of the House was that these or-
ders should only be applied for where there is
a real desire to have custody - custody under
a separate roof and maintenance connected with
the custody - and they should not be applied
for simply as a threat...I think 3 months
is quite enough."
H0L. Debates (1925) 61:661)
The small amount of bargaining power which women had been
accorded under the 'tompromis' had effectively been re-
moved0 The mother had, under this additional amendment
to decide within three months whether to stay and rely
upon her husband's goodwill or reformed character, or leave
while she had an order allowing her to take her children
with her0 In either case of course she was still dependent
upon her husband's ultimate goodwill and benevolence for
maintenance payments for children.
The Government's Bill finally reached the Statute
books in July 1925	 The Government laid great claim by
its preamble to the Act:
"Parliament by the Sex Disqualification (Removal)
Act 1919 and various other enactments has sought
to establish equality in law between the sexes
and it is expedient that this principle should
obtain with respect to the Guardianship of
infants the rights and responsibilities con-
ferred thereby"0
However the rhetoric of the preamble did not in fact
adequately describe the Act. Although it claimed to
establish full equality between the sexes, it did not in
fact achieve this0 What it did was to establish formal
equality of application to the Courts on issues relating
to children where mothers and fathers could not agree0
Either parent could apply to the court for a decision0 In
deciding the issue the Act laid down the principle on
which questions regarding children's custody, upbringing etc0
was to be decided:
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"Where in any proceedings in any court...
where the custody or upbringing of an
infant...is in question, the court in de-
ciding that question shall regard the
welfare of the infant as the first and
paramount consideration and shall not
take into consideration whether from any
other point of view the claim of the
father...is superior to that of the mo-
ther, or the claim of the mother is super-
ior to that of the father.
s.1. Guardianship of Infants Act 1925
Hence, in the absence of court proceedings the patriarchal
structure of the family was to remain unchallenged so
far as family law in this field was concerned. Mothers
could not take any initiative or individual decisions con-
cerning children except on the agreement of fathers.
Conc lus ion
The original demands of NUSEC had sought to attack
the unequal distribution of power between men and women
within the patriarchal family structure. The Government's
major justification for its own Bill was that it was superior
to feminists' proposals precisely because it did not inter-
fere with the status quo of family life. That many both
inside and outside of Parliament had felt that to provide
legislation in an attempt to alter inequalities within
marriage would be tantamount to legislating for the breakup
of the family, is illustrative of the strength of patri-
archal ideology in the period. But what is also signifi-
cant about the campaign is the way in which the language and
sentiments of welfarism - discourses which had initially
been responsible for the creation of an ideology of mother-
hood - had, in effect, been successfully employed to
fragment and displace womens' demands for equal legal rights
for mothers. So far as legal discourses were concerned, of
course the concept of children's welfare (as illustrated
in Chapter 1) was already apparent in case law. However,
as King (1981) argues in relation to nineteenth century
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approaches to childcare, to a large extent, welfarism as
a rationale for just cause and grounds for action gradually
took over from that of Christian morality. That is not
to say of course thatin the case of this Bill, that in
all instances of opposition to the feminsts' proposals
the concept of children's interests was simply engaged as
a 'smoke screen'. But rather, I would argue that it was
precisely because the issue of children's welfare was
(and is) such an emotionally provocative but nevertheless
nebulous concept 8
 that it was so successful in effectively
silencing the concerns of those (women) most closely
responsible for the care of children. Indeed it provided
what on the surface appeared to be a neutral and 'scientific'9
solution to what was a political dilemma. It appealed to
sentiments regarding 'protection of the innocent' against
which no responsible person - especially mothers - could
reasonably object. Indeed it appealed to some of the very




l	 Under the law then extant, except under the operation
of the Poor Law, there was no obligation to maintain
on either parent, although the father might incur
criminal liability if he wilfully neglected his
children and they became chargeable to the parish0
(See Chapter 1).
2.	 In relation to the joint obligation to maintain,
the feminists' original Bill had proposed that in cal-
culating a mother's liability, her domestic labour
for the childin the home should be deemed as a
contribution to the maintenance0 However, that attempt
to gain recognition of the economic value involved
in rearing children was neatly side-stepped by the
1924 Conservative Government on the grounds that "it
was not possible to calculate and reduce to economic
terms the value of the affection and love of a mother
for her children" IH.C. Debates (1924) 171:26901 and
the provision was dropped from the Government's
measures introduced in 1925.
3	 E0g0 Married Women's Property Committee formed in 1855
campaigned for the separation of property within
marriage. This was achieved in 1882 under the Married
Women's Property Act which enabled those women who
owned property to retain it on marriage.
4	 It has been argued, (Lowe (1982)) that in fact middle
and upper class mothers did not in any case rear
their own children0 However this approach is
severely limited in that it fails to address the
power relationships involved in marriage and the way
in which law sustains and reproduces those relation-
ships in and through children.
5	 Home Affairs Committee (Cabinet) P.ROO. C0P. 3719
1922 Memorandum for the Ministry of Health0
6	 The Truck Laws provided safeguards to ensure against
indiscriminate deductions being made against wages0
Thus any deductions must be voluntary on the part of
the worker0
7.	 Attachment of earnings provisions had been used during
the First World War to deal with soldiers who had de-
faulted in respect of affiliation orders. In promoting
the inclusion of such a provision in the Guardianship
of Infants Bill it was argued that "if such orders
were used to allow payments to be collected from a
soldier's pay that we cannot discriminate between sol-
diers and other classes of society". However, in
addition to the economic rationale used to dump the
provision in 1923, it was also argued by the Lord
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Chancellor that "it was most insulting that such an
order should be forced upon (a husband) as if he had
a bastard child".
8. In that children's needs are socially defined, redefined,
adjusted and sustained as dominant expectations of
children change.
9. That notion arose largely as a consequence of the
medicalisation of childrearing practices over the turn
of the century which had adopted a 'scientific'
approach to the task. That approach consisted of some
degree of new and thereby 'expert' knowledge (in
terms of ideas on sanitation, sterilization and




WELFARE, CHILDREN AND THE FAMILY: 1945 AND THE
POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION
Introduction
After 1945, developments in legal discourse
concerning custody of children have tended to be theorised
by contemporary writers in terms of a recognition of the
ideology of motherhood (Freeman 1983; Maidment 1984) . In
assessing developments in Court practices regarding womens'
claims to custody of children writers have drawn upon two
mutually dependent ideologies: welfare and motherhood.
These ideologies have contributed to a 'received wisdom'
regarding the legal status of mothers following the war
and the existence of a maternal preference within the courts.
In turn, explanations of that situation are frequently
located in emerging psychological and psychoanalytic dis-
courses concerning the importance of maintaining the mother-
child relationship for children's future psychological
and emotional stability. Thus those who posited a judicial
preference for mothers usually substantiated that post-war
development through appeals to the new maternal deprivation
theories, and specifically the work of 3ohn Bowlby in
1the 1950s . In this chapter therefore I will examine the
development of law and legal practice primarily, but not
exclusively in the post-war years. My argument is that
although both children's welfare and ideologies of
motherhood are indeed apparent in legal discourses it is
a mistake to conclude that either individually or combined
these notions overdetermined law and legal practices in
all instances. Indeed I will illustrate that although
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a concern for children is frequently apparent7
 nevertheless
that focus was also undercut by notions of morality and
sexual behaviour. This is not however to argue that the
courts and policy makers during that period were not 'really'
concerned about the welfare of children. Rather, it is to
demonstrate that it was one issue within a number of con-
cerns in that period. Firstly, therefore, I will discuss
briefly why the post-war period has become an important
period for feminist analyses of family law and specifically
why it is especially important in relation to current debates
surrounding custody and mothers. I will then examine three
areas of family law, beginning with an examination of the
welfare principle in relation to the concept of illegiti-
macy. I will then discuss the development of new policies
on legal procedure in relation to children and divorce in
the post-war period. Finally, I will examine the courts'
treatment of mothers who have committed adultery.
Motherhood and the 1950s
The 1950s is frequently viewed as the heyday of the
ideology of motherhood. In the post-war reconstruction
mothers were viewed as having a particularly important
role to fulfill, they were again 'mothers of the nation'.
Like mothers over the turn of the century 1
 mothers in the
post-war years were the first point of intervention and
education as the primary caretakers of the nation's future
human capital. Women's magazines and journals flooded the
market with information and advice on how to be a good
mother. New techniques on childrearing and new technologies
for housework all identified mothers as the focus of atten-
tion in the post-war reconstruction (Daily 1982).
Yet despite the idealisation of motherhood which
clearly did occur during the 1950s, many contemporary
feminists have viewed the period with considerable ambiguity
and suspicion. This is largely because regardless of the
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myth and rhetoric surrounding women's role within the
family during those years, documentations of the period
focused upon particular political forces which created a
culture in which it was very difficult to articulate or
gain access to information regarding women°s experiences
within the family. As Wilson (1980) has pointed out we
know very little of married women's experience of that
culture. We know little or nothing of the experiences of
divorced women and single parents or of the position of
battered women, or of the issue of rape during this period.
That gap in our understanding has led contemporary
feminists to re-examine aspects of 'received wisdcm'
during this period (Riley 1981; Smart 1984). For exarple,
Riley (1981) has re-examined the issue of women and employ-
ment at the end of the last war0 It has been part of our
'received wisdom' in this field that there was a conscious
decision on the part of the state to remove married women
from paid employment. Thus, it has frequently been argued
the state closed nurseries in an effort to retrieve jobs
for men, and that the medium through which that exercise
found legitimation was the maternal deprivation theories
expounded by	 John	 owlby (Dally (1982)). Yet on re-
examination of that period in women's employment, Riley
argues that, far from there being a state/male conspiracy
to retrieve jobs for men, in fact, labour shortages in
1947 resulted in a production drive to recruit women workers
(including those with children) (Riley 1981 p0 10). In
identifying both confusion and compromise on this issue,
Riley also identifies wide acceptance of the language of
pronatalism (generated by a low birth rate). A language
which was not simply successful in finding expression in
state policy but equally found acceptance within various
women's organisations 2 . Thus as Riley concludes, it is
not sufficient simply to identify a discourse, in addition
we must examine whether and how it enters or acts to form
specific structures of opinion and ultimately state policy0
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Equally, in relation to family law the task of un-
packing received wisdcms regarding the position of wives
and mothers in the post-war years has a particular im-
portance. It is significant not simply as a general desire
for historical accuracy; in addition, it is important to
address that period because a major focus in debates
surrounding family law in the 1980s is on 'redressing the
balance' in an argument which perceives law as having gone
too far in women's favour. Thus Campaigns such as Families
Need Fathers (1981) and Campaign for Justice in Divorce
(1980) argue that women have come to occupy positions of
privilege within family law, In relation to mothers, that
argument centres on the issue of child custody and the
existence of a maternal preference' operated by the courts
in deciding custody cases. Thus in the final section of
this chapter I will examine that claim in the light of
practices in the courts during the 1940s and 1950s0
Child Centredness and the Child Outside the
Conventional Family
To understand the dimensions of state policy re-
garding the development of the welfare principle it is
necessary to look briefly at policies directed towards
different legal categories of children, specifically those
policies directed at children for various reasons outside
the conventional family. Policies towards that category
of children changed radically after the First World War
and thereis little doubt that the general concern for
such children was accelerated by the effects of war0 Hence
the introduction of both the 1926 Adoption Act and the
Legitimacy Act of the same year sought to deal with some
of the legal and social disabilities of children born to
unwed mothers, and children who were abandoned or orphaned
by the war.
Although aspects of nineteenth century Poor Law
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provision had dealt with some aspects of illegitimacy, the
focus of that legislation was primarily concerned to punish
immoral mothers 3
 (ROW 1979; Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973). How-
ever in relation to adoption there was no legal provision
for the complete severance and transfer of parental rights
over children (there was of course de facto adoption for
example in the practice of baby farms 4 ) . Moreover,
no legal standards existed over parents who left children
to be reared by strangers or relatives, Children could be
handed over from one person to another with or without
payment, they could be sent out of the country without
record. Those Homes and Institutions which did exist were
not subject to any systematic inspection or control
(Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973; Cretney 1974). Indeed public
pressure for some form of investigation and state control
led to the appointment of the Hopkinson Committee (Report
of the Committee on Child Adoption (1921) Cmd 1254 BPP ix,
161) which reported that urgent legal provision was necessary
to deal with the circumstances of children.
The solution was to create formal legal adoption and
instigate a procedure whereby in certain instances married
couples could adopt orphaned abandoned or illegitimate
children. Indeed for these (apparently) parentless
children adoption was perceived as the only viable alter-
native to a stable home with natural parents. To provide a
legal procedure to allow children to become permanent members
of otherwise frequently unrelated family units was not
simply seen as a solution to the plight of the orphaned or
abandoned child, it was also seen as the solution for couples
unable to bear children. For women in these circumstances
adopting children was equally perceived as providing a
complete and stabilising influence upon an otherwise problem-
atic and incomplete marriage (Hopkinson Report 1921 p.62).
The notion of providing a 'fresh start' for children
in a new and 'proper' family also influenced debate sur-
rounding the provisions of the 1926 Illegitimacy Act. How-
ever the latter Act was also guided by additional concerns
which ultimately led to the retention of certain punitive
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sanctions towards both child and mother which were evident
in Poor Law provision. The creation of the legal category
of illegitimacy (largely to protect inheritance rights) and
its maintenance throughout the nineteenth century had served
as a major bulwark of marriage and the family. It operated
as a fundamental source of discouragement of extra-marital
sex for women and a central source of support for the
regulation of motherhood and sexual relations within mar-
riage. Nevertheless increasing numbers of illegitimate
births following the war led certain philanthropists and
various voluntary and state agencies to publicise the plight
of illegitimate children and to exert pressure upon the
Government to consider their situation (Manchester 1980;
Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973). It was felt by many that such
children should be allowed a fresh start in much the same
way as the law had facilitated that for certain other
problematic children through adoption. However it was argued
that the solution chosen in this field of reform should not
be seen to undermine the family, or indeed support motherhood
outside the institution of marriage (Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973).
Thus the final provisions of the 1926 Legitimacy Act pro-
vided that certain children born illegitimate could sub-
sequently be declared legitimate on the marriage of their
parents, provided that neither parent was married to a third
person when the child was born (s 1(2) 1926 Legitimacy Act5).
Refusal to legitimate the 'adulterine' child was justified
on the grounds that to do otherwise would result in a
serious weakening of marriage, indeed it was argued it
would mean dispensing with the most powerful deterrent to
illicit sexual relations (Manchester 1980)
Following the Second World War, the Royal Commission
on Marriage and Divorce (1951-6) considered the position
of the illegitimate child unable to be legitimated by its
parents' marriage. That Commission reported during a
period of intense oral panic' regarding the stability of
marriage immediately following the War (McGregor 1957;
Smart 1984). It is not therefore surprising to find that
the Commission rejected the suggestion that the 'adulterine'
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child should be legitimated by the subsequent marriage
of its parents. The Commission reported:
"It is unthinkable that the State should
lend its sanction to such a step, for it
could not fail to result in a blurring of
moral values in the public mind. A power-
ful deterrent to illicit relationships
would be removed with disastrous results
for the status of marriage"0
(Royal Commission, 1956, p.304-5)
While state policies did continue to broaden the focus upon
different categories of children within family law juris-
diction, it is not/
	 Iaccurate to argue that this
trend was solely determined by a concern for the welfare
of children. When that concern came into direct competition
with notions of public morality or was viewed as in any way
threatening to the stability of marriage, the welfare of
children was clearly not the overriding consideration0
The stigma attached to children born outside marriage was
to remain as a salutory lesson to women of the consequences
of motherhood outside marriage.
However, it was not simply a question of social stigma,
Children born in these circumstances not only suffered
statutory legal disabilities (e0g. inheritance) but were
also in certain situations the focus of a particularly
punitive approach within the courts0 One example of this
approach is found in the courts' treatment of the question
of maintenance of 'adulterine' children. For example, for
some thirty years following the 1926 Legitimacy Act it
remained impossible for mothers to obtain an order for the
custody and maintenance of 'adulterine' children in the
event of subsequent separation or divorce0 This was be-
cause under divorce jurisdiction the term 'children' was
interpreted by the courts as meaning legitimate children
(Harrison v Harrison [1951] 2A11 ER 3466)	 Thus in making
awards for children on the breakdown of marriage the test
applied by the Court to determine whether or not it could
make an order against a parent was not the welfare of the
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child of the parents, but whether or not the child was the
legitimate child of the marriage.
This punitive approach by the courts in effect created
a hierarchy of children in relation to the treatment of
applications for financial relief between different cate g
-ories of illegitimate children generally and for different
categories of children within the same family. For example,
in circumstances where a marriage was declared null and
void or where a marriage was deemed bigamous, thus rendering
any children illegitimate, the law made express provision
to enable the courts to make orders for the custody and
maintenance of such children (Langworthy v Langworthy
7(1886) 11 P.D. 85 ). Yet in neither set of circvmstancs
(i.e. 'adulterine' children or children of bigamous or
void marriage) could one argue culpability on the part of
children involved. In addition, the retention of a punitive
approach to financial provision for illegitimate children
in divorce or separation proceedings could also create
a hierarchy of legal eligibility between children of the
same family (between legitimate and adulterine children)
(Colquitt v Colquitt [1948 ] p . 198).
While the policy trend in relation to children
'outside' a family therefore was towards integration into
new families, nevertheless, the recurrent dilemma for state
policy was how to engage the sentiments of welfarism by
doing what was best for children,  without at the same time
undermining the stability of the family by blurring moral
standards and removing what was felt to be the major de-
terrent to illicit sexual activity. In the 1950s as in the
1930s and 1940s the latter consideration determined aspects
of both law and legal practice. This is not to argue that
a punitive approach completely overdetermined policy in
relation to the illegitimate child as compared for example
with adopted children. Indeed even though the approach
of the courts in relation to maintenance provision of
'adulterine' children was in effect punitive, there is
evidence that certain members of the judiciary were distinctly
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unhappy with that approach. For example, Lord Denning
argued in the 1940s, that the courts should adopt a per-
missive construction of the law, and that the test of the
jurisdiction of the court to act in such cases should be
'parenthood' and not whether the child was the legitimate
child of the couple, (M v M [19461 P.31 9 ). Rather, the
focus here has been to demonstrate that to understand the
development of legal discourses surrounding children it is
necessary to examine specific spheres for the interplay
between crucial concerns, such instances reveal the way in
which what appear to be dominant ideologies can nevertheless
be undercut by other concerns10.
Divorce, Children, and Legal Procedures in the
Post-War Economy
Concern about the substantial increase in divorce
immediately following the Second World War (see Table 4.1)
led to two Reports on aspects of family law, both of which
contained extensive discussion and recommendations regarding
the position of children in parents' divorce.
Table 4.1 Divorce Petitions filed: England & Wales 1937-60
Source: Civil Judicial Statistics, HMSO
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Immediately following the end of war the Denning Committee
(Final Report of the Committee on Procedure in Matrimonial
Causes (1947)) examined existing legal proceduies. And in
the 1950s a Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Morton of
Henryton (Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce 1951-1956)
examined the law on grounds for divorce, administration in
the Courts, property rights between husband and wife. The
Denning Committee and the Royal Commission, though different
in status and extent of enquiry were both informed by simi-
lar sentiments regarding the deplorable increase in the num-
ber of divorces. The focus of the Denning Committee was
the existing system of divorce law administration. It was
required to consider what procedural reforms should be in-
troduced, and particularly whether any machinery should be
made available for the purposes of attempting a reconcili-
ation between parties (Final Report (1947) p.5 para 3) . In
its introduction to the Final Report the Committee stated:
"We have throughout our enquiry had in mind
the principle that the preservation of the
marriage tie is of the highest importance in
the interests of society. The unity of the
family is so important that when parties
are estranged, reconciliation should be
attempted in every case..."
Final Report 1947 p.5 para 4
Some ten years later, the Royal Commission was equally
directed by that same philosophy in its approach to the
question of whether the existing divorce law, based upon
matrimonial fault, should be retained. It argued:
"It seems to us self evident that marriage
cannot be the concern only of the parthers
to it. If there are children their inter-
ests must be considered. But whether there
are children or not, the state must be con-
cerned in the maintenance of marriage and
its dissolution because the state has an
overriding responsibility to ensure in the
interests of the community that the institu-
tion of marriage is upheld".
Royal Commission 1956 p.15 (vii)
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Both Committees saw the function of law as being to
'strengthen the good and control the bad'. For the Denning
Committee, this led (after an extensive examination of the
causes of marriage breakdown) to a recommendation for the
twin systems of education for marriage 11
 (for those about
to marry) and reconciliation services for when marriage fell
into difficulties (Final Report p.5 para 5). For the
Royal Commission it also led to the endorsement of education12
systems but it also led to the recommendation that matri-
monial offence should remain the determining principle of
divorce law because it argued that to do otherwise would
necessarily weaken the institution of marriage (p.13 para 65).
However that general 'panic' and concern regarding .the
stability of marriage did not simply focus attention upon
increasing numbers of divorcing couples. Both the above-
mentioned Committees considered the role of law in relation
to the increasing numbers of children involved in divorce.
That consideration led to substantial shifts in state policy
regarding what the role and focus of the courts should be
in relation to such children. Both Reports viewed the
decision of parents to divorce as essentially deviant and
reprehensible. That decision itself therefore legitimated
a recommendation for a far more extensive and interventionist
role for the courts in decisions concerning children than
had previously been considered either possible or indeed
desirable. In this section therefore I am going to consider
the context in which those recommendations arose and I will
argue that in fact these changes in approach towards child-
ren cannot be isolated from the central concerns of the
Reports and the general attempts of the period at marriage
saving and reconciliation. The central focus of criticism
of both the Denning Committee and the Royal Commission
raxding divorce law procedure in relation to children, was
the courts general lack of jurisdiction regarding children
whose parents divorce. The court could not consider the
position of children involved unless called upon to do so
by parents. But equally, the Denning Committee and the Royal
Commission were also concerned about existing court practice
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in those cases where its jurisdiction was invoked by
parents. The focus of criticism rested upon the type of
information currently available to the court when making
a decision concerning a child's future custody and main-
tenance. Here both Committee and Commission argued that there
was a lack of information for the court other than parents'
affidavits. Thus both Committees stated that in the absence
of independent information, the question of which parent
should have custody frequently became a contest between
parents in which the 'innocent' party (in terms of matri-
monial offence) usually succeeded in obtaining custody.
The Denning Report particularly argued for independent
information for the courts through the form of a report on
the children, but both Committee and Commission argued for
an extension of the jurisdiction held by the divorce court
to consider jJ children of divorcing parents, regardless
of whether parents themselves desired it. However there the
similarities of approach between the two end. While each
was concerned to strengthen the role of the courts in
relation to children the particular function which each
Committee envisaged for the courts led to rather different
recommendations.
The Denning Committee argued that many of the difficulties
suffered by married couples in the 1940s were largely a
consequence of war and would therefore be removed once war
conditions were removed (p.7 para 8). Where it considered
the position of married women, although it recognised the
stress and strain caused to women by the 'double shift'
(domestic work and waged labour) it viewed that position
as simply an unavoidable consequence of war (p.7 para 7/8).
Moreover it argued that in relation to further 'causes' of
divorce in post war Britain many of these could be removed,
firstly, by education of young people for marriage and parent-
hood but secondly, by providing reconciliation services.
However, in arguing that machinery should be available
for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between
estranged couples,
 the Denning Committee were not introducing
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a completely new concept to the handling of marriage
breakdown in society. The model for that machinery was
already provided by the Welfare Services of the Armed
Forces, specifically the Sailors' Soldiers' and Airmans'
Family Association.	 Reconciliation services were
also provided by voluntary organisations such as the Church
Societies, the Marriage Guidance Council and the Family
Welfare Association, and statutory services in the magi-
strates courts were provided by probation services. Indeed
the Denning Report noted with approval the close liaison
between the Probation Services and the Welfare Services of
the Armed Forces. The Probation services had had jurisdiction
since 193713 to interview married women who sought matri-
monial relief in the Magistrates Court' 4 . During the war
years, the Welfare Services of the Armed Forces would visit
the estranged wives of servicemen in an attempt to forge
a reconciliation. Indeed, it appears from the evidence
presented by these Services to the Denning Committee (p. 7/8
para 17) that in the Armed Forces, before any estrangement
could be formally recognised (family allowance stopped
and divorce proceedings started with legal aid for husbands)
the reconciliation machinery of the Forces Welfare Services
had to be set in motion.
The Denning Committee therefore argued both for state
financial support for the reconciliation services in the
voluntary sector 15 , especially the Marriage Guidance Council16,
and for an expansion of the system, currently operated by
Probation Officers in the magistrates court. The divorce
court should also appoint an officer to attempt reconcili-
ation and these officers should preferably be:
"...persons holding a degree or diploma
in social science. They should be trained
in social services particularly in marriage
guidance and the welfare of children".
Third Report p.13 para 29
Moreover the Committee argued that the prospects for recon-
ciliation were much more favourable when the parties had
children:
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"In many cases the most powerful reason
which urges parties to adjust to diffi-
culties or which impels a wronged party
to forgive and forget is the welfare of
children".
Third Report ibid.
But endeavours to save failing marriages did not stop at
extending available services for couples experiencing
difficulties. The Committee recommended an element of
compulsion in the decision as to whether couples should
see a reconciliation officer. Not only were couples to be
given the necessary address of the officer, in addition,
'the officer himself should have access to every divorce
petition to enable him to decide whether to offer his
services' (p.15 para 29 (viii)). In justifying those
powers of intervention, the Committee argued that children
were the innocent sufferers from any estrangement of
parents and it was therefore in their interests that every
possible attempt at reconciliation should be made (p.15
para.29 (viii)). It is not perhaps surprising to find
therefore a considerable extension of the element of
compulsion in the Committee's recommendations regarding
children.
On the question of children and divorce procedure
the Committee argued that existing procedure was poorly
fitted to protecting their interests. The court held a
limited jurisdiction over such children, it could not
consider children's arrangements unless custody was in
dispute. Moreover the Committee also argued that where
custody was in dispute, the Court had no opinion other than
that of parents as to children's circumstances:
"The judge is never in possession of the
report of an independent person as to their
welfare, the result is that the welfare of
children is subordinated to the interests of
their parents".
Final Report p.17 para 30
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Moreover, the Committee felt that where custody of
children was unopposed in divorce proceedings:
"The reason why the application is un-
opposed may be quite unnnected with
the welfare of children ".
Final Report p. 18 para 31 (ii)
But where custody of children was opposed in divorce
proceedings, the issue usually developed into a contest
between parents:
"This leads to allegations by one parent
against the other and an embittered contest
as to whether allegations are well founded
...in the course of which the welfare of
children fades almost out of sight".
Final Report p. 18 para 31 (iii)
The Committee concluded that in the welter of affidavits
it was small wonder that it became difficult to ascertain
what was best for children, thus:
"...judges are sometimes forced back to
the test of who is the innocent party in
the divorce suit".
ibid.
The solutions which the Committee proposeO to these
problems were in effect an extension of the proposals
made in relation to reconciliation procedures for divor-
cing couples. Indeed they cannot be separated from them.
The Denning Committee recommended that the same court
welfare officer who attempted to reconcile
	 husbands
and wives should also 'be available to advise and guide
parents as to the welfare of their children' (p 19 para 34).
In addition the Committee argued that every petition for a
divorce should contain a statement of arrangements as to
18the children (p.19 para 34 ). But moreover, the Commit-
tee argued that the court welfare officer should, in
having access to every divorce petition, be authorised to
investigate every case concerning children regardless of
the wishes of the parents. And in addition, 'he should also
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be authorised to by-pass parents and make an application
to the courts for directions' (p.19 para 34 (iii)).
Legitimation of those extensive powers of intervention
and surveillance by a (relatively) new para legal personnel
was located in the divorce decision itself. The Committee
argued:
"it should be recognised that parents who
have been or who are about to be divorced
have no absolute right to determine the
lives of their children. They have dis-
abled themselves from that joint responsi-
bility and have created a new situation
in which the interests of children need
	 19
consideration apart from those of parents"
Final Report p. 19 para 33
It was not then a general failure in the role of parenting
which was to justify state intervention, but rather
failure at marriage. Divorce was to 'disinherit' parents
of rights to determine absolutely their children's lives.
This was because the decision to divorce was taken as
evidence of a failure of duty towards children to maintain
childrearing within marriage and the nuclear family: children's
best interests were perceived in sustaining marriage,
marriage was automatically in children's best interests.
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the focus of the
psychological evidence to the Denning Committee equally
concentrated upon the importance of marriage. And in
concentrating upon the effects of divorce upon children's
psychological development, the primary concern appeared to
be whether or not such children would later themselves become
divorcees. Thus, psychological development and stability
was here measured solely in terms of a capacity to endure
and sustain marriage.
The intention of the Denning Committee was to import
into legal procedure mechanisms to stem the tide of divorce
following the Second World War. The twin tools were education
and reconciliation services. The former, not surprisingly,
was never developed. Some of the proposals in relation to
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children drawn from the latter proposal were later put
into (a somewhat shortlived) effect 20 . But the coercive
and interventionist role which the Denning Committee proposed
for state para legal personnel ultimately did not become
a reality in the 1940s and 1950s. However that position
was not the result of apprehension or anxiety with rerard
to the wider political implications of allocating to the state
apparatus such extensive powers of total intervention
into family life in the 1940s. Rather, it was ultimately
a consequence of, firstly, an inadequately developed super-
structure of existing state agencies (to undertake the
extensive new work load envisaged by the Committee). And
secondly, severe financial restraints upon public sector
spending in this sphere in the post-war economy 21
 (Royal
Commission 1956 p.109 para 385). Nevertheless, the questions
and options posed by the Denning Committee regarding the role
of law and the powers of the court in relation to children
of divorcing parents do represent an ongoing dilemma which
continues to appear in both legal and psychological dis-
courses in the late part of the twentieth century (Mostyn
1970; Davis. et al 1983; Maidment 1982a 1984 Freeman 1983;
Freud Solnit & Goldstein 1973). The recommendations regarding
complete jurisdiction for all such children and the expansion
of the work of the Probation Service to provide independent
information for the court was however to become a reality.
But the latter provision was not to apply to all children
of divorcing parents. This was because, when the Royal
Commission (1956) considered children in its Report
(p.103 para 365), while in agreement with the criticism
of the Denning Committee on existing procedure, the Commission
however envisaged a further function of divorce law procedure:
that of inducing parental responsibility.
The Royal Commission, like the Denning Committee,
envisaged a vital role for reconciliation services 22
 in
an attempt to shore up marriage and stem the tide of
divorce. Although by the mid 1950s the expansion of the
principal statutory agencies was considerably slower than
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23that of the rapidly expanding voluntary sector , the
Royal Commission nevertheless continued to support the
development of both agencies 24 . In relation to the statu-
tory service it argued:
"Our evidence has shown that in England and
Wales the existing organisations are as yet
operating on a limited scale but the measure
of success already attained supports the
view that in many cases husband and wife
have been able with the help of skilled Coun-
sellors to overcome their difficulties and
to achieve a reconciliation. We consider
that furthe 5 expansion of those facilities
is required ".
However, in the event of the failure of reconciliation
services to prevent divorce taking place, the Royal Commis-
sion's primary concern was that any procedural recommendations
which it made in this sphere should emphasise and not reduce
parental sense of responsibility (p 105 para 370) . It was
this concern which led the Royal Commission to reject the
Denning Committee proposal that every divorce case involving
children should be investigated by state agencies:
"It is this later consideration - the
desirability of bringing home to parents
their continuing responsibility that has
primarily led us to reject the suggestion
that investigation should be carried out
...in every case [parents'] sense of responsi-
bility would be diminished not streng-
thened".
Royal Commission 1956 p.107 para 377.
Investigation by Court welfare officers in all cases
involving children was viewed as counter productive in
achieving a legal procedure which would bring home to
parents the idea that divorce was detrimental to the
interests of children. The Commission instead sought a
procedure which would focus parents' attention on children
and in so doing, might well forge a reconciliation 'for the
sake of the children'. To achieve that end, the question
of children (their custody, maintenance and education) had
to be introduced directly into divorce procedure and not
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be ancillary to it.
The solution proposed by the Royal Commission was
that there should be statutory provision whereby the divorce
itself could not be obtained until the children question
was resolved. Thus it recommended that the custody
question should be introduced into divorce procedure bet-
ween decree nisi and decree absolute. In every case the
petitioner should submit a written statement of arrangements
for the children and until the court was satisfied regarding
those arrangements, the parents should not get their full
and final divorce (p. 106 para 373). In this way the Royal
Commission felt it had secured a solution to existing
failures in legal procedure. It had met welfarist demands
regarding the need to consider all children whose parents
divorce. It had located that responsibility within the
existing divorce jurisdiction of the court. The right of
intervention of court welfare officers however was to be
at the direction of the court and would largely be restricted
to contested custody cases. Thus, the extensive powers of
intervention of para legal personnel envisaged by the Denning
Comrrittee were rejected, not because such powers were thought
unnecessary	 to protect children's interests, but rather
because it was felt that in a period where there already
existed a general failure on the part of parents in theit
sense of duty and responsibility towards children, such ex-
tensive powers of intervention and control would make a
further contribution to that failure:
"Investigations by officials might only
cause resentment ard frustration and would
be counter productive in what is most desirable
namely that the parents themselves should
be encouraged to fulfil their respcnsibili-
ties".
Boyal Commission 1956	 107 para 377
It would indeed be counter productive in the overall venture
which the Commission envisaged for family law during this
period: that of inducing a sense of morality and responsibility.
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Guilty Wives - Unfit Mothers ?
It is aspects of case law, more than any other feature
of legal discourse in the post war years which have con-
tributed to a 'received wisdom' regarding the 'privileged'
position of mothers within family law 26 .	 Indeed, it has
been argued that concern for the welfare of children coupled
with an ideology of motherhood completely overshadowed the
court's prewar occupation with women's matrimonial fault.
Such are perceptions of the influence of these ideologies
upon court practices, that even in a period in which the
availability of .divorce itself remained entirely fault
based, nevertheless, it is argued that the courts came to
view the qeustion of establishing womens matrimonial fault
as a separate issue from that of ascertaining her qualities
of parenting (Maidment 1984).
	 Moreoever, some writers
have suggested that a concern to preserve the mother-child
relationship (largely as a result of the influence of post
war psychoanalytic theories of child development), resulted
in a practice of 'maternal preference' by courts in deciding
child custody disputes (Graveson & Crane 1957; Karminski 1959;
Freeman 1984; Maidment 1984a).
In this final section therefore, I wish to address
those arguments.	 I shall argue firstly, through a re-
examination of case law during the post war period, that
although features of both ideologies (welfare and mother-
hood) do indeed appear in court decisions, they did not
however exclusively determine court practices.
	 Court
decisions equally demonstrate that hey did not adopt a
uniform appraoch to the issue.
	 Nor was it that straight
forward, particularly when addressing issues of 'morality'
and women's errant sexual behaviour.
	 Secondly, I shall argue
that where mothers did retain the custody of children following
divorce during this period, that result owed more to the
materiality of childrearing practices within marriages in
the post war period, than to the dictates of either 'law' or
psychological theories of child development.
In relation to the latter issue (the impact of law and
psychology), although the increase in divorce in the
years following the Second World War necessarily focused
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attention upon the position of children involved in parents'
divorce, it would be a mistake to assume that in all cases
involving children, thejr future custody became an issue
for the courts to decide. As both the Denning Report and
the Royal Commission point out, the courts in fact held
no jurisdiction to consider the welfare of children on
divorce unless requested to do so by parents. And very few
custody cases came before the divorce courts for a decision.
Indeed the figure for fully disputed custody cases in the
1950s was approximately the same as it is in the 1980s: some
5% of all divorce cases involving minor children 27 . In the
1950s approximately 20,000 divorce suits per year involved
children and some 1,000 cases involving a custody dispute
came before the courts (Royal Commission 1956 p 105 para
370). However, in 95% of cases involving children their
custody was not the subject of a court decision. Clearly
then in discussing the post-war years an initial distinc-
tion needs to be made between contested and non-contested
cases. And where women retained the care of children
following divorce, this would largely seem to relate to
the fact that that position generally went uncontested by
the majority of fathers. Such results reflect a continu-
ation of childcare responsibilities as they were carried
out in the majority of marriages28.
In relation to disputed cases, it should be noted that
our general sources of information regarding legal prac-
tices in such cases is limited. It is largely taken from
Court of Appeal decisions and it is from those Reports that
we can gain some information regarding practices in the
everyday divorce courts. In the area of child custody, as
with most areas of family law, the degree of judicial dis-
cretion was (and is) extensive, leading to what has been
referred to as judge-made law (Smart 1984). The relation-
ship between the divorce court and the Court of Appeal is
not therefore always straighforward 29 . One area which
demonstrates that issue is the continuing significance
of issues of morality and women's sexual behaviour when
assessing women's claims to the custody of children.
- 90 -
Some writers have argued that the shift away from a
punitive approach by	 courts in the treatment of mothers
who had committed adultery occured as early as 1910:
"Judges did finally recognise the social forces
for the emancipation of women and were accepting
the special claims of (even adulterous) mothers
to their children by the first decade of this
century".
Maidment (1984 p 152
The justification for that claim is evidenced by reference
to a case in the Court of Appeal in 1910: Mozley Stark v
Mozley Stark & Hitchins. This case is also cited in legal
texts of the 1950s (e.g. Karminski 1959) as evidence of a
fundamental change in the courts' treatment of the claims
to custody of children by adulterous wives, and it is
worth some detailed consideration. A divorce court had
granted a father custody of a thirteen year old daughter on
the grounds of his wife's adultery. The father had placed
the daughter in a school. On a'ttaining sixteen years, the
daughter had left the school, ostensibly to go to her father,
but had broken her journey and joined her mother and the man
her mother had subsequently married. The father issued a
writ of attachment against the mother for contempt of
court and requested an order that the child be returned
to him30 . The mother also applied to the court for an
order transferring custody of the daughter to her. How-
ever, the court ordered the daughter to be returned to her
father. The mother appealed to the Court of Appeal. This
latter court deliberated whether it could, where a child
had reached the age of discretion, order that child into
the care of either parent against its stated wishes. The
Appeal judges had interviewed the young woman concerned and
she had stated her wish to live with her mother. The Court
therefore decided it could not make such an order, it
argued:
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"In these circumstances we think the
proper course for us to adopt is to
discharge the order for custody and to
leave the parties to their common law
rights. If the girl is minded to leave
her father's house it is plain that the
father cannot reclaim her by habeas
corpus or otherwise".
Cozens-Hardy M.R. p 193
Thus, the daughter was released to make her own choice as
to where she would live. But the Court of Appeal did not
award custody to the mother in this case. It simply dis-
charged the previous court order giving her legal custody
to her father. However, in its closing statement the Court
of Appeal added:
"We only desire to add that the matri-
monial offence which justified the divorce
ought not to be regarded for all time and
under all circumstances as sufficient to
disentitle the mother to access to her daughter,
or even to the custod of her daughter, assuming
her to be under sixteen."
ibid, p.193/4
In this case, the Appeal Court judges concluded by stating
that the first duty of the courts was towards the welfare
of the infant involved, and not towards punishment of the
guilty party (p 194). Yet cases which followed the Mozley
Stark judgement indicate that the lower courts continued
to punish mothers who had committed adultery by the removal
of children. Indeed some courts even refused such a mother
any access to her children. For example, in B v B (1924)
(p 176),a mother appealed against a decision of the lower
court refusing her any communication with her eleven year
old daughter on the grounds of the mother's adultery 31 . In
this case the Court of Appeal held that.in.relation to the
treatment of the claims of adulterous wives, there was no
established role or precedent. It argued that each case
must be considered 'in all its circumstances' (p 190). In
this particular case the Court of Appeal noted:
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"..we are dealing with a delicate child of
eleven years of age who is obviously very
closely attached to the mother and who....
has necessarily been throughout the whole of
her childhood under the substantial and sole
charge and nurture of the mother".
jt continued
"under these circumstances it would be a
very strange and unusual combination of circum-
stances that would make it to the interests
of the child to be deprived at that age of all
association iith the mother.
	 It means a cutt-
ing away from the child all the most tender
associations that she has ever had in her life."
Atkins, L.J. B v B [1924] p . p.191
In this case, the Court of Appeal ultimately decided that1
provided the child was s not brought into contact with....
the corroding side of her mother's nature' (p.182), the
mother should be allowed some limited access.
	 This inter-
vention by the Court of Appeal (which are not undertaken
lightly) may suggest that the earlier decision (of the
President (Sir Henry Duke) at the trial stage) to refuse
the mother any communication with her child save in the event
that the child's life was at risk (p.179), was formally out
of line.	 However, we do have to question the effectivity
of the Court of Appeal in this area because, the sentiments
expressed by the President in this case (heard in 1924),
would seem to be more in keeping with those expressed by
Sir Creswell Creswell in Seddon Seddon & Doyle (1862) 2 Sw
32.
& Tr, 640 with regard to mothers who have committed adultery,
than with those expressed in Mozley Stark in 1910.
	 In
the light of this series of decisions, we must ask why, some
fourteen years after the Mozley Stark case, a judge would
still consider adultery sufficient reason to deny a mother
any further contact with her child except in the gravest of
circumstances as the child's life being at risk?
	 At this
point, the question of the lower courts simply being 'out of
line' becomes insufficient as an explanation.
	 Rather, these
lower court decisions demonstrate some important features
of the real movement of judicial practice with regard to
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this issue, features which are lost if we simply
attempt to 'read of f' legal practices during this
period from a consideration of law at the level of
formal statutes and certain Court of Appeal decisions
- points outlined and argued in the Introductory chapter
(pages xxxi/ii and xxxvii-iv herein).
It is also important to remember that in the post
war years, the changing position of women in society
did not lead to an immediately more liberal approach
by courts when dealing with the property and maintenance
33
claims of guilty wives (Smart 1984) .
	 Indeed, the
notion that married women had a special responsibility
in the post war reconstruction effort, frequently
resulted in women being viewed as more culpable for
the breakdown of marriage (Royal Commission 1956, Ps9).
And with regard to claims to children on divorce,
the lower courts continued to attempt to practice a
heavily punitive approach to the treatment of custody
claims by adulterous wives, especially it appears, when
dealing with what seems to have been fairly common
circumstances immediately after the war, in which men
serving in the Armed Forces returned from war service to
find their wives had formed new relationships (Millard
Millard & Addis [1945] 2.525 Dlv; Allen v Allen [1948]
2 All ER 413).	 But evidence of that post war
phenomenon does not simply come from the few cases
which reached the Court of Appeal.
	 Much of the evidence
comes from the work of the marriage saving organisations
of that period, such as the Soldiers' Sailors' and
Airmen's Association, The Marriage Guidance Council,
The Family Welfare Association and the matrimonial
work (limited though this was) of the Probation Officers,
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(Report of the Committee on Procedure in Matrimonial
Causes (1947); Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce
(1951-56)). That many of those cases involving custody
issues were ultimately settled out of court is in no way
surprising. In the immediate post-war economy character-
ised by severe housing shortages, few men, particularly
working class men would have been in a position to estab-
lish a separate residence and contest custody of children
while maintaining a job. Equally few women would be in a
position to be able to leave a marriage unless they could
establish grounds for divorce or separation.
welfare services were able to argue in their evidence to
the Denning Committee in 1947 that they were successful in
orchestrating a reconciliation in twenty five per cent of
cases - not perhaps surprising-especially as both the
Denning Committee and the Royal Commission illustrate,
reconciliation 'for the sake of the children' became the
catchphrase of the period. But for these cases where attempts
to forge a reconciliation failed and divorce proceedings
started, in the vast majority of cases, the custody of
children was not contested in court. Thus the pervasive-
ness of the ideology of motherhood was not ultimately
tested in family law courts.
For those cases which were contested, the position of
mothers was far from secure. Those cases which went to
the Court o Appeal in the 1940s and 1950s largely relate
to circumstances in which ex-servicemen were able to
establish an alternative home and a substitute mother.
And in such circumstances the divorce courts showed no
special concern to preserve mothers' nurturing role. For
example in Allen v Allen ([1948] 2 All ER) a mother appealed
against an order of the divorce court which granted custody
of an eight year old daughter to a father on the grounds
of the mother's adultery. The father had been abroad in the
Armed Forces during the war. He had left when the child
was twelve months old. On return four years later he dis-
covered his wife had formed an adulterous relationship.
- 94 -
}e obtained a divorce on that ground. 	 On decree absolute
both remarried, she the co-respondent, he, a widow. 	 The
following year the f±ier applied to the tourt for the custody
of the child, by then eight years of age.	 He succeeded in
that application.	 This was despite the fact that the child
had throughout her entire life known only the care of her
mother, and the fact that in the intervening period (between
divorce and the subsequent application for custody) the father
had made no attempt to see the child. 	 It was not disputed
in court that the child was happy with her mother, nothing was
said against the mother, except that, during her husbandts
four year absense she had committed adultery with the co-
respondent, whom she later married. 	 However, when the trial
court heard the custody application, it awarded custody to
the fathe; arguing that the child's moral welfare would be
adversely influenced by living with her mother, a mother
'who had committed adultery and was [therefore] likely to do
it again' (p.414). That court's attempt to sanction the sexual
behaviour of married women was ultimately overturned by the
Court of Appeal, to which the mother appealed. And indeed
that court (again) repeated that the trial court had not
applied the proper test (Wrottesley L. J.). This Appeal Court
judge stated that the welfare of the child, both moral and
physical was the paramount consideration, and moreover that
it was impossible to say because a woman had committed adultery
she was not a fit person.....to look after the child (p.414).
In this particular case, the mother (albeit expensively) retained
care of the child.	 However, for the vast majority of women
in similar circumstances in the post war years (prior to
the introduction of legal aid Schemes) that course of action
may not have been an option. 	 Moreover, that Court of Appeal
decision did not put an end to the punitive approach to
adulterous wives and mothers adopted by trial courts. 	 In
Willoughby v Willoughby [1951] P. l84) (the same trial court
judge) awarded custody of a two year old child to a father on
the basis of the mother's adultery.	 The viother appealed and
the Appeal Court again argued
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"While it may be undesirable, and in some
cases it is undesirable that the care and
control of a child should be given.to a
mother if she has committed adultery but
it is not a rule to be followed in all
cases"
Singleton, L.J. op.cit.p.192
Thus, the Appeal Court again overturned a decision of
a trial court judge. In this case, it concluded :
"it is better for this two year old girl
to be in the care and control of her mother
at least for the present"
ibid, p.184
It might be argued that the initial judgements discussed
here are simply an example of the idiosyncratic behaviour
of a particular judge.	 I would suggest however, that
such reversals serve only to further confirm two major
points which this research has been at pains to demonstrate.
Firstly, the role of the Court of Appeal with regard to
monitoring/setting precedents in this area, is not as
clear cut as some writers on this subject have attempted
to argue - a point recently endorsed by the Law Commission
in its discussion of the need for guidelines for courts
with regard to interpretations of the welfare principle
working Paper No.96 Custody (1986) para. 6.26). And that
same point was also made by Stamp, L.J. in 1977 in the case
of Re K [1977] Fam 179, 183.
	 Secondly, the need, in
consequence, to examine judicial practices at jj levels, in-
cluding those formal (ie: reported) enunciations of the Court
of Appeal.
In further evidence of the importance of this more
concrete approach to la we can cite the Denning Committee.
Discussing existing practice in 1947 it argued that many women
found guilty of adultery did not contest the custody of child-
ren because they understood that such conduct necessarily
disinherited them in terms of their claims to custody (p.18,
paragraph 31(u)). Moreover nearly a decade later, the
Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce stated that the
custody of children continued to be awarded on the basis
of guilt and innocence established in divorce proceedings.
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Indeed, the standard lawyer's text book on law and legal
practice during that period stated, that establishing
adultery was the lynchpin in decision making over
children's future custody in divorce proceedings,
(Raydon on Divorce, p.346, quoted in the Denning Committee
Report 1947, p.18).
The issue of the custody of children on divorce,
and the position of mothers in the post war period was
clearly more complex than a sympathetic reading of
certain popular aspects of case law might have initially
suggested.	 In the case of a contested hearing, the
question of which parent would obtain care of the children,
and indeed why, cannot be 'read-off' from ideologies of
childhood or motherhood as these existed in that period.
In those cases which were contested through the
courts, clearly there were contradictions between
the approaches taken by different courts with regard
to the treatment of wives adultery.
	 For those cases
which did reach the Court of Appeal, the practice of
that court was increasingly to overturn the punitive
decisions taken in divorce courts in the treatment of
wives errant sexual behaviour.
Equally however, it would be a mistake to assume
this represented a unified stage in the development of
the approach taken by the Court of Appeal to this issue.
In the 1960s that court can be demonstrated to be also
capable of attempting to sanction women's sexual
behaviour through the removal of children (see chapter
five herein, pages 107-113).
The balance between confirming the existing sexual
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division of labour in society in relation to childcare
and thereby being seen to serve the needs of children,
and awarding custody of children on the basis of guilt and
innocence in divorce proceedings, proved/a fine and in-
deed moveable line. In the majority of cases it was a
decision which the courts did not have to make. In
those contested cases heard in courts, clearly they rep-
resented situations in which it was felt fathers were
most likely to succeed, for example where fathers had
established adultery on the part of the mother and where
they themselves could offer a mother substitute through
remarriage. It was not that they intended to care for
children themselves. And while certain judges in the
Court of Appeal argued that adultery on the part of mothers
did not automatically bar them from claimimg custody of
children, in practice that was frequently the result.
Conclusion
The argument developed in this chapter has been,
that neither ideologies of childhood nor ideologies of
motherhood can adequately explain developments in law
and legal practices concerning children in the post-war
years. The increasing state concern for children in
this period cannot be isolated from a focus upon preserving
marriage and the family. The position of mothers following
the breakdown of marriage was influenced by a number of
factors. Foremost in these was whether or not a father
chose to contest custody of children. In the post-
war years when motherhood was over idealised but where, in
addition, women's responsibilities for the entire ex-
ercise of childrearing was also increased and extended, it
is not too surprising to find that in the vast majority of
cases custody of children was not ultimately the sub-
ject of a court dispute. Where custody was disputed by
a father, the central issue for mothers was their status
in divorce proceedings. During a period when the avail
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ability of divorce remained entirely fault based, the
exercise of the courts! discretion generally meant the
innocent wife became the deserving wife, and she usually
also became the deserving mother.
However, where mothers were also guilty wives, as the
Denning Committee reported, many such wives did not in fact
dispute fathers' claims to the custody of children. This
was largely because it was believed that adultery would in
practice, if not in theory, disqualify them as future
custodial parents. For those mothers who contested fathers'
claims to children, regardless of their guilt as wives,
ideologies of motherhood did not exclusively determine court
practices. In these circumstances that ideology was frequently
undercut by notions of morality and acceptable sexual behaviour
on the part of married women. This resulted in the courts'
continued attempts to sanction women's errant sexual
behaviour through the loss of custody.
With regard to assumptions concerning the influence on court
practices of maternal deprivation theories in the 1950s, these
theories may have provided ideological support for (already
existing) ideas regarding the necessity of the sexual
division of labour in relation to childrearing. However,
I would argue from this evidence that it would in fact
be inaccurate to attribute post-war shifts in legal policy
and practices to those theories. Indeed I would argue
that such theories are themselves the result and not the
cause, of an ongoing development regarding the changing
status and relevance of children in industrial Britain.
As demonstrated in preceding chapters there is substantial
evidence of the appearance of that discourse in law and legal
practice a considerable time before the work of post-war
psychoanalysts in the field of child development. I would
suggest therefore, that research to locate a route of entry
of such ideas into the divorce process is more accurately
directed at the training and case work approach of Probation
Officers. However, it should be remembered that the formal
establishment of divorce court welfare officers did not
- 98 -
occur until 1958.
	 Additionally, because of the shortage
of trained personnel at that time, it is highly unlikely that a
system of training of such officers (and their subsequent duties
of investigation and report writing for the courts) would have
been operating in a comprehensive form much before the early
1960s. Indeed the extension of their matrimonial duties to
cover county courts with jurisdiction to try undefended
divorce cases did not occur until 1968.
With regard to attempts to change divorce procedure after
the war, concern for the position of children cannot be isolated
from an endeavour to provide a new legal procedure designed to
shore up and sustain failed or failing marriages. Indeed the
two concerns are inextricably linked within policy considerations.
Fears generated by a high divorce rate resulted in the engagement
of child protection discourses to legitimate an absolute right
(albeit ultimately largely bureaucratic) of courts to consider
and oversee all decisions concerning the future of children
whose parents divorce.
This is not to argue that there was not a genuine level of
concern for such children. But rather that it only finds expression
in discourses about marriage. And the procedures developed in
relation to children and divorce cannot be isolated either
analytically or procedurally from the overall aim of legal
policy in this area, that of attempting to provide a procedure
to orchestrate reconciliation. Even though those proposals
were slightly modified in the 1950s, nevertheless 'reconciliation
for the sake of the children' provided the primary justification
for introducing questions of childrens' future arrangements
directly into divorce proceedings making divorce itself
dependent upo'n obtaining the court's approval of arrangements.
In addition of course that discourse also legitimated the wider
introduction of Probation Officers (otherwise concerned with
crime) into matrimonial work.
It is however important to note that these new procedures
would have been consistent with existing ideologies of marriage
and the family identifiable in the post-war reconstruction
(see Wilson 1977), Moreover, the new proposals for legal
procedure 'ere not a completely new and novel approach to
- 99 -
marriage breakdown. Rather theywere largely an extension
of the procedure and philosophy already adopted by the
welfare services of the Armed Forces aided by voluntary
marriage guidance agencies.
In retrospect it is of course difficult to judge the
experience of estranged wives who were subject to visits
from welfare officers attempting to forge a reconciliation.
But while it is quite likely that justifications based upon
the interests of 'state and community' would have been
fairly unsuccessful the same may not have been true where
the justification was children's interests. Indeed in a
culture in which mothers were posed as the key to children's
physical and emotional survival, it is likely that such a
provocative argument would have proved highly successful.
It is perhaps not surprising that such welfare officers
reported a reconciliation success rate of some twenty five per
cent of all cases considered (Final Report Denning Committee
1947). Nevertheless, both the Denning Report in the '40s
and the Royal Commission in the '50s were completely silent
upon women's experiences of those visits. Although each
dealt with issues central to the lives of women as wives and
mothers in the post-war years, as part of an endeavour to
achieve a post-war consensus,each, in its .
 remit, effectively




1. Bowlby (a psychoanalyst) argued that early childhood
experiences were crucial for future adult mental health.
He argued that children should experience a warm, intimate
and continuous relationship with their mother (or mother
substitute). Continuity of care was essential, all
other relationships were subsidiary.. Deprivation of
maternal care in children' formative years caused
irreversible emotional damage. Later work in the field
of child development has to a large extent discredited
the major claims of Bowiby's thesis. (Schaffer 1971;
Rutter 1981).
2. So for example, Riley argues that both during the war
and most strikingly just after it, the reproductive woman
at the heart of family policy is surrounded by the
language of pronatalism. Pronatalist thought generated
a great deal of language about 'the mother'. Much of
this was thought to be progressive and for a brief time
it sounded as if it spoke to the same needs for the
protection of motherhood about which various women's
organisations had been agitating for decades.
3. Indeed in some respects the position of the poor un-
married mother worsened during the nineteenth century
because the Poor Law forced the main burden and support
of the illegitimate child onto the mother. Fathers
could be made to contribute financially to the upkeep
of their illegitimate children but single mothers were
forced to enter the workhouse or leave their children if
they could not suport them by themselves.
4. Cretney (1974) argued that de facto adoptions had been
common in the industrial slums for many years. Charitably
disposed neighbours would bring up an orphan who would
otherwise have to go to an institution. But perhaps
the practice which the Government sought to control was
that of unmarried women arranging for their baby to be
delivered in a private lying-in house. The owner of
such a house would receive a lump sum in exchange for
arranging the baby's 'adoption t . The child was then
removed to a baby house. The owners of the house received
a small lump sum and inadequate weekly allowances.
According to the evidence of the Report of the Select
Committee on the Protection of Inf ant Life
(1871 vii 607) such children were so culpably neglected,
so ilitreated and badly nurtured that with rare exceptions
they all died in a very short time.
5. Also, provided the father was domiciled in England at
the date of the marriage, s.1(1) Legitimacy Act 1926.
6. It was argued in Harrison v Harrison that the term
'children' in s.26(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act,
1950 does not include a child born out of wedlock in
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circumstances which prevent the child being legitimated
by the subsequent marriage of the parents. Accordingly
on the dissolution of the parents' marriage, no order
for the custody of the child can be made.
[This case was heard on Appeal from the magistrates
courts in 1947. The mother had applied to that court for
maintenance for herself and a child. The justices had
refused her application for maintenance for the child.
The mother appealed to the Courts of Appeal. In that
Court Barnard J. decided that, under s.26(1) of the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, children meant legitimate
children. He therefore dismissed the mother's Appeal].
See also Packer v Packer [1954] P.15 and Galloway v
Galloway [19541 p.312.
7. Here, the Court claimed it had jurisdiction to deal with
claims in relation to the child of a marriage declared
void under s.35 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857.
(Bryant v Bryant [19551 2 All ER 116)
8. Compare with Packer v Packer [19541 op cit, and Harrison
v Harrison [1951] op cit.
9. This case was concerned with a custody dispute between
parents over adulterine children. Here Lord Denning
argued that the test for the courts' jurisdiction was
parenthood and not legitimacy. That definition resulted
in a successful application by a father for the custody
of three children. Also, Singleton L.J. in Galloway v
Galloway [1954] op cit argued that there should be a
change in the law to enable the courts to deal with
financial provision for such children.
10. The Legitimacy Act, 1959 amended the 1926 Act so that
adulterine children could be legitimated on the subsequent
marriage of parents.
11. Educational courses to instruct young couples in the
duties and obligations of married life. For the Denning
Committee this system was to involve the co-operation
of parents, teachers and pastors in providing a general
system of education for marriage, parenthood and family
life.	 (Denning 1947 p.5 para. 5: p.12 para. 28).
12. For the Royal Commission, the objective of education in
this field was to 'foster in the individual a duty to
the community, inculcating a sense of responsibility
towards children and strengthening his resolution to
make marriage a union for life'. (Royal Commission
1956, p.47 para. 9)
13. As a result of recommendations of the Departmental
Committee on the Social Services in Courts of Summary
Jurisdiction, 1936 Cmnd 5122, the Probation service were
allocated a statutory duty to include reconciliation
work and investigations for the court in relation to
matrimonial jurisdiction of the magistrates' court,
(by the Summary Procedure (Domestic Proceedings) Act
1937)
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14. This would, of course have largely applied to working
class women since the Summary Jurisdiction was largely
a working class forum (Carlen 1976).
15. During the War, the War Office, faced with a decision
of whether to set up Welfare Agencies staffed by its own
paid officers or to make grants available to voluntary
organisations (for example, the Solider', Sailor's and
Airman's Family Association) chose to make grants to the
latter0 The Denning Committee approved that decision:
"in our opinion grants in aid of societies working
in the field of marriage guidance are desirable
in cases where a society has proved the value of
its work".	 (1947 p.13 para.29(i))
16. The Marriage Guidance Council was a voluntary organisation
formed in 1938 and reconstituted following the war in
1943.	 The Council operated a system of largely volun-
teer counsellors to assist people with marital problems0
The Council took referrals from a number of sources
(Social and Welfare agenceis, hospitals and clinics,
Citizens' Advice Bureaux) and sometimes it appears
people were sent by the Probaation Officers in the Magi-
strates Court or indeed by the magistrates themselves0
In 1947, the Marriage Guidance Council in collaboration
with the Family Welfare Association initiated six
Marriage Guidance Centres in London. In addition, the
Council gave specialist courses of instruction to staff
Family Welfare Associations and lectures to the Probation
Officers of the Magistrates' Courts in marriage guidance
17. Interestingly the Committee here use the example of a
wife who because she has committed adultery "may think
that she has thereby forfeited the children and she may
have reluctantly handed them over to her husband" (Denning
Report, 1947 p.18 para.31(ii)). An interesting example
because clearly in case law the two roles are frequently
conflated (Chapter 5), a position adopted by Denning
himself in the 1960s.
18. This was regardless of whether custody was contested,
and the statement should give details such as children's
ages, past present and future home maintenance and edu-
cation (p.19 para.34(ii)).
19. Technically of course this is incorrect, it was not a
joint responsibility or right since fathers were sole
legal guardians. Mothers did not acquire joint guardian-
ship rights with fathers until the 1973 Guardianship Act.
20. Effect was for a time given to the recommendation for
'Statement of Arrangements' for children in divorce
petitions (under Matrimonial Causes Rules 1947). How-
ever, the details outlined by parents were often so
sketchy and incomplete that the requirement was later
dropped (Royal Commission 1956 p.378).
21. The Royal Commission 1956 outlined the practical
- 103 -
impossibility of Welfare Reports in every case concerning
children:
"the benefits achieved would often be negligible
and could not justify the expense.. .even if finan-
cial considerations were irrelevatn it is almost
certain that sufficient experienced social workers
could not be made available to undertake this work"
(p.109 para.385).
22. Interestingly the Royal Commission employ the terms
'conciliation' and 'reconciliation'. It is clear
however that here the fundamental differences between
these two terms and methods (developed in the late 1970s)
were not applicable in the 1950s. In that period
the terms were both used to apply to the same service
and methods, that of saving failing marriages.
23. Voluntary Services (for example, the Marriage Guidance
Council, the Family Welfare Association and the Catholic
Marriage Advisory Council) had received funding following
the recommendations of the Denning Committee and the
Harris Committee (Report of the Departmental Committee on
Grants for theDevelopment of Marriage Guidance, Cmd 7566).
24. The Denning Committee had argued (p.94, p.335) that
funding should be extended to cover the entire cost of
selection and training of marriage guidance counsellors.
Indeed a Marriage Training Board was set up in 1949
and the Royal Commission in 1956 recommended that
Exchequer grants towards a central administration and
selection and training of counsellors should continue.
25. The Royal Commission noted that by 1954, the probation
service had dealt with 40,000 matrimonial cases in which
both husband and wife were seen (p.94 para.334).
26. For example, Re S (an infant) [1958] 1 All ER is usually
drawn upon as evidence of a judicial preference for mothers
(Maidment 1984 p.156).
27. In the 1980s that figure is put at 6% by Eekelaar & Clive
(1977) p.29.
28. This is not of course to say that the custody of
children was never an issue between parents, but that
then as now, the sexual division of labour within marriage
in relation to childcare and domestic labour largely
determined parents' decisions.
29. The role of the Appeal Court in areas of judicial
discretion is such that an appeal will only succeed
where it is possible for the Appeal Court to be satis-
fied that the trial judge came to the wrong conclusion.
There are occasions when Appeal judges indicate that they
might have exercised their discretion differently. But
they are unable to say that the trial judge's exercise
of discretion was actually wrong or unreasonable.
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30. The daughter had written to her mother saying that
she was leaving school to travel by train to meet
her father and that she intended to break her
journey and, requested that her mother be at an
intermediary station to meet her. 	 The mother
acceded to her daughter's written request and
met her at the station. 	 In so doing, the mother's
conduct was technically in contempt of court.
31. In this case, the father had initially given a
voluntary agreement allowing the mother to continue
to bring up their daughter, but with certain
conditions (p.177).
	
Sane time later he physically
removed the child from the school in which the
mother had placed her, and placed her with relatives.
The mother then applied to the court to be allowed
access to her daughter.	 Initially the court granted
the mother limited access over a three month period
afterwhich, the mother again applied for further access
and it was at that stage that the President refused
the mother any further communication with the child.
32. "It will probably have a sftlutary effect on the interests
of public morality, that it should be known that a
woman, if found guilty of adultery, will forfeit, so
far as this court is concerned, all right to the
custody of, or access to, her children" - Sir Creswell
Creswell, Seddon Seddon & Doyle (1862) 2 Sw & Tr, 640.
33. In the 1950s, although the courts spoke of a woman's
right to be housed and maintained by her husband, it
was a 'right' which was vested in a legally constructed
moral evalution of whether she was a 'deserving' or
innocent (or deserted) wife.	 Unless therefore she
had a strict legal claim to property, her rights on
divorce were entirely contingent upon the court's
evalution of her moral behaviour.
34. Here, a husband on return from the ar-my failed to
find employment. 	 The family fell into debt on
the birth of a child and so the mother returned to
her employment on London. The child was sent to
paternal grandparents in Devon, the husband also
went to Devon.	 In his absence, the mother formed
an adulterous relationship and she subsequently went
to live with the co-respondent in the case, who she
immediately married following her divorce.
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CHAPTER 5
CHILD CUSTODY IN THE l960s AND !970s: COURT PRACTICES AND
THE EMERGENCE OF THE STATUS QUO
Introduction
The 1960s and 1970s provide an important backcloth to
current debates in the field of child custody and motherhood
in Britain. The right of courts to consider the circumstances
of all children whose parents seek matrimonial orders was
extended to the Magistrates' courts in 1960 (Matrimonial
Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) Act 1960) and mothers
acquired equal guardianship rights with fathers within marriage
in 1973(1973 Guardianship Act). In relation to parenthood
generally, the language of equality and partnership per-
meated discourses on children and childbirth (Holly 1984).
Certain sociological texts on the family began what at the
time appeared to be an analysis of the decline of role seg-
regation between spouses and the growth of equality of res-
ponsibility for childcare and domestic labour generally,
(e.g. Willmott and Yourg 1973). New approaches to child-
rearing techniques in mother and baby journals at the end
of the sixties acknowledged the (albeit) limited presence
of fathers0
In her analysis of this literature throughout the sixties
and seventies Holly (1984) identifies the emergence of a new
image of fatherhood. It had moved from an authoriarian
style concerned with rights, ownership and discipline, to
a new perspective based upon notions of partnership with
mothers in the care of children. Yet Holly, along with
other feminists (e.g. Oakley 1974; Sutton & Pollock 1984;
McKee & O'Brien 1982) have viewed this image with consider-
able suspicion. Oakley argued from her research findings:
"...only a minority of husbands give the kind




Edgell (1980) argued from a study of middle class couples
that in these homes material relationships remain highly
segregated, unequal and husband dominated (p.104). In a
review of studies which posit the greater preparedness of
fathers to participate in certain childcare tasks, McKee and
O'Brian (1982) argued that many studies suffered from
grave methodological drawbacks particularly in relation to
longitudinal information. Indeed there is considerable
difference between the general image of the new fatherhood
in literature of the 1970s and the position of fathers
as outlined in research. Moreover, that some fathers claimed
to carry out certain tasks within the childcare routine does
not necessarily alter the fundamental division of labour in
the home in which women continue to carry the major responsi-
bility for children. Nor does it address or indeed alter the
material consequences of that responsibility for women's
position in the labour market.
It was partly against that albeit vague and untheorised
image of the new fatherhood tI* the fathers rights movement
emerged in Britain during the 1970s 2 . In Britain, Families Need
Fathers (FNF) has focused its campaign almost entirely on the
issue of custody of children following divorce. It does not
for example offer an analysis or critique of the sexual division
of labour within marriage. Instead it simply argues that in
an era of 'equality' current legal practices discriminate
against fathers and favour mothers in relation to the custody
of children on divorce.
The rise of the fathers' rights movement in the 1970s has
coincided with a number of developments in this field of
family law, for example the introduction of conciliation
procedures and the emergence of psychological texts on
children and divorce. All of these developments present
women with a considerable number of dilemmas. Increasingly
it seems they are faced with public challenges and personal
dilemmas regarding their role and status as mothers. Yet
formally, in the 1960s for example, women had demanded that
men take an equal share of responsibility for childcare and
domestic labour. In view of that history it is sometimes
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not at all clear why feminists in the 1980s are so opposed
to the demands of the fathers' rights movement. Equally,
arguments rehearsed by the fathers' rights lobby, for example, the
notion	 that mothers occupy a position of considerable privi-
lege within family law and legal procedures, raises ambigu-
ities regarding precisely where mothers stand in contemporary
legal practices.
It has been part of our received wisdom but equally part
of our lived experience that in the case of marriage break -
down, 'mothers usually get the kids'. But the reasons why
this is the case and what role courts played in that process
has largely been a superfluous question. For the most part
where feminist campaigns focused upon law in the 1970s,
they centred on issues such as equal pay and sex discrimination
legislation, domestic violence legislation and improvements
to the law in relation to married women's property rights3.
Meanwhile, the figures for single parent households headed
by women continued to rise so that by 1981, 78.5% of all such
households were headed by women and 67.5% of those households
were headed by divorced or separated mothers (National Council
for One Parent Families, Annual Report, 1983-4, p.22)
In the face of accusations that the above figures are
demonstrative of attitudes of privilege or favour on the part
of the courts towards mothers, it is necessary to look in
more detail at the approach of the courts during the 1960s
and 1970s. In this chapter, therefore, I will begin by
looking at case law from the Court of Appeal over that period.
I will then examine the findings of relatively recent research
in this field on the practices of ordinary divorce courts.
Finally, I will consider some of the major debates in the
1970s regarding legal procedure in relation to the handling
of custody questions on the divorce of parents.
Contested Cases in the 1960s. The Impact of 'law'
In the 1960s (as in the 1950s) judicial pronouncements
in the Court of Appeal gave rise to the notion that mothers
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occupied a position of privilege within Courts. However,
prior to the work of Maidment (1976) and Eekelaar & Clive et al
(1977) which I outline below, we had very little information
regarding the processing of disputed custody cases in the
everyday divorce courts. For the most part, cases were
dealt with as uncontested and under these circumstances
they simply came before the Court under what is now s.41
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (children's appointment).
At these hearings, the judge has to certify that s/he is
satisfied as to the arrangements made for the children.
And indeed it is difficult to consider what alternatives are
available other than, in the majority of cases, to issue a
Certificate of Satisfaction. Not surprisingly that pro-
cedure is subject to a considerable amount of criticism,
largely because it has resulted in what has been termed a
rubber stamp approach to the treatment of uncontested custody
cases (Davis 1983). In discussing the sixties and seventies
therefore, a major distinction has again to be made between
contested and uncontested custody cases. Also, it has to be
noted that a tiny proportion of cases which are contested will
ultimately go on the Appeal courts.
In many ways the approach of the courts in the 1960s
to contested custody cases appears to have been more ambiva-
lent than approaches during the 1950s. Although a focus upon
children's need for nurturing resulted in such statements as
"the prima facie rule... is that other things
being equal children of this tender age should
be with their mother."
In Re S [1958] 1 W.L.R. 397
in the majority of cases which came before the Appeal Courts
however all things were not equal. Nor indeed could they be
since divorce itself during this period remained entirely
fault based, and the courts continued to import responsibility
for marriage breakdown into the decision making process
in relation to the custody of children.
- 109 -
In the early 1960s, the case of Re B [19621 1 All ER
875 demonstrates this point.	 In this case the mother
left the father.	 The dispute over the future custody
of tLeir four year old son first came before the
Magistrates' Court.	 That court took the view that the
mother had broken up the matrimonial home; she had in
other words, put her own interests before that of the
child (Evershed, p.874). Moreover, the Magistrates'
Court was also of the impression that she would always
put her own interests first (Donovan, p.875). They also
thought that the influence of the stability of the
father would exert the more.beneficial influence now
that the child was past the baby stage (Donovan, p.874).
There was no evidence of instability on the part of
the mother, other than her decision to leave her husband
(Donovan, p.875). 	 The Magistrates however awarded
custody. of the child to the father. 	 The mother appealed
that decision.
The case came before the High Court, and that court1
largely it appears in the belief that Re S [19581 1 WLR
p.397, had established a rule in this area, ' reversed
the decision of the Magistrates. 	 The father in turn
appealed that decision.	 The Court of Appeal ultimately
restored the magistrates decision - but on the basis
that the appellate court should not have interfered with
the discretion of the magistrates' court. 	 However, Lord
Evershed in the Court of Appeal also added that in fact,
there was no established rule that children of tender
years should be with their mother. 	 He stated :
"every case must plainly be determined in the
particular circumstances affecting that case;
though it is of course true to say that as a
matter of human sense a young child is better
with its mother and needs a mother's care
Re B [1962] (an infant) 1 All ER, 873
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In 'uncontentious' cases, courts have tended to confirm
the sexual division of labour in awarded custody of
children.	 However, the Court of Appeal was anxious
to establish that that was in no sense the 'law'. Mothers
did not start 'one-up' in custody disputes because of
their primary role in the sexual division of labour with
regard to childcare within marriages.
	 Each case it is
argued, is unique, each parent faces the court with
equal rights (Harman L.J. op.cit, p.874).	 Indeed
theiore, far from simply reproducing an ideology of
motherhood at this time, the Court of Appeal did on
occasion clearly struggle to resist some of its more obvious
implications with regard tà care of children on the break-
down of relationships.
Throughout the 1960s the Court of Appeal continued
to grapple with the relationship between women's responsi-
bility for marriage breakdown through adultery, and its
significance for their claims to custody of children.
In the early part of the decade, Court of Appeal decisions
are exemplified by moral statements regarding the failure
of adulterous wives to recognise their responsibilites
and duties to marriage and the family :
"one must recognise that to be a good mother
involves not only looking after the children
but making a Qme and keeping a home for them
with their father.........in so far as she
herself by her conduct broke up that home she
is not a goal mother"
Lord Denning, in Re L (Infants) [1962]
3 ALL ER. 3.
In including a consideration of mothers' behaviour as
wives in the custody decision making process, it was
generally argued by the Court of Appeal that although
the court was instructed to consider the welfare of the
infant as the 'first and paramount consideration', that
did not in fact mean that it was the 'sole' consideration,
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spousal conduct was also relevant.
	 For mothers, this meant
in effect, that regardless of ideologies of motherhood,
adultery and responsibility for ending a marriage was
still relevant to the court's consideration of their
future fitness as mothers.
This arose, not because of any physical neglect or
cruelty towards children per se, but rather, because
the court's conception of 'good mothering' during this
period by definition, carried with it a duty to remain
married to the children's father.
	 The explicit aim
of the law was indeed to safeguard the interests of
children.	 However, the implicit injunction to women
was to remain married. Lord Denning, in Re L cited
above makes this point clear :
"If the mother in this case were to be
entitled to the children it would follow
that every guilty mother who was otherwise
a good mother would always be entitled to
them."
op. cit. p.4
Moreover, Lord Denning also demonstrated in Re L, that
he was not beyond utilising children as a mechanism to
induce an errant wife to return to her husband, by
awarding custody of children to the father in the
hope that the mother will not leave permanently without
them. Although in Re L there was no evidence that
such a move on the part of the court would be successful4.
Re L demonstrates that in the so-called permissive sixties,
the Court of Appeal was clearly reluctant to award
custody of children to a mother, where the father
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had not through his own matrimonial misconduct forfeited
his rights. Again Lord Denning makes this point clear:
"It would be an exceedingly bad example if it
were thought that a mother could go off with
another man and then say of right. . .1 am en-
titled to take [the children] with me."
ibid p.4
In view of the approach taken to the issue of women's
errant sexual behaviour in the 1960s, it cannot be argued
that it was simply a matter of time before the Court of Appeal
'stamped out' the punitive approach adopted by divorce and
magistrates' courts. Clearly the Court of Appeal was equally
willing to impose sanctions upon wives who transgressed
perceptions of wifely behaviour and female sexual passivity.
And this was particularly the case when faced with a wife
determined to end her marriage against the wishes of a man
who the court perceived to be an exemplary husband. The
notion that the courts generally operated a policy of clear
discrimination in favour of mothers in the 1960s is therefore
inaccurate and oversimplified. frideed, new conceptions of
motherhood which set rigid standards and routines in relation
to childcare could, in effect, work to the detriment of
mothers who became involved in court proceedings over their
children. And where certain mothers appeared to fall short
of the new 'ideal', retribution could be particularly
severe, for example, not simply denying a mother custody,
but also attempting to deny her afl communication with her
children. Allegations of 'failure' as a mother could cover
such issues as allowing children to remain in night clothes
at 11.30 a.m. coupled with too much 'self interest' (evidenced
by the fact that a mother left children in the care of their
father)
Over the turn of the decade, attempts by courts to pre-
serve the family by sanctioning the sexual behaviour of mothers
began to give way to what appeared to be a more clearly
defined 'continuity of care' approach. That development was
facilitated by changes in divorce law generally in relation
to the relevance of matrimonial fault (see below). However,
wives' adultery continued to present the courts with a dilemma.
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Guilty wives it seems could not be seen to walk away with
'all the cards'. Although the interests of children dic-
tated a continuation of the sexual division of labour as it
existed in the marriage in relation to childcare, the courts
remained ambivalent when faced with arguments regarding
the rights of 'innocent' fathers.
For a while, that ambiguity found expression in what were
termed split orders. Here, the courts when faced with a
guilty mother ardan 'innocent' father would award care and
control to the mother but legal custody to the father
(Wakeham v Wakeham [1954] 1 All E.R. 434; Re W 	 (JC) (an
infant) [19631 2 All E.R. 706). That development was
.6problematic , but in the 1960s it appeared to mean that all
the legal rights attached to guardianship remained with the
father. This included rights to determine religion, education,
consent to medical attention and to a passport and consent
to marry while the child was under the age of majority.
Mothers in these circumstances continued with the daily
tasks of childcare, but fathers were perceived to hold all
the necessary status and power to make decisions and 'place'
children in wider society.
The argument that the courts during this period were
simply concerned with protecting and enhancing the rights
of mothers conceals more thm it reveals. Custody was
granted only to those mothers who conformed to the acceptable
model(i.e. one which involved not only daily childcare but
also appropriate social and sexual behaviou4. The importance
of continuity of care of children, articulated on occasions
by the Court of Appeal, should not be read as a blanket state-
ment of positive discrimination in favour of mothers. It
was a specific affirmation of the existing sexual division
of labour and not an attempt to enhance the rights of women
per se. For example, where the courts did transfer the custody
of boys from mothers to fathers (W v W & C [19681 3 All ER.
408) it was not suggested that such mothers might neverthe-
less have legal custody or at least share legal custody with
fathers, and thus retain a say in their children's futures7.
Where mothers 'lost', they lost the daily tasks of physical
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care (care and control) and thereby any chance of acquiring
any of the rights attached to legal custody.
Case Law in the 1970s
Changes in the significance of 'fault' generally in
divorce law in the 1970s led to a decline in the significance
of adultery for mother's chances of being awarded custody of
children. The idea that divorce should be available on
grounds other than establishing matrimonial fault was
rejected by the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce in
the 1950s. However the suggestion that divorce should be
allowed following a period of sepration of spouses continued
to receive attention in the 1960s • In 1966, the Law Commission
on Reform of the Grounds of Divorce: The Field of Choice argued,
that while good divorce law should seek to buttress the
stability of the family, nevertheless, where marriages had
irretrievably broken down, divorce law should enable the
empty shell to be destroyed with the maximum of fairness and
the minimum of bitterness and humiliation (para 15). The Law
Commission concluded that divorce law should afford dead
marriages a decent burial and operate to establish harmonious
relationships between parties and their children. It therefore
recommended that the basic principle for new divorce law
(later contained in the 1969 Divorce Reform Act) should be
irretrievable breakdown. This would be inferred from a
number of facts some of which remained the same as those
which established matrimonial offence 9
 but would also include
new grounds of separation 10 . Detailed investigation by the
courts into spousal behaviour was formally rejected as no
longer 'good' divorce law. That approach was reiterated in
1973 in the Court of Appeal, where Lord Denning argued, that
such inquests should not simply be transferred from decisions
as to whether divorce was possible, to court decisions
surrounding entitlement to property and maintenance on divorce
(Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] a All E.R. 829). Conduct was only
relevant in such decisions if it was 'both gross and obvious' (p.835)11
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A similar approach was therefore made possible in relation
to custody decisions. Awarding custody of children accord-
ing to the guilt or innocence of parents as established in
divorce proceedings was also no longer regarded as good
'law':
"the interest and wishes of the parties whatever
their role in the breakup of the marriage must
yield to the child's best [interests]"
J v C [1969] 1 All ER. 788 (H.L.)
"I do not myself think that whether this marriage
broke up because of the husband or the wife or
of both of them is of any consequence vhatsoever."
HvH & C [1969] 1 All ER 263
However that approach by the Court of Appeal did not com-
pletely relieve an underlying ambivalence towards the issue
of fault. Although adultery per se was no longer considered
grounds on which to deny custody to an otherwise fit mother,
nevertheless where it is utilised as evidence of a general
promiscuity or (as increasingly became the case) emotional
instability, the position is less clear. Moreover, that
change in the formal significance of fault did nothing to
solve the indecision of courts as to how to deal with the
demands of 'innocent' fathers. So far as the Court of Apçeal
was concerned, once fathers were unable to enqaqe aduiter'j
as sufficient grounds to prove a mother unfit, it was not at
all clear on what grounds a father could challenge a mother's
claim to children. Trial courts did on occasion continue to
award custody of children to fathers on the grounds that they
were the innocent party and therefore the deserving parent.
The Court of Appeal in turn reversea many of those decisions
(for example,s(BD) v S (DJ) [19771 1 All E.R. 656) 	 But the
concept of the 'unimpeachable father', coupled with notions
of the 'essential justice of the case', continued to appear in
case law well into the 1970s. Indeed, they provided a major
stimulus for appeals against lower court decisions in favour
of adulterous wives0
In addition, mothers were still on occasion viewed as
more culpable for the breakdown of marriage. Thus, where
it was a mother's decision which had brought a marriage to
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an end, such mothers continued to receive moral condemnation
from the courts (Dyter v Dyter [19741 4 Fam Law 52). The
same was not however true of the court's consideration of
similar decisions on the part of fathers (M v M [19771 7
12Fam Law 17)
Divorce Court Practice
Despite the complexity of court decisions in relation to
the custody of children, and what appears to be contradictions
between the practices of the ordinary divorce courts, and
the Court of Appeal, it remained conventional wisdom that courts
operated with a clear maternal preference (Ross Martyne 1970;
Berkovits 1980; Grossbard 1982; Poulter 1982). However,
apart from case law reports from the Appeal Court, we have
until recently lacked any systematic research on the disposition
of custody disputes in divorce courts. There are no official
statistics recorded regarding the number of contested cases
and their dissolution' 3 . Our only source of information came
from reported cases, and it was only from an extensive
'reading backwards' from those cases that we have been able
in any way to grasp the everyday practices of the divorce
courts.
Two studies in the late 1970s attempted to change that
situation. The first study was based on the records of a
Midlands court in 1973 with a sample of 95 cases (Maidment 1976).
This study examined one in five of divorce petitions with
dependent children presented to the court in that year.
The second study was much larger, with a sample of 652
divorce cases selected from the records of ten courts in
England and Wales (representing regional variations and a
cross section of the divorcing population). This bein one in
twenty of divorce petitions involving dependent children
filed in 1974 (Eekelaar and Clive with Clarke and Raikes,
1977), (hereafter Eekelaarand Clive)
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Both the above-mentioned studies confirm that only six
per cent of all divorce cases involving dependent children
are fully contested in court (Eekelaar & dive 1977, p.29;
Maidment 1976, p.236). That is not of course to say that
other cases were not initially contested. Maidment for
example, notes a 50% reduction in the number of cases which
begin as contested (recorded as such in the petition and
the respondent's acknowledgement of service) but become
through certain precourt practices (sometimes referred to
as bilateral bargain) orders by 'consent' or 'agreement'.
Fully contested custody cases are then extremely rare. But
while the percentage is small, the numbers of children
involved is substantial and increasing. For example, in
1979 60% of divorce decrees involved one or more dependent
children, some 137,985 decrees were made absolute, indicating
approximately 82,791 divorce cases involving dependent
children in that year. On an estimation that 6% of those
cases resulted in a contested custody case, in 1979 that
would have resulted in 4,967 fully disputed cases, each
involving one or more children.
In addition, both studies confirm that in contested
and uncontested cases alike, the most significant factor
determining custody after divorce is the children's residential
status quo'. That is in uncontested case, the residence
of the child at the time of the petition, as indicated in
the petitioner's 'statement of arrangements' for children.
And in contested cases, the residence of the child at the
time of the hearing. Issues such as the age of the children
and their sex were not significant factors in either study.
That finding does of course raise issues about the strength
of the status quo in relation to other factors, particularly
rights to remain in the matrimonial home. An order confirming
the residential status quo frequently confirms the right
of the custodial parent to remain in the home (Southall
1985, p.184). And that position has important implications
for bi-lateral bargaining on divorce (Mnookin 1979).
In relation to Maidment's study (1976) there were
thirteen cases classified as contested and she reports a
100% confirmation of the status quo. In Eekelaar & Clive's
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study (1977) with a sample of thirty-nine contested cases
it was found that the court's decision resulted in a change
of status quo in only five cases. In only two of those
five cases was a real change effected' 4 . That those two
changes resulted in a change of custody from a father to
a mother provoked the authors to comment, that although the
study provided evidence of a certain judicial caution in
allowing husbands to look after children (para 6.5), nevertheless
they concluded:
"our study confirms that the major factor
taken into account by the courts in deciding
where a child is to live is the avoidance
of disruption of the child's residence. We
could find no significant relationship between
the outcome of the residence issue and factors
such as the age of children, the sex of the
custodian parent or the separation of siblings."
Eekelaar & Clive 1977, para 13.13
In relation to the two instances in which wives successfully
challenged their husbands' status quo, the authors concluded
that 'such instances are quite uncharacteristic of general
practice' (para 13.14).
Both studies also confirmed that where children were
in fathers' care, mothers were more likely to contest that
arrangement, for example Eekelaar & Clive reported:
"...husbands expressed an initial intention to
apply for custody of children currently in their
wives' care in only 10.3% (49) of such cases,
whereas, in 34.3% of cases (23) where children
were living with a husband the wife expressed an
intention to seek custody herself."
ibid para 13.7
Finally, both studies confirmed that in
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uncontested cases, the vast majority of children were living
with mothers (80% of the Keele sample and 76% of the Oxford
sample) 15
For those writers and campaigners who maintained the
courts operated with a clear preference for mothers, these
findings represented something of a problem. Claims of sub-
stantial bias in favour of mothers could not be sustained0
However, Maidment argued that on appeal there was evidence
of widespread bias in favour of mothers. In 'What Chance
Fathers?' (Forward From Finer No 7 (1981)) Maidment attempted
to investigate what was felt to be a discrepancy between
factors influencing decisions in the Appeal Courts and those
taken in ordinary divorce courts. That study examined cases
reported in Family _Law reports over a five year period
during the 1970s. The major purpose of that survey was to
explore the outcome of cases in terms of the strength of
the status quo hypothesis. Two points emerge from that
study. Firstly, Maidment concludes that in contested cases
which go to the Court of Appeal, the residential status quo
is not the most important factor influencing the Court's
decision (p.15) 16 . Secondly, Maidment argues that in
those cases which resulted in a transfer of a child from a
father to a mother (14 out of 19 cases) those decisions could
only be explained by the existence of judicial preference
for the mother (p.18/19)
The purpose of that study was simply to test the
strength of the residential status quo, it was not concerned
with the reasoning whereby the welfare principle was applied
to reach or justify a given outcome. However, Maidment's
study reveals a further factor which has implications
for both the Court's attitude to appropriate carers and for
any notions of the changing role of fathers in the family.
Where fathers did have the major advantage over mothers
by virtue of holding the children's residential status quo,
two factors clearly influenced whether the court ratified
that arrangement	 Firstly, the existence of a substitute
mother:
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"other factors came into play such as the
father's ability to provide suitable care.
.in particular a female influence in
the form of a grandmother or other rela-
tive, or cohabitee.,.."
Maidment (1981) p.15/16
And secondly, some detrimental factor on the part of the con-
testing mother:
"It is quite clear that detrimental factors
such as a wife's behaviour in breaking up
the marriage on leaving home, her inability
to provide suitable accommodation for the
children, her mental instability, inadequate
personality or, her choice of cohabitee
play a much larger part where the father gets
custody."
ibid p.16
In assessing the relative chances of fathers in contested
cases in the Appeal Court, the author concludes:
"For the time being a father who seeks custody
has a very good chance of getting it as long as
he has the care of chidren at the point of
separation...he has not as good a chance as the
mother and he may have to rely on some defect
on her part0"
ibid p.20
It is clear that the question of which parent obtains
custody of children on divorce or separation is far more
complex than an analysis simply at the level of competing
parental 'rights', or, a focus upon courts' 'apparent'
maternal preference can accommodate, But,in addition, the above-
mentioned	 research raised a whole set of further
questions regarding pre-court practices in this area on the
part of solicitors and divorce court welfare officers
particularly in relation to issues of gender0 Although
the role of the divorce court welfare officer has been under
scrutiny (see below) the focus does not include a discussion
of the impact of gender (or indeed race) on practices and
procedures0
- 120 -
The Divorce Court Welfare Officer and Welfare Reports
The debate surrounding the divorce court welfare officer's
role in the 10s and 1970s focused upon several issues, for
example, the discrepancy in judicial approaches to referrals,
the influence of welfare reports upon judicial decisions,
the power to decide which cases to investigate and the
categories of families most likely to be investigated.
In the 1960s, the Law Commission (Working Paper No.15;
Family Arrangements for the Care and Upbringing of Children)
reported a wide discrepancy in the use made by the courts of
the services of divorce court welfare officers (p.6/7 para
8(a)). In relation to the question of.how influential such
reports are in disputed custody cases, r4aidment (1981)
comments that in relation to her sample, reports were ordered
in some 50% of cases (19 out of 38 cases). However such reports
were not significant in determining whether or not the courts
confirmed the children's residential status quo (p.5).
Eekelaar& dive (1977) reported thatwe1fare reports were
available in 53% of contested custody cases in their research
(20 out of 39 cases) (para 6.3). However, they concluded
that because the numbers were small it was not easy to deduce
any factors especially associated with the ordering of reports.
They also noted that where cases were adjourned for a welfare
report this could result in up to six months delay in obtaining
a decision.
Equally, of course, judges are not in any way bound
by recommendations made by welfare officers (J v J [19791
9 Fam Law 9fl. And although it has been suggested that where
the courts depart from the recommendations of a welfare
report that departure should be reasoned (Re C [1973] 9
Fam Law 50), there continues to be a wide discrepancy in
courts' handling of welfare reports.
It was partly that varied and unpredictable approach
on the part of Courts to welfare reports, and the continued
questioning of the precise functjc of welfare officers in
the field of matrimonial work which prompted a demand to
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return to the radical proposals voiced by the Denning Committee
in the 1940s. The Denning Committee had argued for a
statutory right of welfare officers to investigate and report
on all children whose parents seek matrimonial orders. That
proposal re-emerged as a recommendation from the (by then
well-developed) Family Law Committee of the Chief Probation
Off icers'• Conference in 1976, (Divorce Court Welfare). At that
time some writers in this field were critical of such a
recommendation, largely because it amounted to a transfer of
power from the courts to the welfare agencies (e.g.,. Graham
Hall 1977). -
	 But others (e.g. Freeman 1983; Maidment
1977) argued that in fact welfare agencies were probably
better placed than judges to make the decision regarding which
cases should be investigated. However, this latter approach
is limited in that it fails to address crucial political
questions regarding the practices of welfare officers in
this field. There is , for example, some evidence that working
class families may be more likely to be investigated than
17
others (Murch 1980, p.197) . Moreover, the services have
also been criticised for submerging the functions of in-
vestigation and counselling (Davis 1983) and more recently
for incorporating a therapeutic approach to marital breakdown
(Bottomley 1985).
The demand for a transfer of power in relation to the
decision making process regarding the ordering of welfare
reports in fact represented one school of thought in a
psychological - l ega l debate which emerged in Britain during
the 1970s. A major feature in that development was the in-
fluence of American research (large'ly psychoanalytic) which
examined the children of divorced parents. While I do not
wish here to outline those materials in any detail, the con-
temporary debate emerged around the work of Goldstein, Freud,
& Solnit (1973; 1979) regarding children in divorce proceed-
ings, and more recently has focused on the work of Wallerstäin
& Kelly (1980). In Britain the debate has been taken up by
members of the welfare professior (e.g. Lees 1972), by
psychologists (e.g. Richards 1982) and by lawyers (e.g. Maid-
mefiti l984b Freeman 1983). And it is increasingly argued that
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to protect the best interests of children on divorce we cannot
continue to rely on what, at times, appears to be the
idiosyncratic approaches of members of the judiciary as to
what constitutes a child's best interests. Essentially this
argument called for the integration into the decision making
process of the new approaches to child development in this
field developed in America. Initially it was a call to educate
the judiciary in child psychology and the focus of the debate
was on promoting 'joint custody' orders (Maidment 1982; 1984b).
To a large extent however that debate has been displaced
in the 1980s by the introduction of conciliation schemes in
Britain to handle custody disputes. However, important
questions regarding the precise function and influence of
divorce court welfare officers particularly in relation to
issues concerning gender and indeed race remain unanswered.
Indeed, in view of the trend towards conciliation schemes
and the central role which welfare personnel now play as
mediators in those schemes, I would argue that such questions
are of primary importance. The formal control exerted by
courts in this field is one aspect of the social control
experienced by women. Divorce, however, is a process in which
there are more subtle forms of social control. Therefore, it
is equally important to question whether and how dominant
ideologies of the family, structure the perceptions and work
of the para-legal profession who are increasingly involved
in divorce court welfare work. In relation to the criminal
courts, Eaton (1985) demonstrates how gender divisions are
reproduced by the routine practices of court personnel. But
in relation to the civil courts many questions regarding app-
roaches towards mothers and motherhood generally remain un-
answered.
Moreover, it is indicative of the way in which the current
debate has been constructed (preferential treatment of mothers
and discrimination against fathers) that new research in this
field focuses almost exclusively on the approach of probation
officers towards fathers. For example, Eekelaar (1982)
(Children and Divorce: Some Further Data) attempted to
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provide some information on how far probation officers
approach the issue of care and control by fathers in custody
cases' 8 . From a questionnaire survey he concluded that the
probation officers in his sample saw no grounds for dis-
approving of fathers caring for children.
In this survey, Eekelaar notes that where there was a
dispute at the time of contact by the welfare officer, it
was less likely to be resolved by agreement where the child-
ren were living with fathers. However, in only two cases out
of twenty nine cases were children transferred from a father
to a mother to the satisfaction of the welfare officer.
And in only one of fifty cases were children moved from a
mother to a father, again to the satisfaction of the welfare
officer. Eekelaar concludes:
"Although it is true that when the father's
sole custody of the children was challenged
by the mother [a father] was less likely to
retain them than when he challenged the
mother's sole custody, a father is neverthe-
less more likely to retain custody than lose
it. If he loses custody this will usually
have the approval of the welfare officer."
1982, p.78
Unfortunately, Eekelaar's data is insufficient to allow
an analysis of the theories or principles adopted by welfare
officers in this work, neither was it able to offer any dis-
cussion of the process by which agreement was reached. How-
ever, Eekelaar does note that in addition to providing in-
formation for the courts, welfare officer almost always (82%)
saw a counselling role as part of their function. Moreover,
two thirds of officers saw themselves as 'helping' in the
parties' negotiations.
In view of that definition of the functions of divorce
court welfare officers it would seem important that further
research identifies the influence of dominant ideologies of
the family in this era and their significance for the position
of contemporary mothers involved in custody disputes. In
his analysis of questionnaires, Eekelaar does identify
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aspects of what he terms a 'pragmatic-predictive' approach,
a 'psychological theory' approach and a 'social theory'
approach within the recommendations made by officers in
relation to considering custody by fathers' 9 . We do not
however have any systematic information regarding the approach
taken by officers to the position of mothers, it is largely
assumed that ideologies of motherhood determine this area
of work but as Eekelaar's work demonstrates this is not
necessarily the case.
In relation to the issue of remarriage, Eekelaar states
that fathers living alone with children were more likely to
be contemplating remarriage than wives similarly placed
(28.5% of fathers against 24.1% of mothers) . He concludes
that it may well be that chances of remarriage make it more
feasible for a father to contemplate custody and this
Eekelaar argues, would support a 'social theory' that child
care is more appropriately a female role, particularly of
married women (p.79) . Nevertheless, as Eekelaar points out,
in relation to this study, this still leaves a majority of
cases in which husbands were living alone and not contemplating
remarriage.
The above-mentioned study is limited and most conclusions
are tentative. However, in so far as it does identify the
approaches adopted by divorce court welfare officers to the
issue of care by fathers, these officers do not appear to raise
any objections to fathers retaining the residential status
quo of children, either alone, or, where such fathers contemp-
plate the help of a female substitute.
Where fathers hold the residential status quo position
therefore, it appears they stand a very good chance of gaining
both the support of court welfare agencies in retaining that
position and the agreement of the courts to ratify that
arrangement. If such fathers can in addition utilise aspects
of a mother's behaviour (e.g. responsibility for breaking
up the marriage, or the more fashionable grounds of 'emotional
instability') then, as Maidment (1981) identifies, such
fathers face the courts as clear forerunners in the dispute
for custody.
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Moreover, that position of strength on the part
of certain fathers E*ses regardless of the sexual
division of labour within an individual marriage re-
garding responsibility for children and childcare.
Indeed, both the courts and welfare agencies appear
to proce ed on the basis of what can be quite arbitrary
and fortuitous arrangements regarding the care of
children in the process of marriage breakdown.	 For
example, parents may make what they perceive to be
temporary arrangments regarding who should care for
children during this period. 	 But equally, one parent
may refuse another care of children, or, may order a
parent out of the matrimonial home without children.
Equally, a parent may acquire the children' residential
status quo simply by refusing to return them following
an access period.
It should not then be assumed that in ratifying
the children's residential status quo, that courts
(or social welfare agencies) are necessarily adopting
a 'continuity of care' approach (thus protecting child-
ren's relationship with their major or psychological
parent (Goldstein, Freud & Solnit 1973)). 	 This may
or may not be the case. 	 In certain circumstances
it may equally be the case that the courts are simply
ratifying the outcome of power relations as these are
played out during the process of marital breakdown.
And I outline situations in which that can occur in chapter
8 herein.
However, where mothers lose the custody of children
as a consequences of losing the children's residential
status quo, a pragmatic approach on the part of courts
may indicate that in confirming the status quo, courts
take the view that the least further disturbance to
children the better. 	 But it is also based upon a powerful
underlying cultural belief that regardless of circumstances
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iothers should not lose their status quo position, or,
more precisely, a good mother never leaves or indeed
loses her children.	 That philosophy is reiterated
in the Court of Appeal in the late sixties :
"Many mothers who are good mothers have
left their husbands; but as a rule they
take the child with them"
Salmon L.J.1
 H v H & C [196911 1 ALL ER p.263
In this case, Salmon, L.J. did not dispense with the idea
that there may have been a genuine explanation for the
mother leaving the child with the father, but all the
Court of Appeal (and indeed the lower court) had, were
the affidavits.	 And it was indeed the case that factual
information was generally lacking.	 However, the fact
that Salmon cited it as a general rule that "good mothers
.....talce the child with them" suggests that the judge was
more influenced, generally, by the dominant ideology of
motherhood than the structural realities facing many
mothers when leaving their husbands and the matrimonial
home. The reality for such women usually centres on
their ability to take children when they leave and also
of course1 their ability to provide alternative accommodation.
In the absence of adequate alternative accommodation, or
insLffficient grounds to be awarded sole occupation of
the matrimonial home by courts, then the implicit and
indeed explicit injunction to women1 is to remain within
marriage 'for the sake of the children'. 	 If such a mother
leaves without the children in the hope of finding a
solution to her own situation and of caring for them once
that is sorted out, as research verifies, she places
herself in an extremely vulnerable position, because she
is viewed as having abandoned her children - a heinous
crime indeed for a 'real' and 'proper' mother.
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The research outlined above in relation to the
significance of the status quo attempted to transfer the
formal terrain of the debate on children and divorce.
However, the popular debate in this field continues to
be perceived in terms of favoured mothers and displaced
fathers'.	 Moreover, further research in the 1980s
(Maidment, 1981; Eekelaar 1982) has focused onthe position
of fathers within legal practices. 	 And public debate
continues to focus very much on the position of fathers
and what has been termed, the 'fatherhood crisis' with
regard to children and divorce (Families Need F&thers 1983).
But what of the crisis in motherhood? While the notion
of 'privileged mothers' continues to provide the back-
cloth to debate in this area, we have in fact very little
information regarding the experiences of mothers facing
a custody dispute.
In the following chapters therefore I wish to examine
in more detail the significance of the status quo for
certain categories of mothers, particularly the circumstances
under which they might lose that position, and the inter-
play between the significance of the status quo factor and
notions of morality and sexual behaviour. I will do this
through an examination of the position of lesbian mothers
in Britain in relation to child custody on divorce.	 I
will examine how dominant ideologies of motherhood and
the family are influential in custody disputes, both at
the level of court proceedings and pre-court practices.
Therefore I will also examine the role of solicitors and
divorce court welfare officers in these cases. 	 My argument
is, that aspects of the legal treatment of mothers who are
lesbians relfects in an intensified and revealing form,
central assumptions regarding women in society specifically
in relation to their function and status as mothers.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Although the significance of that right had necessarily
declined considerably since the campaigns of NUSEC
in the 1920s.
2. It is not of course limited to Britain, for example,
Father Power in Auckland, New Zealand, Movement for the
Paternal State (M.C.P.) in France. The International
Working Party on Divorce & Separation held its European
Conference in Brussels in April, 1984. The Conference
was entitled 'DADDY: Parental Equality in the Interests
of the Child' and focused on denial and enforcement of
access, the situation of men and divorce in Europe, and
the preparation of a Petition on Joint Custody to be
presented to the European Parliament and Council of
Europe.
3. And these resulted in the Equal Pay Act and the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975, The Domestic Violence and
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976, The Domestic Pro-
ceedings and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978, and The
Married Women's Property Act 1964.
4. In the case of Re L [19621,
	
it is clear from
the wife's statement that she had no intention whatever
of returning to her husband. Moreover this wife had
sufficient money to enable her to live apart from her
husband in relative comfort.
5. In this case the lower court had denied the mother all
access to her two daughters aged four and five years.
It had argued such a refusal on the grounds that apart
from a lax in childcare standards, the mother had a
close friendship with a man before the correspondent,
and in addition the mother had 'left her husband and
children in the house with no-one to look after them'.
On appeal (S v S & P [19621 2 All ER 3) , it was argued
that 'all these matters are an indication that she had
less interest in her children than she had in her own
personal concerns'. However the Court of Appeal con-
cluded they were insufficient grounds on which to refuse
a mother all future communication with her daughters.
Nevertheless it decided mother should not see them as
often as she would like to see them (Ormrod, p.3).
6. There does not appear to be any clear foundation in
statute law for this type of order. It appears to have
been developed by the judiciary simply to deal with this
situation. For example the notion of divided custody is
unknown to common law, and 'care and control' is a rela-
tively modern development. That judicial development
has contributed to the growing confusion and complexity
in this area of family law. I will take up this issue
in Chapter 9 but it is important here to note that not
all courts can make split orders, it depends upon the
definition of custody (i.e. legal custody or actual
custody as identified in legislation under which the
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application is made.
7. Technically it is doubtful if that solution would have
been possible prior to the 1973 Guardianship Act (c/f
Re H (an infant) Ch D [1959] 3,746). This is because,
fathers during this period remained sole legal guardians
of children within marriage, mothers could only acquire
those rights through the courts on marriage breakdown.
Thus, a joint cistody order in effect, would put a separated/
divorced mother in a more powerful position than a married
mother.
The point here is that mothers were not generally
perceived as having anything to offer their children-
save nurture and domestic labour in early years. The
Courts did not utilise split orders to the benefit of
mothers who lost the physical possession of children.
8. In 1963 Leo Abse presented a Bill which among other
things would have allowed divorce after seven yearst
separation.
9. Adultery, cruelty and desertion.
10. Two years' separation by consent of both parties
otherwise five years' separation.
11. In effect, however, this remained problematic for women,
because conduct was a mechanism generally engaged in
attempts to reduce men ' s financial commitment on divorce
(Smart 1984)
12. In this case a father had deserted his wife and taken
their three children to live with his lover. The focus
of enquiry of the lower court however was whether the
father's lover would provide a good mother substitute
and whether their relationship was likely to be perman-
ent. Although the Court of Appeal ultimately returned
these children to their mother there were no statements
of condemnation regarding his conduct as a father in
'breaking up the family' or 'his responsibility to the
children to maintain a home with their mother' as in
Re L [1962]
13. These figures are not recorded in either HMSO's Judicial
Statistics or HMSO's Legal Aid statistics.
14. In one base the child had already been moved to the
mother by agreement; in one case the mother obtained
custody on a welfare report recommendation after having
abducted the children so that they were already living
with her at the time of the hearing.
15. In uncontested cases the studies reported 11% of the
sample were living fathers in case of the Keele sample;
9.1% in the Oxford sample, ('other' arrangements were
9% and 14.9% respectively). The Oxford sample noted that
if children were living with husband, they were more
likely to be older children and less likely to be under
four (especially if they were girls). However they comment
that the differences were not striking (para 2.2)
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16. There were 11 cases where the mother had the resi-
dential status quo and 27 cases where the father held
it. In only 4 of 11 cases (36.4%) did the mother
retain her residential status quo, and in only 8 of 27
cases (29.6%) did the father retain his residential
status quo.
17. Murch argues that middle class families previously
unknown to either Probation or Welfare Services largely
avoid scrutiny. He also points out that the background
to the Probation Officers proposals in 1976 were
investigations carried out in 1975 and 1976 into divorce
petitions to see what proportion of families were al-
ready known to social services departments or local
probation services. Three studies revealed 39%, 43%
and 36% of families were already known.
18. This research was based upon a questionnaire survey of
twenty-four separate probation areas during June and
July 1978. 120 completed questionnaires were returned.
In 100 cases information was also returned about the
court hearing and its outcome.
19. Eekelaar acknowledges that that classification is tenta-
tive and somewhat problematic. For example an illustration
of 'pragmatic predictive' is given as a rejection by an
officer of the arrangements which a father proposed for
children while he was working and where he was also
known to be a heavy drinker and violent. It is diffi-
cult to know whether from this if the objection related
to issues surounding 'latchkey kids' or, fears regarding
leaving children in the care of alcoholics, or both.
Equally this could have been classified under social
theory (as opposed to pragmatic)
Clearly analysis of decision making and recommendations
made in this area require a somewhat more detailed
analysis and classification system than the present
study allows, since adherence to the dominant ideologies





In 1977 a group called Action for Lesbian Parents
(ALP) produced a pamphlet entitled A Guide to Gay Custody
(AGGC). That pamphlet attempted to give some guidance to
lesbian mothers who faced a custody dispute over their
children. The booklet covered such issue s as the selection
of solicitors and barristers, and a discussion of the range
of problems likely to face a lesbian mother plus information
on courts, legal procedure etc. The pamphlet argued that
for the most part, lesbian mothers had little chance of
being awarded custody of their children by the courts in the
face of opposition from a father.
Although the issue of lesbian mothers has received
some attention in America (Basile 1975; Riley 1973; Armanno
1974; Weston Evans 1982), the issue hae not received any
systematic attention in the U.K. This has been the case
for a number of reasons. There has been little research
on law and legal practices in relation to child custody and
thus very little in the way of a framework against which
one could begin to analyse and discuss the position of
lesbian mothers in the U.K. And that lacuna is partly
responsible for claims of bias and/or simple prejudice by
the courts against lesbian mothers as compared with the
treatment of (presumed) heterosexual mothers. It also
contributed to attempts at explaining the approach of courts
in relation to this issue in terms of 'homophobia' (Humphries
1978; Basile 1974).
In the U.K. we have lacked information beyond an
anecdotal level on the legal experiences of lesbian mothers.
And that position has been compounded by the selection of
cases which are chosen for Report in the Law Reports 1 and
by the need not only to protect the identity of those
mothers who have contested custody from adverse
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publicity but also the need to protect those women working
in this area (as advisers and supporters of mothers). Women
who agree to offer support and advice in this area are
frequently women who have either lost custody of their own
children or women who feel that if their identity became
well known they would almost certainly lose custody of
their children.
However, an increase in the number of cases in which
women in these circumstances decided (at least initially)
to contest custody and the organisation of national support
groups, (for example, ALP, Bristol Lesbian Mothers Group,
The Manchester Lesbian Mothers Group, (Our Lives; Lesbian
Mothers Talk to Lesbian Mothers), and more recently support
groups in Sheffield, Leeds and London) plus the actions of
individual lesbian mothers in providing information about
their cases has began to break down the almost enforced
silence in this area of women's struggle.
In the following three chapters therefore I will set
out and discuss the operation of law and legal practices in
the U.K. in relation to a sample of thirty-six lesbian
mothers. Firstly I will examine a number of cases which
actually reached a a fully disputed court hearing. That
position, like the situation of custody cases generally is
extremely rare. In relation to lesbian mothers however
there are additional reasons why it is so unlikely that a
case will reach the courts. These reasons are partly based
upon particular precourt practices in this field, but it
is also the result of the experiences of those few lesbian
mothers whose cases came before the courts during the mid
1970s (Humphries 1978; Hanscombe & Forster 1982). The
general approach to the issue of 'lesbian mothers' by the
legal profession (solicitors and barristers) and the courts
(judges and magistrates) and by the para legal personnel
(divorce court welfare officers) is to see such mothers as
deviant, morally corrupting and socially threatening. This
led many lesbian mothers facing a similar experience to seek
other types of solution to their situation
For many, it has meant remaining in
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marriages which they find intolerable and which, were it
not for the fear of losing their children they would clearly
leave. In addition many lesbian mothers faced with no
alternative but a legal dispute ultimately decide not to
contest the case in court. In the following chapters I
will outline some of the practices engaged in these cases
which are influential in that decision.
A central theme in my analysis of this issue is that
it is inaccurate to talk of the 'lesbian custody case' or
'the lesbian mother' -	 just as one cannot talk of 'the
heterosexual mother	 That label in fact gives us very
little information. Moreover, we cannot understand the
operation of the law and legal practices in this field
simply by attempting to contrast the legal treatment and
experiences of mothers on the basis of sexual preference.
That is to misunderstand the role and development of law
in this area. In addition, we cannot explain current legal
practices in relation to lesbian mothers simply in terms of
the homophobic nature of 'law'. It is inadequate to ex-
plain the operation of law and legal practices simply in
terms of the class or gercer Or indeed the phobias of its
personnel 2 . Equally, the politics of this issue do not lie
within the 'rights and civil liberties' debate or the gay
rights debate 3 . Analysis of the legal treatment of 'lesbian
mothers' is more accurately placed within an examination
of the social corstruction of motherhood and the conditions
and circumstances under which that role is socially accept-
able and the institutions and mechanism through which it
is sustained and reproduced. The legal experiences of
lesbian mothers reflect many assumptions regarding the role
of women as mothers in society and they demonstrate one
institution through which those assumptions are sustained
and reproduced.
In chapter six therefore I will begin with an examination
of the outcome of a sample of lesbian custody cases in the
light of the residential status quo hypothesis (Eekelaar &
Clive 1977). In chapter seven I will examine in more detail
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the recurrent justifications employed by courts in the
removal of children from the care of lesbian mothers. In
chapter eight I will present materials from a series of




SEXUALITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL: LESBIAN MOTHERS, THE COURTS
AND CHILDREN'S RESIDENTIAL STATUS QUO
In this chapter I will present the findings of fourteen
contested custody cases involving twenty-one children aged
between 3½ and 15 years all of whom are the children of
mothers who are also lesbians. The cases are divided
according to which parent held the children's residential
status quo at the time of the court hearing (i.e. mothers,
fathers or joint status quo - see Table 6.1, p.136). It is
however important to note that that position is not always
a valuable indicator of who has had general responsibility
for the care of children during a marriage.
Mothers' Status quo
Court decision transfers children to father's household
Mothers held children's residential status quo in
eight out of a possible fourteen cases (see Table 6.1, p.136).
In five of those eight cases a court decision resulted in
the transfer of a child or children from a mother's care
to the care of a father. Those cases are, H v C (1980)
(unreported case - County Court); I v I (1978) (unreported
case - High Court); L v L (1976)(unreported case - County
Court); McT v McT (1977) (unreported case - Magistrates'
Court); D v D (1974) (unreported case - County Court).
In H v C (1980) the court transferred the care of two
daughters, aged five and six years from their lesbian mother
to their father. The mother had cared for the children
since birth. Following separation and divorce, the mother
lived with her lover who herself had four children. The
father had remarried a woman with one child. His new wife
undertook to care for the daughters if they were granted
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Table 6.1 : CHILDREN'S RESIDENTIAL STATUS DUO
TRIAL COURT	 COURT OF APPEAL	 WELFARE REPORT	 EXPERT VITNESS
CHILDRENS RESIDENTIAL	 DECISION	 DECISION	 _____________ ___________________
STATUS DUO	 ________ ________	 A pp litation	 - R rond/s	 ______ Rec.endJs
CONFIRMS TRANSFERS DISMISSED UCCESSFUL AVAIL N F OTHER CAUED 	 H	 F
UITH MOTHER
H v C
	 1980	 N/A	 YES	 8/0	 NO
In re B (TA)	 1971	 NO	 NO
I v 1
	 1978	 N N/A	 YES	 -	 NO	 - ______
L v 1	 1976	 N/A	 YES	 Unavailable	 YES{3] (1) (21
AvA	 1980 N	 N/A ___	 - __	 - __
Hct v Hct
	 1977	 N N/A	 YES	 NO
D v D	 1974	 NIA	 YES	 Unavailable NO
ReP	 1982	 __ N	 NO
WITH FATHER
HvC	 1982	 YES
JvJ	 1984	 ...,	 H/A	 YES
E v E	 1980 N	 _____ N
	
YES(2) i	 NO
W v V	 1980	 N	 N YES Unavaiable HO	 - ___
JOINT
YvY	 1977	 YES	 - -
S v S	 1985..,()	 YES	 8/0	 YES(21
N/A : Not Appealed 	 Figures in brackets refer to either
8/0 : Supervision OvdE/	 the nuuber of reports avai1able/noof
H	 : Mother	 expert Nitness&
F	 : Father
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to the father. A welfare report was available, it contrasted
the two homes and stated that the father's home was more
'stable and natural' (p.1). Although the judge accepted
that because the children had always been in the care of
their mother that that was a strong reason for maintaining
the status quo, nevertheless he agreed with the welfare
officer and argued that the new wife's home offered a more
stable and natural environment (p.1) . The father in this
case was therefore awarded sole custody and care and con-
trol of the children. The mother was awarded reasonable
access. The judge also concluded that a supervision order
should be made because of the 'tensions and emotions which
exist between the mother and father' (p.6)
In I v I (t97 a boy aged. five. years as trserre
from mother to father. The father proposed that his parents
should care for the boy on a daily basis while he worked.
The mother proposed to live with her lesbian partner who
also had a daughter aged twelve years. The mother and father
in this case were Australian and had been in England on an
extended holiday 4 . The father intended to take the boy
back to Australia. A welfare report was available in this
case, in which the welfare officer stated he was satisfied
with the welfare of the child in the care of the mother and
her partner (p.5 . The. c3se. in this	 sse.
father's mother as a potential mother substitute. She is
described as a kindly, motherly and considerate mother. In
comparing the alternative homes the judge concluded that if
the child remained with his mother the very real advantage
would be that he would be in the natural place for a young
child. However that would mean that the father would have
to stay in England, and that, the judge concluded, would be
highly unsatisfactory from the father's point of view,
'enforced exile would probably arouse resentment in him'
(p. 11 ). Moreover, the judge viewed the mother's relation-
ship as unstable (not likely to last) and that was therefore
a risk for the child. In addition the judge felt the child
might suffer because of his mother's relationship. In the
care of his father and grandparents, however, he would be
brought up in a normal family atmosphere (p.13). The
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judge therefore awarded custody to the father. While she
anticipated that a child of five would be upset and dis-
tressed at leaving his mother, nevertheless she argued that
'the sooner the change is made the better. . .he appears to
be a resilient and adaptable child I do not see any risk
of his failing to settle down in Australia' (p.14).
In L v L (1976) the mother lived with her partner and
the father lived with his girlfriend. It was initially
agreed between them that the child, a boy aged almost five
years, should live in his father's household. However, the
father decided that no harm would come to the boy in his
mother's care and he therefore returned the child to her,
his own relationship having broken down. In the following
three months the child's home was changed several times.
When the case finally came before the court, the judge argued
that the case required 'expert' opinion. Three psychiatrists
were engaged who gave evidence regarding the possible
effects upon children of being raised by lesbians. Two of
the psychiatrists argued adamantly that the child would be
psychologically damaged if raised by lesbians, the third
argued that that was not necessarily the case. In effect,
the judge opted for the evidence which argued the child
would be damaged and awarded custody of the child to the
father and his new partner.
In McT v McT (1977) a magistrates' court awarded custody
of a daughter aged 3½ years to her father. The father
proposed to continue living with his parents. Initially
both parents of this child had lived with paternal grand-
parents. The father had ordered the mother out of the home
on the basis of a lesbian relationship. She had taken
the child and gone to live with her own mother. Although
the welfare officer in this case is reported by the mother
to have been sympathetic towards her, the court made no
reference to the report when custody of the child was
decided. The magistrate is reported to have referred to
the issue of the mother's sexuality as tperverted and vile'
and concluded that she was 'emotionally unstable'. Although
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the welfare officer did not appear in court, the father's
G.P. was called. He confirmed that 'if left in the care of
the mother the child would suffer greatly because of gossip
and taunts' ('OUT' No.4 p.3 1977). Custody of the child
was granted to the father.
In D v D (1976) three daughters aged seven, nine and
eleven years were transferred from mother to father and the
daily care of paternal grandparents. In this case the father
proposed to move the children from London to the West Country,
where his sister-in-law would assist grandparents in the
daily care; he proposed to continue working in London.
A welfare report was available in this case but the judge
stated that he felt unable to rely upon its content. For
that reason he decided to interview the children himself.
This he did on two separate occasions by visiting the child-
ren in their own home. This is a fairly unusual step to
take, although judges have interviewed children in private
(under both Wardship and divorce proceedings) (Re D W (A
Minor) (Custody) (1983) 14 Fam Law 17) this is generally
done in chambers. However, in this case the judge stated that
he found the visits crucial to his decision (p.6). The
husband here had argued that the mother had no respect for
ordinary family life and that she had stated that a lesbian
lifestyle was the only form of sexuality compatible with her
political ideals. The judge hearing this case concluded
that this mother had quite deliberately sought to free her-
self of the trammels and obligations of family life (p.12)
and in her care the children would be brought up in 'singu-
larly unbalanced feminine environment. . .where they would be
exposed to particular intellectual opinions expressing
themselves as an eagerness for total feminine freedom sexual
and otherwise will have a marked effect' (p.22). The judge
therefore concluded that the children 'are likely to have
a more stable and balanced background in the family home
that is proposed for them in the West Country than in the
single parent family life that is proposed by their mother'
(p.22).
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Mother's Status Quo - Confirmed by the Court
Lesbian mother's continued care of children was con-
firmed by the court in only three cases: A v A (1980)
(unreported case - Sherriff's Court); In Re B (TA) (1971)
Ch, 270 and Re P (A Minor) (1982) (unreported case - Court of
Appeal)
In A v A (1980) the court with clear reluctance, con-
firmed the mother's status quo position on the basis that
a) the father did not himself want custody of the boy, b)
the child was in fact fourteen years of age and had expressed
a clear wish to be allowed to stay with his mother, c) the
only alternative was to place the child in the care of the
local authority, indeed that was the request of the father
who argued that he had no room to take custody of the boy
himself. A welfare report was available in this case and
it recommended that the boy should remain in the care of
his mother. However the father argued, the mother was homo-
sexual, there was no father figure in the home and that
the home was regularly used for meetings of people who
shared the same sexual preference as the mother.
Presented with either continued care by the mother or
local authority care, the court in this case finally opted
for care by the mother but with a statement to the mother to
the effect that she should erdeatrour to esire the hoy
up to be heterosexual.
In Re B (TA) (An Infant) (1971) the magistrates' court
initially awarded custody to a mother on the basis that her
lesbian relationship was over, and it was felt because she
offered the daughter, aged 3 years, a more stable environment
than the father. In this case the mother had acquired the
status quo by refusing to return the child following a period
of access. The father appealed the magistrates' decision.
On Appeal, the judge expressed dissatisfaction at the way in
which the mother had acquired the status quo however 'dealing
with matters as they now presented themselves to the court',
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the judge argued, firstly that the mother had moved into her
parents' household and therefore the daughter would not now
be raised in a manless home (p.276). Secondly, the mother
produced medical evidence to say that the lesbian episode
was due to peurperal depression (p.277). These developments
persuaded the Appellate judge to dismiss the father's appeal
and the mother therefore retained custody.
In the above- mentioned case there is no indication that
a welfare report existed. However there did exist several
circumstances which earlier research has indicated might
well lead to the order of a welfare report (Eekelaar & dive
1977) e.g. the father changed his housekeeper without
notifying the mother (and on that basis) the mother retained
custody of the child following an access visit; the mother
moved her home; the father applied for what would amount to
a further move of residence for the child.
In Re P (1982) the court again confirmed a mother's
residential status quo when faced with an alternative of
local authority care. In this case the mother had originally
left home with a daughter aged six years (and a son aged
fourteen years by a former marriage). She went to live with
her lesbian partner. When the husband discovered the 'nature
of the relationship' he took the daughter back. Five months
later he obtained interim custody of the child. Six months
later he returned the child to the mother because he could
not cope. Two weeks later he took her back. The mother
later obtained an order allowing her access to the child on
condition that she did not allow the child to come into
contact with her lover. During an access period the child
made some very serious allegations against the father (p.36)
and on that basis the mother did not return the child fol-
lowing access. The mother then applied to the court for
care of the child. The father contested her application.
When the case came before the court the judge stated
that the allegations made by the child against the father
were of such a character as to disqualify the father from
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having care of the child if they were true. However by
the time the judge came to make a decision the father had
withdrawn his application for custody, and instead argued
that the court should place the child in the care of the local
authority. His objection to care by the mother was based on
the fact that she was a lesbian. The trial judge however
argued that before he could consider a care order under s.43
of the Matrimonial Causes Act it was necessary to showthat
'it is impracticable or undesirable that the child should
be placed in the care of an individual' (p.37). In assessing
whether or not the proclivities of the mother and the lady
with whom she lives are such as to make it undesirable for
[the child] to be brought up in their home he stated;
"I have no evidence as to the effect upon
children of being brought up with a parent
living with a person of ...her own sex, and
I have no experience of what impact that is
likely to have upon a child. The official
solicitor is unable to help me in that regard.
In those circumstances the best I can do is
to use such common sense as I possess".
(p.37)
The judge then argued that the mother was discreet re-
garding her sexual preference and faced with an alternative
of local authority care he concluded that care by the mother
would be preferable.
The father then appealed the decision on the basis
that under no circumstances should a lesbian mother be
allowed to rear children.	 -
The Appeal Court however agreed with the trial judge,
despite all the risks attendant with care by a lesbian mother
this was in fact preferable to care by the local authority.
However, in view of the risks, the Court of Appeal decided
to ' place the child under a supervision order with the local
authority social services department with reports 'as the
department felt fit but at a minimum the department should
submit a report to the official solicitor on a quarterly
basis (p.40) .
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Father's Status Quo - Confirmed by the Courts
There were four cases in which fathers held the child-
ren's residential status quo at the point of the court
hearing (see Table 6 .l p.l36). And that position was ultimately
confirmed by the court in two cases, E v E (1980) (unreported
case - Court of Appeal) and W v W (1980) (unreported case -
Court of Appeal.).
In E v E (1980) a county court had awarded interim
custody of a boy aged six years to a father. The court
also ordered a supervision order and a further welfare
report in six months time. The mother in this case had
formed a lesbian relationship and on that basis the father
ordered her out of the matrimonial home. The mother lived
with her lover. Two welfare reports were available in
this case, both recommended the mother should have custody.
Both parents had always worked outside the home. The
child had been catered for during t day by maternal grand-
parents. The welfare officer interestingly refers to the
child as "granny reared" (p.49). The welfare officer
recommended that the mother should have care of the son, on
the basis of shortcomings of the father and the firmer
discipline exercised by the mother (p.L19).
The county court judge contrasted the relative 'safety'
of the father's home with the risks involved in the child
living with a mother who was a lesbian. The father was
viewed as 'somewhat wanting in terms of strength of charac-
ter necessary to guide a child'. But the recorder had argued
that, however unsatisfactory the father is reported to be,
giving him the child would not rule out other people taking
an interest or the benefit of other people (p.50). Moreover,
he concluded that a supervision officer could supply the
lacking qualities in the father to ensure the child had a
satisfactory upbringing. In relation to the mother's
lesbian relationship this judge argued that the child would
not understand the relationship and that it could not
arguably be explained. In the mother's care the child would
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soon suffer taunts and he would be aware that his background
was different to others (p.51).
	
In this case it appears the
mother and her lover were going to be 'discreet'. They did
not plan to explain the basis of their relationship to the
child.	 However, in contrast t
	 the judge in J v J (1984)
(see page 149), this judge disliked that approach.
	 He
argued it was 'sly', 'they intend to employ a certain falsity'
(p.51).	 In awarding the child to his fathe the county court
judge concluded that his decision must take a long term
approach. He argued that attempts to hide the relationship
would become increasingly difficult as the child grew older.
Therefore, he concluded because 'the child was getting on
well where it [was], it should remain there and not be exposed
to the risks of custody with the mother' (p.51).
The mother in E v E appealed that decision and the
case came before the Court of Appeal in 1980.
	 Here,
interestingly, it was argued that 'there was no rule or
principle that a lesbian mother or homosexual father cannot
be granted custody of a child'(p.49).
	
Yet it was also stated
that in this case there was nothing the matter with the mother's
home except that, living there, the child would learn of the
unusual and irregular sexual relationship of his mother.
The judge argued that according to the second welfare report
the child was already manifesting a curiosity about something
he could not possibly understand (p.49).
	 In view of that,
the judge concluded that the lower court had indeed made the
correct considerations and she dismissed the mother's appeal.
In considering why the trial judge in this case did not
foJicw the recommendations in the welfare repor't, the President
of the Family Division stated :
"It is of course proper that judges should consider
welfare reports and the conclusions and recommendations
in them.	 It may be that when it is demonstrated in a
particular case that the judge has not considered those
matters, an appellate court will look critically at the
decision, and if it finds it unacceptable will regard
lack of consideration of the welfare report as a valid




The mother's appeal in this case was therefore dismissed.
From the documentation it does not appear that an order
for joint custody was made, it was commented that access
was happening, although there were difficulties (p.50).
Two Appeal Court judges, Sir John Arnold in Re P (a Minor)
(1980), and Lord Lane in E v E (1980), have stated that
there have been cases in which the court has awarded
custody to lesbian parents in the past. However, I would
suggest that before we can comment on such remarks we do need
to know the circumstances under which such awards were made
so that these can be examine against the framework developed
in this research.	 In the light of the
	 statement by
Watkins in Re P (a minor) (quoted on p.182) suggesting that
almost any alternative is preferable to granting custody
to a lesbian mother, the suspicion must remain that only in
extreme circumstances (ie where there is little or no
alternative) is such a course of action adopted.
As further support for this line of reasoning, Action for
Lesbian Parent (a pressure group monitoring cases in the
1970s) approached the Lord Chancellor's Department to complain
about the way in which courts were dealing with these cases
in the mid 1970s. The Lord Chancellor's Department said
it would investigate the issued
 and responded referring to
some eight cases arguing that mothers had succeeded in
several of these.	 ALP's work involved most of these cases
and revealed, in line with my argument above, that lesbian
mothers succeeded in obtaining custody o c'nidren only in
those cases where in effect, the courts had little alternative
(in the majority of these cases fathers had withdrawn or had
insufficient accommodation to offer the children).
In W v W, the father successfully appealed
against an order made in the county court which gave custody
of a boy aged 3½ years to the mother.
	 The effect of this
order would have been to transfer custody from the father
to the mother.	 In this case, the mother had suffered a
period of depression following the birth of the child and
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had eventually left the matrimonial home living first witJt
friends, then with her brother.
The father in this case then gave up his employment
to care for the child.	 The Magistrates' Court made an
order awarding custody of the boy to his father.	 The
mother saw the child on access. 	 Two years after separation
the mother began living with another woman.	 In a divorce
petition she applied for custody of the child. 	 There
was considerable delay (some six months elapsed) before
a welfare report was available, and the case diI not come
before the court for a further six months.	 Thus, a further
year had elapsed between the mother's application, and
the court hearing.
The trial court judge appeared to ignore the mother's
lesbian relationship - for reasons which we can only speculate.
He contrasted the two alternative home , referring to the
fact that the mother's home had a garden whereas the father's
home did not.	 The judge also referred to the fact that the
father had at times developed an interest in homosexual
relationships.	 There is no reference in the documentation
as to the recommendation of the welfare report, nor does
the county court judge appear to refer to the welfare report
in his decision to transfer the boy from his father to his
mother.	 However, the father applied for a stay of execution
and appealed that decision.	 The case came before the Court
of Appeal the following month.	 In that court it was decided
that the lower court had not taken into account, a) the fact
that the child had been adequately cared for by the father
for three years, and, b) the fact that no clear case had been
made to substantiate a change of the child's residential
status quo.
	
Indeed, it was argued that the lower court
had ignored the most important aspect of the whole case (p.55).
And on that basis, it was argued that the 'Court of Appeal
was entitled to apply its own mind to the problem and make
its own deicison in the exercise of its own descretion' (p.55).
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Thus the Appeal Court judges concluded that no case had
been made out for the transfer of the boy, he was happy
with his father, and the Court therefore allowed the
father's appeal.	 The child thus remained with his father.
The mother was allowed access to the child one weekend in
three with visiting access on every other Sunday.
	
There
was no discussion of whether this mother might have joint
custody.
In Cummins and Vassallo (1981) children were left in the
care of their half sister who is a lesbian s
 rather than the
father,	 confirming the children's residential status
quo.	 This sister had cared for the children during
the last year of their mother's life (living with the sick
mother and the husband), she had then ; with the permission of
the father taken the children to live with her.
	
When the
father then contested that situation in court, it became
apparent that he had no clear plans to care for the children,
Ormrod, L.J stated the father 1has really very vague proposals
in relation to the children..........it is right to say that
the picture he presented [to the court] was a pretty colourless
one' (p.2). In these circumstances with the children's
own mother having died I would argue the court was again
left with little alternative.
Father's Status Quo, Transferred to Mother
There are two cases in which the court transferred children
in a father's custody to the care of a mother: H v C (1982)
(unreported case C.A.) and J v J (1984) (unreported case
High Court).
H v C (1982) came back to court sometwo years following the
original order transferring the children from the mother to
the father. The intervening years had been fraught with
access problems and the father now wished to stop the mother's
access completely. 	 A further welfare report was obtained
in which the welfare officer stated that care and control
of the two daughters should be transferred to the mother (p.2).
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The basis of the recommendation in the welfare report
was that the lesbian relationship between the children's
mother and her lover, Ms t? appeared to be stable. But
it was also stated in the Report that the children had
made it clear that they wished to live with their mother.
The trial court judge stated that he found the welfare
report helpful, and felt that the recommendations for a
trarer of care and control of the daughters were worth
trying (p.2).
	 The focus of his judgement was upon
relieving as quickly as possible the stress and pressure
currently on the children as a result of the difficult
(and sometimes violent) scenes which took place at access
changeovers.
The father appealed against that order. 	 The case
then came before the Court of Appeal in February of 1983.
The judge here began by stating that the dominant problem
in this case was 'that the mother was a practising
homosexual' (p.33).
	 Drawing on statements in the welfare
report in which the welfare officer indicated that the
mother was unlikely to give up the fight against the father
for the custody of the children, the judge stated
"A mother who is determined to keep contact
with her children particularly when they
are young will often fight very hard for
them, the result being that neither the
children nor anybody else can establish
a stable way of life".
ibid', p.34
In discussing the weight which the court should
give to the views of the children (now aged nine and
ten years old), the judge accepted that they had made
their feelings known to the social worker; they did
not want to live with their father and stepmother.
However, the judge stated that he felt it was a mistake
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to decide cases on the basis of what children say: 'one
has to look at what is happening to the children and
how they are reacting to the situation, not so much what
they are saying' (p.34).
Nevertheless, this judge concluded that as children
get older they make their views clearer, and can be
very unco-operative and difficult.
	
In this case he
decided that the lower court had come to the right
decision in transferring the care of the children from
their father to their mother.	 However, in dismissing
the father's appeal, he also stated
"...a homosexual way of life on the part
of the mother is not in itself a reason
for refusing to give her control of the
children, although of course it is a
factor which one has to take into account
and think about very hard.	 Experience
shows...... . .that homosexual relationships
do tend to be even more unstable than
heterosexudl relationships are...... .. . ."
ibid, p.35
Interestingly, in this case, the court ordered joint custody
with care and control to the mother - despite th fact that
these parents clearly would not be able to co-operate
over 'important decisions'. 	 When the mother had originally
lost care of the daughters three years previously, she had
not been awarded joint custody, the father had been awarded
sole custody.
In the case of J v J (1984), a county court judge
transferred the residential status quo of three children,
two boys aged fourteen and ten years, and a girl aged six
year from their father to their mother.	 The mother
is a lesbian and proposed to move out of the city in
which she and her husband lived and where the children
attended their respective schools.
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On leaving the marriage, the mother obtained an
interim order (by consent) for custody of the children.
Initially she planned to live with the children in the
same area as the husband.	 However, housing problems
resulted in her moving out of the city to her parents'
(empty) house in Cornwall, some hours journey away. She
had sought and arranged alternative schooling for the child-
ren.
Under protest from her husband she agreed, before a
judge, to return the children to the matrimonial home (in
London) temporarily, until such time as the final order
regarding the children's future home was made.	 The matter
took three months to return to the High Court. 	 During
this period the husband cared for the children with the
assistance of a female neighbour.	 The mother had
regular access.
Two welfare reports were prepared in this case. At
the time of the first report, the mother did not disclose
the lesbian relationship, nor was she questioned about
it. A welfare officer visited I-er home which she shared
with Ms "B".	 The first report described the mother as "a
competent caring mother who has a good insight into the
needs of each of the three children' (p.3).
	
In the report,
Ms "B" is simply described as a lodger and friend. The report
concluded that since the mother was not working she would
have more time to give to the childrn in their general day
to day care.	 The judge stated that the report was limited
in terms of its assessment of the parties (p.8). 	 The second
welfare report, prepared for the High Court hearing, contained
the same recommendations for the mother's custody as the
initial repott. In the first report it was stated the boys had
a preference to live with their father and the daughter wanted
to live with her mother.
The father argued that he held the status quo and the
court should endorse that position (p.13).
	 Moreover, he
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argued the children should be protected from the influence
of their mother's lesbian relationship. He also argued he
had played a significant role in childrearing responsibilities
in the marriage. In relation to this latter issue the judge
concluded the father's involvement was of a recent nature
and not a feature of general practice throughout the duration
of the marriage (p.l5)
In relation to the mother's lesbian relationship the
judge argued that it was right that the court as a general
rule should be aware of children being led into deviant
sexual ways and of the risk of social harm if the mother's
relationship became known. However, in this particular
case he stated that the mother was discreet about her rel-
ationship, she has not flaunted her relationship with Ms
'B'. He therefore concluded:
"I do not for one moment consider that there
would be any corrupting influence by {the mother]
if she were to have care and control of the
children on a permanent basis. As to whether
there would be social harm to the children if the
knowledge of her association...was to become
public knowledge in the Cornwall area I must
confess I find that of a somewhat speculative
nature".
(1984) (p.22)
In this case, the mother was finally awarded care and con-
trol of the three children. A joint order was made in rela-
tion to legal custody.
Parents Holdinq a Joint Status Ouo
There were two cases in which by virtue of either a
splitting of children and/or a sharing of the matrimonial
home at the time of the court hearing parents shared the
children's residential status quo: S v S (1980) FLR, 143;
and V v V (1977) (unreported case - Court of Appeal) . In
the former case the father's position was confirmed by the
court and in the latter case the mother's position was
confirmed.
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In V v V (1977) the Court of Appeal ultimately gave
custody of twin girls aged eleven years to their lesbian
mother. That decision overturned a previous decision in
the High Court in which the father was awarded custody of
the twins and their fifteen year old brother on the basis of
the mother's allegiance to the Women's Liberation Movement
and her lesbian relationship.
Mr and Mrs 'V' were divorced in 1973, but both con-
tinued to live in the matrimonial home. In 1975 Mr 'V'
married his second wife who had three children, but two days
later returned to t1 former matrimonial home. After two
months he left to live with his new wife. He applied to
the court and was successful in gaining the custody of the
children of his former marriage. However, there was no
available accommodation in the home of his new wife for three
further children. Therefore the twin girls remained with
their mother but the boy went with him and slept in a cara-
van in the garden. The mother appealed that decision. The
father argued the mother should be ordered to leave the
(four bedroomed) matrimonial home. He would then return with
the three children and live there until he could buy a larger
house to accommodate both his three children and the three
children of his new wife.
In the Appeal Court, the judge began by stating that the
case contained a great deal of emotion regarding the mother's
attitude towards women's liberation and lesbian activities.
However, he concluded that the case rested upon the narrow
grounds of 'bricks and mortar' (p.15) . He said it was clear
that the father could not make adequate provison for housing
the children and his plans were wholly unsatisfactory and
unsuitable (p.l Ll) . He did however express misgivings about
leaving the twins in the care of their mother:
"The evidence is...that the mother has become
involved in an intense way with various move-
ments of protest.. . She has reached the stage
where no man could do anything right..."
ibid p.8
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The second judge hearing this appeal said that while
accepting that there was no viable alternative in this case
nevertheless,
"I am much troubled lest it prove a disaster
for these two eleven year old girls that they
be brought up by their mother, having regard
to what we have heard of her personality and
her espousal of certain causes.. .1 would not
have hesitated to have taken the two girls
away from her if any acceptable and practical
alternative had been available".
ibid p.17
In this case although a welfare report was available,
the welfare officer stated she felt unable to make any
recommendations. The Court of Appeal called upon the
Official Solicitor who equally felt unable to make a
recommendation. The twin girls had expressed a desire to
remain in the care of the mother. The older boy's prefer-
ence is not stated. Howeverthe father argued that it was
"all or nothing and that he was not prepared to continue
with custody of their son if he lost the twins and the
matrimonial home". The Court of Appeal reluctantly awarded
care and control of the twins to the mother. It appears the
father remained their legal guardian. It was not suggested
that the mother and father should be joint legal guardians
under a joint custody order.
In S v S (1980) , the mother left the matrimonial home
taking two children, a girl aged 7½ years and a boy aged
six years. Initially the mother went to live with her lesbian
lover but later she and the children returned to the matri-
monial home because of accommodation problems. The mother
then started custody proceedings. A welfare report was
prepared which recommended she should have custody (p.143).
Both children had expressed a wish to be in her care. There
was also evidence from two psychiatrists reporting on the
significance of lesbianism. Both doctors argued that there
was no danger of children being led into deviant sexual ways.
However one argued the children should be awarded to their
father because there was less chance of social embarassment
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to the children.
The judge hearing the initial application accepted the
argument of one doctor regarding the issue of social
danger". He also quoted from the judgement of Lord Wilber-
force in Re D (An Infant) [1977] A.C. 602 referring to the
'dangers of children being exposed or introduced to ways
of life. . . and the possibility that such exposure might
scar them permanently'. In the circumstances he concluded
that it was in the interests of the children that custody be
granted to the father with reasonable access to the mother
and subject to supervision order by the court Welfare Officer.
The mother appealed on the basis that firstly, it was
wrong to ignore the recommendations of the Welfare Officer,
and secondly, to prefer the evidence of one psychiatrist over
the other. The Court of Appeal however dismissed the appeal,
it argued that it was for the trial judge to decide whether
or not having heard the evidence he agreed with the con-
clusion in the welfare report. That the judge also pre-
ferred the evidence of the second psychiatrist (even though
this psychiatrist had not seen the parents) was also a
matter essentially for the judge (p.146).
Conclusion
Although the numbers are necessarily small a number of
issues arise. Firstly, ratification of children's resi-
dential status quo is not necessarily an indication that the
courts are protecting and ensuring continuity of care of
children on divorce. This may or may not be the case. It
should be noted that parents can acquire that powerful bar-
gaining factor through purely arbitrary or fortuitous
arrangements. It can for example arise simply because the
most powerful partner determines the position of children at
the point of separation. For the mothers in this study, this
can simply mean a husband asks or orders a wife to leave
the matrimonial home, but refuses to allow her to take the
children. Or, if she takes the children, he can use physical
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(and/or emotional) force to retrieve them. Children can be
returned to the matrimonial home because of insufficient
accommodation (e.g. S v S 1980)). Thus, their home can
change several times and it may be that the parent with whom
the children finally reside at the time of the court hearing
is not necessarily the parent who has provided continuity
of care throughout a child's life. It may simply be the parent
who remains in the matrimonial home.
Secondly it is clear that mothers who are also lesbians
unlike their heterosexual counterparts do not benefit from
holding children's residential status quo at the time of the
court hearing. In this sample over half the lesbian mothers
(eight out of fourteen) held the status quo. Fathers
successfully challenged that position in five cases. In two
of those cases fathers had formed new relationships and new
female partners had agreed to take care of the children in
the event of fathers gaining custody. In both cases judges
viewed the women concerned as acceptable mother substitutes
for very young children. In the remaining three cases
fathers proposed that grandparents would provide the major
caring role for children. In no case did a father contest
a mother's custody on the basis that he himself proposed
to provide the major caring and rearing role.
With regard to the three cases in which a lesbian
mother's status quo was confirmed by the court (see Table 6.1
p.136) , in two of these cases the only alternative open to the
court was care by the state in the form of a local authority
care order. This was the solution preferred by both con-
testing fathers (A v A (1980) and Re p (1982). In the third
case the mother had ended a lesbian relationship and was
living with parents in a home 'well populated by males'
(in Re B (TA) 1971). Indeed, it would appear that the only
time the courts endorse a status quo held by a lesbian mother
is when there is no viable alternative (therefore she wins
by default) or where she has moved into living circumstances
which appear to demonstrate a rejection or denial of her
sexual identity.
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In those cases where lesbian mothers successfully
challenged the status quo of fathers - two of four cases -
clearly the numbers are so small that little can be said at
this stage other than to point out the particular features
of each case. In H vC (1982) the issue turned largely
upon a totally unworkable access arrangement (instances of
violence on the changeover in which the father attacked the
mother, children refusing to go back to the custodial
father following staying access). Also, Social Services had
voiced the possibility of care proceedings (see chapter 8
p.200 ). In J v J (1984) the judge was convinced of the ab-
solute discretion of the mother in relation to her sexual
identity, she was 'articulate and intelligent! and very much
concerned about her child's educational future. She did not
belong to any movements of political protest, she did not
flaunt her sexuality. So far as this court was concerned
she was clearly a very impressive witness.
The Significance of Welfare Reports
Welfare Reports did not appear to be in any way in-
fluential in terms of the outcomes in these cases. Reports
were available in twelve cases (see Table 6.1 p.135).
In six of the eight cases in which mothers held status
quo, welfare reports were available. However in two cases
(D v D (1974); L v L (1976)) the comments and recommendations
were not available from the judgements. It would appear
that this was largely because in both cases the judge
commented, that as a source of information for the courts the
reports were somewhat limited. Both judges stated that they
requried additional information. In D v D the judge decided
to interview the children himself and he concluded that
exercise was indeed crucial to reaching his final decision.
In L v L however, the judge felt the case demanded the atten-
tion and opinion of 'experts'. Three psychiatrists repre-
senting various schools of thought in relation to children's
pschosexual development appeared. This effectively presented
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the judge with a decision based upon preference for a parti-
cular theoretical position. In one case (H v C (1980))
the report recommended that the children be transferred to
the father, and that was the resultant court decision.
Welfare officers were sympathetic to the continued care
of children by lesbian mothers in two cases (I v I (1978)
and McT v McT (1977)) and made a firm recommendation in
favour of a mother in A v A (1980) . In the former two cases,
the mothers nevertheless lost custody of children, and in the
latter case, against an alternative of care by the local
authority, the mother retained custody. But this was un-
doubtedly due to the alternative choice available to the
court and not to the recommendations of the court welfare
officer.
In two cases in which mothers held the children's
residential status quo (in Re B (TA) (1971) and Re p (1982))
it does not appear that welfare reports were available.
In all four cases where fathers held the status quo,
welfare reports were available, (see Table 6.1 p.136). In
three cases the welfare officer recommended a transfer of
care to mother (H v C (1982); J v J (1984); E v E (1980));
and this actually occurred in two cases (H v C (1982) and
J v J (1984)). In one case (W v W (1980) no recommendation
appears.
Where parents shared the children's residential status
quo - two cases - welfare reports were available in both
cases. In V v V (1977) the officer felt unable to make a
recommendation; the Official Solicitor who was also engaged
equally felt unable to make any recommendation. In S v S
(1980) the welfare officer recommended the mother should have
custody, the court however awarded custody to the father.
Clearly welfare reports played no significant role in
these decisions. Of the twelve cases in which welfare
reports were available, in four cases recommendations were
either not made or not considered worthy of discussion by
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the court. In a further four cases, court decisions
clearly went against recommendations made by welfare officers
(all four having favoured custody by mothers). So that, in
only four cases did the court's decision coincide with the
recommendation of the welfare oficer and in two of those cases
local authority care was certainly the only alternative
and in one case (H v C (1982)) it was a distinct possibility.
There were clearly a range of both overt and covert
justifications engaged in the above-m ent i oned cases which
resulted in the denial of custody of children to lesbian
mothers. Courts focused upon issues of harm, damage and
danger and these can be categoriseà into tour basic areas
of concern. It is to a more detailed analysis of those
categories that I now turn.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. When this research began in 1979 there were only two
reported cases Re B (TA) (An Infant) [19711 Ch 270
plus one case reported in Family Law (1976) Vol 6
p.230.
2. That is not of course to argue that certain people in
society do not harbour a fear of homosexuality, but
rather that we cannot explain the operation of law and
legal practices simply in terms of the irrational fears
or phobias of its agents.
3. This is for two reasons. Firstly to argue in terms of
the denial of parental 'rights' is to ignore the whole
development and focus of law and legal practice in this
field. As demonstrated in this research the law has
long since ceased to focus simply upon enforcing the
'rights' of parents. And secondly, to theorise this
debate in terms of 'gay parents' is to ignore the way
in which legal practices have differently constructed
the categories of 'motherhood' and 'fatherhood'.
4. This couple had been in England on an extended working
holiday, during which the father had secured a contract
in the Far East. He had gone there to work leaving the
mother and child in England. The mother's relationship
began while he was away.
5. This mother stated that she had agreed to the child
remaining with the father because she felt that as a
lesbian she had no chance of obtaining custody through
the courts, - see chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 7
IN WHOSE BEST INTERESTS ?
CHILDREN, THE COURT AND LESBAN MOTHERS
In the U.K., as in America, the courts' general disregard
of the children's residential status quo where the mother of
the child is a lesbian is structured around four issues:
(a) that a child raised by a lesbian will be homo-
sexual;
(b) the child will suffer confusion regarding approp-
riate gender role identification and behaviour;
(c) the child will suffer embarrassment and teasing
because of the social stigma attached to the
sexual identity of its mother;
(d) anxiety and myth regarding images of lesbianism
in society.
Since decisions in these cases began to appear in the mid-
1970s, there has been a slight shift in the courts' approach
(see chapter 8). However the outcome for many lesbian mothers
is frequently the same. During the 1970s in Britain the
courts' general response to applications by mothers who
were lesbians was largely one of complete moral outrage
(e.g. McT v McT (1977)). The issue was referred to as 'a
cancer in our society' and the practice 'as perverted and
vile'. Mothers were seen as morally corrupting and physic-
ally dangerous. Underlying many decisions was a covert but
equally sometimes an overt suggestion that children in these
circumstances must be protected from the possibility of
physical abuse - if not by mothers, then the homosexual women
in whose company the mother spent her time. In custody
decisions and access orders concepts such as 'risk' and
'danger' 'exposure to' and 'protection from' appear con-
stantly. In relation to access to children for example,
lesbian mothers have been instructed by courts that, for
access to happen, the mother must not live with her lover.
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If a child is allowed to visit a lesbian mother in the pres-
ence of a lesbian partner, they are instructed not to show
any affection for each other in the child's presence. Indeed
such are certain court's fears and anxiety in this area that
in one court a mother was instructed that when the child in
question goes to the lavatory, the mother's lover must go
to the other end of the house (Guardian 16 January 1978)
Many women (not simply lesbians) were appalled by these
decisions (Coote, Guardian 7 August 1975, Toynbee, Guardian
5 January 1978; Spare Rib 22 August 1976; Sunday Times 7
May 1978). Lesbian mothers who lost custody of their
children in these circumstances argued that research on
children raised by lesbian mothers was urgently needed to
demonstrate that children are not 'damaged' and that lesbians
do not abuse their children. Writers in this field in
America (e.g. Weston Evans 1982) argued that expert testimony
to the trial court is essential in order to establish that
children do not suffer harm or damage. In Britain however
the eventual production of research on the psycho-sexual
development of children in this field (Golumbok 1984) has
had no appreciable effect upon the outcome of cases disputed
in court'. And while research continued to establish
that most children of homosexual mothers are heterosexual
in sexual object orientation (Pagelow 198J ) and that there
were no substantial differences in childrearing patterns
between heterosexual and lesbian mothers (Rees 1979) never-
theless lesbian mothers in both Britain and the United
States continue to lose custody of children through the
courts (Basile 1974; Humphries 1978; ROW (Sheffield) 1979).
In the U.K. courts have tended to fuse two issues,
that of children's future sexual orientation (choice of
sexual object) and that of children's acquisition of gender
identification and 'appropriate' gender role behaviour.
In the 1970s the courts clearly felt that a child raised by
a lesbian mother might well itself become homosexual, if it
did not 'catch' homosexuality, it would be proselytised by
its lesbian mother (it would be 'taught' about the 'gay
life'). Over the turn of the decade that approach has
- 160 -
subsided at least on an overt level, and courts have come
to focus much more heavily upon the issue of social stigma.
However, issues surrounding gender role identification
continue to appear, and of course this is an area in which
the courts have little 'expertise'. But employing 'experts'
frequently does little to resolve perceived problems0 The
fear and anxiety which the notion of lesbians raising child-
ren clearly does engender, frequently results in the engage-
ment of a form of sexual 'McCarthyism' during the legal
processing of these cases.
In this chapter therefore I will outline in more detail
the disposition of lesbian custody cases by courts (both
trial and Appeal courts) in the UK. I will begin with a
discussion of the case of L v L (1976) , the perceptions
of lesbianism engaged, the use of expert testimony and the
justifications utilised to transfer a child from a lesbian
mother to a father (and mother substitute) . I will then
examine the way in which the perceived 'risks' to children
are dealt with. And I shall argue that the focus of the
court is less concerned with the circumstances of the parti-
cular child than with the assumption that chidren per se
can only acquire the necessary ingredients for adequate
socialisation in a heterosexual family unit. Underlying a
substantial amount of discussion in this field is a particular
view of lesbians in society. Indeed cultural beliefs re-
garding the form and content of that identity do give some
indications as to why courts and indeed society generally
might consider a mother's sexual preference as in any way
relevant to determining 'fitness'as a mother.
'Experts' and the case of L v L (1976
The case of L v L (1976) concerned the care of a boy
'P' aged five years. When the mother in this case told her
husband of her lesbian relationship he explained that he had
been having a long term affair himself. He said that the
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child should be allowed to live with him and his lover.
The mother reluctantly agreed, she argued that 'I knew I
had little chance as a lesbian of winning custody'. It
was agreed therefore that the boy would live with the father
and his lover.
Soon after that arrangement, the father's partner left
him and the father returned the child to his mother on the
basis that he could not cope with the child alone. Indeed
the child was moved back and forth several times, at which
stage the mother sought care and control; she argued:
"there was too much tci-ing and fro-ing and I
decided 'P' needed a settled home".
Initially it was agreed that 'P' should stay with his
mother 2 ; she commented:
"I made sure 'P' saw his father regularly. Then
I got the impression that (the father) got worried
and rushed around to find a new woman. He found
someone very competent and impressive whom he
married two days after our divorce. Once she
appeared on the scene it was obvious they would
fight to take 'P' away and everything became
very strained and unpleasant".
The dispute over 'P's custody came before the High
Court in 1976. P's mother commented that although she
felt her chances of keeping 'P' were limited because she
was a lesbian, nevertheless she felt that her case was
strengthened by the fact that she had cared for 'P' since his
birth and she also held the residential status quo position.
Three central issues arose in this case. Firstly,
the judge clearly felt that because the mother was a
lesbian it presented a new dilemma for the English courts,
'there is no guidance or precedent availabl. Secondly,
he therefore felt he should rely upon 'experts'. Thirdly,
both the evidence of certain 'experts' and the final judge-
ment reveal a number of common myths and anxieties re-
garding lesbians and 'lesbian lifestyles'.
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The use of 'experts' generally in lesbian custody
cases can take a number of arbitrary forms. The focus can
be solely on the mother. For example, the initial hearing
can be adjourned for a psychiatric report on the mother.
Generally speaking this is at the request of the father on
the basis that lesbianism is a 'sickness' and is indicative
of an emotional disturbance or mental illness. It is per-
ceived as a personal pathological condition. In the case
of the lesbian mother, since clearly she has lived for a
period of her life as a heterosexual there is generally a
search for 'events' within her recent life history to
'explain' her condition. Pregnancy, childbirth followed by
peurpural depression are frequently cited as explanations
of wives' 'condition'. And courts do seem' generally more
willing to accept an argument of 'precipitating circumstances',
0; that aspects of husbands' behaviour (e.g. laziness and
disinterest in a wife and family, or overdemanding in sexual
matters, or preference for certain 'unconventional' sexual
practices) are responsible for a wife's lesbian behaviour.
Those are events which provide an 'explanation'. However
the courts are less sympathetic towards women who chose
'that' form of sexual expression. It is one thing to be
'born' that way or 'driven' to it, it is it seems 1 .quite another
to consciously chopse it.
Howeve a focus on the mother's mental stability is
usually coupled with a focus upon children and their psy-
dho-sexual development. This latter focus can take a
number of forms. For example a psychiatrist may (with and
sometimes without the consent of the court) interview the
children concerned. The psychiatrist will then report on
the children's psycho-sexual development. This will
usually take the form of assessing current development, and
giving an opinion as to the future consequence of being
raised by a lesbian mother. Equally a psychiatrist may
give verbal evidence in court - and indeed may simply argue
from a particular theory regarding the significance of a
lesbian mother for children's psycho-sexual development.
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In L V L (1976) , three psychiatrists were involved.
The first psychiatrist interviewed the mother; he argued
that although his interview was short (two hours), he doubted
her homosexuality. He felt she was probably bi-sexual.
Moreover, he suggested that she was in fact in court to
further the cause of homosexuality (p.2). The report pro-
duced for the court concluded that the mother 'practices
statistically abnormal sexual acts which can be looked
upon either as deviations from the normal or frankly per-
verted'. A further psychiatrist reported that on examination
of the child, he already demonstated a level of anxiety
about his masculinity (p.3). Both these doctors recommended
that 'P' should be transferred tohis father's custody immedi-
ately. The recommendation was based upon an orthodox
Freudian approach; it was argued:
(a) that fantasy and jealousy play a crucial role in
children's psycho-sexual development. Jealousy
of the same sex parent plays a central role in
correct psycho-sexual development. In a lesbian
environment 'P' could not be jealous of his
mother's lover, he could not adopt the necessary
sexual fantasies about her; he would not resolve
the oedipus complex necessary to lead to approp-
riate sexual orientation;
(b) 'P' is therefore bound to be confused about
his mother sharing a bed with another woman.
(c) It is impossible to e.nter adolescence happily
if these childhood conflicts are not resolved
(irresolution of the oedipus complex is the
basis of neurosis)
The third psychiatrist in this case however argued that
in fact at almost five years 'P's psycho-sexual development
was already set. And any risk in his future development
was very slight. He also said that 'P' would be more likely
to suffer disturbance if he wa removed from his mother and
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the home and environment with which he was most familiar.
Moreover he argued that the openness, warmth and frankness
of the mother in relation to her sexual identity was a
positive aspect for 'P'. However, the second psychiatrist
argued that the mother and her lover should not be open,
they should not sleep together.
In this case, 'expert' in effect presented the court
with two radically different approaches to child develop-
ment •
 Psychology like other fields of research and study
in the social sciences exhibit competeing paradigms.
Orthodox Freudian theories (Freud, 1905, 1920, 1931) have
tended to predominate both English and American training
and clinical work in the field of child development for a
considerable period in the early twentieth century (Brown
1974). However, it would be a mistake to conclude that
those theories continue to hold a rctonopoly. The oic ot
both Freud and the post-Freudians (e.g. Anna Freud and
Melanie Klein 1932) has been subject to a considerable
amount of debate and criticism (Brown 1973; Mitchell 1975;
Cioffi 1975; Eysenck 1965; Oakley 1972)
Moreover, the development of social learning theories
particularly in relation to the acquisition of gender role
(e.g. Kohlberg 1966) illustrated that the acquisition of
gender role identity and gender role development is far
more complex than Freud's initial hypothesis and identifi-
cation with the same sex parent allows. Gender role develop-
ment is likely to be influenced by a number of factors
quite apart from role models exhibited within an individual
family setting. Children are influenced by siblings and
peers, and by knowledge, values and beliefs assimilated about
the role of males and females within the wider social
context.
In the case of L v L the judge argued that in fact
few children were raised by lesbians, and without guidance
or precedent he would have to rely upon expert opinions.
The dilemma of course becomes which particular "experts"'
and additionally, what are the limitations on the knowledge
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of experts in this category of court work (e.g. predict-
ability as opposed to explanatory).
The judge in L v L accepted that the mother was clearly
caring and devoted to 'P'. Nevertheless he concluded 'P''s
psycho-sexual development was not already set; "'P' is bound
to be confused, he is bound to have fantasies, internally
he is not accepting the lesbian relationship" (p.3). Thus
he decided there were three objectives for the court: 'P'
must develop along strong masculine lines, he must live where
he will be happy and where he will obtain the best outlook
on life (p.3), and finally, (somewhat incongruously) that
'P' should nevertheless accept his mother:
"the gravity of possible damage from the lesbian
influence is inestimable, 'P' might grow up to be
ashamed and embarrassed by his mother. . . the import-
ant object is that 'P' accepts his mother..." (p.3)
It was decided that 'P' was most likely to accept his
mother's lesbianism if he was not exposed to it and grew up
in a home which he can describe to his friends as normal.
In awarding 'P' to his father the judge said 'no one need
know of his mother's relationship', he concluded:
"it would be difficult to imagine this little
boy going through his adolescent period of
development without feeling ashamed or em-
barrassed of having a mother who engaged in
sexual practices which are statistically
abnormal". (p.3)
This judge adopted a 'sickness' model in relation to the
mother's sexual preference. He stated that 'the couple
frankly recognised their deviation, but they were free of
lesbian's anti-male attitudes...their social life includes
men (p.3) . Nevertheless he argued that as a principle of
public policy certain lines had to be drawn:
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"1 distinguish clearly between understanding and
sympathy and acceptance and approval. It would mean
the decay of society if people adopted the latter
attitude. We definitely cannot have approval it
would be detrimental, anyone might be influenced".
(po3)
In conclusion he stated
"these are difficult and uncharted waters, I
grant care and control to 'P' 's father". (p.3)
The mother in the above-mentioned case was advised not to
appeal0 In response to the judgement she said:
"do they think 'P t
 is going to grow up to be
a statistician? We desperately need some re-
search on all this0 If we could have said in
court 'look here is a study of fifty children
who have grown up with lesbian mothers and they
are no different from other kids - heterosexual -
whatever, since we have to fight in their terms
at present, - I believe this would have a trem-
endous effect, it would undermine some of the
statements which are based upon nothing but
prejudice and ridicule and myths about homo-
sexuals".
In addition this judge also made 'P''s access to his mother
conditional upon the mother and her partner sleeping apart;
they must appear to be?just good friends'. In relation to
that condition the mother said:
"I really do not know how to find the words to
express my reaction to this queer bashing.
Anyone would think that the sexual aspect of
our relationship is the be all and end all.
I love 'P' and cannot envisage life without
him but it seems that at the moment there is
nothing we can do".
Lesbian Identities: Myths and Fears
Many mothers in this study (see chapter 8) expressed
anger, disbelief and outrage at the focus and degree of
attention given to their sexual preference:
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"when they talk about my kids' best interests
I thought they would ask how I looked after
them not what I did in bed".
Another mother recounted her experience of going before a
judge over custody of her daughter:
"I was completely flabbergasted, he asked
incredibly insulting questions about our
sex lives".
That focus upon where, when and sometimes indeed how,
lesbian sex finds expression is not limited to court room
experiences. It can also be located in the enquiries of
solicitors, barristers and divorce court welfare officers.
In many cases the nature of enquiry indicates not simply
anxiety but in addition a high degree of voyeurism.
To a large extent cultural beliefs and attitudes towards
lesbians are determined by elements of fantasy and anxiety.
Once a mother is identified in terms of sexual preference,
that label becomes the only noticeable quality and the
central focus of the case. Gagnon & Simon (1976) make this
point. They argue that generally speaking even where it
can safely be assumed that an element of sexual activity
takes place (e.g. relationship of husband and wife) the social
constraint is usually to view the role in largely non-sexual
terms (p.2 L17). But where sexual activity is identified
with a role our sense of the dimensions of the sexual com-
ponent is often widely exaggerated:
"such persons are seen as having greater sexual
appetites and less self-control over these
capacities - homosexuals have a lower capability
in controlling their impulses". (p.248)
For lesbian mothers that label and the consequential
identity 'processing' has added dimensions. The suggestion,
sometimes overt but frequently covert is that lesbian
sexuality is predatory and moreover that it is indistinguish-
able from paedophilia. Thus it is feared that lesbians may
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engage in sexual acts in front of children and that they
may subject older children to situations in which sexual
abuse is a possibility. Yet the presumption that lesbian
mothers any more than heterosexual mothers would engage
in sexual acts in front of children is not openly confronted.
In addition the legal treatment of lesbian mothers both
draws upon and necessarily contributes to general myths and
confusion between homosexuality and paedophilia, yet as
Richardson (1981, p.149) points out in her review of the
(relevant) literature in this field, there are virtqally
no reported cases of female (homosexual) paedophilia.
It may be that a substantial amount of the fear and
anxiety expressed in lesbian custody cases is drawn from
assumptions regarding aspects of male homosexual behaviour
and homosexual subcultures (e.g. preference for anonymous
sex, cottaging, etc) (Humphries 1970). This is not to argue
that male homosexuals can be adequately categorised in this,
fashion whilst lesbians cannot - male homosexuals are equally
stereotyped by such images0 Rather it is to argue that much
of our imagery of lesbians and 'lesbianism' is drawn either
from work on male homosexuals or clinical work on lesbians,
or, from images of 'lesbianism' as it is portrayed in porno-
graphy intended for male viewers and audiences. It is onl.y
relatively recently that a growth in writing and research
in the area of lesbian sexuality of a non clinical nature
(e.g. Ponse 1978; Ettorre 1980; Rich 1980) has begun to
address and portray positive images of lesbians in society.
Moreover,	 research (e.g. Kenyon 1970) has identified lesbians
do not differ from heterosexual women in patterns of mono-
gamy and non-monogamy or in valuation of emotional satis-
faction in relationships0 Indeed it is being female which
influences lesbian relationships and sexual behaviour
(Freedman 1971; Schafer 1977). And more recently studies
which focused upon patterns of mothering between hetero-
sexual and lesbian mothers (e.g. Goodman 1978; Lewin 1979;
Rees 1979) revealed that similarities between mothers (for
example in meeting the challenge of single parenthood)
far exceed differences in parenting patterns. But Lewin
(1981) also found that lesbian mothers were 'in fact subject
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to an increased degree of stress as parents through fear
of loss of custody of their children. Nevertheless, for
lesbian mothers involved in custody disputes with ex-husbands
the language of 'risk and danger' continues to permeate
legal practices in this field.
The Risks: Homosexuality and Gender Confusion
As can be seen from this study (see Table 6.1 p.136)
very few cases which reached the courts involved the use of
'experts'. But 'experts' can be influential in reducing
the number of cases which reach the courts and I will
outline that process in the following chapter. For the
most part however judges have ultimately relied upon their
own common sense and experience (e.g. the trial judge in
Re P (1982) p.37). Courts frequently reiterate the argument
that there is no established rule or principle in this
field (e.g. E v E (1980) p.49) while others (e.g. H v C
(1982) p.1) argue that "the authorities think this (lesbian)
relationship can lead to harm...". But the precise nature
of the harm or danger is seldom clearly spelt out and courts
frequently vacillate between concern for children's future
sexual orientation and the circumstances and environment
under which children acquire the 'appropriate' gender
role behaviour patterns. For example in I v I (1978) in
which the mother lost custody of a son aged five years, the
judge argued:
"I am not going to argue that this boy would
grow up to be a homosexual or adverse to women,
he might or might not. It would be less harm-
ful to him if he were to have a sound upbringing
with his father". (p.3)
In the care of his mother the judge felt that the child
would not have the opportunity to grow up understanding
the normal relationships of men and women, and husband and
wife (p.11/12). In E v E (1980) , the trial court judge
decided "not to expose the child to the risks of putting
it with the mother" (p.15). And in D v D (1974) the judge
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concluded that:
"there is a real risk that if the children
were to be brought up in a single parent home
with their mother as head of household, they
would find themselves in a singularly femin-
ine environment". (p.22)
In those cases in which courts do not overtly focus upon
the possibility of corruption and/or proselytization of
children, the issue of 'risk' or 'harm' is raised through
an examination of attitudes toward men and the absence of
male models in lesbian households. Indeed, in Re B (TA)
(1971), the mother's case for keeping her child was finally
agreed by the court because not only had this mother re-
nounced her lesbian experience, she had also moved into a
home 'well populated by men'. Commenting on the moving into
her parents' home in which a twenty four year old brother
also lived the judge stated:
"...in particular the daughter will not now
be raised in a manless home". (p.276)
But the precise importance of not being raised in a manless
home was not addressed. In those few cases which involved
'experts' (e.g. L v L (1976)) the focus of debate was
psycho-sexual development (which includes choice of future
sexual object). However in the absence of firstly expert
evidence, and secondly, complete moral outrage at the very
idea of a lesbian raising children (e.g. McT v McT (1977)) ,
the focus of the court is not so much on sexual orientation
as on the issue of adequate socialisation of children. So
that even where the argument (either by fathers or courts) is
not that a lesbian mother will necessarily 'corrupt' her
children, underlying many decisions is a belief that for
children to be adequately socialised they must be raised in
a heterosexual environment preferably within marriage.
That anxiety that children should be exposed to the
correct family images is expressed in almost all lesbian
custody cases considered here. If it is not directly located
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as an 'absence' in the mother's proposed arrangements for
her children, it is identified as an added advantage on the
part of father's proposals. So that, in cases where fathers
have not remarried or are not cohabiting and therefore
propose to rely on grandparents, the courts frequently view
that situation as preferable to care by a lesbian mother:
"Above all (in his father's custody) he will
see the normal relationships of his grand-
parents".
I v I (1974) p. 3
"I think it is likely to be a more healthy
background for them if they rely upon (paternal)
grandparents".
D v D (1974) p.23
Alternatives to continued care by lesbian mothers are
frequently described as 'more healthy', 'more stable',
'more normal', 'less harmful', 'more sound', 'balanced'.
But this is not simply because it is feared that lesbian
mothers might 'corrupt' their children, it is also because
alternatives are generally seen as providing models of
marriage and the family and of appropriately structured
gender role behaviour. Thus it is not simply a matter of
not 'becoming' homosexual, it is equally important that child-
ren are exposed to appropriate role models. The judge in
L V L (1976) makes this point clearly:
". . . the second objective is to ensure that 'P'
is most likely to develop along strong masculine
lines". (p.3)
Although this point is not always so clearly expressed it
usually underlies discussions of male presence/male absence.
Yet this somewhat unsophisticated model of the acquisition
of gender and gender role behaviour is seldom expressed in
contested custody cases where the mother is presumed hetero-
sexual. It may of course be argued that in those cases
it is assumed that mothers will probably if not remarry
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Psycho-sexual Development
Research on the psycho-sexual development of children
raised by lesbian mothers has been available in America
since the mid 1970s (e.g. Kirkpatrick et al 1976; Hoeffer
1981; Green 1978). However research in Britain is of
recent origin (Golumbok 1983).
The research projects carried out in America are small
scale studies, for example Kirkpatrick et al (1976) inter-
viewed and tested twenty children aged five to twelve years.
In a majority of cases the mothers were living with a female
partner. However the authors reported that children in this
study were no more likely than other children to adopt
atypical gender role behaviour or to become homosexual. In
1978 Green reported from a preliminary study of twenty one
children living with a lesbian (or transexual) mother. He
came to similar conclusions. In this study the children
ranged from five to fourteen years, the number of years in
which they had lived in that environment ranged from two
to six years. Green assessed gender identity, gender role
orientation and, in the case of older children, choice of
sexual partner. Measurements of assessment were based upon
preference for types of toys and games, peer group compo-
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sition, clbthes, roles played in fantasy and vocational
aspirations and actual sexual behaviour0 Children in
this study are reported as having a preference for toys,
clothing, games, friends etc which are 'typical' for
children of their age and sex. Those children old enough
to report sexual feelings and desires were reported to be
heterosexual in orientati,on0 Green concludes that being
brought up in an atypical household does not result in
atypical psycho-sexual developm€nt either in terms of gender
or sexual orientation.
In Britain in 1978 Susan Golumbok at the Institute of
Psychiatry, London, began an similar piece of research.
This study examined and compared thirty-seven children
from lesbian households with thirty-six children from single
heterosexual households. She concluded:
"The findings of the study have been consistent
in showing no difference between children raised
in lesbian households and children brought up
by a single heterosexual parent with respect to
gender identity sex role behaviour or sexual
orientation".
Golumbok (1983) p.iitFJ
Not surprisingly these authors point out that children are
exposed to many images in society, through schools, the
mass media, peer groups, etc. etc. A child's immediate
home environment is simply one factor in this equation and
blearly as the above research points out it is not a major
source of direct influence.' Moreover it woitd be a mistake
to assume the channels of 'influence' (however these are
constructed) are in fact all one way. Children are not'the
passive recipients of 'culture'. As is frequently pointed
out by mothers in this study, most homosexuals had and have
heterosexual parents.
The above_ mentioned research does however raise many
questions, some of which cannot be adequately considered
here. But it is important to point out that while some
mothers in this study desperately wanted English research on
- 174 -
this issue to use as 'evidence' in their cases (e.g. mother
in L v L p. 166 herein) , other mothers however were either
ambivalent or fairly hostile towards such research. Some
for example argued that they were not at all happy with the
'tools of measurement' employed in certain psychological
tests (e.g. the use of standard stereotypical toys and
clothes). Other mothers argued that to use such research
confirmed (albeit in an unintentional way) cultural beliefs
that to be gay is an unacceptable outcome to sexual identity.
It is however true to say that the majority of women in
this study who supported this latter argument were not at the
time of the interview faced with the possibility of losing
custody of their children. For the most part it seems that
while mothers are not happy with this type of research,
nevertheless when faced with a dispute in which they feel
they are very likely to lose their children it can prove
to be one of the few pieces of evidence they are likely to
have in their 'favour'. Having said that it is equally
important to note that the research has been wholly un-
successful in influencing legal practices in this area3.
This is partly because of course arguments which oppose
custody by mothers who are lesbians are not simply based upon
psycho-sexual development, indeed that argument has to some
extent declined in these cases. Rather they are linked to
issues of social stigma and this is a relatively new con-
cept for the courts to consider in deciding child custody
disputes.
The Risks: Social Stigma
The third theme which runs through the courts' consider-
ation of lesbian custody cases is the question of social
stigma. The courts conclude that if children are left in
the care of a lesbian mother they will suffer teasing,
embarrassment, shap e, and possibly guilt:
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"'S' might be mocked. The pain and harm this
might cause him are incalculable".
I v I (1978) p.3
"It would not be long before this little boy
found himself to be the subject of taunts
and his anxieties would be roused by the
difference between his background and others",
E v E (1980) p.51
"It cannot be disputed that observation by
at any rate some sections of the community
...wjll lead to ridicule or scorn...however
just or unjust such a condemnation may be
if it involves a child living in such a
household it must be likely to lead the
child to be teased and embarrassed at the
least".
Re P (1982) p.38
The issue of possible teasing and embarrassment when
taken in isolation from issues of 'corruption' and gender
role confusion in these cases is a fairly 'weak' and highly
problematic justification on which to remove children from
otherwise caring parents,jt would certainly appear to be
a unique instance (it is not for example employed in cases
of unusual or minority religions although the two are not
strictly comparable) 4 . Moreover, it is not established
that teasing is an issue for all children raised by lesbian
mothers. Clearly for some children it might be. But there
is considerable variation and uncertainty in this area,
and it is important to establish whether or indeed why it is
considered an issue of sufficient magnitude to justify the
removal of children and the disturbance of a mother's status
quo.
Courts do not for example generally ascertain whether
teasing actually happens in the case before them. Often
the child is too young and, in thQse cases, the courts tend to
speculate that it will happen. Yet they do not consider
what kind of teasing might occur, how often it might occur
and by whom; neither do they consider the child's own coping
mechanisms nor the way in which mothers may help children
negotiate teasing. Neither does the court ascertain whether
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teasing does irreperable damage to self-esteem. Is it for
example similar in importance to other types of teasing
which children engage in and are subject to during their
lives for example, being an early/late developer, being too
small/tall, fat or thin; having the wrong/different accent;
having parents who are unemployed/separated/divorced;
coming from an ethnic minority; being middle/working class,
or mentally or physically handicapped; being adopted or
illegitimate, etc. Indeed the list of 'differences' is
endless, but except in the situation of severe handicap the
courts do not as a rule remove children on these grounds.
In relation to the question of whether teasing is an
issue for children of lesbians, although there has not been
any systematic study to date, nevertheless, there is in-
creasing anecdotal evidence. For example, in 'Breaking
Silence' (Channel 4 1985) a documentary about lesbian mothers,
several adolescent children spoke about their experiences
as children of lesbian mothers. The participants spoke
with considerable clarity and confidence about their back-
grounds, they said that they felt that their background had
made them more tolerant of differences in their peers,
more aware of the variety of cultures and lifestyles. The
boys in the group also said that they were more self-sufficient
than many of their peers, for example, they were able to cook
and generally take care of themselves. From these inter-
views, it is clear that the children felt there were many
positive aspects to living in "non-conventional" households.
Teasing or memories of being teased did not appear as an
issue for these particular children. Golumbok (1984) also
identifies the positive aspects for children of living in
unconventional households. Green (1978) included some
qualitiative information regarding the issue of teasing.
He reported that from a sample of twenty-one children only
three recalled being teased, and in each case these were
isolated incidents.
The courts, however, take a 'prevention is better than
cure' approach; in I v I (1978) for example, the mother's
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partner also had a child called Mary. Mary's headmistress
came to court as a witness on behalf of the mother. She
reported that Mary was a 'perfectly happy and normal twelve
year old'. In relation to the issue of teasing, she argued
that the climate of opinion towards homosexuality had indeed
changed and moreover by the time this mother's five year old
son was a teenager public opinion may well be even more
tolerant. In response the judge simply argued:
"there is no argument that there has been a
liberation of views in the past period. As
to the future I should not like to speculate,
there have been earlier permissive ages and
these have been replaced by much stricter
views". (p.11)
Clearly the issue of teasing is highly speculative and
generally speaking it is unusual for the courts to make an
order in relation to children involved in custody dispute
based solely upon speculati3n0 Moreover, it could equally
be argued (as it was by the third psychiatrist in the case
of L v L (1976)p.l64)that a child may be better equipped to
deal with an incident of teasing if the child is living
with the mother rather than the father who shares a negatiye
and indeed hostile attitude towards the child's mother.
Indeed more recently a judge at trial level took precisely
that approach, he argued:
"as to whether there would be social harm to
the children if the knowledge of (the mother's)
association with Ms 'M' became public know-
ledge...I must confess I find that of a some-
what speculative nature".
J v J (1984).p.22
He concluded that if teasing became an issue, it could
occur whether the children lived with their mother or
simply saw her on access (p.22).
The above approach differs considerably from the
general approach of other trial courts and indeed the
Court of Appeal. And it is important to raise the question
of what role the courts currently play in reproducing and
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sustaining the image (if not the reality) of social stigma
in this area by a general refusal to grant custody of
children to lesbian mothers. Clearly the reproduction of
social stigma may take many forms but the denial of the care
of children to mothers is probably one of the most serious
indictments against a woman which a society can administer.
However, as with issues of 'corruption' and gender
identification, social stigma does not appear as an isol-
ated issue in this case. Each of the above-mentioned three
issues is underscored by a particular imagery of lesbians
in society. That imagery (as purely sexual) is set in oppo-
sition and contrast to an equally imaginary construction of
motherhood in which motherhood is perceived and reproduced
as an asexual role. It is finally to those perceptions that
I now turn.
Images of Lesbians -
Implications for Lesbian Mothers
Two common themes regarding lesbianism appear in these
cases. The first is that lesbianism is a 'sickness', the
second is that lesbians are unstable. Lesbians are por-
trayed as sick and unhappy women engaged through no fault
of their own, in relationships which are doomed to failure.
That model is partly drawn from clinical work (Storr 1964)
which, while differing in the emphasis placed on certain
etiological factors nevertheless assumes a naturalness
about heterosexual relations and thereby posits and contrasts
homosexuality as 'abnormal' 'deviant' 'atypical' forms of
development.
Thus for example the judge in L v L (1976) argued:
"The root cause of this breakdown was the
homosexual tendency of the mother. No blame
was attributed to her, she has no control over
it and the evidence has demonstrated she has
learnt to live with it". (p.1)
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In A V A (1980) it was argued,
"I am not criticising those who have found
sexual satisfaction in this way. In fact
one may feel sorry for them".
That particular perception of lesbians is not of course limited
to	 lesbian	 mothers in courts. It is drawn from and
in turn reinforces dominant themes within culture regarding
lesbians. Such images are drawn from presentations of
lesbian identities in the media, literary and psychological
materials. And it is that negative model which is increas-
ingly being challenged by lesbians who are openly gay
(Ettorre 1980; Ponse 1978; Rich 1981; Richardson 1981)
To a large extent that development owes much to the Women's
Movement which has focused on sexuality as a major site of
struggle (Millet 1971; de Beauvoir 1974).
For lesbian mothers however that denial of 'sickness'
and the assertion of a lesbian partner as a positive choice
can be particularly problematic, it can lead to allegations
that she is less interested in the welfare of her children
and simply in court to further the cause of homosexuals (L v
L 1976)	 Moreover, where lesbian mothers challenge the notion
of 'sickness' and the general negative response to lesbians
(where they are open and frank and unashamed of their
sexual preference) that approach is frequently viewed as
a further indication of their perversity. Thus it is
precisely those mothers who openly seek support for lesbian
mothers within, for example, the Women's Movement and/or
the Gay Movement in Britain, who can fare the worst in the
event of a dispute over children0 For example, in ReP
(1982) , the trial judge stated:
"The mother struck me as a sensitive articulate
and understanding woman, she tells me she is not
one of those homosexuals who, as many do nowadays,
flaunt their homosexuality...I accept that she is
discreet". (p.38)
In J v 3 (1984) the judge was equally impressed with the
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mother; she too was discreet, articulate and sensible,
and neither would she flaunt her relationship (p.21 ).
However in D v D (1974) the mother's political affiliation
was central to her loss of custody. It was not argued that
this mother was engaged in a relationship at the time of the
hearing, it was simply stated that she supported the right
of women to define their own sexuality. Nevertheless the
father produced materials in court (magazines such as
Shrew, Monster, and Spare Rib) which he argued, demonstrated
that the Women's Liberation Movement was very much tied up
with lesbianism. It was also alleged that the mother had
said that lesbianism was a form of sexuality compatible with
her political ideals and that she intended to live a
lesbian lifestyle. In this case the judge concluded that
the importance of the mother's involvement in the W.L.M.
was that:
"In her friends and associates she found an
atmosphere sympathetic to her decision and
purpose to free herself from the shackles
of married life...She found a philosophy
which justified the personal position she
had decided to take up". (p.17)
He concluded that this mother had found support for her
decision to free herself from the obligations of family
life and throw upon her husband a degree of domestic duty
which was onerous having regard to the amount of work he
had to do as the one breadwinner and head of the house-
hold (p.i). In relation to the custody of the children
(three daughters), the judge concluded:
.being brought up with the mother... [the
children] would find themselves in a singu-
larly unbalanced feminine environment. . . there
is a real risk which their father justly
apprehends that they will be brought up in
a rather exotic atmosphere in which particu-
lar intellectual opinions expressing them-
selves as an eagerness for the total femin-
ine freedom sexual and otherwise which will
have a marked influence". (p.22)
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And in H v C (1982), V v V (1977) and A V A (1980) , mothers
in these cases were not simply described as lesbians, they
were also censured because of activities in either the
Gay or Women's Movement politics. The suggestion was that
these mothers were not simply 'ordinary mothers' contesting -
as any 'prope? mother should - the custody of their children.
They were political activists with a stake in the case which
went beyond a concern for the individual child. Many indi-
vidual husbands utilise that argument as evidence of a
mother's 'unfitness'. But what is perhaps more interesting
is the degree of attention and enquiry which courts give to
that aspect of a mother's behaviour4 The implication is
twofold, firstly 'good' mothers do not participate in wider
political activities, especially where they come into com-
petition with notions of good motherhood. But secondly
for lesbian mothers that activity is perceived as a further
indication of psychopathology (Munro & McCullock 1969;
Romm 1965) . So that while the mother in U V D (1974) was
not an active lesbian, she was very clearly a feminist with
particular views on marriage and the family and she lost
custody.
In J v J (1984) however, the mother was a lesbian and
was living with her lover. However she was an impressive
witness, articulate, sensible, discreet, with a clear desire
to promote the educational needs of her children, and a
strong desire to bring them up in a good environment which
would not preclude them from ordinary society (p.21).
Clearly the comparison is problematic but where two parents
contest the custody of children in courts the criterion
applied by the court can equally be problematic and cases can,
as Maidment (1981) demonstrates, rest upon proving a mother's
'unfitness' by reference to features of her behaviour
which may have little to do with motherhood but more to do
with marriage and 'wifely' behaviour. Moreover, it was
not simply the disolution of cases in courts which carried
those features. Identification of correct behaviour, atti-
tudes, and activities appropriate for mothers is also a
feature of pre-court practices and I will discuss these in
the following chapter.
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Throughout these cases, the courts express a recurrent
theme, lesbian mothers should not generally be awarded
custody of children if there is any viable alternative.
Where a court does award custody to a lesbian mother, the
court is usually careful to explain precisely why, for
example in V v V (1977), the father could not accommodate
the children, and in his summing up the judge made it
clear,
" 4y decision is based on the narrow grounds
of bricks and mortar else...there is no course
other than to allow this Appeal and entrust
custody of the two girls to the mother". (p.16)
and continued
"I would not have hesitated to have taken
the two girls away from her if any accept-
able and practical alternative had been
available". (p.17)
Equally in I v I (1978), the judge argued that if there is
an alternative the child should go there (p.12). Indeed
although courts have increasingly began to include in
judgements statements to the effect that lesbianism per se
is not an embargo on custody (Re p (1982) p.34; E v E (1980)
p.48), in practice, that is usually the result:
"I accept that it is not right to say that
a child should in no circumstances live with
a mother [who is living in a lesbian house-
hold] but I venture to suggest that it can
only be countenanced by the courts when it is
driven to the conclusion that there is no
other acceptable form of custody".
Watkins, L 3 Re P (A Minor)
(1982) C.A.
Indeed that statement is all the more incongruous because it
appears in a case which the Court of Appeal took a previ-
ously unprecedented approach to the question of lesbian
mothers and the corruption of children. In response to an
application by a father that because the mother was a les-
bian, (and would therefore corrupt the child) , the child
should be placed in the care of the local authority, the
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judge in this Appeal case argued :
"as regard the corruption, there was no evidence
either about the likelihood demonstrated by such
statistical or other experience of casework as may
exist, or from any assessment of the subjective
probabilities arising in the present case from an
examination (presumably a psychiatric examination)
of the individuals concerned; nothing at all to give
any clue as to the likelihood of corruption"
ibid,p.38
Yet while dismissing the argument that children will nec-
essarily be corrupted, the issue of social stigma takes on
increased significance. 	 Indeed the judge here concludes
(p.39) that it is a factor of such importance 'as to let
in the power of the courts.........to make an order under
s42 (allowing committal of the child to the care of the
local authority), although in this case, the court decided
against such a course of action. 	 Thus, speculation as
to teasing and social stigma (referred to in this case as
'reputation') is viewed as of sufficient importance by the
Court of Appeal as to warrant serious consideration as to
whether to take a child into the care of the local authority.
One could of course equally argue that children who live
in local authority homes are also stigmatised and may be
teased because of their a-typical background.
The above mentioned case appears to be the most
recent case in the Court cf Appeal involving a lesbian mother,
and it does contain some highly problematic features. It. does
indicate that while to some extent (at the level of court
practices) issues of psycho-sexual development and overt
statements regarding corruption by lesbian mothers may be de-
clining in importance, neverthelss, issues of teasing, mocking,
embarrassment, previously issues of secondary importance in
these cases, are now taking on a more central role.	 Certainly
cases in the 198Os do not appear to carry statement of complete
moral outrage reminiscent of cases of the early and mid 1970g.
But this is rot to argue that there has been any liberalisation
of approach by certain courts.	 Indeed, if the possibility
of future teasing because a child comes froni an a-typical
household is sufficeint to disturb every residential status
quo, it would appear that the courts are in fact exerting
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more stringent criteria and are certainly moving some
distance from dealing with each case individually and on
the facts and evidence currently presented. Indeed it would
appear that custody of children in these cases once again
becomes a 'reward' but rather than an award for the innocent
party they 1bome a reward for the parent who provides the
nearest approximation to a particular image of the family.
That focus upon providing a particular type of family
environment in which to raise children has a number of
consequences which go beyond specific court decisions.
They have resulted in particular pre-court practices in this
field and such practices are frequently of a sufficiently
distressing nature as to dissuade many lesbian mothers
from pursuing their cases through the courts. Indeed the
issue of a mother's sexuality and therefore 'fitness' to
continue being a mother frequently becomes a bargaining
mechanism within divorce and custody proceedings. Although
this term has become extremely unpopular in the field of
matrimonial work in the 1980s and particularly in relation to
divorce, nevertheless children (custody and access) , housing,
maintenance and property settlemetns are all factors which
form part of the bargaining process. And the negotiating
process itself provides opportunities for the linking of
children and money (Mnookin 1979).
Moreover, where there is an 'issue' with regard to a
mother's potential 'fitness' as a parent, this can have a
number of effects upon bi-lateral bargaining. And it can
equally be influential in the power relationships between
couples before they seek legal advice regarding custody of
children on separation and divorce. For lesbian mothers the
period of pre-court practices can be crucial. During this
period solicitors, court welfare officers, barristers and
psychiatrists all become involved in negotiating the form
and relevance of her sexual identity. It is usually the
period in which she is persuaded to give up either her child-
ren or her sexual identity. These two aspects of her life
in effect become bargaining chips and they are usually
mutually exclusive. The following chapter is therefore
concerned with pre-court practices in relation to a sample
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of lesbian mothers and will focus on the kinds of advice
these mothers received from solicitors, their experiences
with divorce court welfare officers and their experiences
of contesting custody in court.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. This is not of course to argue that there were no
cases prior to that date. It is likely that women
in this situation would not have risked a full hearing.
The reasons why this has changed are of course many
and varied, but certainly the beginnings of support
groups, for example Lesbian Line and Sappho in the
1970s followed by Action for Lesbian Parents and a
network of lesbian mother support groups clearly
brought a political perspective to the issue which
would have been impossible on an individual level.
2. When the case first came before a judge, the judge
stated he did not like tug of love cases and sent parents
and counsel outside the court to see if an agreement
could be reached. To her surprise the barristers
finally agreed the mother should continue caring for
'P1.
3. The majority of cases in which Dr Golumbok has been
consulted have been settled out of court. Indeed to
date she has only appeared in court as an expert
witness on one occasion, and the mother in that case
lost. All other cases have been 'settled' out of
court.
4. In relation to religion, courts prefer not to pass
judgement on the beliefs of parents (Re T (Minors)
(Custody: Religious Upbringing) (1975) 2 FLR, 239)
where a parent belongs to a particular sect whose
beliefs are problematic in terms of children (e.g.
the approach of Jehovah's Witnesses to blood trans-
fusions) the court will withdraw certain rights from
that parent (e.g. right to consent to medical treat-
ment) or will demand certain undertakir from a parent
(In Re H (A Minor) (Custody: Religious Upbringing)
(1980) 2 FLR 253). But that is not to say that the parent
loses care and control, only certain features of the rights
contained in custody. Moreover courts are not opposed
to children being brought upin what may be viewed as
narrower spheres of life, e.g. subject to stricter
religious discipline than most people or where they may
not have birthday or Christmas parties (Re T (Minors)
(1975)). Indeed in a multicultural society it would be
an extremely difficult decision to justify.
However, that situation is not analogous to the position
of lesbian mothers. To describe a mother as a lesbian
in fact tells the court very little, it is not a sect,
it does not prescribe a particular lifestyle nor does it
necessarily carry any particular beliefs or values any more
than does the label heterosexua1.
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CHAPTER 8
LESBIAN MOTHERS AND PRECOURT PRACTICES
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with pre-court practices in
which the sexuality of the mother is either an overt or a
covert issue. It is concerned with the legal processing
of cases and the experiences of the mothers involved. The
focus is on particular issues which are brought to bear on
mothers during the preparation of contested custody cases
and the way in which these issues are influential in dis-
couraging mothers in their attempts to obtain legal custody
of children. Thus I am concerned to outline not simply
a further sample of mothers who came to lose custody of
their children but rather to investigate some of the out-
of-court processes which contribute to that situation.
The sample covers the experiences of twenty-two mothers
and involves the custody of forty-Six children, and the core
interviews were carried out between 1979 and 1983. The
sample was obtained through a variety of sources, through
contact at conferences specifically on the law and lesbian
mothers, workshops on the issue of mothers and child
custody, through personal contacts and through lesbian
mother support networks in the U.K. of which I was a
member for four years. To some extent this does of course
mean that the sample has an element of self-selection
and may represent some of the most difficult and intransi-
gent of cases. But the motivation for this study was
not to produce a representative sample of lesbian mothers
contesting custody of children. Rather it was to examine
the processing of cases where the sexuality of -the mother
is perceived to be problematic and to begin to map out
the way in which particular issues such as notions of
'good' motherhood on the one hand, and conceptions of
female sexuality on the othe; are brought to bear on what
is sometimes referred to as bi-lateral bargaining in
contested custody cases.
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It is important to remember, that just as one cannot
talk of 'the' lesbian custody case, neither is it possible
to talk about the lesbian mother's experience of the legal
process. These experiences partly depend upon the
circumstances of separation, the residence of the children
and the position of the contesting father. It is therefore
more appropriate to conceptualise the experiences outlined
in this chapter in terms of a continuum. The extreme
points of the continuum are represented by, on the one hand,
the lesbian mother living with her lesbian partner and
children, faced with a legal dispute with the father of
the children who has a mother substitute (a new wife or
cohabitee, or housekeeper or nanny or willing grandparents).
At the other end of the continuum, a mother, identifying as
lesbian but still living with husband and children, not
involved in a lesbian relationship but wishing to leave
her marriage though not her children. Between these two
possible extremes there are a myriad of possible combinations
of arrangements (just as there are for marriage breakdown
as a whole) and some of these are outlined in the following
section on separation and solicitors.
Although lesbian mothers are not an homogeneous group,
just as the courts have focused upon specific issues
(psycho-sexual development of children and expressions of
lesbian sexuality) so this examination of mothers'
experiences of pre-court practices reveals certain recurrent
themes. Firstly, a sexual 'essentialism' reqardinq the
structure of lesbian relationshLps and their perceived
consequences determines aspects of both legal representation
for lesbian mothers and the approach of divorce court welfare
officers. Secondly that sexual essentialism is presented
alongside constant 'appeals' to an ideology of motherhood.
And a central feature in that imagery of motherhood is that
it should only take place within marriage and that it should
transcend desire.
The following chapter therefore will outline separation
processes, responses of solicitors, experiences with
divorce court welfare officers and the content of social enquiry
reports and will discuss the way in which the above issues




The processes involved in marriage breakdown and
separation for mothers in this study are many and varied.
And the 'presenting problem' to lawyers can be equally
varied. For example not all the mothers in this study
identified as lesbian at the point at which custody of
children was determined; some mothers had been divorced
or separated and had had custody (care and control) of
children for some time prior to identifying as lesbians.
Other mothers were clearly identified as lesbians at the
time of legal proceedings although this does not necessarily
mean they were involved in a lesbian relationship.
Whether the issue of the mother's lesbian identity
arises at the time of custody proceedings or at some stage
in the future the consequences can be equally problematic
for the mothers concerned. For mothers who become involved
in a lesbian relationship after custody of children has been
determined, fear of exposure and a fresh challenge by
ex-husbands to their position as mothers frequently means
that women in this position live their lives under the
sword of Damocles. This fear exists regardless of whether
the father has regular access to children. Sally:
"my real fear is that he will discover that I am
a lesbian and get custody of Joanne even though
he has shown no interest in her for the last
four or five years".
And sometimes where lesbian mothers felt marginally
safer, for example where a husband had remarried, moved
away and showed little or no interest in a child, that
sense of comparative security could quite easily be shattered.
For example one lesbian mother in this situation, Annie,
commented quite early in the study that she felt relatively
safe from a challenge from Marisa's father:
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"oh he doesn't show much interest in Marisa,
we've been divorced several years, he has
remarried, got family of his own. She
occasionally sees him, less so now, he's not
really interested in her, she's seen him
(shrugs) perhaps three times in the last
year".
When asked what she thought his attitude might be if he
discovered she is a lesbian she responded:
"Oh well, I have some indication because well,
after our divorce we had a divorce party where
two gay men came and sat in the kitchen and
held hands...he (husband) threw everybody
out and beat me up because I had a gay man
in my flat, I mean, he went absolutely berserk
so I mean, if he discovered I was a lesbian
there was going to be hell, absolute hell".
Annie and her daughter had a very close relationship, they
travelled a great deal together and had been almost around
the world. However, they came back from one holiday to
discover that Marisa's father had made an application for her
custody. Annie had appeared on a television documentary
programme about lesbian mothers, her ex-husband had seen
this programme. Not surprisingly this threw the mother into
a total panic, not only was she cited as a lesbian, a fact
which she would not in any case wish to deny, but in addition
she was (accurately) described as being actively involved
in promoting the rights of lesbians. And Annie was well
aware that this could make her case doubly difficult -
she could hardly be described as 'discreet'.
For mothers who become involved in lesbian relationships
some time after divorce and custody and where children do
have regular contact with their father, the position is
extremely fraught. Melanie:
"well I wasn't a lesbian or anything when we
divorced, I mean it just wasn't an option that
ever entered my head. He wanted 'out' and
frankly I didn't care too much I was tired of
the rows and things, he didn't want the kids he
didn't want custody or anything, I mean I guess
he felt guilty about leaving us for another
woman. . . the kids went regularly it was
difficult for them I know.. .1, well I did
what most women on their own do in the end, I
just got on with life and looking after the
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kids and things you kno and then I met Sam
our relationship developed (shrugs laughs) we
all spend a lot of time together, Sam and me
and the kids, we go places we have a nice time
and the kids love her, it really didn't hit
me for a while quite what a bomb we were all
sitting on, I mean, if he knew, god, I guess he'd
...well, I don't know what he'd do. He'd explode
I guess.. .and it's so difficult because of course
the kids talk about Sam when they go to see
him, she spends a lot of time with us. And
we can't tell the kids not to mention her how
could we she's part of our-life now and anyway
we wouldn t t put the kids in that position".
A number of women found themselves in a similar position to
elanie whereby their husbands did not contest children's
custody at the time of the divorce and were it seems quite
happy for wives to care for children as single parents.
However knowledge of the development of a lesbian identity
and a lesbian relationship usually instigated a custody
challenge, or indeed the threat of one. One mother reported
that her husband had recently found out she and the women
she shared a house with were in fact having a relationship.
She reported that initially he had created a scene and
said he would take the children from her. She reported some
weeks of threats of	 an impending court application and
arguments in which he also said he would tell her employers.
However she received nothing 'legal'. She recalled that
over those weeks they lived in almost siege conditions
expecting him to come with the police at any time and take
the children. Eventually they realised that in fact it
was unlikely that this father would take the issue any
further, Karen;
"well he had nowhere to take them and nobody to
look after them but at the time we were so
frightened and so isolated we just didn't know
where to go for advice. I didn't want to go to
court unless we really had to so we waited, he
created hell for a while, scared us to death,
every day I went into work I thought it was
probably the last...and then he just went...
disappeared.. .1 mean that's nctunusual, he
does go off.. .it's when he comes back we worry..."
For those lesbian mothers who went through divorce
and/or custody proceedings as lesbians, these mothers fell
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into two broad categories; those lesbian mothers who had
children with them (i.e. they held the status quo - or
shared it with the children's father); and those lesbian
mothers who had lost the status quo. It was usually this
latter category of mothers who felt they fared the worst
so far as pre-court practices were concerned. Some mothers
reported that they had been advised by solicitors that they
basically did not stand much of a chance of getting custody
of children and were advised to simply go f or 'reasonable
access'. Lesbian mothers in this category were subject to
specific problems, some of which are shared by mothers as a
whole where they lose the children's residential status quo0
For example, they are subject to the general ethos that
'good' mothers under no circumstances leave (or lose)
their children. Also, like mothers as a whole, this category
of lesbian mothers frequently had housing problems (since
local authorities bear no responsibility for 'single'
homeless women - it is having the care of children which
gives women access to public housing). But in addition, it
is frequently the 'timing' element which finally militates
against mst mothers in these circumstances obtaining
custody of children. This is because by. the time the mother
has obtained suitable housing, contacted a solicitor,
welfare reports have been ordered and made, several months
can elapse (one mother reported that it took eighteen
months before her case was finally heard in court)0
During this time a father has usually established by whatever
means 1 , that he can in fact provide for 1.the child or
children on a daily basis. Under these circumstances it
is unlikely that the court will overturn what, by that
stage, is a well established status quo in'favour of the
father. Where the status of the contesting mother is also
problematic (for example, where she is a lesbian) it is
highly unlikely that she could succeed in having such a
situation overturned in her favour 2 . The additional issues
regarding assumptions surrounding her sexuality and life-
style and issues surrounding the psycho-sexual development
of her children in effect make her case virtually impossible.
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It is m,others in the above situation who frequently
expressed the most dissatisfaction with their lawyers.
Because in these circumstances lawyers/red mothers to
drop their application for custody and go for access,
women felt their soli'itors did not really fight for them.
One solicitor at a conference for lesbian mothers held in
Bristol in 1981 commented on that situation:
"It may well be that in such a situation a
solicitor can see that the cards are so stacked
against a mother that to put her through the
ordeal of cross examination - an ordeal which,
given the weight of evidence against her, will
clearly destroy her and probably to no avail; in
those circumstances, it could well be in her
best interests to go for 'reasonable access" rather
than risk destroying entirely her chances of
any contact with her child".
Solicitors here are indeed acting as 'gatekeepers'to:the
law taking into account the degree of evidence for and
against a mother, and her chances of succeeding and weighing
that against what generally happens in circumstances where
a mother does not hold children's status quo. In this
situation specialist knowledge is very powerful, clients
are at a disadvantage and have little alternative but to
follow the advice of their lawyers. In retrospect however
mothers sometimes felt that their solicitors (and sometimes they
themselves) did not put up uiuch of a fight.
	 oreover,
mothers in these circumstances were critical of the way
in which in the process of transforming their problem
into 'legalt
 issues, factors which they as mothers thought
important (for example their past record as good, caring
parents, their proven ability in this area, evidence of
fathers' minimal involvement in the daily care of children)
these factors held little influence. Rather, the focus
was on the immediate and future arrangements for children.
And under those circumstances a mother who appears for all
intents and purposes to have deserted her children and is
a lesbian does not stand a very good chance of obtaining
a transfer of custody in her favour.
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Clearly the issue which frequently presents the most
insurmountable problems for mothers in these circumstances
is thEt of adequate housing. But so far as the courts are
concerned that is a relatively 'weak' argument on which to
justify not taking children - the fact that husbands
frequently refuse to allow lesbian mothers to take children,
(indeed some have demanded that mothers leave without
children) does not hold much weight against a well established
father's status quo. One mother from East Anglia makes
this point about her case. She left howe under considerable
pressure from her husband and it became increasingly diffi-
cult for her to get access to the children during the interim
period prior to the court case,
"It was awful really I was painted as the
deserter - the mother who really didn't
care about her childrm I can remember it
now 'you don't really care much at all about
your children do you Mrs Simons, how many
times have you seen them since you left
home'...it was impossible, I tried to explain
why I had left and that I frequently
travelled miles to try and see them only
to be refused on arrival by my husband.
I felt very let do%cn, my case was mis-handled
by my solicitor".
Another (cohabiting) mother of two young children described
how difficult the separation process can be for women with
children and nowhere suitable to take them, Ruth:-
Oh he started interrogating me and issuing
ultimatums, he'd go out in the middle of the
night and at dawn, he threatened to commit
suicide, he was in a manic state I mean, I felt
at that stage I really couldn't leave him in
that state, he drank, he took tranquillisers,
he wouldn't allow me to use the phone or leave
the house, he intercepted my mail,...and then
he suddenly changed, he started saying I was
mad, that I was ambivalent and unfit to care
for the children. He said if I left I could
not take the children, he threatened to make
them Wards of Court to prevent me taking them,
which he ultimately did of course".
She continued:
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"I was terrified but I mean, where can you go
with two children and he knew, he knew I was
living under intolerable conditions'1.
Eventually this mother did leave alone. Aware that the
children's father would accuse her of desertion she left a
note to the effect that she was not in fact deserting the
children. However, the reality of the situation was that
so far as this case was concerned, the father had athple
opportunity to establish a status quo and a case for
keeping the children.
With regard to the lesbian mothers who consulted
solicitors while they still had custody of their children,
the response of solicitors to the issue of 'lesbianism' fell
into three broad categories. Firstly, that it didn't
matter at all - it was irrelevant; secondly, well it was
an issue but not terribly important; thirdly, it is important.
Solicitors who realised the possible consequences tended
to be either those who already had some knowledge of the
issues involved1 cr who were 'fed' information from an
informed lesbian mother.
Ellen, a mother of three boys under ten, married for
several years and still living iith her husband in the
suburban area of a large town in the north east reported
how she had gone to a solicitor in town. This solicitor
she said was known to be a radical lawyer. She explained
that she was a lesbian still living with her husband and
that he had threatened to take the children from her
because she was gay. She said this lawyer's response was
'why should that matter, it's your record as a mother that
is important'. This mother wanted to leave the marriage
and take the children and live with her lover.
Joanne, a mother with two children aged ten and
eleven described a similar experience. She was also still
living with her husband and he knew she was a lesbian.
She said she went to see a solicitor primarily for some
advice at first. Her husband was treating her;'like a
prisoner and I needed to know what I could and couldn't
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do, could I take the children, how would being a lesbian
affect things:
"well she didn't think it Lbeing a lesbiarrJ
was a problem (raised eyebrows)...she didn't
realise the implications, I found that diffi-
cult to understand, I mean I didn't think
she was the one for me...I mean if you don't
think there's a problem in the first place,
how on earth are you going to handle it?...
suddenly you realise 'oh god it's a problem
and I know nothing' ".
Other mothers reported a distinct reluctance on the part
of their lawyers to actually address the issue of their
sexuality and its implications for their chances of keeping
children0 Marie, a mother of three children, described her
feelings of exasperation when she attempted to talk to her
solicitor about allegations raised in her husband's affidavit
and the welfare report. This mother wanted to discuss the
allegations in detail and decide how to handle them.
However she felt her solicitor did not share the same
sense of urgency:
"well he just kept saying 'we'll sort that out
in court, we'll sort that out in court...well,
I'm nearly going off my head. To my mind it
was like going to war with empty guns, you don't
do this, you answer it all, you work it out in
front of Ohe hearing) so whatever you get
thrown at you - you can answer it all".
Mothers criticised lawyers for a lack of preparation, a
lack of attention to specific issues surrounding sexual
identity and motherhood, and psycho-sexual development of
children. Most mothers knew enough about lesbians and
custody to know that they were in a difficult situation.
However they did not know the precise nature of the objections
likely to be engaged. Most left those issues to solicitors
largely because 'it's their job to know these things
isn't it'. Nevertheless those mothers who expressed anxiety
about the lack of preparation frequently had their anxieties
borne out in their court-room experience0 Here, they felt,
their lawyers were frequently defensive, unprepared or
unwilling to respond to some of the extreme allegations made
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regarding the form and expression of lesbian sexuality.
Margaret, a mother of two daughters aged six and seven
makes this point. She had had custody of the girls for three
years when her ex-husband decided, on the basis that she
had formed a lesbian relationship, to contest custody.
She went to see a solicitor and was honest about her
relationship from the start:
"they knew I was a lesbian anyway because it was
in my husband's affidavit but somehow we never
got around to talking about exactly how it would
affect my case...in court when things started to
go wrong you know the sex side of things my
barrister didn't put up any kind of fight, he
simply relied on the fact that the welfare report
said I was a good mother, he just didn't fight
at all".
Some mothers however did report having sympathetic
solicitors who they felt really did fight for them and who
prepared their cases well. However even in cases where
lawyers were prepared to address directly the relevance of
sexual identity and discuss ways of handling it in court,
the issues were not always straightforward either for
mothers or indeed for the lawyers involved. Problems
still arose. and questions of strategy and compromise had
to be discussed and these issues could also lead to frustration
and anxiety for both mothers and lawyers. Mothers reported
that some legal advice though likely to increase their
chances of custody was nevertheless 'unpalatable'.
Advice on 'strategic moves' could cover a number of
issues. For example, Joanne, like other mothers in this
study, had been under considerable stress at home. She
finally left but her husband would not allow her to take
the children. She was a lesbian but not involved in a
lesbian relationship, she went to stay with a (male) friend.
Her husband demanded that she return home, when she refused
he used physical force to drag her into his car:
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"he came for me and dragged me back, we sat up
all night arguing, I can't remember everything
but I do remember how it ended, sex! something
I didn't want and I don't know why he did...I
was really angry, I were just angry I just felt
like a piece of meat - a parcel to be passed
around from one to the other, I felt I just
can't go on like this I'm not going to be
somebody'.s property for ever".
Joanne left the next day and after contact with a support
group contacted a sympathetic solicitor. This solicitor
advised Joanne	 that to stand any chance of being awarded
custody of the children she had to get back into the
matrimonial home. Because of the physical force her
husband had used the previous day, Joanne dare not return
to the house. Following discussion an ex-parte injunction
against her husband was finally obtained and Joanne then
returned home. Technically of course the advice of this
solicitor was correct - for this mother to stand any chance
of getting custody of her children she had to have at least
a joint residential status quo - to get that she had to
return to th home in which the children were resident.
In effect what it meant for the above mother was that
she returned to a home where there was qonsiderable hostility
towards her. She reported that during the period prior to
the custody hearing, nobody spoke to her (the children
aged ten and eleven years were under pressure not to talk
to her), she had to cook her meals separately from the rest
of the family, she ate alone, spent most of her evenings
sitting alone in the dining room and she slept onthe
settee at night. On one occasion she was visited by friends
and her hus.band called the police and insisted they remove
the lesbians from his house. The police duly arrived and
suggested her friends 'should drink their tea and leave'.
Joanne remarked that after that nobody came to see her.
She recalled how lonely and isolated she felt during that
period, nevertheless in relation to her new solicitor's
'return home regardless' policy she said:
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"I felt she was on my side, I mean everybody
kept trying to put her off, we had problems
getting Cemergency legal aid and finding a
judge who would see us at 3.30 on a Friday
afternoon but she kept patiently pushing...
then we had to find someone to serve it
njunctioijT) .. . she was pretty impressive
really...."
Returning to the matrimonial home in order to re-establish
a residential contact with children was however only one
of a number of compromises mothers have to face. But of
particular concern to lesbian mothers is the issue of future
living arrangements - whether or not they live with a:femäle
partner. Even when represented by lawyers who the mothers
themselves thought were sympathetic and well prepared, the
issue of whether to live with a lover could prove difficult.
Margaret reported how she went back to court a second time
having already lost custody of her children some three years
previously. In both instances she was completely open
regarding her lesbian relationship. In the first instance
she lost, but the case came back to court because of enormous
access problems where her ex-husband attacked her during
the changeovers. When the time came for the second hearing
Margaret remarked that she had learned a great many lessons
from the previous case, she also had a new solicitor:
"my new solicitor was really marvelous she
never asked the questions the sexual questions
that the male solicitor had asked. . .1 certainly
think that a different solicitor and barrister
made all the difference. I insisted that I
met the barrister before and we had a long
discussion about things..."
Yet once back in court Margaret came very near to Zlosing
again. She refused to sleep separately from her lover,
she commented:
"it was ridiculous the children know we sleep
together and I refused to make such a compromise".
Margaret Stock's case was in fact very complex, her lawyers
had spent months fending off an attempt by her husband to
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stop her access altogether. Initially the local social
services department decided to take the case back to court
(there was a supervision order) on the basis that access
was unworkable. Fôr:some time it did seem that the children
might well go into local authority care, indeed that was
3the expected order . At that stage Margaret s decision not
to be compromised in any way in her relationship with her
lover caused some exasperation both on the part of her lawyer
and the judge hearing the case. She took a principled gamble
at this stage feeling that she had the backing of-the
welfare officer. In effect she gambled correctly because
the welfare report did ultimately recommend the court should
first try a change of custody and the children were trans-
ferred to her. However the case does not represent a resounding
success for :lesbian mothers, the alternatives before the
court were limited; the children were three years older and
still repeating a desire to be with their mother, the father
was refusing to have custody if he had to allow access)
and social services, who were constantly involved in the
problems of access, made it clear that an application for a
local authority care order was a very real possibility.
When other mothers were faced with similar decisions,
responses varied. All mothers expressed anger and resentment
at being forced to address the issue in this way. Some
mothers refused to be compromised and lost custody, some
mothers argued that by that stage it was doubtful if they
would have succeeded in obtaining custody even if they
agreed to live apart from their lover. Other mothers
were prepared to make enormous compromises (for example,
living alone, or agreeing that a lover would move out
during access periods, or agreeing not to take the children
to see particular friends) - indeed one is tempted to say
such mothers reinforced the notion of 'motherhood' as a
total identity transcending all other issues. But what is
important about this issue and what these cases clearly
demonstrate is the particular kinds of choices mothers are
expected to make. This major choice about whether to live
alone or with a lover increases in magnitude as the case
against the mother mounts. It may well be for example
that a court (usually under the request of a father's
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counsel) orders psychiatric reports on both the mother and
the children. If these reports are detrimental to the mother,
for example arguing that children are already confused
about their sexual identity or that they will suffer in some
way in the future, although the mother has the residential
status quo, her case for keeping the children may begin
to look very difficult. And this is especially the case
when faced with a father who can provide what the courts
perceive to be an adequate mother substitute. In these
circumstances certain mothers reported that even sympathetic
solicitors, solicitors which some mothers described as
'feminists', advised mothers to consider seriously issues
such as living with a lover and not living in an all female
household. This was particularly the case where fathers
objected to children living in an all female household
and this objection was supported by psychiatric opinion.
In these circumstances, where lawyers perceive the cards
to be heavily stacked against mothers, there is little
belief in the power of research and rational argument to
retrieve the mother's case. One mother commented on the
choice she had to make, Jessica:
"it was dreadful I mean, there was I completely
isolated with the children and there was room
for us in Mary's house, I mean it was silly
not to go, but my solicitor said that in view
of the psychiatric stuff, living in an all
female household at this stage was a risk which
I shouldn't take, not right now anyway...we
slood a chance if I lived alone, you know, the
single parent bit...it's incredible isn't it
there it is, a lovely warm caring environment
for the kids but no, to stand a chance of
keeping them I have to be seen to live this
lonely, isolated life.. .does it make sense
to you I mean it's daft isn't it..."
Another mother however, Marie, refused to compromise,
even though she had enormous confidence in her new lawyers
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"they GLawyerJ were worried that if we mentioned
that we slept together the registrar would say
'well this had better go back before the judge'5.
They advised us not to admit to our relationship,
but we couldn't agree. We've fought all along
that we love each other; that we want to live
together; that we will live together".
In this particular case the mother finally did succeed
in getting custody of her children. It took four years,
three social enquiry reports, three different solicitors
and intensive interrogation regarding issues surrounding
sexuality by both a welfare officer and a Judge (see below,
p. 217
The issues surrounding quest.ions of 'compromise' for
lesbian mothers are twofold. Firstly there is the way in
which some lawyers search for ways of improving the application
of lesbian mothers to retain custody of their children.
Then there is the issue of the very nature of the factors
to which they are forced to 'appeal'. The search for
acceptable compromises usually means making two specific
appeals, firstly to reduce the visibility of the sexual
identity of women and secondly to increase the visible
imagery of 'motherhood'. Both these 'appeals' are in fact
to stereotypes; to limited and imaginery repertories of
female behaviour. Patriarchal relations demand that
'motherhood' should transcend desire, and what such 'appeals'
therefore demonstrate is the difficulty of defending
mothers within family law where allegations of 'unfitness'
are sulstantiated by reference to a visible assertive
sexuality. What such 'appeals'
	 achieve might be a
better case (or stronger claim) for custody for the individual
mother, but equally such appeals in practice reproduce and
sustain those stereotypes. So that for example, in the face
of stereotypical factors utilised by fathers to argue
'unfitness' (for example not only is the mother a lesbian,
but she is not a full-time mother; is uncommitted to children;
is promiscuous; mentally unstable, or too invblvedin
politics) it is precisely to that same model of 'motherhood'
that defending lawyers appeal in attempts to regain lost
credibility. Preparedness to be a full-time mother is a
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particularly popular example of this; Jessica makes this
point:
"well there I was just beginning to get my life
organised, my job and everything and then not
only does he say I'm unfit because I'm a lesbian
(which I am but that doesn't make me unfit) he
also says 'look she's not even prepared to look
after the children',...hell, what have I been
doing all these years...but, in an attempt to
regain some credibility, in desperation...
I gave up my job."
Another lesbian doing a part-time plumbing course was also
resentful at being advised by her solicitor to give up the
course for the time being so that she could be seen to be
prepared to be a full-time mother to very young childreii.
This advice was given in the face of a highly critical
welfare report and a husband's affidavit alleging the mother's
increasing involvement in the women's liberation movement
and her ôommitment to a lesbian identity. Equally mothers
resented being advised not to spend nights with their lovers
and not to go away for weekends with their lover (and take
children). Other issues which were mentioned were women's
and gay conferences, and in once case demonstrations
(CND and anti-pornography march). When 'all the chips
are down' so to speak, so far as lesbian mothers are
concerned, it seems there are clearly certain things 'good'
mothers do not get involved in. Action for Lesbian Parents
(1977, p.5) begin to draw on this imagery when they advise
lesbian mothers who have to go to court. to remember that
most judges prefer the 'Marks
	 Spencer' image of women.
What these issues demonstrate is not necessarily a
failure of radicalism on the part of feminist lawyers,
although clearly that is how some lesbian mothers experience
it. But the issue is more complex than that argument allows.
It is not simply that certain 'feminist' lawyers fail to
step outside conceptual boundaries, it is also a question of
the power relations which surround and underpin those
boundaries. As Cain (1979, p.33) argues when discussing the
role of lawyers, 'lawyers peddle the language of law
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...they coerce the experiences of life situations of
their clients...and individualise and de-politicise issues'.
Cain argues that a process of reconstjtution occurs in terms
of a fundamentally bourgeois set of ideological categories.
What the pre-court experiences of these lesbian mothers
demonstrate is that for matrimonial lawyers these ideological
reconstructions are patriarchal as well as bourgeois.
The translation of the life situation of lesbian mothers
into the language of law creates problems because of the
limited repertoire of behaviou±:patterns available to mothers
generally. Patriarchal relations do not generally allow
for the sexual visibility of mothers particularly outside
of marriage. The assertion of sexuality and sexual needs
and desires is/'rally the prerogative of men. That is partly
why in pre-court practices lesbian mothers become stereo-
typed in the search for the dyke! 6 . It is largely because
there is no perception of/	 M!i visibility and eroticism
which is not linked to male sexuality. Thus, it is precisely
when lesbian mothers claim a right to both a motherhood
which does not transcend desire, and a sexual identity
which is assertive and which refuses to be de-politicised,
that the role of the lawyer becomes problematic0 It is here
that a choice frequently has to be made between two historic-
ally and socially constructed roles, the role of 'the lesbian'
perceived as essentially erotic, and the role of 'the mother'
essentially asexual.
Divorce Court Welfare Officers and
Social Enquiry Reports
Discussions regarding t1visit of divorce court
welfare officers or social workers raised a great deal of
anger and bitterness in several women in this study.
Indeed some mothers felt that the welfare report had
provided yet further unsubstantiated ammunition to support
the accusations and prejudice of husbands. The major
complaint voiced by mothers in this area rests upon the
overriding focus upon mothers' sexual identity and stereo-
type notions of the lesbian identity. Indeed where mothers
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made this complaint they argued that the focus on assumptions
regarding sexual expression far outweighed the attention
given to other factors in the report, for example that
given to discussing children and their futures.
Several lesbian mothers said they had made conscious
decisions to be frank, ôpen and honest in their discussions
with welfare officers regarding sexual identity. Indeed
two mothers said that it had never occurred to them to try
to hide anything. For example Marie and her partner Paula
visited a divorce court welfare officer together at his
request. He made attempts to make them feel comfortable
and at ease and they felt this was a genuine attempt to be
sympathetic and understanding. They were asked if they
were prepared to be frank and honest with him and they
replied that they were. The interview lasted three quarters
of an hour. During this period the officer asked Paula if
she looked at the children with the idea that she could
be their father and if she was maintaining them (Marie,
their mother, was at this time not receiving any maintenance
from their father and was living on social security). He
then proceeded to ask Marie if she was sexually satisfied
by Paula - did she reach orgasm - did they both - did they
enjoy it? He also said he knew women friends of theirs
who wore a tie and waistcoat and dressed like men when they
went out. Marie recalls that they denied the more pre-
posterous insinuations and answered the sexual questions
honestly. Neither home situation nor the children were
mentioned. A week later Marie's solicitor sent her a
copy of the report this officer had prepared. They were
horrified,
"In the report he said we reached orgasm by
mutual masturbation. . .we never used words like
'mutual masturbation'".
Another mother, Joanne, describes her visits from
the divorce court welfare officer:
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"oh she had the usual you know, the typical view
of a lesbian - trench coat - it seemed a bit of
an obsession with her, she wasn't unpleasant in
fact she was very nice in a lot of ways except
she said that the ten to sixteen years age
group could be affected by me being a lesbian
mother - she said Stephen ftier eleven year old
son) could grow up to hate women and Jan er
ten year old daughte may grow up to be
frigid'.
This mother also recalled that this welfare officer said her
children would be called names at school and that because
lesbians were anyway a minority group 'the children would be
bound to suffer'. (These children lived in an industrial
town in the Midlands and were of Afro-Caribbean origin).
This mother argued with the welfare officer on the basis of
research on the psycho-sexual development of children
raised by lesbian mothers, she then rang her solicitor
to explain what had happened. Her solicitor rang the
welfare officer and raised the question of obtaining expert
opinion regarding the psycho-sexual development of children.
The welfare officer again visited this mother and suggested
to her that her solicitor had a vested interest in gay
rights.
Helen Longman, a mother who lost custody of her
daughter in the mid 1970s said:
tithe welfare report was so damning jtts now
a blur thank god but one thing I do remember
it said I had the welfare of my children
close to heart and then said two lines about
my husband and two pages about my 'lesbianism'".
Welfare officers also cross examined lesbian mothers on
role play in sexual relations, Jessica:
"he asked me whether I played the male or
female role in bed - I ask youL what the hell?
I mean, what an assumption I mean how dare he;
I just looked at him and I knew he was finding
the whole thing a big turn on, I could have
hit him what a cheek! but I had to stay calm I
kept thinking 'don't explode this is our future
being decided here' I managed to stay calm,
lots of deep breaths,'no we didn't go in for
that type of role playing, no the children
didn't call Mary daddy'..but he'll never know
hOw close he came.. •
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One mother also reported being asked if she 'used
appliances'.
A further issue which some women reported welfare
officers focused upon was their involvement in political
activities. For example in one case,a mother left home
and went to live with friends in a mixed household. She
also worked in a resources centre in the local town run
collectively by community groups and women's groups. This
mother was very much aware that as a lesbian she was likely
to lose custody of her two children. She developed a
strategy for dealing with the questions of the welfare
officer. Under interrogation regarding her sexuality this
mother refused to be drawn and instead attempted to keep
the focus of their discussion on the position and future
of her two young children.
In his report this officer stated that his enquiries
into the 'community resources centre' in which the mother
worked 'suggest that the organisation was influenced by
the women's feminist movement and allied political groups
it would be true to say that individuals of a lesbian
persuasion find acceptance in this group'. He also reported
that when he questioned the mother about ler affiliation
with the Women's Liberation Movement and her lesbian
tendencies 'I did not get clear answers, notions of identity
were limited to that of"woman and "mother",. ..sexual
preference was not admitted". He concluded that
"having seen the boys with Mrs Turner I have
nothing but praise for the level of emotional
warmth and caring that is extended towards
them, Mrs Turner has sound parenting and
maternal qualities, nevertheless there is
another aspect of her life which may have
greater prominence than she has led me to
believe and with which I personally feel the
children will inevitably be affected".
Re concluded:
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"My impression is that her interests and active
participation in political issues and feminist
matters will accelerate. She sees no conflict
in her external pursuits and her role as a
mother... equally she argues that research
shows that children growing up in a homosexual
atmosphere do not necessarily imitate their
parents, my response is that the evidence is
neither conclusive nor universal... I recommend
that the father remains the custodial parent
[he was awarded interim custody]
The approach of the welfare officer in the above case
clearly demonstrates the dilemmas and tensions, and the
choices, which certain mothers are expected to make. Once
rnoti1ers begin to step out of what here appear to be particuLarly
rigid behaviour patterns,	 once they reject men and marriage
their status as mothers become problematic and uncertain,
they are on the borders of society. It is in these circum-
stances that defending solicitors and indeed some mothers
themselves are forced into positions of compromise (in
terms of relationships and living arrangments) in an attempt
to retiieve some of the lost ground, the lost credibility
associated with marriage and images of motherhood in
society.
Ruth, a mother of three who attempted to incorporate
childcare with research for a higher degree, describes how
anxious she felt about the visit of the divorce court
welfare officer and her possible appraisal of her as a
mother. Her cohabitee had said she was promiscuous and
mentally unstable and therefore not a 'fit' mother. She
lived in a house with two other women and she recalled
preparing for the visit
"yes I remember her visit, we cleaned and
scrubbed like hell before she came
	 aughtei)
yes we vacuumed the surface off the carpet and
I donned my only 'Laura Ashley' dress and
arranged myself so that I was playing creative
games with Harry when she arrived [we both
laugh I, anyway none of this cut a moment's
ice with this woman".
Following visits to the homes of both parents the welfare
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officer in this case insisted both parents attended her
• office together in order to attempt to sort out custody
of the children. Ruth recalled how she tried to resist
that demand
"she said to me 'you must come' and I desperately
didn't want to".
JB: "why was that?"
R:	 "because I hadn't seen him since he'd rushed
off to London and made the children Wards of
Court and I desperately did not want to be in
the same room with him I felt horrified by
what he'd done"
JB: "can you recall what happened at that
appointment?"
R: '[t was very grim I mean He sat there -
serenely - puffing away on his pipe, I was more
or less in tears at the shock of seeing him,
and'em, extraordinary lies were being told about
me, really, I just could not believe it,I felt I
was showing up rather badly, I was coming over
the emotional hysterical woman and, you know, he
was the 'talm composed man'...and she was really
rather convinced by this...it ended up with
both of them trying to persuade me that what he
wanted (care and control of the children) was
best, I remember she said 'but why Ruth, why
won't you let Dr. S have care of the children?'"
The above mother along with other mothers in this
study suffered fundamental attacks upon their 'fitness'
as mothers and their responses demonstrate- the difficulty
of defending that position once that status is undet attack.
A point which came over in all the interviews was that at
some stage in the welfare report the mother is described
as 'a good caring mother'. However, that in itself was not
sufficient. Margaret Stocks, a mother who lost custody of
her children in 1980 recalled the visits of her social
worker0 This social worker visited her home on several
occasions and spent several hours with her and her
children. The mother reported that the social worker
would arrive at between two and three in the. afternoon and
would sometimes stay until early evening when the children
were put to bed. Margaret:
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"Yes she spent a long time with the girls, long
enough to build up a relaflonship she sometimes
came when they came home from school and stayed
til their bedtime, she'd play games with them".
JB: "what kinds of games?"
M:	 "well she had these dolls and beds and furniture,
tiny little things they were and she wanted to
watch them play and who the children put the
dolls with and that sort of thing".
JB: "Did she explain to you what she was doing?"
M:	 "not explain, she didn't exactly say why she was
doing it but I knew, I mean it was obvious, she
didn't attempt to hide anything I mean we both
knew, we understood she was concerned to see how
the children related to two females being
together and a man and a woman and whether this
was on their minds...she'd produce these dollies
and say 'it's bedtime I want you to put the
dollies to bed' she wanted to see who the children
put the dolls with...she wanted to see if the
children were being moulded into lesbianism -
that sort of thing".
In the final welfare report the above social worker concluded
that Margaret was a very good caring mother and in no way
neglectful. Moreover she said the children had expressed
a desire to stay with their mother (she had had custody
for three years by this point) and that they had a strong
sense of belonging with her. This social worker had also
told Margaret that she felt her to be capable of the
feminine touch. Margaret recalled how she felt about that
remark:
"well	 milincD I thought it was nice because,
because a lot of people get the impression
that a lesbian is going to stick up feminist
posters and become butch and incapable of
putting up net curtains, they'd put a blanket
up at the window! - but in lots of ways I am
very feminine and of course this comes out
in my home and the way I set up home".
Nevertheless, this social worker ultimately recommended
a transfer of custody of two girls aged six and seven
years to their father. He had recently remarried and the
report concluded that he and his new wife would be able to
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offer the children a more 'normal' home.
It tended to be the contents of welfare reports
rather than the contents of husband' affidavits which could
have the most disturbing impact upon some mothers. They
frequently expected moral outrage, prejudice (and hatred)
from husbands, they were less prepared for the prejudice and
criticisms they frequently received in welfare reports.
Mothers who felt they had been co-operative and honest
during investigations were frequently shocked when they
saw welfare reports. They expressed anger at the apparent
freedom which the welfare officer has to determine the focus
and content of enquiry.
A major source of complaint was the overriding
attention which 'lesbianism' received in the reports.
Mothers complained that the focus frequently overshadowed
other issues. Moreover mothers complained about the
right of the welfare officer to question them for intimate
details of their lives. They felt such questioning was
completely irrelevant to the purpose of the visit. However
few mothers felt able to refuse to answer such questions,
they felt that a refusal would go against them in the final
report.
In addition mothers clearly resented being asked
questions about their political views and interests, the
presence or absence of males in their lives or the views of
the women's liberation movement on lesbians. These kinds
of discussions frequently led to what one mother described
as "one liners [in the reportJ to twelve years of dedicated
childrearing and domestic services and two pages of accusation
and assumptions regarding my sexual and political views".
Even those mothers who did manage to remain positive
about their chances of being awarded custody of children in
the initial stages of the legal process, became despondent
on receipt of a 'damning' welfare report, especially when it
followed what a mother felt had been a sympathetic meeting
with the welfare officer. A great deal can depend on the
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response of the solicitor at this stage. Some mothers
felt solicitors tended to 'throw in the towel' and some
mothers reported their self esteem took a tremendous knock
at this stage. Mothers also expressed concern about the
lack of weight which was given to the history of responsibility
for childcare during the marriage and the way in which the
issue of their sexuality and sometimes political interests
override questions of proven ability and desire to care
for children. Some mothers felt that solicitors should have
challenged more of the content of the welfare report than
they ultimately did.
One of the major problems was that some of the reports
managed to 'damn by association', so that reports seldom
actually said that mothers should not engage in women's
groups, community organisations, political marches or
demonstrations, but what they do clearly achieve is a process
of comparison. They set in motion a process whereby
those activities, presented alongside extensive discussion
of the mother's sexuality, come to form the .major piece
of information on the mother in question. And these features
are presented in opposition to an imagery of 'motherhood'.
They 'draw' upon a received wisdom - a taken-for-granted
model of 'good' motherhood. While the mQther's sexuality
and sometime political affiliations are spelt out, the imagery
of motherhood to which reports appeal is not. As one mother
put it, 'well, it feels as if my concern for my children
should be limited to washing faces and collecting them from:
shool, it should not extend to a concern about the arms
race or pornography or male violence'. By contrast however
the proposals of fathers to care of children are frequently
described as 'normal' 'conventional' 'stable'. Substitute
carers proposed by fathers (new wives, grandparents, sisters-
in-law) were described as 'warm' 'motherly' 'sound' 'depend-
able'.
However not all lesbian mothers are involved in
political organisations. Indeed most of the lesbians
involved in this study were not. Many described their
lives during marriage as simply consisting of home, work and
the family in varying degrees of importance. Most felt
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that they had been solely responsible for children particularly
when the children were small. Many of these women did not
know where to go to seek specific information regarding
the significance which being a lesbian might have for their
chances of getting custody of children. In these circum-
stances where a solicitor did not challenge the contents
of welfare reports (where they referred to the consequences
of a lesbian identity for children's future development,
or issues surrounding a 'lesbian lifestyle'), mothers seldom
felt able to. It tended to be lesbians who were aware of
gay and women's organisations and increasingly those lesbians
who were able to engage a feminist solicitor who felt able
to challenge some of the contents of welfare reports.
During the mid 1970s some solicitors working on
these cases requested a second or sometimes an independent
social enquiry report. However following the Cadman ruling
(Cadman v Cadman, The Times 13 October 1981) solicitors
have expressed doubt about independent reports and some
showed a clear reluctance to try that approach8.
Finding a psychiatrist where it proves necessary to get
a psychiatric report on a mother and/or children can be
equally problematic. It may be for example that certain
psychiatrists while not necessarily holding a 'sickness'
model of lesbians would nevertheless express doubt about
lesbians bringing up children. One mother in this study
for example agreed under considerable pressure to see a
psychiatrist. He reported that although she was not
'sick' he did not feel able to support her claim to custody
because 'the children would suffer teasing'.
However another mother did see a psychiatrist at the
demand of her husband and in an attempt to convince the
court that she was in no way unstable. Her solicitor
went to considerable lengths to find a psychiatrist who
they both felt would give the mother a fair hearing and
did not subscribe to the view that lesbians are by definition
'sick'. The consultant psychiatrist reported to the court
that there was 'nothing mentally wrong with this mother;
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the issue is not a psychiatric problem'. While this report
was clearly useful for the mother concerned, nevertheless
the case does demonstrate that being a lesbian is still
grounds for assuming mental disturbance and it seems few
solicitors feel able to argue or refuse the suggestion
of psychiatrk opinion on the mother, on the basis that
being a lesbian is not a psychiatric disorder.
Equally where a soliOitor did confront a welfare
officer regarding the contents of a report this raised
enormous hostility on the part of the divorce court welfare
officer and the solicitor in question also said she was
aware that it would be a mistake to engender the hostility of
the court by a too detailed and fundamental criticism
of the report.
Although the numbers here are small, only six women had
full copies of the report, nevertheless the other mothers
recalled with great clarity the focus and content of the
report. As one mother stated 'it's not something you
forget easily'. However even with these small numbers one
can begin to see where some of the pressures for mothers
to 'compromise' comes from. Reports show a wide variation
in length and number of visits and focus of attention.
The focus on the mothers' lesbian identity was clearly
voyeuristic in some cases, yet mothers felt too threatened
and unsure to be able to refuse to answer certain questions.
Comments regarding the significance or possible consequences
on children of a lesbian mother were not substantiated by
reference to either research or case work. In some instances
children were interviewed and their views were stated but
the recommendations of the officer did not necessarily
follow the stated views of children. For example Margaret's
children - two girls aged six and seven years - told their
social worker that they wished to remain with their mother,
the officer recommended transfer to father; Joanne Butler's
children - a girl aged ten and a boy aged eleven years
decided they wished to remain with their father (on that
ground Joanne dropped her application for custody) but the
welfare officer in this case had already told the mother
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prior to that decision that she had decided to recommend
the children should go to their father.
Mothers on Trial
One theme which runs through the experiences of all
those lesbian mothers who finally went through a court
hearing in relation to the custody of their children is
one of profound shock. This is partly as a consequence
of the overriding focus upon sexual identity - its form and
content - and partly as a result of an attack on her 'fitness'
to continue bringing up children. Idenfrifying a mother as
a source of moral and possibly physical danger to her
children is experienced, not surprisingly, as a fundamental
and irredeemable criticism. This is not to say that these
lesbian mothers were ashamed or regretful of their sexual
identity, quite the reverse.
	 The initial shock and
disbelief at the focus of enquiry was quickly replaced
by anger. The anger was twofold. Firstly, mothers deeply
resented the way in which 'those with power' (welfare
officers, judges) denied them the opportunity of being
both parents and lesbians. But secondly, mothers felt the
whole process had very little to do with their perception
of the welfare of their children. No mother felt for example
that she actually could 'affect' the psycho-sexual development
of her children. Some mothers discussed the complexities
of children's development - the acquisition of gender and
sex role behaviour - and how limited they felt their influence
upon children was particularly when children reached school
age. One mother recalled with some amusement how five years
of an anti-sexist home environment was practically obliterated
by the first year of school and traditional teaching materials.
These mothers were therefore appalled at what they felt
were the crude and simplistic models of 'influence' or
'causation' adopted by welfare officers and indeed courts.
Lesbian mothers' discussions of the contested hearing
were often prefaced by statements such as the worst day of
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my life", "it's so painful to recall," "I was so exposed,
so defenceless", "I was made to feel like an animal", "the
questions were completely irrelevant", "what has all this
got to do with my kids?". The focus upon lesbian sexuality
was firstly upon its precise expression and secondly its
consequences for children. Women reported being subject
to cross examination regarding when, where and indeed how
lesbian love found expression. Questions concerned such
issues as whether children had seen the mother and her
partner in bed together, whether the children knew they made
love, where children were when they made love, what did
children think about it. One mother recalls with bewilder-
ment how during her case the court got completely 'bogged
down' in trying to decide how long it would take to walk
from her bedroom to that of her lover. The judge put this
same question to her social worker. The mother reported
that her social worker was equally perplexed and angry
by the question. Margaret:
"I was then asked by the judge how I would feel
if my children turned out to be lesbians, I said
I would be sad because it's not easy to be a
lesbian in this time and age in society but if
they were heterosexual I would understand that
too because my older daughters are heterosexual
and I had a heterosexual relationship for a
number of years".
This case had lasted all day but the jduge did not make
a decision; Margaret:
"he wanted time to seek advice so we went back
to court a week later, he said he had found
nothing to give him any sort of help, it was
up to individual judges, so their father
was awarded custody care and control".
This mother reported the total shock she felt at losing her
children after having had them in her sole care for three
years. She had felt the welfare report was good because
it had said she was indeed a good mother. However it also
recommended that the father should have custody because his
household was a more normal family. Margaret recalled the
days following the hearing:
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"I just crumbled, I got back to my flat and
spent days really trying to think about what
to do we had twenty eight days to appeal but
I felt my solicitor and barrister had let me
down badly, I had nowhere to turn, so, 'em, I
asked my social worker to hand the: children
over immediately I just crumbled..."
Shortly after that decision this mother and her ex-husband
went back to court (in fact one of several further visits) to
define the children's access. Her husband would not allow
staying access. Margaret:
"It was decided I could have staying access on
condition I didn't share a bed with Clare while
the children were in the house...I refused. I
wouldn't agree and the judge finally said 'look
Mrs Stocks	 if there was not enough room
would you sleep on the settee' and I said yes and
he said very quickly 'I make the order for staying
access 4 ".
Marie another mother recalled how she attempted to remain
cairn and unashamed when some letters to her lesbian lover
were produced and read out in court:
"it was pretty sickening really I had to stand
up in court and there it was in black and white.
She udgQ asked me 'was it a lesbian relation-
ship?' do we make love? do we - whatever the
word is they use - ? I said 'yes' I kept saying
'yes'. Then she asked 'do you sleep together?'
I said 'yes' she said 'do you indulge in a
lesbian liaison?' I said 'yes'..." -
1
She continued:
"By this time I was feeling quite sick and hot
under the collar I kept thinking 'I'm not to
look ashamed' I had to sit down I felt quite
faint...I'm there thinking 'no you're not to
sort of sleep you've got to keep your head
up... you've got to look them in the face'
otherwise I thought I'd appear ashamed".
Another mother, Lisa, reported how, in an attempt to
sidestep a direct attack on her sexuality she and her
solicitor had decided to argue that her lesbian relationship
had simply been a one-off affair:
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"(I was) convinced that the only way I could get
custody was to try and convince the court that
my affair had been a one-off fling. That was
my solicitor's angle anyway and since I was
incapable of seeing beyond my nose and the
immediate necessity of keeping my child, I
went along with it".
However, for Lisa Maclean this line of defence was to no
avail. Custody of her three and a half year old daughter
was transferred to the child's father, Lisa:
"he magistrate lectured us about perversion
and about wifely duties plus a reference to
emotional instability...custody was awarded to
him Cfather not because I was a bad or
neglectful mother or cruel or given to
excessive drinking. Nor was the decison
based upon a fair assessment as to which of us
had the best to offer the child. It was
ordered because I am gay, though this was not
the word the magistrate chose. He chose
words like perverted and vile and was so
scathing in his comments.. ."
This mother concluded:
"I came from court emotionally shattered and
physically near collapse. Of course I had
known there would be little chance for
custody to be given to me, lesbians seldom
get custody of their children. But you
do fl t t stop hoping for a miracle of some sort...
all of a sudden I was an unfit mother, branded
morally dangerous for my child simply
because I exhibited the ability to love
another woman".
Even lesbians who do not ultimately contest the custody of
their children through the courts do not necessarily escape
the courts' condemnation. Stereotype notions of the lesbian
as a sexual predator and a danger to children can still
direct the courts' attention. For example, Joanne mother
of two children (a boy and a girl) ultimately came to an
out-of-court settlement with her husband. He was to have
care and control of the two children, they were to share
legal custody. Joanne and a locum solicitor 9
 and her
husband and his solicitor turned up at court for what
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everyone expected to be a simple administrative procedure
(s.41 hearing) since both parents were now in agreement as
to the children's future. Joanne:
"nobody mentioned lesbianism but then he (Zjudge
started going on about why was there a divorce...
he started flipping through the papers and things
...then he suddenly exploded, 'good heavens don't
tell me this woman is a lesbian! and one of these
children is a little girl!'".
Joanne continued:
"he sort of implied I would molest her, I mean
this would not have helped my case at all but I
was ready to go up there and give him a good
hiding...I was fuming, it got so bad that even
John's solicitor got up and started speaking for
me., .the solicitor with me hadn't a clue what was
happening, John's solicitor said 'there's never
been any suggestion that anything improper has
gone on between Jan and Mrs Butler'. By this
time I was really mad".
The judge continued this line of enquiry. Firstly he
turned to this husband and said 'do you want this woman
to have anything to do with your children?' But before
he had time to answer the judge declared 'joint custody'
to be a totally inappropriate order and sent everybody out
of court to come up with a more suitable alternative.
Joanne left the court room in tears. In the waiting
room the parties stood in opposite corners and eventually
her husband's solicitor approached her and said they
were quite prepared to go back into court and say they did
not wish to change the original application for joint
custody. Joanne:
"we went back into court in the afternoon and
the judge said 'are you of the same mind' and
our solicitors said 'yes' and he said he was
not happy about that...he then suggested that
I might keep Jan against her will! I mean,
the size of her! I mean, he was going on as
if they were bits of kids instead of practically
men and women, they've minds and opinions of
their own and not slow in showing 'em".
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Indeed it was ultimately the children's opinions as to
their immediate future plans that had decided Joanne not
to contest custody. However, after considerable argument
Joanne said the judge 'rubber stamped the whole thing and
trotted off in total disgust'. This mother was awarded
generous access. In relation to whether the children ever
stayed overnight she continued:
"if they stayed overnight Mrs 'D' (divorce court
welfare officer) said I wasn't to have anyone
here just them and me. I wasn't to have any
friends in that's what she said, but there's no
legal document nothing officiai, it's all very
vague really".
As some of the comments of the mothers in this study
demonstrate, even in the face of strong opposition and weak
legal representation certain mothers were able to maintain
a visible strength. It would however be wrong to assume
these mothers came through unscathed. Indeed during the
process of the interview some mothers said they felt they
would never recover fully from the horrors of what they
felt amounted to a 'public' cross examination in relation
to very intimate aspects of their lives and the loss of
their children. Equally the experience could also have a
politicising effect, for example Margaret discussed how
following the loss of her children she went 'public' as a
lesbian mother:
"I knew it was time to fight publically after
all I'd already lost the children what else
could I lose".
That approach in itself cars as illustrated here, have
additional problems for lesbian mothers. Several mothers in
this study were not simply accused of being lesbians -
an identity which they freely admitted, but in addition,
husbands and welfare officers also focud on mothers'
involvement in political movements - usually the women's
liberation movement but sometimes the gay movement. For
example one father produced feminist publications in court
in an attempt to outline what he saw as his wife's extreme
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political views. When asked what the importance of his
wife's involvement with the women's liberation movement was
this father responded:
"I do not myself expect or believe that what
would happen is that my wife would successfully
brainwash her daughters into militancy and an
associated belief that in order to be truly
militant they would need to adopt a lesbian
way of life. What I fear is that she will
move in company where the persuasion is of a
sexual rather than an ideological kind as
the girls grow up".
When asked specifically what it was about his wife's
political views that disqualified her as a parent this
father responded:
"my major fear is that my wife's own sexual
problems are so profound that whatever
guidance she gives will tend to be harmful".
The above mother was not involved in a lesbian relation-
ship at the time of the court hearing nor was it ever
suggested that she had been. However the judge did find
her political views relevant - they provided a justification
for her decision to 'break up the family t
 (see supra p.lIq)
Sarah recalled that in deciding her children's custody a
good deal of the hearing focused upon her duties as a wife
and her responsibility for the marrige breakups that angered her:
"t mean one of the points is that according
to the letter of the law children are supposed
to be paramount and my duties as a wife should
have nothing to do with my duties as a mother
I mean I have always thought they were
completely separate".
Another mother from Sussex recalled how she was horrified
when she received her husband's affidavit in support of his
claim that she was an 'unfit' mother. She was particularly
shocked because she along with other mothers in this study
said she lived with a man who professed to share her radical
sexual politics. Both parents had other relationships and
that was an agreed part of their marriage, Nina:
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"I just didn't think he would do such a thing
I mean because he was a radical I mean, firstly
I didn't actually think it was relevant and I
thought it would offend even his own self-image.
Certainly I thought it would offend his feelings
of his position as a radical I didn't think he
would do it for a minute".
This mother was already aware that lesbian mothers experienced
problems over custody. However because of what she felt to
be their shared political perspective in relation to issues
of 'sexuality' she had never felt that she might be placing
herself in any 'risk'. When she found herself labelled as both
a lesbian and a political activist it came as a considerable
shock.
In his affidavit the above father outlined in detail
the mother's involvement in various women's campaigns and
argued that her view of men, marriage and the family would
have detrimental consequences for both his son and particularly
his daughter. Moreover this husband linked her lesbianism
to mental instability. That link is not at all unusual in
these cases. For example, Ruth a mother of three children
under five, recalled a similar experience. She was accused
of being promiscuous and emotionally unstable. She was
also involved in a relationship where both parties acknowledged
other relationships. The children's father in this case
was an academic in a university town who was seen as a
'feminist'. This mother described her horror at the change
of behaviour in her cohabitee and the pressure she experienced
when she expressed a desire to leave (she was not at this
time engaged in a lesbian relationship, indeed she was
initially involved with another man during this period:
"I was being watched, he said he knew my
movements, I mean, my movements were very
conventional I was going to the university
library and taking the children back and
forth from school and nursery, my letters
and phone calls were being intercepted, I
was very frightened I kept thinking 'I can't
endure this regime I must be able to sleep
at night I must be able to sleep in my own
room'".
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Ruth commented that she clung to the belief that if she
waited long enough and kept calm they could keep things
out of court and settle things amicably. She recalled
her feelings over that period:
"I was very afraid I couldn't just seize the
children, where would I take them? I talked
to various friends but people just don't have
two rooms free in their homes, I was terribly
worried, I felt if anything will precipitate
him carrying out his threats it's if I seize
the children and go, but if I tell him in ad-
vance he'll just lock the doors how will I
get out I don't want any violenee'.'.
Eventually this mother left alone. However well aware of
the legal implications of leaving without the children she
said:
"I left a note behind, I didn't dare take the
children, I left a note saying, I mean, I tried
to cover myself to say that I wasn't intending
to desert the children, he knew I was living in
an intolerable situation and I didn't have any
intention of deserting the children it was a
Catch-22 situation I mean he'd several times
said if you leave this house I'll get you for
desertion and I will get the childrens.
Ruth eventually found somewhere else to live with two other
women, she commented that although he didn't actually say
you can't see them [children] he made it so difficult". One
afternoon, Ruth received a telephone call saying he had been
to London and made the children Wards of Court. He argued
that she was unpredictable, ambivalent in her attitude
towards her children, and that that stemmed from her own
family background; that she had a history of promiscuity;
that she might take the children abroad, and that she worked
full time. He proposed that care and control of both children
should be awarded to him and that staying access should be
granted to Ruth when she was free and willing to care for
the children herself.
Both these latter mothers had lived with men who the
mothers felt shared a particular view regarding the role
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of sexuality within a relationship. They claimed a commit-
ment to 'radical sexual politics'. Other husbands in this
study also claimed they supported women's liberation -
they were not against equal pay for example. However much
of that support appeared to be more apparent than real.
As one mother concluded:
"his support of the idea of the liberation of
men and women was superficial rather than real,
in practice it meant when the children were
little I played the traditional role but I can't
use that against him I mean, courts don't expect
him to play minder".
Moreover what that verbal commitment clearly does give some
men is an access to a body of ideas regarding sexual
politics which can then be utilised to usurp the validity
of women's claims to the custody of their children. It
indicates that whatever certain men's proclaimed commitment
to radical sexual politics and the campaigns of the women's
movement is, in reality they are quite prepared to become
commercial bargainers over their children's custody in the
full knowledge that drawing upon traditional notions of
motherhood will place these mothers in almost. indefensible
positions so far as the courts are concerned. Indeed in
many ways the political involvement of some mothers provided
a more acceptable explanation for husbands, welfare officers
and courts for the choice of a lesbian identity. It does
seem that wherever possible there was a resistance to
conceptualising 'Jesbianism' on grounds oth
	 than 'feminism'
and a tendency to conflate lesbian identity (as a sexual
and erotic experience) with feminism (as a political
philosophy)
Conclusion
In view of the legal experiences of the mothers outlined
in this chapter it is not perhaps surprising that few
lesbian mothers pursue their applications for custody of
their children through the courts. In addition to the
problems of maintaining children's residential status quo,
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ascribed sexual essentialism in relation to lesbian relation-
ships and ideologies of motherhood and the family operate
to ensure that lesbian mothers seldom achieve custody of
their children either as a consequence of out-of-court
settlements or indeed at the order of the court.
Experiences of legal processes involved in a contested
custody dispute illustrate the powerlessness these women
experience both as lesbians and as mothers. The dynamics
of maintaining identity as 'mother' demand a denial of an
assertive sexual identity. A decision to maintain an
identity as a lesbian will mean the withdrawal of the 'right'
to remain a mother. What this process demonstrates is the
precarious and uncertain nature of the status of motherhood
once it is associated with an active assertive sexuality.
As one mother's solicitor commented in relation to the
position of men contesting custody of a lesbian mother,
'it's an absolute gift'. Certainly the husbands of women
in this study utilised the issue of sexuality as the major
way of discrediting mothers and usurping their claims to
custody of children. 	 Husbands went to great lengths to
obtain evidence regarding their wives' sexual identity.
They intercepted letters and phone calls, and letters were
handed to welfare officers and solicitors and read out in
court. Husbands also hired private detectives to follow
wives, they also searched bedrooms and handbags, removed
books, articles from magazines and diaries. And this is
not especially unusual. For example in D v D (1974) the
husband produced literature which he had taken from his wife's
bedroom. He argued that the literature demonstrated that
the women's liberation movement was very much tied up with
lesbianism. In re B (T.A.) (1971) the husband hired a
private detective to provide evidence of his wife's sexual
preference. In W v W (1980) the father produc& both letters
and articles in court to prove his wife was a lesbian.
In S v S (1980), the husband produced tape recordings of a
telephone conversation, as also did the husband in J v J
(1980). But not only is evidence of sexuall€y used to
usurp mothers' claims to custody of children, it is also
used on occasion to keep women in marriages they might
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otherwise leave. Mothers in this study also for example
reported that husbands had threatened to tell their employers,
so that they lived not only in fear of losing their children,
but also of losing their job.
Underevaluation of childcare was also an issue which
constantly recurred in discussions with mothers regarding
pre-court practices. Mothers felt that as the case became
increasingly complex, as levidences against the mother
mounted, so thefocus on the history of responsibility for
childcare within the marriage declined. And that situation
was repeated in court, Sarah:
"1 mean there was no discussion of things when I
got to court (and, so far as I know, when anybody
else has been in court) of things like who meets
a child from school who takes it to the doctor's
and things like that, I mean, those are the things
I would have thought would have been important,
but the courts don't see it that way."
Margaret:
"I am the better parent, whether I am
heterosexual or homosexual I have a relation-
ship with my children and that has been taken
away. He (husband) has not showed any interest.
in the girls, with the older girls he never
showed any interest in them, he never spent
any time with them, he never related to them,
in fact, the children saw very little of him,
but nobody discussed this it wasn't seen as
important".
Indeed no father involved in the cases discussed here argued
his application for custody simply on the basis of a
history of shared childcare responsibility. One father
did supplement his argument that the mother was 'unfit'
(because she had had a lesbian relationship, was a member
of the women's liberation movement and mentally unstable)
with a statement that they had had an unconventional marriage
in which they both had other relationships and he had
shared childcare. The former element of unconventionality
was confirmed by his wife, the latter she disputed. Only
two husbands proposed to care for children alone (i.e. without
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a resident mother-substitute) . Both argued in affidavits
that grandparents would provide a back up service. Neither
had a history of joint or shared childcare responsibilities.
The focus of husbands' arguments for being awarded custody
of children in these cases rested not upon a past demonstration
of 'fatherhood' but nor indeed does the law or legal practice
demand that it should do. Rather, it rests upon discrediting
the position of mothers and providing substitute care for
the children's future in as near an approximation to the
family as possible.
In the introduction to this section (Part III) I argued
that it was in fact inadequate to explain the operation
of law and legal practices in relation to 'lesbian mothers'
in terms of the homophobic nature of 'law' (Humphries
1978; Basile 1974). My argument is that that explanation
conceals far more than it actually reveals. This is not
however to argue that certain legal and para legal personnel
do not harbour a very real fear, dislike or indeed disgust
for homosexuals, nor is it to deny the influence of individuals
in certain instances' 0 . Rather it is to argue that we
cannot explain law and legal practices simply in terms of
the personnel involved. Indeed to set up the question
in terms of the rights of lesbian mothers as compared with
the rights of (presumed) heterosexual mothers and then to
explain the problems of the former simply in terms of the attitiiides
of the legal
	
actors is to misunderstand the role and
the development of law and legal practices 'in this field.
It denies the political centrality of the concept of the
family and the relationship of law to the family. Indeed
such an approach is uncritical at the level of politics
since it excludes an analysis of gender oppression. As
the examination of pre-court practices reveals it is not
simply issues surrounding sexual essentialism which are
important in the lesbian mother's experience of contesting
custody of children. But in addition a preference to preserve
and sustain a particular form of motherhood and to award
children to 'normal', 'stable', 'conventional' family forms.
And, as Barratt and McIntosh (1982) argue, the family is
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not a descriptive term for households. It is more
ideologically constituted than that. The family is a collection
of ideological cultural and economic factors imbued with
certain power relaftionships. What feminists working in
the field of law have been concerned to examine is the way
in which law and legal practices reproduce and sustain aspects
of those power relationships (Smart 1984; Eaton 1985;
McCann 1985). The major problem therefore with utilising
the concept of homophobia in this field of analysis is that
it is unable to locate a theoretical or political referent.
It says nothing about the role of law in relation to the
family and the social construction of motherhood. In effect
it de-politicises the practice of lesbian motherhood
because it fails to recognise that the overt political
challenge is represented by a shift from family to household.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Usually a substitute carer - grandparents, a neighbour,
sisters, a new wife, or paid help.
2. Indeed, that she left home without children in the
first place is often used as evidence that she places
her own sexual needs above her duty to her children.
3. This view was expressed by her solicitor.
4. Some fathers argued that they felt the mother's
'lesbianism' was due to depression. In two cases
fathers argued that mothers had changed following
the birth of a second child, and a subsequent
period of depression. In one of these cases a
psychiatrist refuted that claim.
5. This case was originally heard before a judge who
thought the children should go into care. Two of
Sue's three children were in voluntary care, she
could not retfieve them because she was homeless
and living in a hostel with one other child.
6. One mother for example recalled how the judge was
visibly shocked when he discovered from the document-
aE±on that she was lesbian: - "she didn't look like
a lesbian, indeed she was quite ordinary".
7. Both these parents in fact had a Ph.D.
8. In Cadman v Cadman (1981) on appeal it was held
that it was TM doubtful" if the court could appoint
an independent social worker in a case concerning
a custody dispute arising in matrimonial proceedings.
A Practice Direction was issued on 24 March which
clearly limited the access of an Independent Reporter
to the child in question and to previously prepared
reports. In effect this Direction directed Courts
to continue to rely upon the Welfare Officer of the
Court (see Legal Action Group Bulletin May 1983).
Following that Direction two solicitors acting for
women in this study declared a reluctance either
to request an independent report or a second welfare
report on the basis of the "Cadman ruling".
9. Her solicitor had dealt with all the negotiations
and felt she had the case well sewn up. She had
another trial case that morning and sent along
a locum to attend the s.41 hearing with the mother.
10. Although I would argue that the history of homophobia
in religion and medicine for example (Basile 1974)
is not at all helpful in understanding the history
of lesbians in society.
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CHAPTER 9
LAW, STATE AND THE FAMILY:
THE POLITICS OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE 1980s
A major theme in this research project has been to
argue that existing explanations regarding the development
of law and legal practices in the field of child custody
are inadequate. Through a re-reading of developments
throughout the nineteenth century I have been concerned
to demonstrate that we cannot understand those changes
which have occurred, simply in terms of a gradual erosion of
the patriarchal family through a decrease in the absolute
rights of fathers, and a corresponding increase in the
'rights' of mothers. Rather I demonstrate a clear reluctance
on the part of the state to interfere in the patriarchal
structure of the nineteenth century family and reduce the
powerlessness of mothers.
Moreover, I have argued that the emergence of the
welfare principle and the subsequent appearance of an
ideology of motherhood was undercut by ideologies of the
family. So that, although motherhood was 'elevated' within
certain social practices (for example medicine, psychology)
it was generally argued that the family was the only legiti-
mate site for motherhood and the rearing of children. In
the post-war years in Britain neither legal practice nor
procedure were exclusively determined by the welfare prin-
ciple. Preservation of the family dominated legal discourse
surrounding procedural changes in relation to children
and divorce. And in the courts a concern to sanction
women's errant sexual behaviour frequently meant loss of
custody. Although the majority of divorced mothers retained
custody of children during those years, this was not due
to the 'privileged' position of 'motherhood' within family
law. That outcome had very little to do with 'law'.
Rather, it was a consequence of the sexual division of
labour in the post-war family. Mothers succeeded in
retaining the custody of children on divorce because for
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the most part, fathers did not contest that arrangement.
Increased emphasis on the welfare principle in this
area of law has not been a neutral or necessarily
progressive move. It has signified a movement from a
strictly legal criterion (based on !rights .') to what some
perceive to be a more benevolent 'caring' approach to the
dissolution of custody disputes between parents. Never-
theless as Murch (1980 p.2lil) has pointed out 'the rationale
of preventive child welfare has legitimated a powerful
authoritarian paternalistic force which poses a real threat
to the rights and liberties of the ordinary citizens'.
For feminists the trend towards welfarism has a particular
significance. This is because its referant is always
'the family'. While for mothers in certain instances
that may result in a protection of aspects of the nurturing
role it is usually only within the confines of the family.
As Oakley (1981) has argued, 'how reproduction is managed
and controlled is inseperable from how women are managed
and controlled'. This statement does not simply apply to
biological reproduction it also refers to social reproduction -
to the conditions and circumstances under which motherhood
is reproduced and sustained. It is important to remember
that there are many modes of discipline and regulation.
The general trend in Britain away from tlaw! (the courts
and judges) and towards conciliation to deal with custody
disputes through both ir and out-of-court schemes1does
not indicate a necessary decline in regulation. The
rest of this final chapter therefore is concerned with
major policy issues in the area of children and divorce in
Britain in the 1980s. The major themes in current debate
in this area relate to 'joint custody' and conciliation
schemes. These issues do not however occur in a vacuum.
Increased criticism of legal (adversarial) processes
involved in child custody disputes, the emerging fathers'
rights movement (and indeed the children's rights movement),
plus aspects of psychological discourse all have a stake
in 'joint custody'. Indeed the debate over joint custody
has come to dominate policy discussions. In the following
sections therefore I will present the general criticisms of
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existing law and legal procedure in relation to child
custody and the arguments regarding state intervention.
I will then look at the claims made regarding the benefits
of 'joint custody' through an examination of this type
of order in the United States. Finally I will discuss
the implications for feminist policy in this area.
The Law in relation to Custody
There is little doubt that a review of the law and
legal practices in relation to children is long overdue.
Indeed the Law Commission recently began a process of
review starting with the issue of Guardianship (Law Commission
Working Paper No. 91). Part of the demand for change in
this area comes from a wish to clarify a very complex
area of family law. But the demand also comes from writers
who argue that family law must develop to meet the needs of
changing family forms. These forms have been created
by increased divorce and remarriage and thus the creation
of step-families, but also increased co-habitation and
illegitimacy. The demand is that the law must adapt to
the fluidity and shifting composition of families in the
latter part of the twentieth century (Glendon 1984). To
date it has been the position of illegitimate children
and step-children which has received attention (Law
Commission No. 118, 1982 Burgoyne & Clark 1982). However
the Law Commission did recognise in 1984 that reform of
the law generally in relation to the position of children
in society deserved priority. It stated that 'the law
(flow) consisted of a cascade of legislation employing
different concepts and terminology and a multitude of
judicial decisions given in different procedural contexts'
(Law Commission No. 131, para 2.43).
In relation to the concept of 'custody' that 'the
bundle of powers exercisable over children' (Hewer v Bryant
(1970) IQB, 357, 373) it is no surprise that parents are
frequently confused by the law. The concept of custody
is subject to different interpretations depending upon
the particular legal jurisdiction invoked by a parent's
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application. Under the Guardianship Acts (Guardianship
of Minors Act 1971 - 1973) (GMA) and under the Domestic
Proceedings and Magistrates Courts Act 1978 (DPMCA)
'custody' is defined as legal custody and cannot be 'split'
from actual custody. Under divorce jurisdiction however
it is possible to award legal custody to more than one
person and to split legal custody from actual custody.
The major difference in the definitions of custody used
in these Acts relates to 'legal' custody and 'actual'
custody.
Under the GMA 1971 and under the DPMCA 1978 (as
amended by the Childrens Act 1975) legal custody means
'so much of the parental rights and duties as relates to
the person of the child (including the place and manner
in which his time is spent) ' (Children's Act 1975, s.86)
Under this jurisdiction the court cannot grant legal
custody to more than one person. But what the court can
do where it grants legal custody to one parent, is to
order that the other parent retains certain specified rights
sharing these with the custodial parent (DPMCA 1978, s.8
(4) and GMA 1971, s.11 (A)). So that for example an order
could provide legal custody to the mother (giving her
possession of the child) but also providing that she
shares the right to determine educational issues with
the child's father.
Under divorce jurisdiction however (under the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1973) it is possible for the courts to make an
order for joint legal custody, or a split order (custody
to one parent, care and control to the other) or a sole
order (custody care and control to one parent) , or the court
can simply make an order for care and control (leaving
legal custody as it existed during the marriage). Never-
theless lawyers are increasingly reticent to give a precise
meaning to 'custody' in the divorce jurisdiction (Cretney
1984 p.313)
Historically it was accepted that 'custody' related to
the right to possession of a child and, as Cretney argues,
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(ibid p.314) it has been accepted by the courts that the
expression 'custody' was not confined to the actual
physical possession of a child but also entails the right
to determine the child's life. This means rights to
determine education, to discipline, to choose religion,
and rights to services and to administer property and to
represent the child in legal proceedings. In addition,
it includes the right to consent to medical treatment and
to allow a child to marry under the age of consent. Hence
the 'split' orders of the post war years appeared
to make sense, one parent (almost exclusively the father)
was awarded custody and that entitled him to make the
decisions outlined above. And the other parent, (usually
the mother) was awarded care and control - the daily task
of childcare.
In practice, the divorce courts have tended to divide
power and responsibility for children in whatever way
they think f it, but generally they have utilised those
combinations outlined above. However, a recent decision
in the Court of Appeal has displaced much of the conventional
views in this area. In Dipper v Dipper (1981) Fam 31,
Cumming Bruce L.J. argued that it was a 'misunderstanding'
to think that a parent having custody had a right to control
the child°s education. Moreover he argued that whatever
the parent's custodial status, neither parent has any
pre-emptive right over the other with respect to education
or any other matter. He argued that both parents are
'entitled to know and be consulted' on these issues.
It is difficult if not impossible to reconcile this new
approach with previous decisions. Indeed it makes split
orders in effect quite meaningless. However that decision
does support the view that this area of law is long overdue
for review. If the courts and lawyers are unclear about
'custody' it is hardly surprising that parents themselves
have difficulty in understanding the reality of awards
made by the courts. It is unlikely that the Law Commission's
review of 'Custody' will begin until the spring of 1986, and
that time will represent an opportunity to raise issues
relating to feminist policy in this area.
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The State, the Child and Divorce
The focus upon children and divorce in the 1980s
has increased dramatically. And that focus is directed by
a whole range of issues, for example the continual
increase in the numbers of children whose parents divorce,
further psychological research on the effects of divorce
upon children, plus a growing general criticism of the
adversarial system as an inadequate and inappropriate
forum in which to resolve disputes over children (Parkinson
1983a, 1983b; Evis	 al 1981),. And of course the continuing
argument that the 'law' discriminates against fathers and
favours mothers. Underlying these issues is a general
concern regarding a crisis in the family not simply represented
by divorce itself, but by a breakdown of 'parenting'.
In Britain, the search for 'new solutions' has been
greatly influenced by the work of Wallerstein and Kelly,
Surviving the Breakup, (1980). Indeed arguments in favour
of introducing mandatory 'joint custody' of all children
following parents' divorce is frequently substantiated
by reference to the work of these authors. In this section
I want to look at the influences of that work in terms of
current recommendations for change in both legal practice
and procedure in Britain.
Despite the limitations of the work of Wallerstein
and Kelly 2
 the major contribution of their research has
been a substantial shift in the focus of attention surrounding
divorce. It has moved from a focus on divorce itself as
the problem to a consideration of divorce as a process.
Although Wallerstein and Kelly share the same psychodynamic
framework as previous writers in this area (for example
Goldstein Freud & Solnit 1973) the major recommendations
of their work are substantially different. In the seventies
in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, Goldstein Freud
and Solnit argued (p.38) that children have difficulty
relating positively to, profiting from, and maintaining
contact with, two psychological parents who are not in
positive contact with each other. Wallerstein and Kelly
however stressed the imortance of both parents in children's
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adjustment to parents' divorce (p.307). These latter authors
atgued that a major feature of importance in children's
emotional adjustment to divorce was a lack of hostility
in the post divorce environment. For •many contributors
to the debate on children and divorce in both Britain and
the United States, a 'joint custody' order was perceived
as the legal framework to facilitate better contact with
a non-custodial parent.
In Britain, the debate on children and divorce has
polarised around the question of how much or how little
state intervention is necessary to achieve better contact
with non-custodial parents. What is interesting about this
debate is the distinct similarities which it bears to the
debates of the post war years. Despite 'claims of the new
'egalitarian family, the equal division of labour in relation
to childcare and the new 'liberated father' (c/f Holly 1985)
the current debate still focuses on issues of how to utilise
'law' to induce parental responsibility particularly in
relation to fathers. Indeed the 'child savers' of the 1980s
•are rehearsing very similar arguments to those identified
with the post war years. The Denning Committee (1947)
argued for absolute powers of state intervention in fl
cases concerning children, but the Royal Commission (1956)
argued that absolute state intervention would simply
reduce, parental responsibility. In the 1980s, a desire to
increase the protection afforded to children whose parents'
divorce leads Freeman (1983 p.199) to argue for firmer state
control. He is sceptical of the ability of conciliation
	 -
to represent the interests of children and facilitate agree-•
ment between the parties. Indeed he says that 'private
ordering' may well be a mirage. Freeman argues for firmer
control through the introduction of separate legal represent-
ation of children involved in custody disputes. He argues the
case, first articulated in 1975 by Justice, for a children's
Ombudsman. This person would have both legal and social
science training and would act as overseer of children's
interests. The Ombudsman would be able to instruct solicitors
and counsel to represent children's interests in parents'
divorce. Within this new procedure Freeman argues that
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joint (legal) custody should represent the ideal outcome.
1n argument ostensibly in favour of less state control
and increased 'private ordering' of custody is put by Maidment
(1984b). She argues that existing research in the area
of children and divorce verifies that divorce itself is
not the problem: "after control for social and economic
disadvantage there is little evidence that family break-
down is linked to any long term consequences and certainly
none that cannot be reversed by change in environment" (p.173).
Therefore, she argues, divorce itself is no justification
for state intervention. Rather the justification for
intervention lies in identifying the child 'at risk'.
Like the Royal Commission of 1956 Maidment argues that
family law must encourage responsibility in parents. The
concept of parental responsibility demands that parents
should not be allowed to abandn a parenting role simply
because a marriage has ended (1984a p.279). She argues
that current divorce practice of making sole custody orders
in relation to children and in allowing access orders
to go unchecked is by implication encouraging parental
irresponsibility.
Maidment argues (p.271) that family law should enforce
parental responsibility in two ways. Firstly, access or
parental contact should be mandatory and secondly, procedure
should involve 'screening' couples. Although the logical
extension of this would be mandatory joint custody orders,
Maidment concludes that this would in fact add nothing.
Rather she argues the court should refrain from making
any order at all in relation to custody. This would preserve
the legal position of parents as it existed in the marriage.
The court should simply make orders for physical care
(which could be sole or shared). The value of this
approach, argues Maidment, is that it carries a symbolic
message regarding the continuity of parent-child relationships
and their imn'unity to the breakdown of marriage. Equally
Maidment argues that law has an educative function, joint
custody orders 'would have a powerful influence over parental
behaviour by enforcing and facilitating co-operation (p.279/80)
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In relationto procedure Maidment argues that s.41
hearings (children's appointments) should be used as the
screening process to detect those families where there is
the potential of 'damage'. This presumably relates to those
parents who do not agree to joint legal custody and
mandatory access. Maidment argues that the criteria for
intervention should be the welfare of 'the family'.
She says, in the interests of children it is necessary to
reach a 'family solution'. Maidment concludes this procedure
would demand not simply conciliation, but for those parents
who reject joint custody and mandatory access, a therapeutic
input through family therapy and a family systems approach'3.
Freeman reifies '.the child' and dOes not consider any
of the political, theoretical or indeed practical problems
of prioritising children's wishes - for example it would
seem that some children would prefer that their parents
simply did not divorce., nd equally, some children may
prefer to live with the wealthier parent, (predominantly
the father). Maidment however reifies 'the law' and adopts
an uncritical acceptance of the dominant model of the
family. She argues ostensibly for less state intervention.
and an increase in 'private ordering'. But in effect
by reducing the parameters within which parents can negotiate
'piivate ordering' she ultimately adopts a more authoritarian
and interventionist role for the state.
Máidment and Freeman are not of course alone in the
search for legal solutions to the problem of 'divorce and
children'. But they, like most other writers in this field
perceive the problem in extremely narrow terms. For them,
it is primarily a problem of divorce and essentially a
problem about forging and maintaining men's post'divorce
relationship to children. 'Joint Custody' is therefore
represented as the panacea to a whole range of issues.
For Freeman and Maidment it holds symbolic power. Although
they both argue that it signifies the continuity of 'parent-
hood', neither of these writers address
	 the materiality
of 'parenthood', it is a given. Yet in marriagejust as
in divorce 'motherhood' and 'fatherhood' are differently
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constituted with substantially differing social and economic
consequences. But neither writer considers the way in which
law reproduces and sustains those 'givens'. Both writers
are prepared to support considerable state intervention in
divorce, clearly a political move, yet neither writer addresses
the politics of marriage and the way in which state policies
'induce' women's parental responsibility but reduce that of
men.
Other writers place hopes on 'joint custody' orders as
bearing the powers of persuasion where all other endeavours
have failed. For example it is seen as an answer to the
current non payment of child maintenance by fathers (Walczak
& Burns 1984 p.139) . The fathers' rights movement see it
as an essential redistribution of lost power and a chance
to halt regression in the family structure, (Lettington
1983). And it is seen as an answer to two warring parents
because there are no 'winners' and no 'losers'. (Maidment
1984a; Richards 1982)
In Britain the State came to the brink of a presumption
of 'joint custody' in 1983. In a major review of procedure,
the Matrimonial Causes Procedure Committee (Booth Committee)
examined existing procedures and made recommentions for
reforms which 'might mitigate the intensity of disputes,
encourage settlement and provide for the welfare of children
(p.1). That Committee also thought that joint custody had
much to recommend it. Like Freeman and Maidment the
Committee felt joint custody held a symbolic value, it also
had important psychological consequences for fathers who
do not have the daily care of children. Moreover the Committee
also thought that it would have a therapeutic effect on
disputes, 'it would encouragethe parties to settle their
differences' it would focus attention on children and would
assist on such questions as acces&. Indeed the hopes
attached to 'joint custody' with regard to its influence
upon parental behaviour were very similar to those attached
to s.41 hearings when they were introduced by the Royal
Commission in 1956.
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Howeveç when the Booth Committee reported in 1985
it ultimately rejected the idea that 'joint custody' should
be a mandatory starting point in every case(p.64). The
Committee rejected that approach primarily because it was
felt it would fetter the absolute discretion of the court
to determine the welfare of children. 	 But the Final
Report did say that the Committee hoped that joint custody
would be the agreed outcome in the majority of cases, a
comment which has served to support the philosophy of
conciliation - that 'joint custody' is the preferred order
(Parkinson 1981). Moreover, that comment does illustrate a
change of direction from that of the courtsduring the
1970s.Gerierally speaking,it was held by courts that joint
custody would be an appropriate order only in those cases
where parents were likely to co-operate (Jane v Jane 1983
13 Fam Law, 209).
While the hopes for joint custody are fairly clear the
reality of such orders is far from clear. Indeed the
terrain on which the current debate is taking place has made
it very difficult to raise certain questions, the parameters
of welfarism delineate not simply the preferred solutions
but also the range of questions. Yet clearly legal decisions
about the custody, care and control of children have far
reaching effects. Decisions not only affect the lives
of children they play a crucial role in structuring the
social and economic wellbeing of mothers, as indeed does
the division of labour and responsibility for childcare
within marriage. Yet reification of 'the child' and different
feminist positions on 'motherhood' 'frequently makes inter-
vention at the level of policy appear difficult. I believe
however this difficulty is more apparent than real.
Historically feminist campaigns and debates surrounding
motherhood have been about improving the conditions of
motherhood, and a focus upon law has been one aspect of
that campaign (Brophy 1982). But feminist discussions in
the area of motherhood have frequently been vexed by the
question of how to achieve improvements without increasing
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either women's sole responsibility for children or women's
economic dependence upon men0 Indeed contemporary
feminists have reacted very strongly against the notion
that only women should care for children and that motherhood
is destiny for all women (Corner 1977 and de Beauvoir 1974 ) a
And those issues have sometimes led feminists to adopt
quite different approaches to the use of 'law' in this
field (Smart & Brophy 1985). The case in favour of 'joint
custody' has been put by feminists ,(f or example Bruch 1978)
who arçues that it is one way of forcing men to take more
responsibility for children. I would argue that both in
theory and in practice that approach is flawed. Bruch,
like Maidment reifies 'the law'. In this area I think
it is important for feminists to consider in much more
detail the realities of 'joint custody'. There are a
number of questions which require discussion before we can
begin to develop a feminist response to this issue in
Britain. It is not sufficient to argue that since we have
formal equality in relation to parental rights in marriage,
these should continue on divorce. Experience has illustrated
that complete equal treatment is not a sufficient goal
for feminists where structurally women are at a substantial
disadvantage vis-a-vis men. To begin to discuss in more
detail some of the claims made for 'joint custody' it is
important to look briefly at women's experiences of this
type of order in the United States.
Joint Custody - California style
In the United States, the trend towards 'joint custody'
appears like a social revolution in post divorce arrange-
ments for children. In California, statute law has moved
from 'father right' to the 'tender years' doctriie and on
to a sex neutral code with increased formal emphasis
upon shared parenting. By 1985 thirty States in America
had adopted some form of joint custody legislation in an
endeavour to encourage fathers to share post divorce
parenting. However one of the striking things about the
adoption of joint custody legislation between different
States is the degree of compulsion involved. For example
some States have legislation whidi provides joint custody
as an option to the court, and here the court is empowered
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to impose an order for joint custody on parents who do not
want it. Also, some States' legislation allows for joint
custody orders where parents agree, and this is based on a
recognition that a degree of parental compliance is necessary
if the order is going to be workable. Other States have
legislation which allows for joint custody at one party's
request, this legislation allows judges to force a joint
custody order on two hostile parents. This is the form of
order which has been promoted by the fathers' rights
movement both in America and in Britain (Brophy 1985).
Finally, some States have legislated for joint custody
as a preference or presumption, to overcome this presumption,
a parent opposed to the order must prove that it would be
detrimental to the children concerned. It is this type of
order which most closely approximates to that provisionally
recommended by the Matrimonial Causes Procedure Committee
in Britain during 1983. Although joint custody where
both parents agree is generally the most judicious and
widely approved statute (Weitzman 1985) it does allow for
the possibility of coercion in obtaining agreement. For
example, a mother who is afraid of losing custody altogether if
the	 judge learns that sheis unco-operative, or where she
is afraid of losing custody because her husband threatens
to raise issues of 'unfitness', such a mother may agree
to joint custody through fear of losing altogether.
The rapid adoption of some form of joint custody
legislation in two thirds of the United States and acceptance
of joint custody preference in six States did signal a
rapid break with legal tradition. The policy objectives
engaged were not dissimilar to those currently voiced in
Britain - an attempt to assure a child frequent and continuing
contact with the non-custodial parent (in the majority of
cases of course the father) ; encouraging parents to share
the rights and responsibilities of childrearing. The legacy
of Wallerstein and Kelly legitimated pressure put upon
parents to work out a joint custody order for the 'sake of
the children'. In the United States the mechanism through
which that was achieved was conciliation. Indeed, the
movement from the legal arena (from courts, lawyers and
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the judiciary) to 'private ordering' in conciliation
became not simply the preferred mode of dispute settlement,
it became compulsory in some States (for example, California:
in 1981)
The State of California was the first to adopt a joint
custody statute and it has the strongest pro joint custody
law in the United States. The joint custody preference
allows the judge to impose joint custody upon parents where
conciliation has failed to get them to agree. Equally it
allows a judge to impose such an order where one parent
opposes it or indeed, where both parents oppose it. It is
important to note that California law defines and distinguishes
joint legal custody from joint physical custody. Joint
physical custody means that both parents legally share the
day-to-day care of children (in Britain joint care and
control); joint legal custody (the focus of decison making)
can be awarded to both parents with physical custody to one
parent.
In relation to the effects of these new joint custody
laws Weitzman argued (1985 p.250) that while legal labels
are now different, the reality is not so different. In
America, like Britain the vast majority of cases concerning
the custody of children are not disputed in court and most
children are in the care of mothers (Weitzman & Dixon 1979;
Eekelaar & Clive 1977) . Weitzman argues (1985 p.250)
that the change of terminology simply means that orders
which were (prior to the introduction of joint custody
statutes in 1980) called liberal visitation orders, are now
called joint custody orders. So that, while the shift may
have important psychological consequences for fathers
who now define themselves as joint parents after divorce,
nevertheless, it has not changed the reality of the daily
care of most children. Indeed provisional results from
studies suggest that less than one in five couples elected
or felt pressed to try joint physical custody (Maccoby
& Mnookin 1983; Wallerstein & Huntington 1985) . As Weitzman
remarks, within a legal system which positively promotes
joint physical custody of children on divorce such a response
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underscores the pervasive social attitude - most men and
most women prefer not to share post divorce parenting.
In the light of suggestions that joint physical custody
of children on divorce represents the ideal situation -
(both by lawyers and psychologists in the United States and
in Britain and indeed, by implication, the ideal for feminists)
it is important to consider why parents might not opt for
shared physical custody of children. Steinman (1981)
studied twenty-four couples who chose these arrangements0
She states that such arrangements demand unusual commitments
of time and energy and in addition, financial resources
which most couples cannot afford. Those couples who chose
joint physical custody were well educated with at least
average income and a strong commitment to parental
responsibilities. Arrangements were very expensive, for
example children had to have two sets of everything. But
in addition, the arrangments were not without anxiety for
children. They expressed confusion about where they were
supposed to be and when. And this occurred even when the
geographical locationof parents was not a problert (i.e.
when they lived very close). In a follow-up study (Steinman
1985 p.411) this author reported that the complex logitic
arrangements involved in joint phisica1 custody broke
down when on€ parent moved and/or remarried.
In the Bodenheimer Address in 1983, Steinmar reflected
on joint custody and argued 'joint custody is an ideal,
a policy and a set of expectations...there is no consensus
on what it means and a great need for further data' (p.741),
Her sample in 1981 arranged for joint custody extra judicially.
They were parents who were personally committed. But
their childrens' experiences were mixed, Switching homes
every third or fourth day created confusion and anxiety.
Steinman stated that joint physical custody offers benefits,
but it is not for everyone, the capacities and vulnerability
of individual children must be a primary consideration.
It may be that co-operative smooth running co-parenting
relationship is a precondition for children to do well
but it is not sufficient. Steinman concludes that firstly
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we need to consider not only parents but equally which
children make good candidates for joint custody. And secondly
that the evidence we currently have does not support a
legal presumption in favour of joint custody. A legal..
presumption would, she argues, be based upon hope: that
hostility and conflict between parents will die:
"Joint custody is a philosophy not a legal
formula, at its worst it technically divides
a child's life between two parents without
consideration of the child's specific needs
or capacities and that tries to end a war
between parents who do not or cannot agree".
Steinman, 1983, p.761
It appears that the most common award which the
California courts currently make is for joint legal custody
with maternal care to mothers (Weitzman 1985). And results
from preliminary studies indicate that there has been the
largest change in this type of award (Maccoby & Mnookin
1983; Wallerstein & Huntingdon 1985). The rationale for
introducing that type of order in the United States was
similar to that currently being voiced in Britain. It is
primarily a legacy of the work of Wallerstein and Kelly.
After the five year follow up study of the impact of
divorce on children the authors argued:
"while no single factor was associated with good
outcome...the continuity of relationship with
both parents and the extent to which the conflict
between divorcing partners had subsided all
contributed to the wellbeing of the child".
Clearly the important caveat to continued contact is the
absence of hostility. Where hostility and conflict
continue children are typically caught in the middle.
Moreover, it is important to note that the Wallerstein
and Kelly research findings were based on a sample of
farpilies who were self selected and (by definition)
committed to co-operation. This is not then a reccmmendation
for a court order to co-operate where couples register
hostility to that type of order.
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Two other major justifications are voiced in support
of mandatory/preferential joint custody. Firstly that it
improves chances of child maintenance being paid (Kelly
1983 p.765; Walczak & Burns 1984, p.139), and secondly
that it will eventually reduce parental conflict (Maidment
1984a p.280). With regard to the argument that fathers are
more likely to pay child support where they are awarded
joint legal custody the evidence suggests that this is
not necessarily the case.
In the United States as in Britain levels of
maintenance payments for the vast majority of women and
children remain wholly inadequate and are only attempting
to make a Contribution to the cost of raising children.
Too little is ordered, even less is paid, enforcement is
inadequate and awards do not keep up with either inflation
or rises in male earnings (Maclean & Eekelaar 1983; Smart
1984; Gibson 1982; Pearson & Thoennes 1985; Chambers 1979).
Indeed in the United States, Pearson and Thoennes reported
that in 1983 forty per cent of the 2.6 million women and
children living below the poverty level were owed child
support from fathers (1985 p.1)
However, research into child custody awards and payment
performances in the United States reveal that maintenance
payments cannot be linked to the type of custody order made
by the courts. The issue is more complex, other variables
are more important - primarily employment and remarriage.
For example, a father's employment stability has a clear
relationship with both regularity of payment and amount
(Pearson & Thoennes 1985 p.12). These authors reported
that parents who were receiving regular support payment
were also those who reported their ex-spouses had had no
recent employment problems. Equally husbands who remarried
and more importantly, those with children by new spouses,
were less likely to pay child maintenance regularly.
These authors conclude that knowledge of legal custody is
of limited value in predicting maintenance payments after
controlling for the effects of other independent variables.
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With regard to the argument that a joint legal custody
order will eventually reduce hostility between conflicting
parents, the evidence is equally unconvincing. The argument
is that once the father is assured of a clear legal right
to be involved in decision making this will lead to a
reduction of tension. However preliminary research findings
in the States do not confirm this. Pearson and Thoennes
(1984) found that many of the couples who settled for joint
legal custody with physical care to mothers had originally
disagreed about custodial arrangement of children on
divorce. Typically the preference was for sole custody.
Joint custody represented a comprorr.ise. These authors
reported that mothers who were dissatisfied with the
arrangement (three years hence) felt that they had been
talked into it. Equally these mothers also reported a
poor relationship with their ex-spouses and that their children
were aware of the conflict and anger between parents
(1984, p.14). Further research (Patrick et al 1986) also
concluded that post divorce litigation was more likely
in cases of joint legal custody than sole maternal custody.
The high rate of post divorce litigation in relation to
joint legal custody orders in these American studies is
significant because the original custody awards were the
result of 'voluntary' agreements. If these couples end up
with more conflict and litigation in relation to children,
the forecast certainly does not hold good for parents
'no are pressured into tiat type of order by conciliation,
or by courts.
But not only does joint legal custody of itself
do little to improve payment of child maintenance by fathers,
it can also be used as a device to lower child maintenance
awards. For example fathers may argue that because they
spend more time with children they should not pay full
(or sometimes even any) child maintenance. Indeed in some
cases fathers have argued that they are entitled to part
of the child benefit and single parent allowance4.
Major legal changes over the past fifteen years
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in California have not dramatically altered the distribution
of child custody awards. Neither it seems have they
affected the materiality of childcare following divorce.
Yet in America, as in Britain, general perceptions (for example
media representations) are, that a growing number of men are
seeking and obtaining custody of children. This may of
course be partly due to the fact that while the percentage
of fathers who get custody has remained fairly constant,
the number of such fathers increased dramatically because
of the steady rise in divorce. Weitzman also argues
(1985 p.261) that the particular characteristics of the
fathers who ask for and are awarded custody are relevant.
She identifies them as well educated and of high occupational
status, thus they are more visible and likely to be seen
as trend setters. Equally I would argue that they are
precisely those men most able to afford to employ substitute
carers. This enables such nen to continue to gain all the
benefits of full-time employment alongside 'parenthocd' -
a privilege frequently denied many mothers.
The implications of the American research are primarily
these; firstly, 'law' alone cannot determine behaviour in
the way in which such writers as Maidment (1984a) and Bruch
(1978) envisage. It makes little sense to argue as Bruch
in particular does, that access should be legally enforceable
and where fathers fail to turn up the courts should administer
a financial penalty. Given the levels of child maintenance
awards and records of payment by fathers in both Britain
and the United States, that form of enforcement is almost
certain to fail to say nothing of the. issue of whc pays
for the mother to take legal proceedings against the father
for non-payment of the financial penalty? It might make
more sense to argue that such fathers should not be 'allowed'
to remarry and incur further expenses.
Secondly, it is impossible to ignore social and
economic factors in this area of policy. Indeed the most
'acceptable' all round solution - joint physical custody -
demonstrates this point most clearly. Major problems
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with this type of order related to financial resources.
Equally children experienced anxiety, and remarriage
increased the problems. Those experiences demonstrate
that we cannot ignore the social and economic factors
surrounding children and divorce as some writers suggest.
It is not possible to isolate 'psychological' factors on
the basis that they are somehow more 'universal' while social
and economic factors1 although difficult, are nevertheless
susceptible to change given political will. It is not
possible either in theory or in practice to isolate custody
decisions from the social structure which . they inhabit.
Clearly if joint physical custody of children following
divorce was a problem for the affluent parents and children
of California, one can suspect that suchorders might be
at least equally problematic for the parents and children
of Toxteth or Brixton, and for those parents generally
who move to seek employment.
Thirdly, court orders do not in themselves ensure
the greater participation of men in the lives of children.
It must be remembered that in the research outlined above
less than one in five couples opted for joint physical
custody in jurisdictions where such orders were positively
encouraged. The picture begins to look particularly
bleak. But this is partly due to the narrow parameters in
which the debate is currently placed. Co-parenting does
not begin with divorce, it is a concept equally applicable
to marriage. Yet while the arguments in favour of joint
ten
custody and conciliation are/neavily critical of mothers
who reject both these 'facilities Y (for example Kelly 1983,
p.769) there is no corresponding critique of either parent-
hood in marriage, or of fathers. Indeed that status remains
largely undefined. It is argued that extensive state
intervention through parental education, mediation and
counselling will be necessary to persuade mothers that
joint custody is what they should agree to on divorce
(Kelly 1983; Maidment 1984a). But there:i no discussion
of education/rehabilitational programmes for fathers.
Moreover the degree of coercion necessary to gain
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mothers' compliance is likely to take considerable time.
Nestor for example (1983 p.772) argues that a proper
evaluation usually required at least ten hours with parents
and children. This time has to be spread over periods of
up to eight weeks to allow for parents to react, absorb
and think about what is going on. This is clearly not the
cost saving in-court mediation programme envisaged for
divorce Courts in Britain by the Booth Committee (1985
p.86/87). Thus to think about utilising conciliation as
an agency to change and override parents' decisions demands,
as a pre-requisite, a commitment to fund out-of-court
schemes. A decision which has for the moment already been
rejected in Britain (Inter-Departmental Report on Conciliation
1983). Equally such a task also makes problematic the
philosophy that conciliation is about 'party control'
and parents making their own decisions.
But in addition the focus upon divorce and the
rejection of issues surrounding parenthood in marriage has
further implications for the practice of conciliation.
Utilising conciliation to obtain joint custody orders to
instill into divorcing parents the necessity of co-parenting
(Parkinson 1983, p.34; Maidment:1985, p.279) not only
envisages substantially more state control over childrearing
on divorce than exists in marriage, it is in effect1 attempting
to impose a particular model of parenting on divorced
couples which may bear little relation to the reality
of decison making within their marriage. It is important
to locate the model of co-parenting which is being applied
in conciliation. These questions are not simply pedantic.
Instigating new patterns of behaviour is not the same task
as enabling existing patterns to continue. The task of
the conciliator will not be the same. Piper (1984) has
addressed this question in her research on conciliation
in Britain. Her research reveals cases where marriage
ended because of one partner's inability to cope with
the control exercised by the other. This control includes
the imposition of all child care duties on the other parent
and/or the retention of all major decision making concerning
the children.
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There is then a fundamental problem with the movement
towards joint legal custody as a mechanism to achieve
co-parenting on divorce. It assumes and thereby imposes
a model of parenting upon parents whose marriage itself
lacked mutually negotiated joint parenting. As Piper argues
(1984, p.6) 'co-parenting' may well be a completely novel
concept to the clients of conciliators. Therefore a
presumption in favour of continued co-operation may be
a presumption in favour of containing a situation in which
there is inequitable inputs into childcare duties and
decision making. In effect a practice which reproduces and
sustains existing power structures and relationships.
Patriarchal Relations and Child Custody
I began this chapter by arguing along with Oakley
(1981) that the way reproduction is handled in society is
inseperable from the way in which women are managed and
controlled. Throughout the research,the analysis prupposed
the existence of
	 institutionalised, material and
ideological forms of oppression. Concrete analysis of
practices was necessary to investigate the relationship
between formal parental equality and notions of children's
welfare, and women's oppression within the family. In the
1980s moves towards 'joint custody' whether through the
'back door' of conciliation or by legal presumption (unlikely
following the Booth Report) demonstrate, that where legal
policies fail to address the materiality of parenthood
for both mothers and fathers, changes may well endorse
and reproduce those existing inequalities.
But in addition, the desire to preserve and reify
'the family' at whatever cost to women and children perpetuates
the belief, and hence the economic reality that children's
interests are generally only ever properly served within
'the family' (Finer 1974; Marsden 1973) . That the family
can be a dangerous place f or women and children (Binney
et al 1979) is never addressed. And that many children
grow up in households which cannot be described as traditiona.l
nuclear families is still viewed as essentially a social
\
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problem and a deviation from the 'norm'.
Moreover that focus upon preserving the family has
particular political appeal in Britain in the 1980s where
there are attempts to valorise the family in Conservative
social and economic policy and a call for the return of
Victorian morality and values. As Hall argues (1979) 'we are in
the middle of a deep and decisive movement towards a more
disciplinary and authoritarian kind of society' (p.3). A
focus upon preserving the family structure after divorce
facilitates appeals to the 'law and order' debate and claims
regarding the breakdown of the family as instrumental in
current 'inner city unrest'. This is partly why there is
media appeal in organisations such as Families Need Fathers.
It is because they focus not upon marriage and the power
structures within marriage, but rather on the erosion of the
authority of fathers by divorce and the 'deviancy' of the
mother-headed household:
"At a time of concern about urban violence,
largely attributed to juvenile delinquency, and
appeals from Government spokesmen for more
parental accountability, it may seem strange
that among the myriad explanations for the causes
of such disturbances, discussions of the effect
of the loss of parental influence has been
notable by its absence. Fathers who had
traditionally been responsible for discipline
in the family, particularly regarding their
sons have had that authority eroded in recent
times by...theories which over emphasised the
mother-child relationsl-iip...these t'neories 'nave
reinforced discrimination [against fathers] in
the divorce courts".
Beniansetal 1983, p.4
There is, in conclusion, a profoundly reactionary philos-
ophy underlying the current debate over children and divorce
in both Britain and the United States. Because the focus
is limited to 'fatherhood' on divorce and does not consider
parenthood within marriage it takes-for-granted the work which
women do in relation to childcare and domestic labour. It equally
takes-for-granted men's continued non-participation in childrearing
in marriage. Psychological discourses make a major contribution to
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that position. By arguing that a father's psychological
importance to his children is not a function of the
parenting role he played in marriage (Wallerstein & Kelly
1980) , this lends legitimation to a political decision
to ignore the structure of parenthood within marriage.
Yet even within the authors' own terms this statement is
problematic. They do for example acknowledge that children
do have a perception of their parents' roles within marriage.
For example children are reported as perceiving their
parents as 'at fault', 'cruel' and 'vindictive' and as
'aggrieved','mistreated' or even 'martyred' (p.88).
This is not to say that such children would not want a
relationship with the offending parent, they might, but
equally they might not. So that, one cannot deny the
significance of the history of the marriage - a history
which children (though clearly powerless in the situation)
nevertheless share. If a part of a child's experience
of fatherhood for example included physical and/or sexual
abuse, is that to be ignored in striving to construct a
post divorce father-child relationship?
Moreover, ignoring the history of the marriage when
making joint custody orders has meant that men who have
battered their wives have, in effect, been guaranteed
continued access to and control over their wives through
.5the children. It seems that neither courts in Britain
nor the United States consider wife beating as an indication
of bad parenting (Schulman 1980) . Yet there is considerable
evidence the children witness their mothers' physical abuse,
and may well become involved in an attempt to protect her
(Binney et al 1979). An expectation of 'mutuality' and
'co-parenting' under these conditions is fundamentally
misconceived. A mother who lives with the fear and reality
of abuse and who in addition1 is usually economically less
powerful than a father is not in a position to effect co-




Clearly any discussion of feminist policies in this
area is immensely difficult partly of course because of
the limited parameters of the current debate. But there
are a number of issues which I think are central. I think
it is important firstly to consider the contribution which
feminists have already made to this issue.
A major contribution of feminist analysis has been
not simply a political analysis of the sphere of 'domestic'
relations (Delphy 1977; Mackintosh 1979; Bland et al 1978),
but in addition, a rejection of the traditional split
(practiced by both the left and the right in British
politics) between the private and the public spheres.
Thus feminists analyses have moved between these spheres
of work and home neglecting traditional boundaries to
consider how those divisions impinge upon and construct
the experiences of women (for example, Pahl 1985; Smart
1984)	 Research has been concerned to show that
the family' is not the gender neutral alliance of sociological
textbooks,
 but rather reflects power structures in the outside
world.
Within that exercise. the issue of motherhood, its terms
and conditions, has been a recurrent focus in feminist
politics. The focus has not simply been on the conditions
of motherhood within the family, but has equally sought
to demonstrate the consequences of those conditions for
women's position in the labour movement. Thus feminist
campaigns have been concerned with the extension of
maternity leaye, equal pay, free creches, accessible public
transport, improving the conditions of part-time employment,
play centres for schoolchildren, workplace nursery schemes
etc. And those issues have existed alongside a critique
of unpaid domestic labour, and a movement to separate
out motherhood.from the package of marriage and hetero-
sexuality. The demand that motherhood and paid employment
should not be an either/or decision for women, carries.
with it a critique of the organisation of the domestic
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economy and the artificial split between the public (work)
and the private (home). Thus feminist critiques of the
'public' - of the world of work - is no simply about women's
exclusion and segregation within employment. it is also
a critique about the nature and organisation of employment
itself and the way in which that organisation reflects on
the conditions of mothering in society. At the centre of
feminist analysis is a rejection of the public/private
distortion.	 The demands of the women's movement in
the 1970s that men take equal responsibility for childcare
and the domestic duties which accompany it,, was not only
a demand that individual men do their fair share. It was
also a demand that men problernatise and politicise that
distinction and the way in which the 'public' takes priority
It was a demand to consider 'fatherhood' and the conditions
of the domestic economy which make 'fatherhood' and full-
time employment possible.
It is that failure to politicise marriage and parent-
hood which identifies the fathers' rights movement. That
movement does not address the oppressive structures of
marriage. Nor does it consider the way in which the
sphere of the private and the public serve to the advantage
of one parent. In Britain for example the voice of such
groups as Families Need Fathers and Campaign for Justice
on Divorce has been silent in relation to the recent
campaign against the Conservative Party decision to tax
wGrkplace nursery facilities as a fringe b'enef it. There
was no trade union outcry that such facilities are a
necessity to working parents. Equally, such organisations
have been silent on the Government's rejection of the EEC
Directive on parental and family leave. It should be
remembered that the 1980 Women and Employment Survey
(Martin and Roberts) revealed that 45% of women who had
returned to work part-time after having a child, return to
a job in a lower occupational status (p.147). Data from
the same survey shows that family formation has a lasting
effect upon women's lifetime earnings - (an effect of
25% to 50%) (Joshi 1984 p.45). Moreover women spend a
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disproportionate amount of time of f work for family reasons
such as caring for elderly and disabled relatives0 And,
given demographic changes and current community care poiióies,
it is likely that this burden will increasingly fall on
women. It is the silence of the father	 rights movement
on these issues, and their ferocious public front in relation
to rights over children on divorce which reveal the
reactionary nature of these groups. They, do not have a
critique of marriage nor an acknowledgement of the conditions
of parenthood. Indeed their demand is ultimately for a
continuation of the conditions of motherhood which in
turn facilitate 'fatherhood'.)
There is not a social revolution in childcath underlying
the debate on joint legal custody in Britain. There are
not vast quantities of men rejecting the ' benefits of
full-time employment for part-time jobs and the pleasures
of childcare. Nor are men's rights groups advocating men
should relinquish some power in the workplace to women
workers or positive discrimination in favour of single
parents. On the contrary, mothers as part-time workers
remain the least secure and the lowest paid workers
(Martin & Roberts 1984).
It is partly then against that background that feminists
enter the discussion on law. Clearly at this level of
analysis divorce law has a limited role to play. As
demonstrated here,'law' and legal practices do not instigate
women's oppression. However they can and do reproduce thal
situation. And power and control over 'conditions of
reproduction determines power and control over women.
Clearly it 'is then important that feminists engage in the
current debate on children and djvorce but the issues need
to be clear. The current debate is not concerned with
equality of responsibility. How/e'felre are areas where women
could benefit from change. On a procedural level, a reduction
of the length of time it takes to get a case to court
is to be welcomed (proposed for the Initial Hearing-Booth
Final Report 1985) because this reduces the uncertainty
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for both women and children. But the question of the
purpose and usefulness of welfare reports remains problematic,
certainly the welfare officer who does the welfare report
should not also attempt conciliation (Bottomley 1985).
But equally it does seem that we should consider substantive
law because it clearly creates uncertainty and ambiguity
for mothers. When we address this area we meet! certain 'old'
problems for feminist theory and policy - how do we improve
the conditions of mothering without further institutionalising
women's sole responsibility for childrearing and increasing
their economic dependency on men. Also we need to be aware
ofplaying into the hands of the 'right' in the. creation of
a 'new' ideology of motherhood. Experience has shown
that formal parental equality at the point of legal dispute
is not necessarily progressive. A sex neutral code has
distinct advantages for men since it means that the sexual
divison of labour in relation to childcare within the
marriage accounts for very- little. A father can continue
with full-time employment and 'fatherhood' in the knowledge
that the fact that he has taken little or no responsibility
for children will not matter if the case gets to court.
Equally1
 there is no acknowledgement of women's childcare
responsibilities by such/
	 dFabour and lost economic
opportunities for economic self-sufficiency o f/lIp)eÔ 0eature
•	 settLementsin ôivorcelyet they are an expected part of women's
contribution to marriage.
One basis for opcnin discussion on substantive law could
be the American 'tender years' doctrine (Klaff 1982). Kiaff
argues that the policy objective ih this field of law should
carry a presumption in favour of the primary care giver.
In relation to the existing division of labour that would
generally be a presumption in favour of the mother. To
some extent this would remove some of the ambiguity and Un-
certainty engendered by the 'best interests' principle
since it would be an evidentiary presumption. However
the issue is complex, particularly while courts employ
differing criteria to the value of parents' employment.
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While fathers' employment is taken for granted and not
considered a handicap, mothers t employment however may
militate against her record as a good mother, particularly
if her status is already under attack. It is frequently
assumed that if both parents work outside the home, they
are equal in the amount of time and energy thi commit to
children and childcare. In reality, employed mothers continue
to provide primary care and responsibility for children
(Polikoff 1983) . Clearly a 'tender years' doctrine has its
limits and is not entirely satisfactory. But in principle
it need not be displaced by issues of age of children nor
employment. While it would obviously allow for flexibility
it would be a presumption applied if the case went to court
but it would not inhibit different out of court settlements
if the primary parent agreed. And it would perhaps remove
some of the ambiguity and uncertainty mothers experience
at present. It should be remembered of course that it is
unlikely that enormous numbers of fathers will actually
contest custody of children in Court. But what is important
is, that beneath the surface is a bargaining climate.
Within that climate women are scared or threatened and they
feel compelled to give up or compromise their financial
interests in order to retain custody (Mnookin 1979)
The removal of child custody from the public area
of the courts to the welfare agencies and 'private ordering'
and the focus upon joint legal custody is highly problematic.
And it may be that the fragile ground women have gained in
this field will be withdrawn by the oppressive and regulatory
hand of welfare. While it is indeed difficult to develop
a feminist response to this movement, to begin that process
it is necessary to understand the underlying philosophy
and its implications for conditions of mothering in society.
This final chapter has been a contribution to that endeavour.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. There are many definitions of conciliation, but the
general aim is to bring couples together to reach
an amicable agreement over children.
2. The sample was self selected, and the researchers
also acted as clinicians counselling families. Also
the researchers were psychoanalysts working within
a particular framework regarding children's development
and the influence of early life experiences to future
mental health.
3. The systems theory was evolved by natural scientists.
When applied to the family the theory is an approach
which sees the family as more than the sum of its
members. It stresses the interdependence and inter-
relationships within the family structure. Any change
affecting an individual, affects the whole family,
functioning depends upon facilitating communication.
4. Two fathers in the study outlined in chapter 8 used
this argument.
5. In a recent BBC 'Open Space' programme on 'domestic'
violence, mothers from refuges for battered wives
complained that they kept having to move refuges because
violent husbands had joint custody orders which gave
them access to both children and wives. In effect






The focus of Interest in this piece of research has
been the role of law and legal practices in the social
construction of motherhood and the consequences which that
construction has had for the position of women within the
family. Initially I was solely concerned with contemporary
legal practices in contested cases where the sexuality of the
mother is a major issue. However, it proved impossible to
analyse the position of such mothers within existing
explanations of the role of family law in child custody
disputes.
A subsequent re-reading of both the post-war period
and o-f nineteenth century developments in this field
ultimately lead me to reject both the 'pendulum' theory of
developments (a 'parental rights' approach which argues that
'the law' has moved from nineteenth century 'father right' to
a version of twentieth century 'mother right'), and the
welfarist approach (that all developments in this field can
best be understood and explained as the state's ever
increasing concern for the welfare of children). I have
argued in this research that neither of those approaches
fully explain the development of law and legal practices with
regard to the guardianship and custody of clii idren,.
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The first two parts of this thesis therefore have been
concerned to map out and re-read legal history iru the area of
children and parental rights and responsibilities both within
and outside of marriage.
	 Parts I and II focus on various
documentary evidence (eg: the political debates surrounding
the introduction of legislation, the legislation itself,
Government Reports and Enquiries, Evidence presented to such
Enquiries arid case law). For the most part (excluding the
materials presented in chapter three) the case law examined
and discussed in these sections have beer, previously
discussed by lawyers (Pettit 1957; Karminski 1959; Maidment
1984; Freeman 1983;) and by legal historiar,s (Pollock 8
Maitland: 1968; Plucknett 1949; Manchester 1980).
	 However,
I have argued that traditional methods of reading law have
operated within a highly structured framework.
	 'Law' in
effect has defined its own boundaries arid traditional legal
methods of reading law have not afforded an opportunity for a
fundamental questioning of the very process of defining what
counts as legal issues (ie the selection of relevant 'facts'
the disregard of irrelevant 'facts' the application,
extension and rejection of precedents) by courts. The impact
of feminism on legal enquiry therefore is partly demonstrated
in the category of questions addressed to these materials.
So for example, in addition to questions regarding the process
0+ constructing law, I also raised questions regarding the
role of the state at various times.
	 Moreover, I was also
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concerned to examine the role Df law' in sustaining women's
powerlessness within the family during periods more
frequently identified as significant for the increased rights
allocated to women. In terms of 'doing' this part of the
research therefore, that approach raises two issues in
par t i cu 1 ar.
Firstly, it demonstrates a link between the theoretical
perspective outlined in the introduction to this research and
research 'questions	 methods'.	 This point will become
clearer when I discuss the sample of mothers analysed in the
third part of this thesis. But it is also relevant in
discussing 'non-reactive' data such as that contained in
chapters 1,
 2 3, 4, and 5.	 In those chapters particularly, I
look at 'public' documents some of which have been previously
examined and discussed within the academic discipline of law
and legal history.
	 However, I re-address that legal data
from a rather different framework, and with a new set of
questions.	 Such an approach, concerned with power
relationships, brings a critical perspective to women's
position within the family and to the role of law arid legal
practices in attempting to change or sustain that position.
So for example, where lawyers and legal historians point to
the way in which nineteenth century statute law gradually
increased mothers formal rights to the custody of children on
marital breakdowj,, I have, in addition, focused the role of
- 263 -
law in relation to the rights of mothers iithin families and
the consequences which that role had for mar-ned women's
power and ability to leave unsatisfactory marriages. That
focus has revealed a more complex and frequently more
oppressive role of law in this field than was previously
thought to be the case.
Secondly, with regard to the connection between
theoretical perspectives and research methods, it may be
argued that the above approach simply leads to a form of
relativism (ie: 'findings' are largely determined by the
framework within which issues are addressed).
	 However, I
would argue that the criterion by which such an approach
should be measured and assessed, is, whether it can throw new
light firstly, on the social effectivity of law, that is, the
on the way in which 'law' and legal practices can effect
peoples lives; and secondly, on the contributions which such
an approach can make to theoretical understandings of the
role of family law in particular periods, and thereby
finally, to contemporary policy debates. As Rich (1979) and
others (eg Smith 1978) have argued with regard to the role of
feminism generally and its relationship to theory and to
methods in social research, the task of feminism is not
simply to add another dimension -simply tacked on to existing
theories and methods - but rather to demonstrate how a focus
on gender and women's experiences changes the very basis of
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existing theory and methods, and reinterprets what we call
knowledge.	 And while the impact of that approach by
feminists is increasingly identifiable in subjects such as
history, literature, politics and sociology, it is hardly
touched upon in the analysis of law (c/f O'Doriovan 1985:59).
With regard to chapter three of this thesis, the
materials presented here have not been brought together and
analysed previously.	 They are new and original materials
drawn from archives.
	 For this part of the research I spent
several months working in the Public Records Office and the
Fawcett Library (1). In chapter 3 I document the development
of a campaign by a group of feminists (The National Union of
Societies for Equal Citizenship -NUSEC- an umbrella
organisation representing some twenty five women's groups and
organisations).	 This Union began campaigning in 1919 for
rights for mothers within and after marriage in relation to
children and fought several Goverriments over the lack of
general rights for mothers.
	 This chapter documents the
develDpment of that campaign, and the responses of various
governments between 1919 and 1925 which finally culminated in
the 1925 GuardIanship of Infants Act.
The materials analysed form the records of the NUSEC
(held at the Fawcett library) and these cDnsist of
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correspondence, minutes of meetings, draft Bills and
Amendments and notes, personal letters and resolutions of
meetings with various women's groups and with members of
Governments and the Lord Chancellor and his officers. The
Government records (held at the Public Records Office)
consist of minutes of meetings of various state departments,
minutes of the Home Affairs Committee of the Cabinet and
records of the Lord Chancellor's Department and the Law
Officers Department, Evidence and Report between the Home
Office, the Lord Chancellor's office and the Law Officers
Department, plus correspondence, draft Bills and minutes of
meetings between the Lord Chancellor's Department and NUSEC.
(Brophy 1982). Tracing this campaign through original
sources was important.	 It demonstrated very clearly both
the limitations of the 'we1farist approach as a complete
explanation for the provisions which were ultimately
contained in the 1925 Guardianship of Infants Act, arid
indeed the preamble of that Act as an complete indication of
legislator's concerns and intentions.
Parts I and II of this thesis have been concerned with
reading re-reading and documenting 'non-reactive' data. 	 The
concern has been to approach that data with new questions
regarding the position of mothers and the role of law. The
importance of Parts I and II, is that they do provide a new
and more critical framework from which to begin to re-address
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questions concerning law and legal practices in the 1980s.
In Part III of this thesis, the focus of the research
moves away from the construction and interpretation of law by
the courts, and examines the social effectivity of law
through an examination of 'women's lived experiences of those
practices. That approach forms part of a growing endeavour
by feminists within sociology of focusing on women's
experiences (eg: Graham 1982; Oakley 1981) as a method of
locating what Matza (1969:67) refers to, as the relationship
between personal troubles and the social structure. In this
section therefore I present and discuss law and legal
practices in relation to a group of lesbian mothers concerned
with the custDdy of their children on the breakdown of
mart' iage.
In chapters 6 and 7 I outline and exarnir,e the
disposition of fourteen lesbian custody cases by courts. I
analysed court transcripts (some of which are available or,
Lexis (2)) , plus barrister's and solicitor's notes and
documentary evidence provided by the mothers themselves. I
examine the strength of the children's residential status quo
hypothesis on court decisions and I also discuss the
influence of social enquiry reports. In those chapters I
develop a framework for the analysis of cases, utilisirig the
notion of a continuum upon which I 'plot' the relative
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familial positions of the contesting mothers and fathers.
outline and discuss the influence of notions of gender
identification, acquisition of sexual orientation in
children, and female sexuality in 9eneral, on the court's
approach.
My findings partly concur with those of certain
!merican lawyer examination of courts' approaches to this
issue (ie: courts are concerned about the 'effects' of lesbian
mothers on the psycho-sexual development of chi ldren
(egBasile 1974)). However, my analysis of this issue and
the theoretical framework developed in this research extends
existing American writing in this field in two ways.
Firstly, it provides a way out of the problematic focus on
denial of 'rights' or civil liberties of lesbian mothers (3)
frequently prominent in the American materials (eg: Armanno
1974).	 This is especially important because, so far as law
and legal practices in Britain are concerned, neither of those
approaches is especially helpful, either in terms o-f
political practice or future legal policy changes. In
Britain we have been moving away from a focus on
unambiguously enforcing parental 'rights' in this field of
law +or the best part of a century (some would argue longer).
The enforcement of parental 'rights' as justification for
decisions by courts has therefore taken something of a back
seat at least in terms of stated formal policy for some
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considerable time. A focus on the denial of formal 'ri9hts'
or civil liberties of mothers In this field therefore -
appealing though such a focus may be from a campaigning point
of view - is unlikely to meet any serious consideration at
the level of formal policy changes. In addition of course
for some feminists (eg: Marxist feminists) demands for
changes based on a notion of the inherent and absolute
'rights' of the individual is problematic. This is because
such demands invoke a libertarian philosophy, and that
perspective presents particular problems with regard to wider
social and economic concerns (Kingdom 1985:Anderson & Dawson
1986; 15)
Secondly, this research on lesbian mothers and 'law'
demonstrates that this issue is not simply one of
'homophobia' 'at large' in the courts.
	 In addition, it
tells us something about how law and legal practices operate
in relation to the issue of female sexuality and motherhood
in general.	 In other words, we cannot fully understand law
and legal practices in relation to lesbian mothers unless we
contemplate the social construction of female sexuality in
general and its particular focus on reproduction and
motherhood only within marriage and the family. Hence, this
section of the research locates the issue of lesbian
motherhood and the role of law, within the wider social and
political structures of sDciety.
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By moving down into the realms of pre-court practices
in this field, this section of the research demonstrates some
of the social effects of notions of the 'good' mother and
'the lesbian'. A small number of American writers have
exai.ined court practices regarding lesbian mothers, but we
have no information about pre-court practices.
	 Indeed there
are enormous gaps in our knowledge generally about this area
of legal practice.	 By focusing on the experiences of
lesbian mothers at that point In the legal process, the final
part of this section attempts to increase our knowledge arid
understanding of this part of the legal process.
	 It
demonstrates that pre-court practices play a crucial part in
these cases, by providing information, not simply on why
lesbian motherhood presents courts with such enormnous
dilemmas, but in addition, demonstrates why so few lesbian
mothers ultimately contest custody of their children through
the courts.
Interviewing Mothers:
	 (1) Issues of Confidentiality and the
Presentation of 'results'.
The highly sensitive nature of the issues dealt with in
chapter eight of this research raised a number of problems.
In terms of providing the results of interviews with mothers,
not surprisingly, there were major problems surrounding the
issue of 'confidentiality' and protection of the identities
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of the women involved.	 Some of these problems have been
partially overcome through the adoption of a particular
method of presenting what are usually referred to as the
'findings' or 'results' of interviews. I have deliberately
not followed a 'case work' approach in the presentation 0+
materials.	 I do not therefore give biographical details on
each case, with dates, courts, ages of children, mother's
position with regard to sexual relationships, geographical
location, occupational group etc., etc.,
	 Rather, I develop
a framework for the analysis of each case which focuses on
those details only in so far as courts and legal practices
deem them to be significant.
	 In terms of the experiences
of the mothers presented in chapter eight there+or. e it is thes€.
particular features which form the legal construction of the
case which form the focus of attention.
	 That choice 0+
method of presentation of 'findings' was also important
because, it must be remembered that some of the mothers who
took part in this research project took enormous risks in
being involved	 their identities must be protected.
	 Indeed,
many of the mothers with whom I came into contact over the
period of this research could riot be involved or associated
with it.	 For example, some mothers have been successful in
obtaining the custody 0+ their children through the courts
through the denial of sexual identity.
	 In certain cases
mothers were indeed telling the ttruth', at the time of the
hearing they were not involved in a lesbian relationship.
But fear• of losing their children meant in effect a
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commitment not simply to immediate celibacy, but in addition
to future isolation and loneliness for some time in the
future-usually until their children were in their mid teens,
- and for some women, this meant ten years or more.
Moreover•, that initial decision could also mean that mothers
were under the constant surveillance of ex-husbands searching
for 'proof' of a mother's sexual identity.
	 Lesbian mothers
in such circumstances frequently live their lives in almost
total isolation of both friends and potential and past lovers
through fear of being brought back to court, both for
contempt and the possibility of losing the custody of
children.	 Clearly for women in these circumstances
'speaking out', however careful that exercise is, it
nevertheless can carry enormous risks both for the women and
the childrer, involved.	 The position of such mother-s cannot
be jeopardised, either for the sake of political campaigns or
academic research.	 Having witnessed husbands attempts to
listen to telephone calls, intercept mail, and follow women's
movements in an attempt to document her- involvement in
lesbian and gay issues, caution in presenting materials is
essential even some considerable time after the 'formal'
resolution of all the cases outlined in this research.
It is therefore the task of feminists researching and
writing in this field, to address conventional methods - 0+
both 'doing researci)' (see below Interviewing women (2) ),
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and presenting 'findings' - and to develop methods which
allow women to "speak-out" but equally do.not, in doing so,
jeopardising their own position or that of their children.
In other' words, where orthodox methods of presenting
materials are problemtic, this should not indicate that only
those issues and experiences which are easily accommodated
and 'reproduced' should be investigated and reported.
Rather, it is the political task of feminists within social
research to develop techniques and methods which reflect the
complexity of women's position, but which do not thereby
increase the vulnerability of women who are already
demonstrated to be politically 'at risk' in certain areas of
thier lives.
It is also important to point out that the degree of
information gained through interviewing these mothers could
riot have been obtained by any other 'method'.
	 It is
doubtful for example whether solicitors would have been able,
or indeed willing, to provide the same degree and depth of
information about their own handling of lesbian custody
cases.	 Equally divor•ce court welfare o++icers and/or social
workers would not have been formally able to supply
information regarding their approach to lesbian motherhDod,
or indeed supply copies of the social enquiry reports they
prepared. Indeed, strictly speaking, those documents should
not be shown to any person other than parties to the
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proceedings and their respective lawyers. However many
mothers did have copies of the report on themselves and their
children, and they allowed me access to these documents as
did certain sympathetic solicitors. Clearly those cases
should not be easily identifiable.
Interviewing Women:
	 (2) The Social Practice.
When I began this research I did not envisage, given
the complex and sensitive nature of the issue, to be able to
produce a 'representative sample' of lesbian mothers.
	 I
simply hoped that I could provide sufficient materials to
demonstrate that there are problems regarding the way in
which courts approach the issue of lesbian mothers and child
custody.	 I certainly did not envisage being able to devote
an entire chapter to pre-court practices and bi-lateral
bargaining.	 The development of a focus on the importance of
pre-court practices in this area came from early discussions
with various lesbian mothers regarding their experiences at
that level arid their reasons for what they termed 'giving up'
in their struggle for custody of their children.
I talked with mothers who had already lost custody of
their children, and mothers who were trying to avoid going to
cDurt through various forms of compromise and evasion with
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their ex-husbands. In addition, I also talked to mothers who
were 'closeted', their sexual Identity unknown to all but
their lover and perhaps one or two close female friends, and
to mothers who had flatly denied being lesbian in order to
keep their children, and to mothers who returned to live with
husbands (some agreeing to abide by very strict and harsh
rules laid down by such men regarding their freedom of
movement and friends) in order to avoid going to court,
facing cross examination on their sexuality and the ultimate
risk of losing custody and possibly even access to their
c h i 1 d r en
Given the nature of the problems encountered by lesbian
mothers, it was not of course always possible or practical to
interview all the mothers discussed here at precisely the
same stage of their case.
	 I therefore talked to some
mothers some time after their case was 'resolved' (that is, a
court case, or a dispute settled out of court).
	 Other
mothers I talked to immediately after the resolution of their
case by courts.
	 And in some cases, I witnessed the case
from start to finish, discussing the issues with the mother
when it first became apparent that there was going to be a
dispute over the custody of their children, visiting
solicitors, discussing affidavits and welfare reports and the
use of 'expert' witnesses, and contacting 'expert' witness
(usually psychiatrists and psychologists).
	 In these cases I
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met lovers and children and friends - and occasionally in a
court waiting room - an ex-husband.
The focus of the interview schedule therefore had to
reflect the processes involved in contesting the custody of
children as a lesbian mother.	 Thus, I explored experiences
with solicitors and barristers and divorce court welfare
officers, and in some instances experiences with social
workers.	 The practice of exploring those experiences
through 'interviewing' does however raise a number of issues
about interviewing women.
Firstly, in addressing this section of the research I
did not approach the issues armed with a standard
methodological textbook on interviewing techniques (eg:
Selltiz 1965; Moser 1958).	 On the contrary, in the
beginning I simply talked with and listened to lesbian
mothers and to other women concerned about the problems
lesbian mothers appeared to face - a form of participant
observation.	 For those women who were concerned about this
issue in the mid 1970s, this was a process, a gathering arid
exchanging of information among a small group of women some
of whom had faced a dispute because they were lesbians and
who had lost custody of children, some of whom were trying to
avoid going to court.
	 It was that process of talking and
gathering information which gradually structured my thoughts
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on the importance of pre-court practices and/necessity of
revealing some of those practices. However, the practice of
'doing' the interviews was in effect also a process.
	 It was
not and indeed could not be a one way dialogue, too few women
had any knowledge of the issues involved and within the small
circle of women concerned about this area in the 1970s one
could not discuss experiences and not exchange information.
In certain cases it was necessary to talk about issues of
pDssible tactics and strategy.
	 But that discussion was only
possible if the mothers concerned had some information on
which to base those extremely important decisions.
	 For
example, there is little point in denying sexual identity in
cases where husbands have cleats
 evidence of a relationship
(or where he had, in the past, encouraged it). Moreover, in
making those kinds of decision It is important that mothers
are aware of the consequences for their future lifestyle and
that of their children.
That approach tD the issues however, can raise certain
questions regarding the meaning and value of the information
which is ultimately obtained. And some of the points which I
raise out of my experience of 'doing' this part of the
research, and my subsequent criticisms of orthodox textbook
approaches to interviewing, have been raised and discussed
by other researcher•s in relation to in interviewing women
(Stanley & Wise 1983; Oakley 1981), and with certain
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qualifications (c/f Smart 1984: 157/8) (4) my work in this
area adds validity to some of the points raised.
In her review of sociological textbook approaches to
interviewing Oakley (1981:36) locates certain contradictions
both between the prescriptions given to the prospective
interviewer (on how to adDpt the role of 'an interviewer')
and her own experiences of interviewing women.
	 With regard
to the instructions outlinefor the interviewer, Oakley
identifies that on the one hand1
 the interviewer is instructed
to create the right atmosphere of empathy-to establish a
rapport with the interviewee - in order to enable the
researcher to elicit information, but, at the same time, the
interviewer is alsQ instructed to retain a sense of
detachment, and indeed, is encourage to simply consider
h/herself as a research tool.
	 Thus, the interviewer is
instructed to elicit, but not to give out any information, to
receive but not express an opinion, and, if asked to do so by
an intet-viewee, is instructed to employ various verbal
deflection strategies such as oh I don't know, that's a
difficult question I'll have to think about that one' etc.,
etc., (Goode and Hatt 1952; 198; Selltiz et al 1965: 576) As
Denzin rightly points out (1970:186) in effect the
interviewer walks a tightrope between generating sufficient
rapport and maintaining the stated necessary detachment. But
as Oakley identifies from her own research in which she
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interviews large numbers of women, there is a paradigm set up
by orthodox approaches in certain situations and especially
in situation.sin which the primary orientation of the work is
towards the validation of women's subjective exper'ieruces.
In these circumstances the orthodox model of 'doing'
interviews which incorporates notions of complete detachment
and invoke a hierarchical relationship between the
interviewer and the interviewee is not in effect adequate to
gaining an understanding of social events and experiences.
Finding out about people is frequently best achieved where
there is a nonhierarchica1 relationship (Oakley 1981:41).
With regard to this research, an orthodox approach to
interviewing these mothers would simply have failed to get
off the ground.	 It would have been impossible and indeed
indefensible in terms of the political objectives set out in
the introduction to this thesis. Moreover the most important
and penetrating questions raised within this section of the
research were only possible from a continual dialogue with
mothers.	 Yet as Oakley identifies (1983:46) very little has
been written about that process and it is almost certainly
under-reported.	 Throughout this research, women explained
their life histories and legal experiencesto me in great
detail and asked a whole range of questions. 	 Foremost in
these were questions about legal procedure arid what they




also asked me about the availability of 'evidence' regarding
the influence of lesbianism on children's psycho-sexual
development.	 Moreover, mothers also asked about the use of
'experts' in court - was that a good idea - would it make any
difference to their chances of succeeding? Equally, as
mothers became more aware of the issues involved they often
became increasingly dissatisfied with their lawyers and asked
if and how they could change and to whom they might change.
My response to all these questions was to answer honestly
based on my own experiences 0+ cases and those of the support
group, and I frequently put mothers in contact with each
other both for advice and support.	 Where possible
therefore information and ideas were exchanged. 	 So for
example where a mother asked if 'expert' witnesses (such as
psychologists) had been influential in past cases, I
explained that generally speaking, they had been more
influential in supporting father's claims against the mother
than in supporting the mother's case.
	 When asked about the
kinds of cross examination they could expect in court, I went
over previous court transcripts, and as Chapter eight
verifies, a focus on popular images of lesbianism does tend
to produce particular categories of questions regarding the
way in which that sexual identity is thought to find
expression.	 My experience of doing this part of the
research in effect increased my motivation for producing a
section which concentrated on women's experiences of pre
court practices. In presenting that work however it is
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important to demonstrate that the process was not as orderly
and 'hygienic' as many existing textbook approaches to
interviewing generally Indicate.
Almost certainly under-reported, is the researcher's
own emotional experiences of carryiny out the research.
	 In
this research there were cases where I got to know the
mother, and very detailed and intimate aspects of her life
over the period of her case.
	 I also got to know her lover
and in some cases I also knew the children quite well.
	 I
was contacted by mothers in the heat of a custody strug9le
and looked at some affidavits and welfare reports in the
almost certain knowledge that the mother would lose the
children.	 I sat with mothers who wept at what husbands said
about them and at what divorce court welfare officers
reported with regard to the perceived consequences of
lesbianism.	 I sat and listened to mothers who wanted to
talk about the consequences of staying with husbands they
clearly found intolerable or of leaving and the risks that
involved.	 I sat in court waiting rooms with mothers who
wept with anger and despair - and rejoiced with mothers who
'won'.	 I waited in coffee bars with mothers while
injunctions were served on violent husbands so that mothers
could get back into the matrimonial home to be with their
children.	 I listened to mothers who had been threatened
with local authority care orders on the basis that they were
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lesbian, and to mothers whose anger at courts, psychiatrists
and solicitors was interpreted as a sign of possible mental
disturbance, and to mothers outraged by the decision of
court to award custody of children to men who had been
violent, who had drunk throughout the duration of the
marriage and who had spent very little of their time or
energy or emotion on their children. And indeed questions
from mothers surrounding the justification for such decisions
were the most difficult to answer. Moreover, I sat well into
the night with mothers who had lost custody or given up in
the face of what they felt was impossible opposition. 	 I
would argue that it is not possible to began and sustain
research which focuses on such oppression and emotional
turmoil in the lives of a relatively small number o-f women,
and to work to develop research methods which allow for the
reflect of those issues, and at the same time not be a part
of and influenced by that process, which is, in effect, a
political struggle.	 And indeed I would add that there were
instances where the support and enthusiasm expressed by
mothers for this section of the research far outweighed the
support for the research within certain sections of the legal
academic community.
The point which the above experience of doing research
demonstrates is not that orthodox methods should in all
circumstances be dispensed with.
	 But rather, that in
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certain instances the social and political practice of
'doing' research (as with theoretical and political debates)
must be developed to reflect the impact of feminism, because,
in so far as it does not, it actively prevents the
acquisition of knowledge and understanding.
	 A commitment
to the issues under investigation does not necessarily equal
'bias'.	 It does not necessarily jeopardise the hard won
status of sociology.	 Indeed, there are situations in which
it can produce new information and knowledge where
traditional methods would fail.
One final point needs to be made regarding this part of
the research and that relates to my experiences of goinq
with mothers to see their solicitors.	 In this situation I
was able to observe first hand how solicitors responded to
the issue of lesbian motherhood.
	 Generally speaking I did
not introduce myself and was taken for a social worker or a
supportive friend (although in some cases solicitors were
aware of my involvement in the lesbian mothers support group
and in some cases of my research).
	 It was sometimes the
case that the mother involved knew more about the issues
likely to be raised in her cases than the solicitor
representing her.
	 When the case became clearly contentious
-usually that was on the receipt of a husband's affidavit or
a damming welfare report - it was often a question of
'tactics' as to how to introduce possible, options and ways of
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respofldiri9 to the issues raised which did not at the same
time alienate or antagonise the solicitor. However, for the
most part at that stage, solicitors were only too grateful
for information and ideas.
	 And this was especially the case
if psychiatric reports were requested. For most solicitors
an 'expert' was an 'expert', and therefore it was often
necessary to spell out why many experts would take a negative
approach to lesbian motherhood (based upon certain
of pychitry and psychoanalysis
theoretical teriet) and why it was therefore riecessary to
find a psychiatrist/psychologist who did not start from that
premise.
In addition, I was also able to observe first-hand how
reticent some solicitors were to discuss the relevance of
sexuality to the mothers case.
	 This may of course be the
case for a number of reasons, including a wish not to appear
voyeuristic about lesbian relationships, or indeed a genuine
but frequently misguided belief that it was irrelevant, or,
it could be due to the belief that 'all that can be sorted
uut in court'.	 But while the ability to 'think' on one's
feet may be an important and developed skill generally for
lawyers, in these circumstances, it appears few in practice
could 'think' a tenable and unrehearsed defence for a lesbian
mother once under attack in court.
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Further Research Questions
With regard to the question of further research, it may
be that the networking approach (where women are put in touch
with each other by word of mouth) and that working in a
lesbian mother's support group has produced a study o-f some
of the most intractable of cases. 	 However, the focus of
this research has not been simply to 'prove' or disprove
discrimination.	 The focus has also been on developing a
framework to allow discussion of the legal experiences of
lesbian mothers.	 From the materials presented in the latter
part of this thesis, I have argued that there are certain
events and circumstances which can turn any case from one in
which a lesbian might succeed in being awarded custody to one
in which it would be highly unlikely.	 Thus, I developed	 the
notion a-f a conceptual 'continuum' on which to 'plot' the
circumstances of the mother and the familial situation of the
contesting father. The importance focus of that section was
to develop a framework which would allow both for- the
discussion of individual cases, but in addition, would also
demonstrate the link between individual cases and certain
social structures and ideologies in society. 	 In other
words, a +r-amewor-k which places both lesbian motherhood and
law and legal practices within and not outside of social and
political structures.	 With regard to further research
therefore, it is that framework, based on the notion of a
continuum, which requires further testing and development.
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But in addition, further research should attempt to
isolate and study more clearly issues of both class and race,
and indeed linked to both those issues is that of housing.
With regard to the mothers in this research, alternative
accommodation was a major problem.
	 And this appeared to be
the case regardless of class or more specifically
occupational status.
	 Even those mothers who, in formal
terms (of education and qualifications) might be described as
professional or middle class, they nevertheless, lacked
sufficient financial resources to enable them to establish a
separate residence for themselves and their children.
	 Some
mothers (eg: the mother in 3 v 3 (1984) ) did manage to
obtain accommodation, but on the whole, that situation is
unusual and most mothers in this study could not. Many
mothers reported having left their husbands prior to the
final separation which resulted in the custody dispute (some
had left more than once the most being three times).
However the primary reason for returning was lack of secure
alternative accommodation for themselves and their children.
The influence of class or occupational status in
relation to married women is clearly complex.
	
Often married
worien's status is determined by that of their husbands.
	 So
for example if a mother is married to professional man (eg
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a doctor or a teacher or a solicitor etc. etc.,), she is
frequently presumed to be 'middle class'.
	
However,
separation and divorce can frequently reveal the way in which
marriage conceals women's economic and occupational status,
50 that it is only after the marriage breaks down that
women's financial vulnerability and dependency upon men
within marriage is clearly evident.
	 Few women in this
study had any form of independent means (only two worked full
time at the time of the interview) arid this was regardless of
previous occupational status.
All the mothers discussed in chapter eight had worked
both prior to and during their marriage.
	 By occupational
group, the mothers included a computer programmer, who was not
employed in the labour market at the time of the interview,
two mothers who had completed a university course (one had
acquired a doctorate) both were in part-time insecure
lecturing posts. A further mother worked as a spinner in a
mill in a northern provincial town.
	 She had, where work
had been available, worked throughout her married life,
having returned to work soon after her two children were
born. Her husband worked shift hours and to some extent they
managed the childcare between them. This mother had however
suffered periods of unemployment with the decline of the wool
and cotton industry and had on occasion done private domestic
cleaning to bring sufficient income into the home. A further
- 287 -
mother had moved from a skilled manual post to be a manager
in a confectionery/newsagency. Married to a man who was
frequently unemployed and then bankrupt, this mother had
worked through the majority of her married life and had
frequently been the only wage earner. 	 She had paid off
debts incurred by her husband through several failed business
ventures o-F which she in practice had no knowledge or
authority. Three mothers were not employed at the time of
the interview, one had been a school teacher prior to having
two children, the other two had had jDbs in the services
industries. It should also be remembered that in certain
cases mothers were advised to give up their employment at the
time o-f the custody cases in order to increase their chances
of being awarded custody of children. 	 Including the
additional sample, mothers occupations included a teacher, a
small holdings farmer, a homeopathic doctor, a nurse, a
receptionist and a women's refuge worker.
	
Most mothers
complained that the break in employment to have and rear
children made it difficult to return to the labour market and
that they felt out of touch and underskilled. And, where
they had children with them they complained that those
difficulties were compounded by lack of adequate childcare
facilities.
With regard to the occupational status of husbands,
taking the sample combined, these included men of both
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professional and semi and unskilled occupational groups.
Occupations included an academic in the prestigious
university, a senior administrator in local government, a
teacher, an education officer with a large urban educational
authority, a doctor, a lorry driver, a brick layer, an
unskilled factory worker, plus some men were unemployed.
With regard to race, the majority of the women in this
study are white and the arguments presented may therefore be
limited largely to the experiences of white lesbian mothers.
In the core sample, one woman is black and she is Afro
Caribbean.	 Although this mother initially wished to contest
custody of her children and went some considerable way to
doing that she ultimately withdraw her application on the
basis that the children expressed a wish to be allowed to
live with their father.
	
Nevertheless this mother did not
escape condemnation by the judge when the case came before
the court (as a consent order) the basis of that condemnation
was focused on her 'lesbianism' and the fact that she had a
daughter (implying there was a possibility of sexual abuse).
A further mother was of mixed race and fought her case on
grounds which do not allow discussion here. In both cases
therefore it is difficult to determine the interconnection of
race and gender. This is clearly not to say that race in not
an issue in custody proceedings but rather that my sample
does not allow for informed discussion. Indeed we have no
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general information on issues of race and divorce or custody
disputes, and in a society with significant multi racial
communities in urban areas, that under-representation is a
cause for concern especially with regard to future policy
changes in this field.
So far as this sample was concerned there was enormous
diversity in terms of geographical location.
	 Mothers were
drawn from both rural and urban communities, from as far
north as Tyneside and from the West country, from East
Anglia, from industrial northern towns arid from the London
metropolitan areas. This may of course be an indication that
the framework developed here is not limited to a particular
court or jurisdiction. However if further research with a
larger care sample were possible, it would clearly be
important to examine issues of jurisdiction in more detail.
This may be an issue which could be discussed in relation to
the Family Courts Debates, since clearly there is a need for
more uniformity and certainty in this field of family law.
Two final but related points should be made with regard
to future research.
	 Firstly, as outline in this research
there are aspects of pre-court practices in relation to
lesbian mothers which have implications for all mothers
likely to contest the custody of their children, (eg they
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are all likely to be measured and assessed by a particular
model of 'good' motherhood). 	 This part of the legal process
therefore does require further research because, if fathers
who contest custody continue to have to rely on some notion
of 'fault' or 'failure' on the part of mothers in order to be
successful in their own application, (Maidment 1981:16), then
clearly that practice will have repercussions for mothers on
on the way In which contested custody cases are constructed
and fought out in pre-court practices (and this includes
conciliation).	 And a central question would seem to be
whether there is a level of continuity in the particular
categories of mothers who 'fail' in the face of criticism in
the legal process - are the adulterous mothers or the mothers
who are responsible for breaking up the matrimonial home or
the mentally unstable or the 'inadequate' personality - or
the lesbian mother -potentially the same women?
Secondly, as children's interests are increasingly
identified with conflict free marital breakdown, it does seem
that 'conflict' itself is perceived as a symptom of 'risk' in
divorce and thereby a justification for increased state
intervention. Historically it has been the case that where
divorcing parents are not in open conflict over children, the
law in reality seldom interferes. But given current trends
towards eradicating 'conflict' (by conciliation arid
adaptation to s.41 hearings (Booth Committee 1984), and by
attempts to introduce joint legal custody) in those cases
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where parents do not agree about the future custody of their
children, it may well be that it is the mother who refuses to
conciliate, the mother who does not fit what seems to be an
emerging model of a post divorce 'co-parent' who will, in
effect, be stigmatised as a 'bad' mother because she is seen
as exacerbating conflict. In other words, it does seem that
in terms of ideologies of motherhood and the law, an
additional feature of that legal ideology in relation to
divorce in the in the 1980s is a willingness to co-operate,
to take on the notion of co-parenting on divorce, if only for
the sake of 'law'.
	 If this is indeed the case, then we must
ask on both a theoretical and a political level what such a
situation tell us of the nature of law and legal practices in
the contemporary period.
In examining contemporary 'law' therefore it is
imperative that we do not simply focus on what statute law
actually is, or, on what courts, lawyers and conciliator•s say
and/or believe they do in terms of practice.
	 Further
research must focus on what is happening in that virtually
'invisible' arena of pre-court practices, because it is there
as well as in courts that ideologies of motherhood are
reconstructed and have an impact upon women's lives.
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Footnotes
The Public Records Office is situated in Kew Gardens,
Richmond, Surrey.
	 The Fawcett Library (which holds
the archive materials of some of the major feminist
organisations of' nineteenth and early twentieth century
Britain) is situated in the City of London Polytechnic,
Old Castle Strett, London El.
2	 Lexis is a comupterised system of case law reports. It
holds additional transcripts of Court of Appeal cases
to those reported in the law reports.
3	 This is of course a different argument to that posed
in relation to the rights of the child.
	 But in either
case (ie whether the argument is put in terms of a
denial of rights of lesbian mothers, or, in terms of
a denial of the rights of children) where that argument
is based upon articles under the European Convention
of Human Rights (articles, 9, 10, 11 and 14), because
of the non compliance clause where such issues touch
on notions of morality or public health, in those
circumstances, an argument which hopes to benefit the
case of a lesbian mother may incur problems. Indeed,
Articles 8 of that Convention which deals with everyone's
right to respect in private family life could in fact
be utilised to deny lesbian mothers custody of children.
This would of course depend upon the precise definition
of 'family life' adopted.
To date however, the Articles contained in the Convention
have had little or no impact upon the disposition of
child custody decisions by courts in the U.K. where the
disputes over custody is between parents in the throes
of divorce.	 But it is likely that this may change
given the publicity given to the father of an illegitimate
child currently pursuing his case in Strasbourg (see
John v U.K. The Independent V7 Dctoer 9Bb.
4	 Smart argues that m\Jh of what Stanley & Wise say should
be restricted to certain specific situations.
	 So for
example, with regard to the issue of power imbalances
and the idea that feminists engaging in interviewing
should devise strategies to reverse that imbalance, Smart
rightly points out' (1984:157/8) that such an approach does
not fit all situations.
	 As she demonstrates in her own
research when interviewing the 'locally powerful' (solici-
tors and magistrates) there is clearly not the power im-
balance (between woman interviewer and interviewee) which
Stanley and Wise suggest.
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4/Contd.
Therefore, as CarolSmart corciudes, there is not an
inevitable power relationship involved when women
as researchers are interviewing, that approach is
only tenable is we ignore all social class and race
divisions in society and the structure of dominance

















A Pre Separation Details
1. Mother's age
2. Date of marriage






4. Are they all the children of your exhusband
If not, is the father likely to apply for custody
Does he have access - regularly
Does he pay maintenance






If (1) or (2) nature of employment
6. Did you do any paid work during the period in which you were living
with husband - if so, at what, and for how long ?
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1. What type of accommodation did you share with your husband:
where:




8, What happened to that home following court proceedings
9. Prior to the custody dispute had you ever left home before
If yes, why





Where do you go
How long did you stay away
Why did you return
10,Has he ever been violent towards you prior to this dispute - what
happened?
11,Has he ever been violent towards the children prior to this
dispute - what happened ?
12. Did you report that incident to a solicitor
(1) at that time	 (2) in current dispute
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CUILDCARE ARRANGEMENTS
13. How would you describe his relationship with the children during
the period you lived together.
j4, Did you at any time discuss how the childcare arrangements should be
organised ?
15.Were you employed outside the home at any time after you had the children ?
16.What aspects of their day-to-day care was their father either wholly
or partly responsible for?
For example: who got them up, prepared breakfast and fed them
who took them to nursery and/or school
who collected them
who took them to the doctors/clinic/dentist
who went to school meetings
who bought their clothes
who took time off work when they were ill - how was that
decided (i.e. through discussion, on financial
grounds, tacit assumption, etc.)
who prepared supper and washed them and put them to bed
What happened at weekends
Did their father ever read or play with the children on a regular basis
Did he ever taken them to the park or/and on trips
Help with their homework
If, when you both went out, who organised a baby sitter
11. Did any of these arrangements change during those periods in which
you were employed outside the home, if so, how
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Were you happy with these arrangements. If not, what would you have
preferred 7
19.Has your exhusband always been in full time employment 7
20.Did you have any specific problems over money. What were these 7
21.Do you feel that during the period you lived together he was as far as
possible a responsible financial provider for the children ?
MOTHERHOOD
22.Had you planned to have children 7
23, What was your experience of being a mother 7
24.Did you have any leisure time away from your home and family?
If so, what did you do1
 For how long. E.g. 1 afternoon,
1 evening a week, etc.
Did you have any transport of your own ?
Did you live on a good bus route 7
25.Did your exhusband ever go out alone, how often ?
26.Did you go out together regularly 7 If yes, how often 7
. How would you describe your marriage ?
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D. DETAILS OF EVENTS LEADING UP ¶10 SEPARATION
, CONTACTING A SOLICITOR
j. Did you have a solicitor at the time you separated ?
32. How did you go about finding one ?













34.Had you heard of any of these groups P
35.Do you think you might have contacted one if you had known they might
have been able to advise you ?
36.What did you want when you first went to see a solicitor ?
37.Was lesbianism an issue then (even if your husband didri' t know)?
38.If yes, did you tell the solicitor ?
Why P
39.Can you describe' your first visit, how you felt, what did you tell h/her ?
O. What was the response ?
4. Did you contact more than one solicitor ?
Did you ever consider doing so P
Did you ask if they had any special expertise that would be helpful
in handling your particular case?
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43.Did you ask if they had any doubts about lesicn mothers raising children ?
44.Were you aware that lesbianism would be an important issue for the
courts in deciding custody ?
45.How did you find out ?
46.Were you aware at that stage of whether any special strategy problems
would be involved. For example, whether to deny or admit that accusation ?
47.Did you have any support during your visits to the solicitor, if so, who ?
48.If no, would you have liked someone to have gone with you. Why ?
49.Did you always understand what your solicitor was doing ?
50.Did h/she explain things to you ?
51.Did you ask, when in doubt ?
52.Did he/she keep you well informed of progress ?
53.Did he/she consult you before making any decisions ?
'54. How would you describe your visi;ts to the solicitor's office ?
55. If lesbianism was an issue, what was the solicitor's initial advice
or opinion of your chances of getting what. you wanted ?.
4-
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56. Did that opinion change during the course of your case ?
57. When and how did that change occur ?
58. Did he/she ever suggest you change your application ?
If so, at what stage
and what was your response
59. Did you ever consider changing your solicitor ?
Why ?
What happened ?
60. Did you receive legal aid ?
Did you make a contribution ?
61. Did your solicitor discuss h/her choice of barrister with you ?
62. Did you meet the barrister prior to the hearing ?
63. How did that meeting go ?
64. Did you ask the barrister whether h/she had any experience of
lesiban custody cases ?
65. Would you have liked to ?
66. Did you have any affidavits supporting your case ?
67. Did you think of having any ?
	 Who ?
68. Did your solicitor suggest it ?
	 Did you ?
'4.
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69. Did your husband have' any? 	 Who ?
io. During the period leading up to the hearing was there any noticeable
change in your husband's relationship with the children ?
If yes, what form did that take ?
e.g. quality of care/practical care! more/less contact.
71. Do you know what the children's responses were ?
72. Did your relationship with the children change in any way ?
How 7
Why do you think that was ?
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F. WELFARE REPORTS
73. Had the social services ever been involved with the family ?
If yes, can you tell me about the circumstances ?
74. Was there a Welfare Report on the children for the custody dispute ?
75. Did the Court Welfare Officer visit you ?
For how long did you talk ?
76. Did h/she know or ask if you were a lesbian ?
77. Did the Court Welfare Officer ask to see your sleeping arrangements ?
If yes, did you agree ?
	 Why ?
If no, did you offer ?
	
Why ?
78. Did the officer see or speak to anyone else with whom you were living ?
79. Did h/she interview the children ?
If yes, alone ?
How long roughly did the interview last ?
80. did h/she interview your husband ?
81. Did h/she interview anyone in his household who would be partly or
wholly responsible for the childrenM.ilJhe gain custody ?
82. Did you see the Report which was produced ?
83. What was your response ?
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84. Did you have any expert witnesses to speak on your behalf ?
If yes, who and how was that received in court ?
If not, was it ever suggested, would you have wished to use one
had you known it was possible ?
85. Would you have wanted someone to testify that your sexual choice






	 Judge Regis tratar?
88. What were your living arrangements at that time ?
89. Had they changed since the separation ?
90. Had they changed since the visit of the Court Welfare Officer ?
91. Had your husband's circumstances changed in any way ?
92. Can you describe what happened
Were you cross-examined on the content of the social enquiry report ?
Were you given any opportunity to answer any allegations in it ?
Was the Welfare Officer present in court ?
How were witnesses (if any) treated ?
Expert witnesses ?
Did the judge make any comment ?
If applicable
Was your lover in court ?
If yes, at whose suggestion , was she cross-examined ?
If yes, how did that go ?
If no, do you think on reflection she should have been ?
Why ?
93. What aspects of your husband's role came under scrutiny ?
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94. Was his past record as financial provider examined ?
95. Did you give any thought to what you were going to say, or how you
should 'appear' ?
96. How long did the hearing last ?
97. When you went into court, what did you feel your chances were about
getting custody ?
98. Did they change during the hearing 7
99. What was the decision ?
100. Did the judge make any comment 7
101. Did hJs. issue his sumiing up - do you have a copy 7
102. What was your solicitor/barrister's response ?
103. Did you want to appeal ?
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fi	 AWARD/ACCESS ARRANGEMENTS
104.What are your living arrangements now ?
105.What are your husband's living arrangements ?
106.Is he employed ?






Arrangements for pick up
108.ACCESS: Working ?






110.How has this affected your relationship with the children ?
111.If applicable: how much have you and/or your husband told them ?
= 309 -
I. MOTHERS' OPINIONS
112. Why do you think you lost your children ?
113. Do you think it is possible to talk of a lesbian lifestyle ?
1. How would you depict such a lifestyle ?
2. How is that different from the way in which you previously
lived ?
To what do you attribute this change ?




4. Did your solicitor ask you questions about your lifestyle ?
114. Do you think your children's development would or could be affected ?
1. Their psycho-sexual development
2 Their emotional development
115.. In what way could your choice of partner affect your children ?
1. Negatively
2. Positively
116.Has this case changed in any way how you see your role as a mother ?
117.Do you think the issue of your sexuality is relevant to determining
your role as a mother ?
Are they completely separate, partly linked and if so, how ?
Why do you think it is seen as important ?
Does one in any way affect the othe. ?
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APPENDIX III
LESBIAN MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN
CORE SAMPLE - INTERVIEW SCHEDULE, APPENDIX II
The first ten mothers listed overleaf (page 311 )
provide the core sample of the research documented in
Part III.
	
The mothers were interviewed using the
schedule attached under appendix II. In addition
to the information given in the (taped) interviews
many of these mothers had entire files containing the
documents relating to their custody case. 	 These in-
cluded affidavits, welfare reports and psychiatric
reports plus where appropriate, judges summings-up.
The other twelve mothers listed on page 285
provided information over a period of time relating
to their position.	 This information was provided
through letters, telephone converions and discussions










1 girl, 2 boys




















1 girl, 2 boys
1 boy, 2 girls





(B) Lesbian mothers and their children
Children :
LAURA KELLY
	 3.	 3 boys
MARY JAMES	 1	 1 boy
GILLIAM TAYLOR
	
2	 1 boy, 1 girl
JOANNE LAWLOR	 1	 1 boy
HELEN LONGMAN	 1	 1 girl
ELLEN BAILEY	 3	 3 boys
SALLY B HARRIS	 1	 1 by 3.
HELEN SHERWOOD	 2	 2 girls
CELIA WEBSTER	 2	 1 girl, 1 boy
BARBARA BENNETT	 1	 1 boy
MELANIE DALLY	 4	 3 boys, 1 girl
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